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Ontogeny of critical consciousness.

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ONTOGENY OF CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

A Dissertation Presented

by

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DEDICATION

To my parents, Rosa and Michail Mustakov, whose inner dignity and love of truth, unfailing generosity and caring have built me up and strengthened me through the years. To my husband, Earl Possardt, whose noble mind and heart and respect for life have been my guiding light through the latter part of this journey. To all the beautiful, courageous people who crossed my path and whose journeys spun webs in my heart. To my friends, those remarkable women who inspired me and whose inner light and endurance helped sustain me, to Vessela Markova, Terry Carlson, Nourieh Jalalzadeh, Janna Essig, Carol Rutstein, and all the others.

To my son, who tried me and forgave me again and again as we grew together. To those who survived through oppression and injustice and were able to keep their faith, and to those who did not make it. To all of you and to all of us.

O SON OF BEING!
Thy heart is My home; sanctify it for My descent. Thy spirit is My place of revelation; cleanse it for My manifestation.
(The Hidden Words, Baha'u'llah)

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ABSTRACT

ONTOGENY OF CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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This dissertation studies the generic construct of critical consciousness, defined as the kind of awareness characterized by the independent and interdependent investigation of truth and meaning, both internally and in one's social environment, which allows an individual to disembed from it, engage in a critical moral dialogue with it, and become a moral and caring agent for positive change in his/her social world.

The study subjects the broad phenomenon of CC to a rigorous empirical and developmental exegesis through descriptive accounts of the levels of its evolution in the life-span of interview subjects and secondary life histories from different cultural and historic contexts. It brings together Neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian understanding into an integrated model of the ontogeny of CC as an alternative, optimal developmental pathway of the evolving of adult social consciousness on the boundary of public and private.

This study has established three levels in the CC

pathway: Pre-CC, Conventional CC, and Postconventional CC. Each level is described in terms of a different range of tasks, concerns, and capabilities in their cross-cultural and socio-contextual variation.

Converging theoretical and empirical evidence supports the empirical claim that the centrality of authentic moral concerns in the formation of consciousness is independent of the level of operant structural development, although the moral motivational dimensions are continuously elaborated throughout development. Hence, the ontogeny of CC is described as the synergistic outcome of the on-going interplay between moral motivation and the composite structural development of consciousness.

The composite structural developmental component includes social-cognitive and ego development. Moral motivation is analyzed in terms of the interaction of four dimensions in the formation of personhood. They are: (1) the formation of a moral sense of identity and moral imperative; (2) the negotiation of external moral authority progressively internalized as moral responsibility and agency; (3) the formation of empathic and permeable relationships, and concerns with justice and not hurting, which grow into social consciousness; (4) the search for greater meaning in life than the individual self, which serves as a vantage point for self-reflection and critical examination of reality.

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

Introduction and Statement of the Problem

> The world is but one country,
> and mankind - its citizens.
> Baha'u'llah

This dissertation project takes up the study of a phenomenon which has been referred to as critical consciousness (CC). The term denotes the kind of awareness which allows individuals to disembed from their immediate cultural, social and political environment, and engage in a critical moral dialogue with it, defining and re-defining their own place in society. This awareness represents an important human faculty, and although there have been philosophical attempts to describe the phenomenon of CC, it has not been the object of consistent psychological developmental study.

I see the reason for this neglect as two-fold. On the one hand, CC has been defined in broad philosophical terms and described in isolation from available psychological theories. On the other hand, psychological theory itself has not been able to integrate the various dimensions of human awareness into a noetic theory of the evolution of consciousness (Wade, 1996). This inability of psychology to adopt a noetic approach, i.e. one that focuses on the overall unfolding of mind and consciousness in the way philosophy, religion and other noetic fields do, is related

to the lack of an interdisciplinary paradigm within which such an integrated discussion of consciousness would be possible (Wade, 1996). This, I believe, accounts for the split I encountered between the insights on CC offered by philosophy, and current psychological understanding. It made the study of a phenomenon such as critical consciousness from a psychological perspective a daunting and somewhat suspect task.

My work on CC is distinctive in the way it links moral, as well as broader social and historical considerations with the evolution of individual consciousness. I approach CC as an interdisciplinary construct the study of which is inextricably tied to our current historical context of slow and painful emergence as a global society with global forms of governance and understanding.

In studying CC, I ask two orders of questions. The first order questions focus on evolving an adequate psychological definition of the broad phenomenon of CC, and beginning to subject it to a more rigorous empirical and developmental exegesis through descriptive accounts of the levels of its evolution in the life-span. In undertaking these questions, I examine the historical and cultural variability, as well as the generic cross-cultural existence and developmental characteristics of the construct of CC. The second order of questions refer to the place of the psychological understanding of CC with relation to current

historical macro-discourses and other noetic fields such as religion, philosophy, etc. The main focus of the dissertation is on the first order questions, in the examination of which some conclusions will be drawn in the last chapter regarding the second order questions.

My thinking about the construct of critical consciousness began inductively, through trying to organize and name my personal experience and observations around questions of social responsibility and citizenship while living and working in several different societies and cultures: Bulgaria, Libya, The United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and the US.

In Bulgaria, I taught and observed closely adults who seemed to feel that in order to survive, they had to accept the norms of a deeply corrupt social and political system, whose requirements contradicted basic common sense and morality. Few were the independent thinkers who questioned the prevailing absurdity, and drew parallels between communism and the Nazi regime. Few bothered to question what made this system's 50 years of existence possible in the first place. The majority adapted to it to the degree that the system's destructive requirements became the norm, profoundly undermining the fabric of social life and collective moral standards. Those who resisted, primarily from the so-called intelligentsia, eagerly and earnestly sought ways to educate their minds and hearts, in order to

overcome the fear and powerlessness, and gain a sense of agency amidst inimical social conditions.

In my travels, it appeared to me that the spirit of the majority of East Europeans was simply crushed by the iron fist in comparison with the freedom of the Western world. However, I lived in Libya, travelled through Europe, lived and worked in The United Arab Emirates, and finally in newly liberated Zimbabwe, where I taught at a Teacher Training College. In these different contexts, I began to encounter disturbing similarities with the limited understanding of citizenship in my home environment. I saw various expressions of compartmentalized or limited social responsibility. In Zimbabwe, where my work was the most socially involved, I witnessed the uncritical naivete with which the communist ideas were embraced by intelligent people as a seeming panacea, regardless of the historical experience of the whole Eastern bloc. Here again people were compartmentalizing social reality from historical experience and allowing themselves to be submerged into the present.

In 1990 I came to the US, the place that East Europeans most frequently associate with the idea of freedom. I soon found out that freedom is a relative thing. American society also turned out to be embedded in mass myths, only different, more advanced and attractive ones. I realized that, just as anywhere else, U.S. citizens are subjected to mindless indoctrination and gradual disempowerment. The

homeland of democracy has turned into an alienated, compartmentalized, consumer society which subtly entices people to remain locked in a limited reality, while believing that it represents the peak of civilization.

Hence, I arrived at the construct of CC as I confronted the chasm in these societies that separated people who were willing to adapt to an unjust or morally questionable social reality and make the best of it, from those who seemed able to resist the forces drawing them into collusion with the system. I saw sophisticated and unsophisticated, educated and not so well educated people in both camps. The people who resisted seemed to rely on moral frames of reference which took precedence over social reality. Their inner power, and their tendency to question, seemed to come from a loyalty to a greater humanity, and an internal deeply held moral core.

The question I started asking was: how did these people arrive at this place? In what way and under what influences was their way of being constructed so differently? What role did formal and other kinds of education play, and what kind of education, offered by whom? How did social forces, family, educational, institutional, political, and spiritual, interplay with their internal construction of reality in a way that generated the ultimately liberating capacity these people showed to engage in a dialogue with reality? Since there were poor and marginalized people in

both camps, it was clearly not all about what the political and social system was doing to them; there was also a difference in how they were equipped to deal with unjust and oppressive social reality.

On the other hand, in the people who adapted to social injustice, I observed a common pattern: a tendency to compartmentalize socio-cultural reality, to act as though they do not see meaningful interconnections between the different aspects of their lives. People seem to ask few critical questions. They remain generally disengaged from the needs of humanity at large, consumed with their immediate reality and the needs of a close circle of others. They tend to take limited socio-cultural realities for absolutes, and have difficulty taking a perspective on the larger system that sustains individuals and examining it critically.

The questions I was pondering clearly were related to existing concepts such as: **integrity**, **critical discernment**, **empathy**, **permeability**, **motivation**, **prosocial behavior**, **moral commitment**, **social responsibility**, **agency**. Yet, none of these concepts by themselves could explain the phenomenon I was observing, which seemed to occur on the boundary of public and private, and to characterize adult functioning in the larger social world.

Freire (1973) described the phenomenon of CC within the context of the struggle to liberate the Brazilian peasants

from the oppression of illiteracy, fatalism, and military dictatorship. His work sheds light on some obvious societal factors that inhibit the development of CC, and challenge people in less developed countries - poverty, oppressive regimes and cultures, economic dependence. However, Freire's understanding of the phenomenon of CC far outgrows the specific context of the closed Brazilian society within which the concept was born. This concept appears to be directly applicable to modern Western society - a belief which spurs this study.

A critically conscious dialogical relationship with one's environment does not seem any easier to develop in the relatively open and democratic Western societies, where universal education and information are available to the majority of people. The forces which inhibit the evolving of a liberated, CC way of being are subtler but no less powerful. Fromm's (1989) critical social analysis suggests that in the large information societies of the West, mass media, advertizing, ideologies, and politics on every level have greatly shrunk the personal space where the individual's standing in the world is negotiated. With almost every aspect of life subject to public scrutiny and powerful business and political interests, people are not really free, but disempowered. Although, to all appearances, the individual has more rights, or can at least talk about

them, ego-strength is undermined by forces of massification and indoctrination.

On the other hand, it takes a strong and grounded individual to be able to negotiate successfully the worldwide information flow and the ever-expanding radius of our social world. Many people experience this globalization as intimidating. More than ever before, people in this century are struggling to define their place and their lives in relation not just to a single immediate community, but to complex, impersonal and often perplexing national and international forces.

Hence, in different parts of the world, people struggle with different aspects of socio-political and international realities, which leave them feeling crushed and voiceless, or overwhelmed and defensive. The tendency is, then, to delegate responsibility for the central issues in their lives to external sources of authority - state laws, political parties, organizations, trends, public pressure, or just fate, the way things are. Under such circumstances, it seems natural to isolate oneself in the domain of private life where one can feel a measure of control, and to limit one's sense of relatedness to immediate others. The split between public and private life becomes increasingly greater.

This project focuses in particular on the split between public and private life in the Westernized world. It has

been expressed in a number of different phenomena described by social critics. For example, in the US context, the idea of work as calling has become a more and more outdated phenomenon, replaced increasingly by work as career (Bellah et al, 1985, p. 69). "Lifestyle enclaves" begin to replace interdependent and all-inclusive communities (Bellah et al, p. 72). Lifelong commitments, transcending lifestyles and the sectoral organization of life, become harder and harder to come by (Bellah et al, pp. 72-74). This combination of precarious relatedness coupled with a utilitarian and morally relativistic approach, which dominates the Western world, increasingly infiltrates the less developed countries as a mistaken symbol of progress and advanced thinking. Centuries-old bonds of interrelatedness are breaking and new ones are hard to formulate.

The importance of the generic study of critical consciousness and socially responsible citizenship is best understood in view of the contemporary challenge to define a historically responsible personal space and personal path in relation to an ever-expanding social world. This challenge to the individual is now much greater than ever before in history. The First International Dialogue on the Transition to a Global Society, held at the Landegg Academy in Switzerland in 1990 under the auspices of UNESCO, pointed to "the apparent chaos of the world around us" (p. 3), and the variety of imbalances that various societies exhibit in the

relations between the three main sectors in every society: economic order, socio-political order and spiritual order. Western societies in the main were viewed as obsessed with economic development, with rampant materialism overshadowing the socio-political and spiritual orders. Eastern European societies were regarded as representing the collapse of societies as a result of the dominance of the socio-political order over both spiritual and economic orders; while some countries in the Muslim world "serve to demonstrate societal dissonance... because of the marked dominance of the spiritual order" (p. 47). "Certain African societies illustrate what happens when none of the sectors makes an adequate contribution to the societal whole" (p. 47).

As we are moving steadily toward internationalization of the planet, people face correspondingly greater complexities, ambiguities, and responsibilities. Most of us are not ready for this transition; we are searching in our own ways (some of those ways have been movingly described by social critics like Wuthnow, 1991; Bellah et al, 1985); and we are held back by old traditions of thought. Frightening as it is, changes are happening fast. As Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, points out:

> There are good reasons for suggesting that the modern age has ended. Many things indicate that we are going through a transitional period, when it seems that something is on the way out and something else is painfully being born. It is as if something were crumbling, decaying and

> exhausting itself, while something else, still indistinct, was arising from the rubble (The New York Times, July 8, 1994).

In this context of a painfully emerging global society, which is being negotiated in every person's individual life, the role of individual critical consciousness becomes significant. The study of CC allows us to understand how people make sense of, relate personally to, and influence larger social reality as they progress through the life-span, and what allows them to become moral and caring agents in their social world.

General Research Question and Purpose of the Study

This study takes up the Freirean concept of critical consciousness and redefines it as an integrative psychological construct. It brings together three main bodies of research, psychological, philosophical, and sociological, which shed light on the phenomenon of CC. The purpose is to develop an integrated definition of the construct, define its main components and the dimensions along which they evolve, and offer descriptive accounts of the levels of the life-long transformations of CC. I also highlight some speculative observations regarding the possible conditions for the emergence of CC, the exploration of which awaits further research.

The central research question concerned the nature of adult social consciousness which occurs on the boundary of

public and private, and is characterized by engagement in a liberating, meaningful dialogue with the present and future of one's world, and resistance to the forces of collusion with an unjust status quo. CC is characterized by an active negotiation of the set of social relations in which an individual finds her/himself from the point of view of preeminently moral frames of reference. CC involves a particular kind of internal conversation: one that is aware of contradictions between reality and a vision of how things can be, asks critical questions, yet remains open, permeable, and connected with reality. It is a moral conversation spurred by the quest for truth and justice. CC also involves actual choices and decisions resulting from this ongoing internal conversation. In other words, individuals, while in the here and now, have concerns that go beyond the immediate realm, and lead them in the direction of moral agency, moral commitment, social responsibility and responsible citizenship.

In the above sense, CC is an important aspect of the social structure of personality. The construct of CC focuses on both the formation of adult social consciousness under the shaping influence of various socio-historical forces, and the way this consciousness operates in the social world. I.e., the construct describes the **ontogenesis of self as a socio-historical construction** and the **active operation of self on social reality** (Mustakova-Possardt, 1995a).

This study approaches the above two aspects of CC somewhat differently. It examines a large body of literatures, and deductively establishes some converging preliminary understanding of the formation of adult social consciousness and its main dimensions. It offers empirical descriptions of the way this social consciousness operates on social reality at different levels of its evolution. It also offers non-definitive empirical observations on possible connections between ways of operating and circumstances of the formation of social consciousness.

The construct of CC provides a normative interdisciplinary framework for the understanding of community, national, and global citizenship. It brings current thinking on moral and social values, community, social responsibility, moral commitment into a single phenomenon. Freire understood CC as the praxis of empowerment. Other research in the Freirean tradition (Bembow, 1994), studies as examples of a critically conscious approach to reality individuals' commitment to radical social change in a number of ways:

* the struggle against racial, ethnic, or religious oppression
* the struggle against gender and/or sexual oppresion
* the struggle against class oppression and/or poverty, hunger, and other forms of economically based oppression

* struggle against political oppression
* the struggle against ecological and environmental destruction of the earth and its atmosphere
* the struggle for unity and peace on the planet.

The current study focuses on the generic emergence of CC as representing *the emerging capacity of individuals to emancipate themselves from embeddedness in their economic, social, and cultural contexts and to begin to consciously re-evaluate and reinterpret their relationships with their culture, socio-political world and historic age*. The life-long transformations in CC represent *the qualitative transformations in consciousness which allow individuals to conceptualize the need for social change and to act toward it*. In the course of these transformations CC gives rise to *a particular sense of moral identity tied to a sense of history and socio-cultural contexts*.

In studying CC, I attempt to understand how it manifests itself on different levels of reality: cultural, social, political, historical, spiritual. I use the term culture to refer to the customs, traditions, and ways of being of a particular group (ethnic or other). The term social is often used to refer to interpersonal phenomena, but I use it to refer to the characteristics of the social system within which the individual functions, as they get expressed in that particular culture. The political dimension is probably the most obvious manifestation of

social realities, and therefore the one usually associated with critical consciousness. However, although political activism may be a manifestation of critical consciousness, it is not what necessarily sums it up. Rather, the important element is the effort to understand socio-political realities and place them, and one's own relation to them, in perspective. I see the historical dimension as the most fundamental one, because it is the historical perspective on social reality, i.e. the ability to connect present with past and future, which allows disembedding from immediate realities and their critical understanding. Since the historical dimension appears to be the most complex one, it seems that it will be a later development in the increasing complexity of critical consciousness. The spiritual dimension informs all the other dimension of reality, and, I believe, colors the way they will be understood and related to.

I approach CC as a developmental phenomenon. I believe that different levels of CC will manifest different understanding of the social world and one's place in it, with a general developmental tendency toward expanding circles of inclusive concerns. At the earlier levels, CC is likely to be expressed in fairly straightforward concerns with social justice and personal commitment. At later levels it will develop into progressively broader integrated visions of society, history, and world transformations.

Significance of the Study

I see this study as basic research, attempting to contribute to our understanding of people's ways of being in the social world. Freire (1973) named the phenomenon of critical consciousness (CC) and built a social movement for literacy and empowerment around it. There have been philosophical attempts to describe the phenomenon (Marcuse, 1989a,b,c,d; Fromm, 1959, 1989; Jung, 1933; Jung in Progoff, 1973; Kirkegaard in Webb, 1988), as well as phenomenological studies (Bembow, 1994), and applied psychological studies of some of its aspects (Walker, 1995). In spite of the existence of a diverse body of literatures which bear directly on the phenomenon of CC, and the particular relevance of Neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian developmental approaches (Kohlberg, 1984; Wertsch, 1985), the phenomenon of CC has not been the object of generic psychological developmental study.

I redefine CC as an individual developmental construct, and develop its descriptive and explanatory value as one of the several hypothetical constructs (such as altruism and prosocial behavior) in social science which describe how individuals understand and relate to larger social forces. My study of CC unites two different theoretical developmental approaches: a macro-developmental evolutionary socio-historical approach, and a micro-developmental structural approach.

This dissertation focuses on the micro-developmental analysis. However, if we were to take for a moment the macro-developmental approach, which will be taken up again in the last chapter, the study of how people's thinking about the social world undergoes progressive reorganization with the evolving knowledge of social configurations and patterns, and the evolving understanding of one's relatedness to them, indicates that CC is an aspect of social intelligence. I believe that CC lies at the core of the kind of intelligence that will allow us to survive and develop as a social species. Russian-born, University of Kiev genetics professor Theodosius Dobzhansky, member of the US National Academy of Sciences and foreign member of the Danish, Swedish, and Brazilian academies of sciences, points to the "appallingly myopic" character of evolution unless counterbalanced by its off-spring, intelligence (Maslow, 1959, p. 76).

> At any given time it [evolution] tends to make the species successful in the environment which prevails at that particular time, quite regardless of the future needs. Hence the apparent paradox: living species change almost always in the direction of a greater adaptedness, and yet most of them end sooner or later by becoming extinct (p. 76).

This analysis is disquietingly reminiscent of some of the worst fears of our own civilization. Not only is our myopic adaptation to our most immediate circumstances threatening to lead us to an all-destructive war, but we are

also becoming a threat to the very ecological environment that sustains us.

In summary, I see the macro-developmental significance of the phenomenon of CC as the evolutionary antidote of myopic adaptation in the human species. As an aspect of social intelligence, CC makes possible adaptation to a rapidly changing social environment, not just the way it is but the way it needs to become. In this sense, the capacity for CC liberates the individual from the narrowly adaptive lock of the present, and allows him/her to live with one foot in the future, actively transforming that present into a better future. Therefore, part of my macro-developmental approach to the study of CC consists in bringing in a broader Vygotskian understanding of specific historical contexts. As Dobzhansky says, "human nature cannot be adequately understood except as a product of its historical development" (Maslow, 1959, p. 76).

In order to study CC, I pursued a micro-oriented developmental approach which integrates Vygotskian and Piagetian developmental perspectives with the understanding of socialization offered by social psychology and critical theory. Neo-Piagetian structural developmental theory seems to contain the potential for such an integrated approach, because it offers a broad vision of a unified process of personal development, embracing a wide range of individual contextual variability.

Hence, as basic research, my inquiry into CC defines a new construct, which bridges the gap between the structural-developmental understanding of personality and the understanding of socialization offered by critical social theory and post-modern thought. It opens the door for a broad range of new research into aspects of human social consciousness.

However, I see the greatest value of this study in its potential implications for educational and social practice. Although CC will probably have different manifestations in different parts of the world, in different contexts, this construct bears directly on choices and degrees of individual agency and responsibility. Understanding the potential for individual CC bears directly on creating the kinds of educational, social and international institutions which can foster individual empowerment and global understanding. This study will begin to speculate on important applied questions, such as how to educate for CC, what kind of educational and social institutions hinder or facilitate its development, what kind of spiritual and moral environments foster CC.

Role of the Researcher

In undertaking this study, I need to be explicit about my personal frame of reference and passion which underlie this work. I come to developmental research through a back

door similar to the ones described by W. Perry and R. Kegan; i.e. through a hermeneutical quest through world literature and philosophy in an effort to understand what it means to be human. My personal history as a white woman growing up in a politically and socially repressive and deeply sexist totalitarian communist society, and in a family distrusted and marginalized by the regime, has a lot to do with my efforts to understand how people can overcome fear and powerlessness, gain a sense of agency amidst inimical social conditions, and become life-long devotees to the search for truth and justice.

Through my personal journey, I discovered what Kegan (1982) identifies as the larger context of his study of The Evolving Self. In his prologue he writes: "Psychology asks fundamental questions about being human; the examination is metaphysical" (p. 1). The more I have delved into developmental psychology to try to find answers to the questions that move me, the more I have become aware of the metaphysical dimensions of this quest. In 1992, two years after this research had formally begun, and after a life-long journey as a self-defined enlightened agnostic, I began to discover the hermeneutical power and macro-developmental vision of the Baha'i spiritual paradigm. It has a distinctive unique perspective on the current process of globalization; it teaches that humanity has so far gone through its stages of collective infancy and childhood; and

that the modern age reflects the historical process of humanity emerging from its turbulent adolescence, and slowly and painstakingly entering its age of collective maturity. A close examination of the current historical processes does indeed reveal the characteristics which we know from developmental psychology as specific to each of those stages in the individual life-span.

This macro-developmental Baha'i approach to the evolution of human civilization helps me see in a new light the challenge of understanding the phenomenon of CC and implementing that understanding into our current social and educational institutions. I believe that the majority of people have always had difficulty in recognizing the socially-constructed nature of socio-cultural reality, establishing interconnections, and a sense of agency in their own socio-cultural experience precisely because CC is an accomplishment of adult development. Since human civilization has so far been negotiating earlier stages in its collective development, CC has been more an exception than a norm. However, as we move toward collective maturity, the developmental conditions for its collective emergence become ripe, which makes its study all the more pressing.

I believe that this work on CC reflects on the level of individual developmental psychology the ongoing "reexamination of the attitudes and assumptions that currently underlie approaches to social and economic

development" (The Prosperity of Humankind, 1995, p. 2). The social sciences have recently intensified their attention to issues related to moral and social values, community, social responsibility, moral commitment, and the nature of knowledge, in search of an interdisciplinary paradigm from which to approach these burning questions. In developmental psychology so far we have gained understanding of how various dimensions develop and mature in the life-span. We know a lot about cognitive development, perspective taking, emotional and epistemological development, etc. We are now facing the question how all these dimensions come together in a mature individual; what cross-domain phenomena unite them. Colby and Damon (1992) talk about "a mature individualism" which "implies fully articulated links with others and with society as a whole" (p. 297). I see CC as one of those unitary cross-domain phenomena which can help us understand mature individualism.

Specific Research Questions

This inquiry attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the main components of CC and what are the criteria for the emergence of CC? Along what dimensions does it evolve, and what is the course of its evolution through the life-span?

2. What are the characteristics of the qualitative transformations in consciousness which allow individuals to experience and conceptualize progressively more adequately the need for social change? What are the particular concerns specific to each qualitative transformation? How does the individual negotiate his/her social environment differently at each level of transformation? What forms do social responsibility and moral commitment take at each level? What are the characteristics of the language used to describe them? What are the achievements and limitations of each transformation?

3. What might be the important conditions for the formation of CC? What is the role of family environment and socio-historical context in the emergence and progressive elaboration of CC? Are there multiple developmental pathways?

4. How does CC differ from other forms of consciousness; is it a different phenomenon or is it on the same continuum of noetic development?

In order to begin to answer these questions, this inquiry will be based on an interplay between primary and secondary empirical data, and theoretical understanding gained from the relevant bodies of literature.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of the following review of related literatures is to provide a context for the understanding of the construct of CC. As it was pointed out in chapter 1, the focus of this work on the psychological study of consciousness creates a problem since psychological approaches usually focus on specific dimensions of consciousness, and have not yet agreed on an integrated psychological understanding of the noetic development of consciousness, nor on the paradigm within which it can most adequately be explored (Wade, 1996). The concept of critical consciousness poses a second order of difficulties in terms of understanding what a critical awareness would mean in the context of psychological and other types of discourses. Hence, there are a number of procedural questions involved in choosing a literature review.

I chose as my primary source Freire's work on CC and the writings of critical theorists who focus on critical social understanding. The second body of literatures I examine is that of postmodern philosophical and sociological thought which deconstruct current cultural resources in terms of the challenges they pose to individual awareness. The third body of literatures is the theoretical and empirical research in moral psychology which sheds light on CC as a fundamentally moral phenomenon. The fourth body of

literatures I examine is that on social activism, since critical consciousness is expressed in being a moral and caring agent for positive change in one's world. The fifth frame of reference is developmental theory as it elucidates the evolution of the dimensions of consciousness. Table 2.1 below summarizes the way I draw on the above bodies of literature.

Table 2.1

Bodies of Literature Which Contribute to the CC Construct

Freire and The Critical Theorists	
1. Freire:	Defines phenomenon and its main characteristics in the context of developing countries. Describes in broad terms the movement of social consciousness toward CC.
2. Critical Theorists: (Marcuse, Adorno, Fromm, Horkheimer)	Describe the socio-historical forces in the Western world which influence the formation of social consciousness (mechanisms of political integration in postliberal societies; forms of familial socialization and ego development; the role of mass media and mass culture).
Postmodern Philosophical And Sociological Thought	
1. Social Critics (Bellah et al, Wuthnow)	Sociological analysis of American culture as it shapes consciousness, community life, values and the ability for compassion.
2. Postmodern Thought (constructionism, feminism, poststructuralism)	Deconstructs culture and its grip on consciousness through the concepts of dereification, hegemony, and power/knowledge networks.
Moral Psychology	

Continued next page

Table 2.1, continued

1. Development of Moral Judgement	Describes the evolution of morality through the changing relationship of the individual to his/her social milieu, and through a gradually widening social radius and the overcoming of cognitive provincialism.
2. Development of Empathy and Prosocial Behavior	Describes the motivational source of moral actions and emotional allegiances to a larger humanity as well as the development of internal moral orientation and moral self-attribution through specific childrearing practices and forms of socialization.
3. Empirical Studies of Moral Exemplars	Describe the growth processes which transform early moral awareness into life-long moral commitments (developmental transformation of goals, active receptiveness), as well as the unique characteristics which sustain exemplary people (unfailing certainty, faith and positivity). Shed light on habitual morality and the formation of a sense of self with a moral center. Identify important personal characteristics and interpersonal styles which promote moral development.
4. Research on Values (ontological and humanistic approaches)	Differentiates between historical society- and culture-specific and ultimate values derived from the Ground of Being and the totality of the human experience. Study ultimate values (creative love, service to humanity, differentiation of ends and means, self-actualization and self-transcendence) as the concomitants of freedom.

Studies of Social Activists

Continued next page

Table 2.1, continued

1. Phenomenological Case Studies	Describe the unplanned, synchronistic nature of becoming a social activist, the experience of being on a spiritual path, and the role of fundamental moral values in this path.
2. Generational Theories of Motivation For Social Change	Explain social change with the conflict between generations or the outcome of the new historical consciousness of generational cohorts and units, and socio-economic class.
3. Personality and Development Studies	Identify relationships between levels of moral reasoning and radical activism, as well as personality characteristics most often associated with conservative and progressive socio-political views.
Developmental Models	
1. Social-Cognitive Development (Weinstein & Alschuler, Commons et al)	Describes the cognitive microsteps in the progressive complexity of how we make sense of social situations and our place and role in them.
2. Epistemological Development (Perry, Kitchener & King)	Describes the progression from dualistic through multiplistic reasoning to contextual relativism, as well as the accompanying progressive sets of assumptions about knowledge as they bear upon critical thinking.
3. Ego Development (Kegan, Cook-Greuter)	Describes the evolution through self/other distinctions and the accompanying sequence of emotional, motivational, and psychodynamic organizations which allow progressive disembedding from one's social environment and entering into relationships with the world.
4. Noetic Development (Wade)	Describes the overall evolution of consciousness as a unified structure without reducing it to its separate dimensions.

The Literature on Critical Social Analysis

Freire and the CC Construct

The first context within which I examined CC was Freire's work, from which I adopted the term CC itself. The Brazilian educator Paolo Freire (1973) named the phenomenon of critical consciousness and developed an approach to it from the perspective of the praxis of empowerment of oppressed social groups. He believed that "one can only know to the extent that one `problematizes' the natural, cultural and historical reality in which s/he is immersed" (p. ix). He called this capacity critical consciousness, differentiating it from the technocrat's "problem-solving" stance (p. ix).

In order to understand what Freire meant by CC, one needs to understand how he defines consciousness and critical. **Consciousness**, he wrote, **is characterized by "intentionality towards the world"** (p. 146); i.e. **the experience of the "world as an objective reality, independent of oneself, capable of being known"** (p. 3). In this process of knowing the world, the human being engages in relationships with the world.

> To be human is to engage in relationships with others and with the world.... Animals, submerged within reality, cannot relate to it; they are creatures of mere contact. But man's separateness from and openness to the world distinguishes him as a being of relationships (p. 3).

All human beings are in some "relation to reality" which "results in knowledge", regardless of "whether or not they are literate", and even if this "knowledge is mere opinion" (p. 43). This **knowledge becomes critical to the degree to which causality is apprehended.**

> The more accurately men grasp true causality, the more critical their understanding of reality will be. Their understanding will be magical to the degree that they fail to grasp causality. Further, critical consciousness always submits that causality to analysis; what is true today may not be so tomorrow (p.44).

Freire (1973) understood this type of consciousness in broad developmental terms, as a cognitive disembedding from reality passing through three or four stages. He describes early social consciousness as "semi-intransitive", characterized by a sphere of perceptions limited to biological necessities and lacking "a sense of life on a more historical plane" (p. 17). Since perceptions are "impermeable" to other than biological challenges, there is "a near disengagement between men and their existence"; "discernment is difficult", and people "fall prey to magical explanations because they cannot apprehend true causality" (p. 17).

> Magic consciousness... simply apprehends facts and attributes to them a superior power by which it is controlled and to which it must therefore submit. Magic consciousness is characterized by fatalism (p. 44).

Gradually, horizons expand but responses still have a magical quality, which marks the "naive transitive

consciousness". Freire describes naive transitive consciousness as characterized

> by an over-simplification of problems; by a nostalgia for the past; by underestimation of the common man; by a strong tendency to gregariousness; ... by fragility of argument; by a strongly emotional style; by the practice of polemics rather than dialogue (p. 18).
>
> Naive consciousness sees causality as a static, established fact, and thus is deceived in its perception (p. 44).

Further development depends on two conflicting tendencies: the tendency (1) to adapt to social reality, and (2) to inquire into its contradictions and integrate them. To the degree that the tendency to adapt predominates, a massified, gregarious, mythical perception of social reality develops as a result of accepting ready myths and mass ways of thinking about the social world. Freire calls this "fanaticized consciousness", and he sees a close potential relationship between naive transitivity and massification, i.e. a tendency to be governed by mass understanding and mass ways. If the second tendency predominates, it involves what Freire calls a movement toward critical consciousness.

A key concept in Freire's definition of CC is **transitivity**. He even refers to CC as critically transitive consciousness. Here is how Freire explains transitivity:

> As men amplify their power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions arising in their context, and increase their capacity to enter into dialogue not only with other men but with their world, they become "transitive".... Transitivity of consciousness makes man "permeable". It leads

> him to replace his disengagement from existence with almost total engagement (p. 17).

An important component of Freire's definition of CC is disembedding from the lock of the present moment, gaining perspective on one's situation and its historical context, and taking responsibility for one's choices and actions. That is what he calls becoming a subject.

> Men relate to their world in a critical way....And in the act of critical perception, men discover their own temporality.... As men emerge from time, discover temporality and free themselves from "today", their relationships with the world become impregnated with consequence....As men create, re-create, and decide, historical epochs begin to take shape.... Whether or not men can perceive the epochal themes and above all, how they act upon the reality within which these themes are generated will largely determine their humanization or dehumanization, their affirmation as Subjects or their reduction as objects.... If men are unable to perceive critically the themes of their time, and thus to intervene actively in reality, they are carried along in the wake of change (p. 3-7).

The focus of Freire's work is not on describing in detail the movement from early forms of social consciousness to critical consciousness, but on the potential of education for CC and praxis to bring about large-scale social transformations. Freire arrived at the construct as he took up the creation of literacy programs for the Brazilian peasants, steeped in illiteracy, fatalism, and powerlessness under a military dictatorship. He set out to facilitate the process by which the peasants could begin to problematize their social settings in cultural circles.

> we must take the people at the point of emergence and, by helping them move from naive to critical transitivity, facilitate their intervention in the historical process (1973, pp. 44-45).

In developing the praxis of liberatory education, Freire's central concept, stemming from the very definition of CC, is dialogue. I.e., if CC means people's ability to be engaged in a critical dialogue with reality, then the way to facilitate CC would be through engaging people who have capitulated to reality into a dialogue about reality. This is what distinguishes his understanding of true education from what he sees as prevailing educational methods, which he qualifies as "domestication" (52).

> Dialogue is an I-Thou relationship, and thus necessarily a relationship between two Subjects (p. 52).

Clearly, Freire's insightful understanding of the phenomenon of CC reaches far beyond the specific context of the closed Brazilian society within which the concept was born, and appears to be directly applicable to various social, cultural, and educational contexts.

Several components stand out in Freire's formulation of CC. First, it involves **critical analysis of causality in our relationships with specific aspects of reality**. Second, it is characterized by **permeability**, i.e. openness and receptivity to dialogue with others and with reality. Third, it involves **the responsibility of the human subject to grasp the historical themes of the time**, disembed from the present

and discover temporality. Fourth, it involves **conscious, responsible, and creative relationships with reality** in reconstructing it and joining the historical process. Fifth, it is **a way of knowing** which Freire considers the only true way of knowing.

These five components are fundamental to my definition of CC as well. The people in the encounter with whom my own thinking about CC took shape exhibited to some degree all five components of Freire's definition of CC. I saw also an explicit moral component which seems to be implicit in Freire's understanding. Freire's work suggests the following important points which I take up:

1. **The centrality of relationships and one's relatedness to the world in the concept of CC**. Freire directly relates the concept of CC with relationships, or one's relatedness to the world. This brings into focus the fact that as we begin to experience our separateness from the world around us, we also negotiate our relatedness to it, and the ground is set for the development of relationships. Hence, although we do not develop a fully differentiated sense of separate self, and therefore fully defined relationships, before mature adulthood, the negotiation of our relatedness with the world begins much earlier, in childhood. It would be important, then, to find out what events and factors in the personal history of people I interview might have influenced the

process of negotiating relatedness, and establishing relationships with their social environment later in life.

2. **The centrality of permeability to dynamic social interactions and change**. Freire sees people's varying permeability as a broad developmental tendency. However, he also notes the tendency in some people to develop "fanaticized" consciousness and become further impermeable to change toward CC. What are the micro-developmental factors, if any, and what other factors might influence this capacity for permeability? Is their any relationship between this tendency toward permeability and the inner moral frame of reference which I observed?

3. **The centrality of the understanding of causality**. Since the essential characteristic of CC is the ability to apprehend and analyze causality, that means that CC is an adult formal operational phenomenon which has at least some developmental characteristics that need to be further elucidated.

4. **The centrality of an expanding range of responsible relationships**. An important research question would be what people (from both primary and secondary case studies) stand in responsible relationships to? How much of the full human range of relationships with oneself, family, friends, nature, profession or calling, society, country, history, the world, God, is represented (consciously accounted for) in each individual's life story? How is that related to the

nature of the consciousness out of which the person operates? How do people define those relationships?

5. **The centrality of socio-historical perspective-taking**. Another important question is to what degree individuals exhibit a sense of perspective on their own historical context, and to what degree they seem embedded in the present? What are the developmental and non-developmental factors which play into this ability for perspective-taking?

6. **The centrality of agency and commitment**. Freire's distinctions between a human being as a subject or an object evoke specific developmental models, which I will discuss in a later section of this chapter. Freire sees committed behavior as rooted in CC and the capacity for genuine choice. It is important to understand where this capacity for genuine choice originates, and to what degree it is a purely developmental phenomenon.

7. **The possibility for adults to operate out of a level of social consciousness specific to childhood**. What Freire calls "semi-intransitive" and "naive transitive consciousness", one with a sphere of perceptions limited to biological necessities and impermeable to larger challenges, the other with expanded but magical horizons, are social-cognitive developments specific to childhood. It is important, then, to understand the factors that cause adults to operate at those levels.

Freire's treatment of CC as a fundamental human faculty on which one's place in the world depends, confirms my understanding of **CC as a potential evolutionary development.** My interest is in examining CC as an evolving structural progression within the context of social forces and education. The focus of my work is on understanding **the dynamic interplay between individual and environment, in which some individuals enter into a critical moral dialogue with their environment.** If seems to me that the life paths of people like Gandhi, Mother Teresa and contemporary activists and moral exemplars have something to tell us about the evolution of this adaptive faculty.

Table 2.2 below summarizes the important contrasts which Freire draws between CC and alternative, less developed forms of social consciousness, since my work builds on both those contrasts and some of the terms Freire uses to describe them.

Table 2.2

Freire's Description of Contrasts between CC and Less Developed Forms of Social Consciousness

CC	Alternative, less developed forms of social consciousness
knowing to the extent that one `problematizes' the natural, cultural and historical reality in which s/he is immersed	technocrat's **"problem-solving"** stance
consciousness: **intentionality towards the world**; i.e. **separateness from and openness to** the world, **engages in relationships**	creatures of **mere contact**
relation to reality results in knowledge: **critical understanding to the degree to which causality is apprehended**	**opinion, magical or naive understanding**: apprehends facts and attributes to them a superior power, or sees causality as static
sense of life on a more historical plane; discovery of temporality; relationships with the world impregnated with consequence; **total creative engagement** with reality	**perceptions impermeable** to other than biological challenges; **disengagement between men and their existence**; **discernment difficult**; narrow horizons (semi-intransitive consciousness)
tendency to **inquire into contradictions** in social reality and **integrate them**; **transitivity** (permeability): power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions arising in their context; enter into **dialogue**	tendency to adapt to social reality, accept ready myths and mass ways of thinking; over-simplifications of problems, gregariousness, fragility of argument, **polemics**, impermeability (naive consciousness & fanaticized consciousness)
human subjects	reduction to objects

Critical Theorists and the CC Construct

The Freirean (Shor & Freire, 1987) understanding of critical consciousness as empowerment through liberating education and piercing the veil of existing power relations masked as reality, is further elaborated by critical theorists. While Freire shed light on the phenomenon of CC in the socio-historical context of developing countries governed by authoritarian regimes, critical social theory explicates the socio-historical forces at play in the formation of social consciousness in the context of Western democracies. The parallel examination of both contexts reveals both the context-specific and the cross-cultural generalizability of CC as a developmental phenomenon.

I find critical theory particularly useful, because it offers a multidisciplinary approach to social analysis, "which combines perspectives drawn from political economy, sociology, cultural theory, philosophy, anthropology, and history" (Bronner & Kellner, 1989, p. 2). It overcomes the fragmentation of academic disciplines, as well as the relativistic or nihilistic tendencies of other contemporary approaches to social analysis, and offers a "normative social theory that seeks a connection with empirical analysis of the contemporary world" (p. 2). The term itself came into use in 1937, and the way it is defined below reveals an understanding of "critical" comparable to Freire's, i.e. involving examining causality in reality.

> In fact, critical theory is not a single doctrine or unified worldview. Instead, it is a set of basic insights and perspectives which undermine existing "truths" even as they foster the need for a theory of society that remains to be completed (Bronner & Kellner, 1989, p. 3).

In my analysis of CC, I draw on the following themes, examined by the critical theorists, which contribute to the understanding of the Western context. They subject to critical analysis:

a. "the mechanisms of political integration in postliberal societies";

b. "the forms of familial socialization and ego development";

c. "the role of mass media and mass culture" in the formation of consciousness; (Bronner & Kellner, 1989, p. 21);

More specifically, I rely on the work of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Max Horkheimer. From Horkheimer's (1989) work, I draw on his insightful analysis of the trap which modern consciousness has to negotiate in a market economy reliant on fear (e.g. fear of unemployment, of the inability to compete others, etc.). Horkheimer points to the atomizing and alienating impact of the consistent counterpoising of people's interests as a mechanism of political integration in a postliberal society. I recognized this institutionalized fear in both my US and my Bulgarian interviewees. Hence, I found Horkheimer's well-known summary of the parallels between the two socio-

political contexts very helpful: "Whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism" (p. 7).

However, Herbert Marcuse (1989a) was the one who provided what I see as the most comprehensive examination of advanced industrial societies, and in particular the US. He

> describes a universe in which technology and scientific rationality produce a new world of thought and behavior. Where thought had previously functioned to provide alternatives to the existing society, in the new technological universe, it exists merely to make the prevailing system more efficient and raise technical means over normative ends. Indeed, precisely because moral and critical ends lose their force, the dominant modes of thinking analyzed by Marcuse make individuals adapt to the existing order rather than foster their capacities for critical judgement (Bronner & Kellner, 1989, p. 9).

Marcuse saw the dominant rationality as repressing any values, aspirations, or ideas not in conformity with it. He described the ahistorical quality of industrial society, the **"atrophy of historical transcendence"** (p. 119), and the embeddedness of industrial society in the here-and-now of economic efficiency and profit. He pointed to the **"neutrality" and "instrumentality"** (p. 124) introduced by the new scientific method as forces of domination, causing a split in human consciousness and taking the place of **natural immediacy, wholesomeness and personal involvement**. He examines the flip side of the new scientific method which "destroyed the idea that the universe was ordered in relation to a goal, to a teleological structure" (p. 120),

and substituted for it the almost "metaphysical" universal applicability of scientific method and technology in the place of ontology.

Overall, Marcuse shows how economic conditions in an advanced industrial society are responsible for the social frameworks in which reality is organized, and integrate and absorb all forces of opposition, producing a "one-dimensional society" and a "one-dimensional man" (Bronner & Kellner, p. 9). This classic analysis is another way of referring to an alienated, self-absorbed, consumer society. The dimensions to which Marcuse points, along which Western societies shape consciousness, are the same that I observed, and I rely on his terminology in describing the phenomenon of CC.

I also found very helpful the approach of critical theorists, and particularly Erich Fromm (1989), to social psychology. It unites Marxist and Freudian insights in order to analyze the dynamic between social conditions and the psychological make-up of the modern individual. Applying this method, Marcuse (1989c) argues that **the direct socialization of individuals into currently pervasive cultural institutions** such as mass media, schools, sports, peer groups, **unmediated by the ego-building tensions of a strong family unit**, tends to eliminate the conflict between individual and society, producing **massive social conformity** and **weak egos.** Here is how Marcuse (1989c) describes the

impact of conditions in postliberal societies on the lives of individuals:

> transition from free to organized competition, concentration of power in the hands of an omnipresent technical, cultural, and political administration, self-propelling mass production and consumption, subjection of previously private, asocial dimensions of existence to methodical indoctrination, manipulation, control...reduce the `living space' and the autonomy of the ego and prepare the ground for the formation of masses (p. 235).

He further describes the formation of consciousness under these circumstances:

> weakening of the critical mental faculties: consciousness and conscience....Conscience and personal responsibility decline `objectively' under conditions of total bureaucratization....The more the autonomous ego becomes superfluous...in the functioning of the administered, technified world, the more does the development of the ego depend on its `power of negation', that is to say, on its ability to build and protect a personal, private realm with its own individual needs and faculties. Yet this ability is impaired on two grounds: the immediate, external socialization of the ego, and the control and management of free time (p. 238).

Hence, Marcuse points to what I define as one of the main components in my definition of CC: the power to resist the status quo. He sees knowledge and moral judgement as prerequisites for a **consciousness capable of "breaking through the material and ideological veil of the affluent society**" (Marcuse, 1989b, p. 281). He describes the affluent society as

> growing on the condition of accelerating waste, planned obsolescence, and destruction, while the substratum of the population continues to live in poverty and misery (p. 280).

Liberation, Marcuse writes, "is **predicated upon the opening and the activation of a depth dimension of human existence**" (p. 281).

The role of the culture industries in **managing consciousness** and **obscuring social conflict** has been examined by Theodor Adorno (1989). He views mass culture not as a popular culture rising from the experiences and the concerns of the people, but as a form of administered culture for the purpose of duplicating reality, reinforcing and strengthening mass mentality. Adorno analyzes mass culture as obstructing human emancipation, and giving rise to particular sets of contradictory personality tendencies such as pride in being an individualist and constant fear of not being like the others; jealous guarding of one's independence and inclination to submit blindly to power and authority. These thoughts led to the seminal study of personality tendencies by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950), The Authoritarian Personality, which sets out to measure the psychological propensities toward authoritarianism in the US. It identifies a potentially fascist mind-set along dimensions such as anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and political-economic conservativism, and finds an alarmingly high authoritarian potential in the studied population.

In this study, I examine further and incorporate the critical social psychological concepts of direct vs.

mediated socialization, liberation through activating the depth dimension of experience, and the formation of contradictory personality tendencies as a result of mass culture. My overall reading of the critical theorists leads me to the conclusion that their social and psychological analysis reveals adequately the forces that inhibit the occurrence of CC in the contemporary Westernized context (which includes Eastern European societies). My experience growing up in communist Bulgaria confirms their analysis. One of the most favored methods of obscuring social conflict that the communists used was to artificially develop a culture, paid and supported by their establishment, in the arts, including literature, and in sports. Later in life, as I came to the US, I realized that mass culture had actually strongly paralleled the Western mass culture of advertisement, mass media and mass entertainment, and had exercised a very comparable grip on individual consciousness. Hence, I use the above analysis as a foundation which provides clear context for my primary and secondary data, derived mostly from Westernized contexts.

The sobering insights of the critical theorists are particularly helpful given the predominant assumptions of the Western world that it represents the peak of civilization and offers its citizens a better opportunity to develop as autonomous individuals. A more open and cross-cultural examination allows us to understand the phenomenon

of CC in all its complexity without exaggerating its Eurocentric dimensions. The contrast between the socio-historical contexts of developed and developing countries, as revealed respectively by the critical theorists and Freire, makes it clear that each confronts the individual with different advantages and disadvantages in terms of developing CC, and neither one can claim to be more conducive to CC than the other. The contrast also reveals a lot of common themes which will be revisited in the summary section of this chapter.

In conclusion, the work of the critical theorists represents, in my understanding, an initial normative analysis of the phenomenon I refer to as CC, as well as the conditions that hinder its unfolding in the Western world. Table 2.3 below summarizes the way I rely on the important contrasts which the critical theorists draw between CC and mass consciousness, as they are related to context conditions.

Table 2.3

Critical Theorists' Description of Contrasts between CC and Mass Consciousness in Relation to Context Conditions

Context Conditions	Mass Consciousness	CC
market economy reliance on fear and competition	**atomized** and **alienated**	**integrated** and **interconnected**
technology and scientific rationality	thought serves to make prevailing system more efficient and raise technical means over normative ends; **moral and critical ends lose their force**; centrality of technological questions	**thought functions to provide alternatives to existing society; moral and critical ends central;** centrality of ontological questions
industrial society embedded in here-and-now of economic efficiency and profit	**ahistorical; neutrality; instrumentality**; split between private & public	**natural immediacy; wholesomeness; personal involvement**
advanced economic conditions absorb forces of opposition	**consumer** consciousness; **alienated; self-absorbed**	**service to others and the world;** transcendence of economic conditions
direct socialization into pervasive cultural institutions (mass media, sport, peer groups); weak family unit; bureaucratization	massive social conformity; **weakened critical mental faculties**; decline of conscience and personal responsibility	power of **resistance** built in strong family units; **knowledge and moral judgement capable of breaking through veil** of duplicated reality
mass culture duplicating reality; material and ideological veil of affluent society	contradictory personality tendencies: pride in being an individualist and fear of not being like the others	**opening and activation of a depth dimension of human existence**

Social Critics of Contemporary American Culture and the CC Construct

The above social analysis of the critical theorists finds further confirmation in contemporary sociological studies of American culture. Bellah et al (1985) examine the cultural limitations of the moral discourse which Americans share, and describe in detail the all-pervasive "first language of individualism" within which ordinary people try to define their social affiliations, values and commitments (p. 20). The cultural landscape they describe is very reminiscent of the analysis of the critical theorists:

> American cultural traditions define personality, achievement, and the purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual suspended in glorious, but terrifying isolation (p. 6).

Bellah et al find that this unmitigated individualism has led to a profound split between public and private lives, pervasive compartmentalization and alienation, and a moral void with no basis for enduring commitments beyond the self. The predominant morally relativistic framework provides "no reliable way to connect one's own fulfillment to that of other people, family, or the larger social and political community" (p. 17), and therefore offers a fragile foundation for the justification of one's life, and leads to precarious commitments, if any. It provides "no framework for thinking about a community in the context of the larger society" (p. 13); hence, wherever small-town values still

hold, they can easily lead to dangerously narrow conceptions of social justice. Even within political activism, this moral relativism offers little understanding of how to build a just society or what would be a just society. The authors conclude that cultural resources often fail their interviewees when they try to live out fuller lives of connectedness and commitment than they can justify within pervasive individualistic terminology. Bellah et al.'s work provides a direct context within which I examine my interviews with ordinary American midlifers. Their analysis captures the main components of the lack of CC, and in that sense helps define further the construct and the contextual conditions for the phenomenon it reflects.

Wuthnow (1991), in his book Acts of Compassion, draws an important distinction between customary altruistic acts ingrained in the social convention, and the actual experience of compassion understood as suffering with or feeling with another human being. I find this distinction important because compassion is a fundamental motivational characteristic of CC, and its source is the sense of interconnectedness with and attachment to other human beings. That quality may or may not be present in different forms of prosocial behavior, and it is the motivation, not so much the particular behavior that qualifies a choice as critically conscious or not. Research on social

responsibility has confused this boundary somewhat by focusing all too frequently on behaviors.

Wuthnow offers an insightful analysis of the cultural tradition of voluntary cooperation, and an impressive statistic of the frequency of "informal volunteering" (p. 6). He finds that although altruistic values initially derived from "the Christian duty of love", from the idea, in the words of Winthrop, of making "others' conditions our own, rejoice together, mourn together" (p. 9), they are embedded in a cultural context which values individual freedom, success, and self-interest above anything else.

American culture has exalted nonconformity and the ability to defy others' expectations at the expense of a deficiency of attachment to other human beings. Wuthnow describes ways in which individuals struggle to bring together compassion and altruism with a more balanced individualism. He also shows how the American cultural heritage has left people without a consistent spiritual education which would counterbalance individualistic mythology. With the general disillusionment with Christianity, the hold of basic spiritual principles of love, service, and humility has been greatly lost, and so has even the language; and with it, the habit of self-reflection and bringing oneself to account.

The vignettes Wuthnow draws of altruistic individualists reveal people who do not even know how to

think or talk about the better impulses of their hearts. The vacuum left with the decline of religion has been filled, as Bellah et al show, by the modern religion of psychotherapy and individual freedom. Yet, both Bellah et al, and Wuthnow, reveal this concept of freedom to be illusory.

> The irony is that here, too, just where we think we are most free, we are most coerced by the dominant beliefs of our own culture. For it is a powerful cultural fiction that we not only can, but must, make up our deepest beliefs in the isolation of our private selves (Bellah et al, 1985, p. 65).

In this cultural context, searching for alternative ways to lead socially responsible, connected and committed lives amounts to **a struggle to overcome and redefine one's cultural heritage and live as a critically conscious individual**. This means that **people face the challenge to negotiate, integrate and transcend their culture in order to follow the better impulses of their hearts.**

Table 2.4 below summarizes the main limitations social critics identify in American cultural consciousness, in contrast to what I see as fundamental characteristics of CC. This contrast is particularly important in view of the predominantly American empirical sample in this study of CC.

Table 2.4

American Cultural Consciousness and CC

Context	American Cultural Consciousness	CC
first **language of individualism** within which ordinary people define their social affiliations, values& commitments	personality, achievement, and **purpose of human life defined in** glorious but **terrifying isolation**	**purpose of human life defined beyond individual**; common purpose with other human beings & the rest of humanity
unmitigated individualism	split b/n public and private life; **compartmentalization; alienation**	**consistency** b/n public & private life; **integration;connectedness**
predominant morally relativistic framework	**moral void** with **no basis for enduring commitments beyond the self**; fragile foundation for the justification of one's life, **precarious commitments**	**ultimate moral values: basis to connect one's fulfillment to that of larger community**; lasting commitments; moral dialogue w/reality
no framework for thinking about a community in the context of the larger society; small-town values	either no concept of social justice or **dangerously narrow conceptions**	**ultimate moral values provide context for inclusive concept of social justice**
conventional altruistic behaviors embedded in a cultural context which values most individual freedom, success, & self-interest	informal volunteering as part of the norm, without a necessarily altruistic motivation	**compassion** as a fundamental motivational characteristic;**empathy**, empathic guilt, distress & anger; sense of interconnectedness
culture exalts nonconformity & ability to defy others' expectations	**deficiency of attachment** to other human beings; **defiance** & **arrogance; illusory concept of individual freedom**	spiritual principles of **love**, **service**, and **humility; ability to transcend and redefine culture**

Postmodern Thought and the CC Construct

Postmodern thought recognizes that cultural resources have limited people everywhere, and individuals have to rely on their own ability to interrogate and redefine culture. Postmodern thinkers take further the deconstruction of social reality begun by the critical theorists, and examine the value-ridden nature of this process. Three concepts they develop are particularly helpful in understanding the challenges of developing CC in any cultural context.

Dereification

Berger and Luckmann's (1967) concept of the dereification of consciousness brings into focus the fact that individuals are born into an already constructed social reality, which they tend to take for absolute. Hence, every individual faces the challenge of realizing that reality is socially constructed and can therefore be reconstructed, if it is first **dereified**, i.e. deconstructed.

Hegemony and Power/Knowledge Networks

Gramsci's (1971) and Althusser's (1971) concept of hegemony, and Foucault's (1980) concept of power/knowledge networks elaborate further the concept of dereification by focusing on the fact that social reality is constructed by the dominant ideology or world view which itself is grounded in economic, political and cultural interests. These interests produce a particular interaction between power and knowledge which creates all the social structures and fields

of discourse that shape our consciousness, and appear to constitute truth and reality.

Constructionism, feminism, and poststructuralism combine these concepts in an attempt to integrate the relation between language, subjectivity, social organization and power into a social theory which allows the deconstruction of reality to its constitutive value-laden elements and their careful scrutiny (Weedon, 1987). In this way, postmodernism reformulates the main challenge of CC: the ability to dereify social reality, pursue causality in order to identify hegemonic power/knowledge networks, and take on the responsibility to re-construct creatively, on the grounds of explicitly adopted values.

Postmodernism makes it imperative for any social research project to explicitly formulate the values on which it rests. As I examine the work of Freire and the critical theorists, as well as my own approach to CC, I identify the implicit values of the Enlightenment reconstructed in the context of the postmodern age. In the words of Foucault (1984),

> ...Enlightenment is a process that releases us from the status of `immaturity'... both as a process in which men participate collectively and an act of courage to be accomplished personally...[It is] a type of philosophical interrogation-one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject-rooted in the Enlightenment (pp. 34-42).

At the foundation of this research project lie the Enlightenment values of reason, justice, freedom, and equality for all. I share the postmodernist belief that "reason, like experience, requires both deconstruction and reconstruction" (Weedon, 1987, p. 10), as we try to understand what it means to be a critically conscious individual at the verge of the 21st century.

I also adopt from postmodern discourse the belief that language mediates meaning and consciousness, and hence any attempts to study the manifestations of CC through people's verbal accounts of their life's experience will have to include an awareness of the role of language and cultural contexts. I do not, however, adopt the poststructuralist belief that "meaning and consciousness do not exist outside language" (Weedon, 1987, p. 32).

The above bodies of literature clearly highlight the fact that any **effort to be critically aware of one's environment and to engage in a critical dialogue with it, is grounded in moral values**. Therefore, I need to examine what moral psychology contributes to the construct of CC.

Moral Psychology and the CC Construct

Moral psychology as a field is still in its early phases of understanding and the different approaches within it do not yet form a coherent body of literature. It brings together a variety of foci, ranging from character education

and personality traits, to studies of altruism, empathy, prosocial behavior, moral values and moral commitment, and the developmental transformations of moral reasoning. All of these bear in one way or another on CC, and the decision of how to organize the review of this diverse body of literatures was influenced by my personal understanding of how they come together. I have grouped the research along several dimensions: a) the development of moral judgement; b) the development of empathy and prosocial behavior; c) empirical research on moral exemplars; d) research on moral values.

Development of Moral Judgement

My work has been profoundly influenced by Kohlberg's (1984) theory of the life-span development of morality along three levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. Kohlberg describes the way values and emotions are organized around evolving self-structures, as a result of "the changing relationship of the individual to his or her social milieu through a gradually widening social radius" (Labouvie-Vief, 1992, p. 212).

Since I define CC as a moral phenomenon, and its ontogeny as the evolving of an engaged moral dialogical relationship with one's world, I incorporate Kohlberg's levels of morality. Although I believe there is more to a person's moral relationship with his/her world than the

evolution of moral reasoning, I find central the main distinctions between the three types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations.

At the preconventional level, rules and social expectations are something external to the self; if recognized at all, they are something to get around. Values center around a concrete individual perspective of instrumental purpose and exchange; moral reasoning is egocentric, and moral decisions are based on physical and material consequences. The movement toward conventional morality is characterized by an increasingly internal orientation toward mutuality, trust and common standards. At the conventional level, the self is identified with or has internalized the rules and expectations first of immediate others, and gradually of society's perspective. This level gives birth to a social conscience guided by sense of duty, loyalty to law and order, respect for social institutions and commitment to their maintenance. The emergence of postconventional morality is characterized by a progressive orientation to the basic moral principles underlying society's rules, where these principles come prior to society's perspective. The postconventional person has differentiated his/her self from the rules and expectations of others, and defines his/her values in terms of self-chosen ethical principles.

The three levels of CC I differentiate rely on the same distinctions between the absence or presence in an individual of an understanding of social convention, or his/her operating form principles which have priority over the convention. However, in view of the definition of CC as involving the ability to enter into a moral dialogue with one's social world, I see as the cut-off point the emerging understanding of social patterns and social system. Hence, Pre-CC, Conventional CC and Postconventional CC, parallel Kohlberg's levels of moral reasoning with one distinction. Conventional CC excludes Kohlberg's early stage 3, Interpersonal Conformity, which I see as still part of Pre-CC. Conventional CC begins with late Interpersonal Conformity which evolves an understanding of social patterns beyond interpersonal morality, and moves toward Kohlberg's stage 4, Social System and Conscience.

I adopt to some degree Kohlberg's view of moral efforts and the ensuing development of moral reasoning as dependent on decentration. As Gibbs (1991) points out, decentration spurs the progressive construction of moral meaning by generating motivational feelings of the logical necessity, or justice, of restoring the balance of perspectives where it is perceived as disturbed. Kohlberg's (1984) cognitive-developmental theory of morality sheds important light on the universal progression toward overcoming what Allport (1959) calls cognitive provincialism in the direction of

broader and more all-inclusive moral perspectives. Kohlberg shows how moral judgement depends on logical reasoning, cognitive decentering and social perspective-taking, and underlies the structure and content of the values out of which an individual operates.

However, moral psychology increasingly recognizes that there is more to morality than moral reasoning, and that moral preoccupations seem to have some other motivational source. Although people's social radius of moral understanding has the potential to widen through continuous internal construction of social experience, many adults in modern American society do not exhibit even fully developed conventional morality. Further, as Allport (1959) points out, there is a difference between the cognitive recognition of broader allegiances, and emotional allegiances to a larger humanity. Allport's work suggests that overcoming affective provincialism may have more to do with family education and internalizing different symbols of inclusion than with reasoning per se. Hoffman's (1983) approach to moral development sheds further light to this line of thought.

Development of Empathy and Prosocial Behavior

Hoffman's (1991) theory helps understand moral motivational processes by integrating affect and cognition in a way different than Kohlberg. Hoffman does not see moral

affect solely as a derivative of developing moral cognitions, as does Kohlberg. He studies moral affect as related to human beings' natural proclivity for empathy; he also studies the synthesis between affect and various forms of cognition. In this sense, his key concepts are central to my understanding of moral motivation as a component of CC, and will be briefly reviewed below.

Hoffman (1991) poses and attempts to answer three different questions. First,

> what the motivational processes are that predispose the bystander to help the victim (whether he or she actually helps is another issue) and where these motives come from developmentally (p. 106).

He sees the answer in the human capacity for empathy, which he believes "develops in a stage-like manner, in correspondence with the individual's social-cognitive development" (p 106). Hoffman (1989) examines the importance of **the development of a cognitive sense of others as part of the transformation of basic empathic arousal into levels of empathy and empathic moral affect**. At the basis of this cognitive development he identifies evolving self/other distinctions, perspective-taking, and the formation of personal identity. Among the higher levels of empathy, which unite empathic arousal and cognitive understanding of others, Hoffman identifies: empathy for another's feelings; empathy for another's experiences beyond the immediate

situation including empathy for general conditions and future prospects; empathy for an entire group.

The second question Hoffman asks is what allows a person to or prevents them from actually harming someone or "contemplating acting in a way that may harm someone - not intentionally but in pursuit of one's instrumental goals" (p. 107). In examining this type of moral encounter, Hoffman stresses

> the internalization of the motive to consider others and the importance of discipline, especially inductive discipline (p. 107).

In the tradition of Compte, Freud, Durkheim, and Levi-Strauss, Hoffman (1991) focuses on how **internal moral orientation develops as a result of specific forms of socialization**, i.e. parental disciplining practices of **moral induction** emphasizing the effect of the child's behavior on others. These practices stimulate more intense processing, or internal construction of social experience on the part of the child. Coupled with optimal non-threatening arousal, moral induction fosters "the self-attributional feature of moral internalization" (Gibbs, 1991, p. 94). It tends to "enlist a motivational resource that exists in the child from an early age, namely, the child's capacity for empathy, defined as a vicarious affective response to others" (Hoffman, 1983, p. 252). As a result, "hot" cognitions form (Hoffman, 1993, p. 261), meaning that

> the prosocial cognition embodied in the inductive teaching gains motivational properties through

> classical conditioning with empathic affect and its derivative, empathy-based guilt. In the subsequent internalized morality, as empathy and anticipatory guilt are activated in situations of moral conflict or temptation, the induction-taught prosocial cognition is endowed with sufficient motive power to overcome (at least usually) egoistic motives or aggressive impulses. The result is moral conduct (Gibbs, 1991, p. 94-95).

This account for the evolving of moral motivation through the **progressive acceptance and self-attribution of moral norms** evokes Maslow's (1959) discussion of the role of teaching in strengthening the inclination of a human being to be authentic and overcome aggression, hostility and other instincts. It helps understand the prominence of intense moral preoccupations in critically conscious individuals. Hoffman's theory also sheds some light on alternative pathways of social development where CC does not seem to emerge; for example the indifference to others' suffering caused by injustice, the tendency to rationalize any discomfort related to the above, and the tendency of some more internally morally-oriented people to remain detached from suffering and not feel personally implicated in it.

Hoffman's theory suggests that such social developments may be associated with specific childrearing practices different from moral induction coupled with optimal arousal. For example, in Gibbs (1991) interpretation of Hoffman's theory,

> harsh and arbitrary power-assertive discipline does not foster empathy and moral motivation", so that "the child's empathy remains uncultivated and

> ineffective against egoistic motives, to say nothing of angry impulses (p. 95).

Hence, arbitrary power-assertive disciplining in childhood may account for a person's empathic potential remaining uncultivated. In my understanding, other kind of environments (e.g. alienated, overly pragmatic, materialistic) may also fail to foster, and even discourage, empathy. Since, according to Hoffman, the potential for empathy is biologically rooted, if the environment discourages empathy, a tendency may occur to rationalize others' suffering as an effort to suppress the empathic impulse.

Hoffman identifies **empathy-based guilt** as yet another important development as a result of moral induction in childhood. Prominent moral induction connects the recognition of one's impact on others and/or of others' suffering with one's own empathic arousal. Later in life this kind of empathy-based guilt may develop into a tendency to feel guilty at the sight of others' suffering unless one tries to intervene. Hence, the ability of some internally-oriented moral thinkers to remain detached from the suffering of others may have to do with a family environment in childhood which did not recognize the value of empathy-based guilt, failed to stimulate the development of this motivational resource in the child.

In trying to understand how moral principles becomes more than an abstraction in the lives of social activists in

the 1960s and allow them to "choose among moral claimants" (1991, p. 108), which is Hoffman's third question, he studies the interplay of empathic affect and moral cognition in the construction of prosocial behavior. When **a moral principle is experienced together with empathic affects**, "mental representations of the associated victims, culprits, and relevant actions" (Hoffman, 1989, p. 81) may form and become charged with empathic feelings, which will be easily activated by subsequent moral encounters. This may also lead to seeking out and engaging in further moral encounters.

In my conceptualization of CC, I rely on Hoffman's understanding of the development of levels of empathy, moral induction and self-attribution, empathy-based guilt and other empathic feelings, and their role in prosocial activism. I find helpful a combination of Kohlberg's and Hoffman's approaches to the importance of progressive moral constructions. While Kohlberg applies them to increasingly advanced modes of moral thought, Hoffman applies them to the "successive assimilation" (1991, p. 108) of induction information and the resulting development of emotionally charged cognitive structures. As Gibbs (1991) points out, "Kohlberg's and Hoffman's theories of morality are essentially complementary and potentially integrable... Justice and empathy are equally primary and mutually irreducible sources of moral motivation" (pp. 96-97).

Gilligan's (1978) revision of Kohlberg's model through the introduction of the metaphor of "voice" (i.e. the feminine paradigm), argues for an expanded conception of moral development which integrates the role of empathy and the ethic of care with the principled understanding of justice. As she suggests, developmental theory leads to "a conception of adulthood that is itself out of balance, favoring the separateness of the individual self over its connection to others" (p. 53). Gilligan (1978) shows that intellectually sophisticated women consider the awareness of and respect for other people's feelings essential to moral judgement, and struggle to define a morality which harmonizes opposites and solves problems in a way that none gets hurt. Thus Gilligan enriches Kohlberg's understanding of complex moral judgement, based on considerations of care and responsibility. Later Belenky, et al (1986) develop this line of thought into "connected ways of knowing rooted in the self as authority as the highest form of moral and intellectual meaning making" (Bembow, 1994, p. 201).

Empirical Research on Moral Exemplars

Maslow's (1954) seminal study of self-actualizing people has been followed since the 1960s by an abundance of studies of activists and morally remarkable people. I find most helpful Colby & Damon's (1992) study, Some Do Care: Contemporary Lives of Moral Commitment, because it offers an

in-depth account of the growth processes responsible for transforming the early moral awareness of 23 exemplary Americans into a lifelong calling. The researchers apply a broadly developmental interpretive framework, which begins to integrate the insights of moral psychology on caring, values, empathy, moral reasoning, moral action, and moral commitment, as well as personality theories and character education. They look at "how character is acquired, how it grows, and how it may foster sustained moral commitment" (p. 4). They study "the developmental continuities between everyday acts of morality and the enlarged commitments of moral leaders" (p. 4).

Colby & Damon (1992) establish three recurring characteristics in their exemplars: **moral certainty**, **unfailing positivity**, and a remarkable **unity of self and moral goals**. They group them around the following patterns:

(1) **developmental transformation of moral goals** throughout the exemplars' lives and ever-expanding moral commitments;

(2) the **reciprocal nature of transformative social influences** that shaped the exemplars, or what they call "a peculiar mix of directedness and receptiveness";

(3) **certainty in moral principles** and **moral courage, combined with an openness** to new facts and their implications;

(4) unremitting **faith in humanity** and its future, and an enduring positivity and capacity to find hope and joy in the face of often dreary truth (pp. 9 - 16).

These characteristics of the moral commitments of Colby & Damon's exemplars, as well as my secondary analysis of the five case studies they offer, showed that these people were engaged in an on-going critical moral dialogue with their world. Their progressively expanding moral commitments appear to be the outcome of an initial moral awareness which led them to: 1) question the social relations in which they found themselves; 2) feel compelled to actively redefine their relationship with those social conditions in congruence with their understanding; and 3) seek an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with issues of justice and equity. In other words, these people exhibited what I consider to be different levels of CC. Hence, I believe that the phenomenon of CC is related to moral commitments, since CC is related to both self and morality, and Colby & Damon's findings bear on the better understanding of aspects of CC.

The researchers found that the moral actions of their exemplars showed little evidence of the kind of information processing and bringing "evaluative frameworks to bear on problems of moral choice" (p. 69), which constitute our common notion of human morality. Rather, Colby & Damon point to a simplicity of moral response in their exemplars which

reveals **a sense of moral compulsion**, a high level of integration between reflective theoretical beliefs and spontaneous habitual mode of direct moral action. They identify as an optimal condition of moral development the condition in which **habitual morality** is supported by one's **reflective sense of self**, resulting in a **unity between self and morality**. The authors also point out that according to cognitive models, "moral action becomes a relatively simple affair... when frameworks of moral judgement, social and personal responsibility, and self-interest operate in unison" (p. 69). It is when these frameworks collide that one is placed in a moral conflict, and internal deliberation follows.

As Damon (1988) points out, early in life, self and morality are separate conceptual systems. To the degree that children begin to define themselves later on by their moral inclinations, a closer link between their moral interests and their self-interest is created. For most adults, the two become linked only up to a point, with the relationship varying from relative separation to relative integration, and true uniting of the two remaining a rare event. "Moreover, the extent of unity is an aspect of personality growth that derives more from a person's sense of self than from the nature of the person's moral beliefs" (Damon, 1988, p. 306). This claim of Damon's is supported by Hoffman's findings on the early fostering of empathic moral affect,

which by adolescence becomes a fairly steady personal characteristic expressed in levels of empathy. This characteristic in turn facilitates the adoption of certain values in adolescence. In the course of the social-cognitive transformations of these values, they are likely to lead to a progressive unifying of self and morality.

Colby & Damon's findings led me to hypothesize that **the development of critical consciousness in individuals involves the evolving of frameworks of moral judgement, social and personal responsibility, and self-interest, and their gradual coming together into** what the researchers call "a **mature individualism**" (p. 297). According to Colby & Damon, it involves a dedication to the common good. "Mature individualism implies fully articulated links with others and with society as a whole" (p. 297). I find this definition very important because it points to epistemological phenomena at the basis of expanding moral commitments.

> Moral exemplars are both highly individuated persons as well as highly committed ones. They report no conflict between these two states (p. 298).

Such an understanding leads me to believe that although moral action may begin as a simple moral response perhaps motivated by empathy and basic moral values, it involves the gradual redefining of self/other distinctions, as commitments deepen and expand. **CC can be expected to emerge in the process of progressive integration of self and**

morality, which begins to the degree that children begin to define themselves by their moral inclinations (Damon, 1988). I.e. values which foster empathy (e.g. religious belief in one's oneness with the world) early in life can probably initiate or spur this process, which can be expected to lead to one's growing readiness to be consciously involved in the social world.

Colby & Damon find that individuals who have led lives of sustained moral commitment, have from an early age held and continuously developed strong inner standards of judgement, and have manifested a strong sense of connectedness, i.e. caring for their world. These basic values characterized their **family environment**, and were in most, although not all cases related to religious values. Even those individuals whose **early values education** was secular, later developed progressively spiritual (self-transcending) frames of reference. Over time, the relationship of Colby & Damon's exemplars with their own spirituality was continuously renegotiated, as were the content and structure of their inner standards and sense of connectedness.

Another important characteristic which Colby & Damon observe in their moral exemplars is the "**gradual**" and "**collaborative**" (p. 168) **processes of open life-long interaction with one's environment**. In order to explain it,

they develop the concept of "the developmental transformation of goals".

> The conditions for developmental change are set when social influence coordinates with individual goals in a manner that triggers a reformulation of the person's goals. We consider this process... the critical instigator of moral development during much of the lifecourse (p. 169).

The essence of goal transformation is the presence of "social influence processes" which "trigger reevaluation of a person's current capacities and must provide guidance for their further elaboration" (p. 169). This leads to a "gradual transformation of moral goals, along with a transformation of strategies to achieve these goals" (p. 170). As the authors point out, this concept derives from the Vygotskian school in human development, and more specifically from activity theory. It parallels in some ways the concept of scaffolding in adult-child interactions (without its asymmetrical subordination), in the sense that it involves

> Active participation of all parties; an initial, though only partial match of goals; ...partial mismatch of goals, in which the goals of the influencing party constitute a logical extension of the goals of the parties being influenced; reciprocal communications about goals and strategies; a structure of guidance providing a bridge from the matched to the mismatched goals; a mutual receptivity to direction and feedback; an exchange of concerns, strategies, and capacities, culminating in a transformation of goals (p. 170).

An important further elaboration is that not just positive, but negative social influences can propel this process. On the one hand, there is the role of trusted

associates. On the other hand, there may be confrontation with oppressive or unacceptable social values which will lead to resistance, and from there toward "transformation, elaboration, or strengthening" (p. 173) of one's moral goals. Suffice it to remember here some of Freire's (1987) illiterate peasants and their quiet dignity and resistance; or the experience of many intellectuals in Eastern Europe during the years of communism, where the totalitarian pressures only served to bring about greater moral clarity. Colby & Damon give an excellent example of the latter with Andrei Sakharov's development under the Soviet regime. Yet another example would be the impact of various religious teachings on individuals: they may have served as both a positive and a negative influence, and in each or both ways have caused further reevaluation of moral goals. As some other examples, Colby & Damon cite "becoming inducted into a framework of ethical and charitable values early in life" (p. 175); "inspiration by example" (p. 177); "friends who induced [him] into ever broader moral awareness" (p. 180); or even just "a fortuitous turn in a career, or even a chance event" (p. 181).

The authors also point out that these social influences can come during any period in life, including early childhood, and the general features of the goal transformation process will remain the same. Further, the authors explain:

> We do not believe that this is the primary condition for all types of psychological growth, or even for all types of moral growth, at all ages. In the early years of life, for example, natural emotional responses such as empathy do not require goal transformation for their elaboration (see W. Damon, [1988], *The Moral Child* [New York: The Free Press]. Goal transformation becomes a key process when a person communicates regularly with others about moral values. For those who continually immerse themselves in moral concerns, and in social networks absorbed by such concerns, goal transformation remains the central architect of progressive change throughout life (p. 337).

This elaboration raises an important question: what would motivate a person to communicate regularly with others about moral values and immerse him/herself in moral concerns? An answer which, it seems to me, stems out of Colby & Damon's goal theory, is that closeness with important adults (parents) in childhood and partially shared goals (the child's need for attachment and the parents' need to love and guide a child) will lead to the **progressive internalization of moral concerns** if those are central for the adults.

Colby & Damon describe **a snowball effect: the more these people become engaged in reevaluating moral concerns with others, the more their lives become "a history of social relationships"** (p. 178). The more that happens, the more reevaluation and growth that occurs as a result of the redefinition of existing values, incorporation of new values and expansion of moral thrust. This leads Colby & Damon to examine some of the turning points in their exemplars' lives, in view of the fact that normally in adult life

conservative forces preserving continuity and personal stability seem to predominate over change. They find examples of some very "abrupt changes of course" (p. 185). Colby & Damon identify as perhaps the "most intriguing common characteristic" of their 23 subjects "the paradoxical mix of lasting commitments and sustained capacity for change" (p. 184).

> Even as the exemplars' grip on their core ideals remained unwavering, they continued to reexamine their most fundamental attitudes and choices at frequent intervals. Many of them expanded the nature and extent of their engagements, many took on unexpected challenges, and many dramatically altered their beliefs, conduct, or life conditions on short notice. All the while, the exemplars remained true to their overarching original values, which endured the flux of frequent change and growth, and in a fundamental sense contributed to the shape of that change and growth (p. 185).

The authors sought partial explanations in the

> nature of certain personal qualities. These qualities, such as open-mindedness or honesty, continually expand a person's developmental horizons, because they enable the person to fully experience the world in a fruitful manner. Such qualities may be thought of as personal continuities that provide individuals with repeated experiences that enhance their capacities as well as new challenges that stimulate their growth (p. 187).

Colby & Damon describe the developmental transformation of goals in the life of each exemplar through a dynamic interaction between two types of personal continuities, cumulative and interactional continuities. The first type, cumulative continuity, is "the tendency of individuals to create or select environments that reinforce their own

personality characteristics" and "amplify the precise qualities that lead them to choose such environments in the first place" (p. 188). The second type, interactional continuity, is "the tendency of individuals to evoke, through their own particular styles of social interaction, particular sorts of responses from others", which "reinforce the interactional style" (p. 188).

Colby & Damon identify clusters of personal continuities, which seem to stimulate powerfully both overarching stability and steady growth and change. Some of them are:

Cluster 1: **positive response to challenge**, willingness to seize opportunities, sense of **personal efficacy and control**, desire to test oneself,**"can-do" attitude**, entrepreneurial spirit, resourcefulness.

Cluster 2: **love of people**, gregariousness, extroversion.

Cluster 3: **organizational ability**, ability to mobilize people, leadership.

Cluster 4: energy, **engagement**, **desire to learn and expand understanding**.

Cluster 5: **sense of security** that gives **greater independence**; **belief that God will provide**.

Cluster 6: **respect for the dignity of persons**; desire to do good for others.

Cluster 7: honesty, **integrity**, pursuit of personal growth.

Cluster 8: willfulness, **strong-mindedness**, defiance, honor.

Cluster 9: **inquiring mind**, open-mindedness, **honesty with oneself**, lack of hypocrisy.
Cluster 10: **generosity**, open-heartedness, **compassion**, **sense of preciousness of all people.**

The role of these continuities in the formation of stable behavioral dispositions in people suggest the importance of environments which foster, encourage, and reinforce the above characteristics, and hence contribute to building moral character and commitment. As Colby & Damon point out, people will tend to seek out both environments and interactions which further reinforce their personal style and characteristics, shaped by earlier environments. Important as these continuities are, it is their particular mix which enables a developmental change to occur. As Colby and Damon point out with regard to two of their exemplars, Virginia Durr's strong-mindedness could have been closed-mindedness if not combined with a deep and searching honesty. Coleman's unwillingness to compromise could be rigid dogmatism if not combined with a strong desire for self-improvement and a sincere concern for truth and personal integrity.

The researchers point out that, in the moral realm, the most important influences which further reinforce personality characteristics leading to stronger commitments are interactions.

> Many of the personal continuities that promote lifelong development are interactional rather than

> cumulative. Morality is an interpersonal affair even when it takes the form of a transcendent faith in a supernatural power, because it is inevitably implemented through the quality of a person's interaction with the social world... Moral values are communicated and implemented through social interaction, and moral concerns are discovered through social experience and social influence... In the moral realm, certain kinds of personal qualities, progressively enhanced by interactional continuity, can be especially powerful forces for life-long change... If the quality of the person's continuing interactional style is open, reciprocal, generative, truthful and self-reflective, the social relations engendered by that manner will promote and sustain that person's moral growth... the interactional styles that spur lifelong moral growth are ones that establish open systems of feedback between the self and others (p. 196-197).

This observation is reminiscent of Freire's (1973) understanding of CC as standing in responsible relationships with one's world, which makes a human being a Subject. Colby & Damon's exemplars exhibited many different interpersonal styles which helped them receive rich and extensive feedback from others. Among the above 10 clusters offered as an example, each individual manifested some rather than other. This variety of interpersonal styles which promote good communication, help keep people developmentally alive and lead to sustained moral development, illustrates the **multiple developmental pathways** through which a certain development may occur. All of the exemplars, however, manifested a striking **openness to moral change**, and **active receptiveness to particular social influences**. Both of these allow their moral potential to broaden.

Colby & Damon's findings are central to my study of CC, and I will return to the ways in which I rely on them in chapter 4. Their detailed study of moral exemplar provides reliable empirical data to redefine the fully evolved manifestations of what I define as CC. I merge their sample with my own study of ordinary people in order to understand the full range of CC.

Amongst Colby & Damon's central findings is the role of spiritual understanding in the unique life-paths of moral exemplars. In most of them, the researchers find one variation or another of what they call "an intimation of transcendence", which operates as a powerful personality integrating factor, and seems to be the source of their unique energy, endurance, faith, and positivity. This empirical finding converges with the theoretical understanding of universal values discourse, reviewed in the next section.

Research on Moral Values

In the context of pervasive moral relativism, the discourse on universal moral values (Maslow, 1959) focuses on reclaiming the validity and centrality of universal moral values in the development of consciousness. In his introduction to the collection of articles on New Knowledge in Human Values, Maslow (1959) wrote:

> ...the ultimate disease of our time is valuelessness...this state is more crucially

> dangerous than ever before in history... wealth and prosperity, technological advance, widespread education, democratic political reforms, even honestly good intentions and avowals of good will have, by their failure to produce peace, brotherhood, serenity, and happiness, confronted us even more nakedly and unavoidably with the profundities that mankind has been avoiding by its busy-ness with the superficial (p. vii).

From the point of view of postmodern analysis, what Maslow refers to as "valuelessness" is, in fact, not the lack of values but the predominance of superficial and short-sighted values, such as separateness, self-interest, pragmatic instrumentality, etc, as described by Marcuse (1989a,b,c) and the critical theorists. There is remarkable convergence between the observations of the critical theorists, and those of The First Scientific Conference on New Knowledge in Human Values in 1957, regarding the main tensions faced by modern consciousness. They are:

a) fear of the challenges of a wider and more complex world <u>versus</u> a sense of empowerment and courageous acceptance of those challenges;

b) a sense of being lost <u>versus</u> a sense of freedom and fulfillment;

c) frantic one-sided reactions to a confusing world, with one aspect of the self living at the expense of another, i.e. compartmentalization <u>versus</u> inner wholeness and union of emotional, sensory, and rational faculties and aspects of life;

d) lack of inner models and organizers of experience versus their strengthening presence (e.g. unselfish love, creativity, explicit moral and spiritual frames of reference, etc.);
e) alienation and limited loyalties versus openness to the world and recognition of the continuity between a human being, their world, and nature (Maslow, 1959, pp. 86-92).

I consider the negative sides of these tensions to be the benchmark characteristics of the lack versus the presence of CC. The humanistic and the ontological approaches to the study of values converge in identifying as their opposites the same fundamental values of "serenity, kindness, courage,... honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness" (Maslow, 1959, p.126), inclusion of broader loyalties together with smaller ones, unity and harmony, relatedness and creativity, an open self, and the ultimate unity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.

Ontological Approach to Values

The ontological approach distinguishes between concrete historically-specific values and the above ultimate values, which have been recognized as "the basis of human freedom" (Weisskopf, 1959, p. 109), the foundation of a consciousness able to transcend specific life situations. This distinction is very important in understanding the motivational source of critically conscious behavior.

> This opens up alternatives; the dimension of actuality is left behind and the realm of

> potentiality is entered, creating the possibility of choice and the necessity of decision based on guiding values... Values, then, are a concomitant of freedom. What is the ground of values and what determines their content? On the level of concrete actuality-historical conditions, society and culture...The ultimate ground of values, however, is rooted in the ultimate ground of being... that dimension in which all antinomies are united and harmonized... Even those who reject metaphysical arguments can learn from history that all cultures derived their ultimate values from a basic concept or symbol which stood for the ground of being, such as God, nature, the universe, etc. Wherever the awareness of this relation between the ground of being and values was lost, values began to disintegrate" (p. 109).

Weisskopf sees the ultimate content of values in the human striving to overcome the basic existential split of consciousness and reunite with the world of being. Like most psychologists, he identifies two unifying tendencies underlying different values. One is "a regressive tendency towards the dissolution of the existing state and the restoration of a previous, less complicated state", or what Freud called the "death drive" through avenues of escape such as ecstatic behavior, sex, intoxication, etc (p. 111). The other one is the "**union upwards**", a **tendency towards individuation**, "abandonment of collectively imposed values and their replacement by individually chosen ones" in the direction of greater knowledge and understanding, and hence **ultimate harmony** (pp. 111-112). This second tendency is primarily the goal of human striving, and "determines the content of ultimate values" such as truth, beauty, love,

empathic understanding, etc. (p. 112-113). This tendency seems to be what Colby & Damon identify in their exemplars.

Weisskopf believes that "most of our spiritual, psychological and social problems can be traced back to the lack of integration and union" (p. 115). He points out that Fromm's criticism of modern economic man as profoundly **alienated refers to** the "the surrender of the total human being to an outside power or to a partial striving", "the **reduction of human behavior to a small segment of its total potentialities and dimensions**" (p. 116-117). **At the heart of this alienation is "expedient utilitarian rationality**", the orientation towards change and control of the external world, and consumption at the expense of the inner life (p. 116). **This reduction of life to the economic principle has led to the "disintegration of those aspects of life" to which this approach is unapplicable,** e.g. "friendship, love, charity, creative activity, aesthetic, and religious experiences" (p. 116-117). As an economist, Weisskopf concludes:

> In a way, union, integration and balance is also the answer to some of our economic problems. In an economy of abundance with a high productive capacity, the problem is not increased efficiency..." (p. 117).

In this line of thought, a prominent and somewhat forgotten thinker, Pitirim Sorokin, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Harvard University and the first Professor and Chairman of Sociology of the University of St. Petersburg,

writes about the need for "a transformation of modern sensate man and of the dominant sensate culture", and the role of "the creative, unselfish work of love for humanity at large as the key to the reconstruction of the world" (p. xi). Sorokin examined many of the currently fashionable prescriptions for the prevention of war and the building of a new world order. He refutes the popular belief in "a political reconstruction of all nations along the lines of American democracy", as well as in education as panaceas, showing that, over the course of history, democracies have proven as militant as autocracies, and the most educated and technological century in human civilization is also the bloodiest one.

Sorokin's extensive sociological studies showed creative love to be a central value, which accounts for "the longevity of societies and organizations" (p. 9). Some examples are "the longest existing organizations... the great ethico-religious organizations -Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Mohammedanism", which have lasted for millennia, in contrast to the relatively short-lived different kinds of other organizations over the centuries. He points to the historical impact of individuals such as "Lao-Tze, Confucius, Moses, Buddha, Mahavira, Jesus, St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi, Mahatma Gandhi and other founders of great religions, discoverers of eternal moral principles,

and living incarnations of sublime, unselfish love" in contrast to monarchs, conquerors, revolutionaries and other historical figures (p. 10). He concludes:

> ... love is the loftiest educational force for enlightenment and moral ennoblement of mankind; love performs important cognitive and aesthetic functions; love is the heart and soul of freedom and of all moral and religious values..." (p. 11).

Another prominent thinker, biologist and General Systems Theorist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, examines the uniquely human symbolic universe of language, thought, and other symbolic behaviors, with their universal and culture-specific categories. He concludes that we are witnessing the imminent breakdown of our symbolic universe, where no values are taken for granted any more, and cultural, social, and political realities contain a deep undercurrent of nihilism. This pervasive loss of meaning is reflected in both existential philosophy and the staggering percentage of crime and mental disease, as well as in the infantilization of culture, the creation of "mass man", and the supplementing of religion with the "pseudo-religions" of "scientific progress, psychoanalysis, nationalism, soap opera, or tranquilizers" (Maslow, 1959, pp. 71-72).

My interviews with ordinary non-CC individuals gave ample evidence of the above expressions of loss of meaning. In contrast, I found **unselfish love** to be a **central motivational characteristic** of CC individuals. Table 2.5 on page 85 summarizes my understanding, derived from the

ontological approach to moral values, of how the centrality of certain historically-specific contemporary values, or of universal spiritual values, accounts for different characteristics of individual consciousness.

Table 2.5

Ontological Approach to Moral Values: Relationship between Values and Characteristics of Consciousness

Contextual source of values	Consciousness
<u>Specific socio-historical</u>: - **economic principle** in life central - **expedient utilitarian rationality** - **relativism**; breakdown of symbolic universe; cultural, social, and political nihilism; existential philosophy - **infantilization** of culture	**disintegration** of those aspects of life to which the economic principle is not applicable (friendship, love, charity, creative activity, aesthetic & religious experience; **alienation**; orientation toward **consumption, change and control of external world** at the expense of inner life **precariousness of values**; **pervasive loss of meaning**; crime and mental disease; pseudo-religions of scientific progress, psychoanalysis, nationalism, soap opera, or tranquilizers; **adolescent adults**
<u>Universal ethico-religious organizations</u> (Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, etc. - essential foundations as distinct from dogma and institutions): - **nature of human being** central - **service to humanity** as the only true source of happiness, honor, and meaning in life - **altruism** as the heart of all human endeavor - **rectitude of conduct, trustworthiness and honesty** as the foundation for stability and progress	orientation toward bringing inner and outer life in harmony w/ eternal moral principles **creative love as the heart and soul of freedom and of all moral and religious values**; **transcendence of self**; **fusion of true, good, and beautiful**; **wisdom, honesty, naturalness**; **differentiation of ends & means**

Humanistic Approach to Values

From a somewhat different angle, humanistic psychology derives the understanding of values from the totality of the human experience. The findings of Maslow, Fromm, Rogers, Jung converge in showing that

> ...the human being has within him a pressure (among other pressures) toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good, and a lot else (Maslow, 1959, pp. 125-126).

Maslow's (1954) study of self-actualizing people, whom he calls healthy people, show that they

> uniformly yearn for what is good for them and for others, and then are able wholeheartedly to enjoy it, and approve of it. For such people virtue is its own reward in the sense of being enjoyed in itself (1959, p. 129).

Maslow (1959) concludes that although we tend to perceive the nature of culture as "an instrument of need-gratification as well as of frustration and control", in fact "the main function of a healthy culture and each of its institutions" is "the fostering of universal self-actualization" (p. 129). All the secondary and primary examples of **CC individuals** I examined showed them to be **self-actualized people**.

Maslow points out that few people are truly self-actualized, or know how to be authentic; in the majority of people this tendency is rather "a hope, a yearning" (p. 130). The **inner potential for self-actualization**, "**this**

inner core, this real self", requires learning in order to unfold, because there are also other instincts such as aggression, hostility, hatred, and destructiveness. Hence, Maslow critiques so-called "instinct" theories, which tend to biologize morals and assume that if you "behave authentically, you will behave well" (p. 131). He points instead to the role of the teachings of world religions:

> ...our description of the actual characteristics of self-actualizing people parallels at many points the ideals urged by the religions, e.g., the transcendence of self, the fusion of the true, the good, and the beautiful, contribution to others, wisdom, honesty and naturalness, the transcendence of selfish and personal motivations, the giving up of `lower' desires in favor of `higher' ones, the easy differentiation between ends (tranquility, serenity, peace) and means (money, power, status), the decrease of hostility, cruelty and destructiveness and the increase of friendliness, gentleness, kindness, etc. (1959, p. 128).

As he examines self-actualized, healthy people, Maslow

> find[s] duty and pleasure to be the same thing, as are also work and play, self-interest and altruism, individualism and selflessness (1959, p. 132).

This description summarizes Colby & Damon's concept of the unity of self and morality in their exemplars. Maslow points out that the tendency for self-fulfillment is

> ...easily drowned out by habit, by wrong cultural attitudes toward them, by traumatic episodes, erroneous education. Therefore, the problem of choice and of responsibility is far, far more acute in humans than in any other species (1959, p. 133).

The findings of two other prominent psychologists, Gordon Allport and Erich Fromm (Maslow, 1959), complement

Maslow's insights on the significance of choice and education in fostering healthy self-actualization of a human being's inner core or real self.

Fromm (1959) examines values as they originate in the root of the human condition, in basic human needs. He identifies the human need to transcend "the state of the passive creature... thrown into this world without his consent or will", and become a "creator" (p. 153). Such an understanding of a human being is reminiscent of Freire's approach to **CC as standing in a creative relationship with one's world and fulfilling one's potential to be a subject.** Fromm believes that **"destructiveness is a secondary potentiality" which arises when the will to love and create is thwarted by social circumstances** (p. 154). Hence, creative love as a basic human value originates in the human condition.

Fromm also studies **the need for rootedness:**

> Every adult is in need of help, of warmth, of protection, in many ways differing and yet in many ways similar to the needs of the child... Is it not to be expected that he cannot give up this intense longing unless he finds other ways of being rooted?... Living is a process of continuous birth. The tragedy in the life of most of us is that we die before we are fully born... To the extent that man is fully born, he finds a new kind of rootedness; that lies in his creative relatedness to the world, and in the ensuing experience of solidarity with all men and with all nature (p. 156-157).

Related to this is **the need to have a sense of identity**. According to Fromm, the problem of identity is not

just an intellectual problem, but "stems from the very condition of human existence, and is the source of the most intense strivings" (p. 159). He examines the historical progression of the human race from a sense of identity found in the clan, to occupation, class, religion, nation and other substitutes for a truly individuated sense of identity. He also describes **the evolving of "a new herd identity"** in the majority of people, as a result of social mobility and the falling apart of more traditional forms of status identification, coupled with a failure to accomplish individuation (p. 159).

Fromm's analysis, which relates the need for identity with the need for rootedness, relatedness, and transcendence as a context for the understanding of basic human values, shows that man's most fundamental needs in fact require a rethinking of our collective world. His approach is central to my analysis of CC.

Allport (1959) elaborates this point further by focusing on what he calls "the principle of enlargement of interests" which allows societies and individuals to evolve all-inclusive, hence peace-making values (pp. 141-142). He sees this enlargement of interest as the result of overcoming what he calls "**cognitive provincialism**" and "**affective provincialism**" (p. 144). He points out that most adults of all nations have still not completely accomplished the adolescent cognitive developmental task of decentering,

as a result of which they can hardly recognize "membership in any unit larger than the nation" (p. 144). I observed this phenomenon in my interviews with non-CC people, and it raised some important questions regarding education for CC.

In addition, Allport points out the distinction between overcoming cognitive provincialism and overcoming affective provincialism, meaning feeling connected to all the people one knows about. Affective provincialism "seems to **depend largely on the attitudes [he] learns from [his] parents**", and the feeling of belonging to a larger humanity is even less common than the cognitive recognition of such a fact (p. 144). He writes:

> Membership in any unit larger than the nation simply is not a psychological reality. Let international problems be handled by our leaders, they say. And most, though not all, leaders, we know, lack affective, or even cognitive, decentering beyond the sphere of purely national interests (p. 115)

Allport sees the solution on several levels. On the individual level, there is the **need to educate in people a more "embracing circle of loyalties" through family values and a re-evaluation of the content of educational instruction and experience** (p. 146). On a collective level, we need a better understanding of the nature of a human being which is the common ground for unity, as well as the developing of "symbols of inclusion that will assist children, and citizens, and statesmen to look beyond the confines of egocentricity" (p. 149). We also need a

collective social system which can embrace all nations into a larger loyalty.

> The social system which is painfully coming to birth will grow out of national states, but their structures will not be annihilated in the process (p. 145).

Table 2.6 below summarizes the understanding I derive from the humanistic values discourse of the values, virtues and other distinctive characteristics of optimally and sub-optimally developed consciousness.

Table 2.6

Humanistic Approach to Moral Values: Characteristics of Optimally and Sub-Optimally Developed Consciousness

Optimal Consciousness	Sub-Optimal Consciousness
Natural striving toward and inner potential for: **unity of personality**, **spontaneous expressiveness**, **full individuality & identity**, **seeing the truth** rather than being blind, **creativity, goodness**, **unity of duty** & **pleasure, work** & **play, self-interest** & **altruism**, **individualism** & **selflessness**, guided by spiritual teaching, unfolds into **authentic consciousness**	Hope and yearning toward full actualization thwarted by social circumstances (habit, wrong cultural attitudes, traumatic episodes,erroneous education); **destructiveness** as a secondary potentiality arises when the will to love and create is thwarted; **instincts** such as aggression, hostility, hatred, and destructiveness uneducated by healthy moral and spiritual induction **dominate**
new kind of **rootedness** which lies in **creative relatedness to the world**, and ensuing experience of solidarity with all people and with all nature	rootedness in need of help, warmth, protection
truly individuated identity found in **rootedness**, **relatedness** & transcendence as the most fundamental human needs	identity found in the clan, occupation, class, religion, nation & other substitutes for a truly individuated sense of identity; new herd identity, result of social mobility & the falling apart of more traditional forms of status identification, coupled with failure to accomplish individuation

Continued next page

Table 2.6, continued

cognitive and affective decentering & **enlargement of interests**; feeling of belonging to a larger humanity; **embracing circle of loyalties** (through family values and a re-evaluation of the content of educational instruction & experience)	**cognitive affective provincialism** (incomplete decentering & egocentric family values & collective social system, unable to embrace larger loyalties) **membership** in immediate social units only

The above review shows that moral psychology has many valuable insights to offer to the understanding of CC as a moral phenomenon. The question is how these different dimensions of morality come together in the formation of the consciousness that underlies moral social behavior. Clearly, the understanding of a broad interdisciplinary construct such as CC will have to rely on an integration of insights from various approaches to moral psychology, strictly structural-developmental, broader developmental, induction and socialization oriented, as well as value oriented.

Studies of Social Activists and the CC Construct

One of the main questions guiding this research, how some individuals came to be so different in the way they constructed their place and role in the world, has been the focus of a lot of case studies of activists since the 1960s. Hoffman draws on some of them (Kenniston, 1968; Lifton, 1968) in exploring the motivational base of prosocial activism. Although these studies do not explicitly identify

a unified construct such as CC, but focus on what I consider more specific expressions of it, such as activism, social responsibility, moral commitment, etc., I find them helpful in teasing out the main characteristics of the consciousness that underlies them. One of these studies, Bembow's (1994), has been particularly influential in my research on CC because it focuses explicitly on "that aspect of consciousness through which individuals come to know the world in a certain way" which leads to their commitment to social change (p. vii). Her work comes out of the Freirean tradition, and in my understanding attempts to study the phenomenon of CC in some of its specific socio-political manifestations.

Phenomenological Study of Radical Activists

Bembow defines as the object of her study the "**phenomenon of how certain individuals come to be actively committed to radically changing the social structure** under which we live", as well as "**how these individuals come to know the world** in a particular way that leads to such a commitment" (p. 1). Her study of twenty contemporary American social activists from different walks of life is concerned with

> the interactions, e.g. patterns, networks, and conjunctions, between objective reality and the individual's intersubjective experience that have brought these individuals to a place where: 1. They no longer take the existing construction of reality as necessary or inevitable; 2. They are

> consciously engaged in a practice committed to an alternative construction; 3. That alternative construction is one that is explicitly committed to issues of freedom and equality; and 4. They believe that individual and collective participation and empowerment are essential for the construction of that reality" (pp. 1-2).

Bembow's definition of the phenomenon, as well as the above four conditions, both refer to key aspects of CC as I define it, and reveal important distinctions. In order to make it clear how I use Bembow's phenomenological thematic analysis and hermeneutical insights on the process of developing CC, I need to highlight those distinctions.

The first one is that Bembow understands the Freirean concept of CC in a static way: as a type of consciousness gained or achieved by embracing the critical paradigm, and which has strategic superiority over other types of consciousness. She understands the adoption of the critical paradigm as a dereification process, which, she claims is "embedded in biography" (p. 16). The understanding of how that happens remains vague; somehow, in an effort to make sense of the "dissonance between intersubjective reality and objective reality" in their personal history, individuals come to CC (p. 16).

I find the notions of biography, synchronistic serendipitous unfolding, dissonance and progressive dereification, to be important and helpful insights. However, I believe that Bembow is referring to a developmental process, and the avoidance of its recognition

for purely ideological considerations limits her work. In Bembow's postmodernist understanding, any attempt at a more universal, law-like understanding of the social world represents positivistic reductionism, to which she is philosophically opposed. In an effort to deconstruct the generation of knowledge, Bembow approaches the study of CC through the concept of socio-political paradigms or world views (Fay, 1975, qtd. in Bembow, 1994). She contrasts the epistemological and ontological assumptions of the positivist, the interpretive, and the critical paradigms, and positions her own study within the critical paradigm. She explains her use of the concept of paradigm in the following way:

> While the concept of paradigm cannot be said to have a one-to-one correlation to state of consciousness, it is a concept that serves to locate the meaning implied in my use of the word consciousness (p. 11).

Although I recognize the centrality of paradigmatic frames of reference to any inquiry, I do not believe that the definition of a phenomenon should be explicitly tied to a paradigm. My research on CC studies its emergence with the progressive integration of self and morality as an explicitly structural-developmental process not limited to any particular paradigm.

The second distinctions is that, as a result of associating CC with the embracing of the critical paradigm, Bembow limits her understanding of CC to individuals who

have committed their lives to specific radical forms of socio-political praxis. This poses a problem, because unless praxis is redefined in broader terms which include alternative, and perhaps subtler, forms of being engaged as a moral and caring agent with one's world and committed to its improvement, the construct of CC becomes embedded in a particular socio-political agenda and loses its comprehensive significance. Hence, although praxis is an important part of my definition of CC, I understand praxis in broader Freirean terms, as an implicitly moral union between knowing and doing, which empowers the individual and leads to community transformation.

Nonetheless, both Bembow and I recognize two key elements in the definition of CC, **critical perception** and **commitment to work for change**. The generative patterns of interaction "between objective reality and the individual's intersubjective experiences" (p. 1), which Bembow identifies in the lives of her activists, are directly pertinent to my own findings and will be briefly reviewed below.

Bembow finds that becoming a social activist is an unplanned, synchronistic process, experienced by the individual as "being on a path" (p. 140). All of her participants use the metaphor of the path and do not remember undergoing any sudden conversion; i.e. "the path was not consciously or rationally chosen, it unfolded" (p. 142). Most of the time, "the nature and direction of the

journey may not be known" to the individual, but there is a "mystical sense" of being on the "right" path, "the path that the person was supposed to take" (p. 142). One of the participants says that "in a sublime sense, it was the best of all possible paths, for it is a path that serves some greater, righteous purpose" (p. 142). Another speaks of the "**spiritual nature** of the path as one of an **increasing ability to empathize with people and ideas**" (p. 140).

The participants also speak of the role of values in the "walking" of that path. They experience the process as a constant "interplay of fate and choice". "In order to stay the course, one must make the right decisions and pass the right tests", but "in spite of this exercise of free will, fate" seems to be intervening (p. 142).

Bembow unites the above characteristics into an interesting analysis of the concept of synchronicity, understood as "being in the right place at the right time" (p. 145). She uses Jung's (1955 ctd. in Bembow, 1994) acausal concept to refer to a meaningful coincidence in the presence of a meaning-making organism, where this meaning making can arise at levels much deeper than the conscious mind. Synchronicity is not just a product of objective reality, but requires a subject.

She finds the following common patterns among her activists:

a) **feeling different** (p. 151). Some of her participants experienced themselves as outsiders, or as "being in a world not of my own making", or as being very serious, "someone who acted much older than my years" (p. 152).

b) **experiencing cognitive dissonance** or "catching culture in a lie" (p. 153). Paul

> experienced an ambiguous culture that was telling me conflicting messages... once you catch culture in a lie, a lie that is personal...then I think you can move to the next step. You can say `so maybe what they are saying about Saudi Arabia and Vietnam is also a lie: You can start to question (p. 153).

Jim describes how at the age of 7 his "little antennas went up" because of "the expressions on people's faces and the tone of people's voices and how people just dismissed certain things" (p. 154). I believe that in this excerpt Bembow's subject is describing an early moral awareness which I found very common among exemplary individuals.

c) **being noticed**, encouraged and supported by others at just the right time, and/or being mentored by others who are already on a path (p. 157);

d) **exposure to ideas**, specifically ideas that help make connections and understand their experiences (p. 161). Participants mention the role of reading, specific books, getting from one's interaction with others "an intellectual framework" which help orient one's "dance with history", define an identity within a "history and a heritage" (p. 162).

e) **intellectual aptitude** (p. 163).

Bembow believes that the theme of the role of values in "walking" the path reveals the "motivational source" of all the decisions these individuals made (p. 164). The participants identify as their core values love for people, justice, equality. They describe them as:

> ...guided by values of radical participatory democracy...guided by a commitment to social justice, a commitment to fairness, to ending economic and social violence...concerned about relationships between people... learn how to love people... understand political and social justice... (pp. 165-166).

The subjects report a sense of these values always having been with them. Paul says he "always felt, even at a very early age, that [I] should not be associated with violence". Jim feels that, at some level, he has always been a critical thinker, and always reacted to or rejected many of the values around his upbringing. Fourteen participants pointed to "the significance of childhood exposure to religious or spiritual values" (p. 179), and most claimed that they "got their values from their families" (p. 175) and in some cases from their church.

Bembow sees these people as manifesting a tendency to act on and make meaning of their values in new ways often outside or beyond the models available in their socialization process. The subjects seemed to use their values to overcome certain forms of socialization. For example, Jim's father had a strong environmental awareness

and sense of fairness but was politically conservative. His parents socialized Jim to work in spite of the family being well off, and to being fair. "Was it their intention that his concept of fairness be extended to giving away all his money" (p. 173)? In the same way, nothing in Clara May's socialization experience prepared her to refuse the award from the Governor for her essay because it had been changed, all the more that she could "hear [my] Mama crying in the back of the auditorium" and she knew her Mama had "caught hell" to be at the ceremony (p. 174).

Bembow concludes that her interviewees were all in one way or another engaged in continuing the ideals of the Enlightenment, (i.e. humanism, freedom and equality). They upheld the fundamental dignity and value of every individual, and "sought a social order based on more freedom and more equitable relationships among people" (p. 187-188). Each of her subjects only gradually came to realize, as a result of their values and ensuing activities, that they were radicals. In a sense, they were all "recruited", as she chooses to call their sense of mission which transcends immediate circumstances. This finding strikes me as describing adequately the paths of Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars as well.

Bembow's study brings into focus two important value-related issues. First, she interprets the presence of a "consistent set of core or fundamental values" (p. 164) in

the lives of her activists from a very early age as "**basic moral principles and instincts**" (Keniston, 1968 cited in Bembow, p. 203). She sees in them Jungian archetypes which have been present in human culture and history; which arise "at a much deeper level than the conscious mind" (p. 194), and which, in the form of "symbols and metaphors play an a priori role in our meaning-making" (p. 206). Her understanding of these **core values** is reminiscent to some of the approaches to values discussed in the previous section.

Second, Bembow emphasizes the potential significance of the value systems from which the individuals she studied operated. The core values driving all the participants are the same values that Colby & Damon' (1992) found spurring moral exemplars. Whether these values were acquired through explicit contact with one of the world's religions, or they were implicitly embedded in the ethical matrix of family life, they became a "generative... motivational source to" all the decisions these individuals made (Bembow, p. 164). Colby & Damon find that, over the course of a life-time, these values both underwent progressive re-examination and re-defining, and retained enduring centrality in these people's lives.

Bembow believes that the lives of these individuals reveal the importance of being in touch with what she calls our real values, and acting "out of our values openly and consciously" (p. 211), which builds true commitment and

gives a sense of home-coming. Bembow's understanding of **the development of CC as an unfolding of "real values"** suggests an approach to **values as something that we inherently possess and have to learn to be in touch with.** This approach is **supported by the main insights from the values discourse** discussed earlier in this chapter. I believe it does not conflict with a **developmental understanding of the evolving dialogue between the self and these archetypal values, and their progressive redefining through life.** I will return to a more careful examination of this process in chapter 4.

Bembow sees this unfolding of consciousness as resting

> on a specific set of complementarities: the ability to break out of externalized authority and use self as a basis for one's moral conduct; the ability to transcend the imprinting and socializing aspects of reality as it is already given (i.e. to realize that reality is constructed and therefore re-constructable) (p. 202),

as well as to find in oneself and in present reality the creative energy to reconstruct. In spite of Bembow's claim that CC is not a developmental phenomenon but an altered consciousness, her findings indicate a developmental process. Her study offers valuable insights on the dynamic interplay between person and environment in the unfolding of a CC person.

Bembow highlights the parallels of some of her findings with those of Keniston's (1968) study of young radicals. Keniston also finds a sense of specialness in his interviewees, a sense of being different. He identifies the

same set of basic moral principles (justice, decency, equality, responsibility, non-violence, fairness) at the heart of commitments, rather than any formal and elaborated philosophy.

On re-analyzing the five case studies which Bembow offers, I gained some further insights. Her activists reveal a remarkable tendency to be in touch with their feelings from early on, as well as a compelling internal need to be truthful and morally consistent. There also seems to be a clear inner standard of truthfulness, a strong inner voice and moral imperative. Along with their greater awareness, these people show a strong sensitivity and tendency to be responsive to others (greater empathy). Dissonance seems to automatically activate their moral imperative even in childhood, and they show what Colby & Damon refer to as "habitual moral response". Their developmental path to adulthood and as adults seems to be mostly about becoming conscious of and naming these experiences, as well as transforming them into a consistent personal philosophy. All of this suggests that Bembow's findings may be pointing even beyond the frame of reference within which she interprets them, as well as to more complex forms of integrating one's social experience than those offered by the critical paradigm. In other words, the results of her research are both generative, and in need of further examination.

Since I have relied on secondary case studies of social activists in hypothesizing the main components of CC and their development through the life-span, it seems important to review briefly the several different theories within which a psychological analysis of the consciousness of activists has been attempted. I will rely on Bembow's (1994) comprehensive literature review.

Theories Dealing with Social Activism

In her effort to understand better **the consciousness that underlies liberatory praxis**, Bembow (1994 focuses on social activists defined as individuals "concerned with issues of societal change and whose activism is much broader than political party or electoral politics" (p. 20). Her research draws on several bodies of literature: generational theories, psychoanalytic and developmental approaches, personality theories, and a variety of contextual studies. I will touch briefly on the main insights of each of these, as they may be helpful in constructing the hypothetical developmental model of CC and analyzing the interview data.

Generational Theories

The efforts to understand the motivation that underlies social change can be summarized into the functionalist approach and the structural-historical approach. The functionalist approach emphasizes **the role of adolescent rebellion in the period of identity formation**, as well as

the Oedipus complex, i.e. the desire to kill the father (Erikson, 1963). This view helps me **differentiate between adolescent revolt and CC** in coding my interviews. Bembow's (1994) own findings show that the people who committed themselves to liberatory praxis for life were moved by a great deal more than revolt, and that **the structure of their CC revealed the life-long centrality of values, not of age-specific revolt**.

The historical approach, represented in Manheim's (see Bembow, 1994) work, focuses on the formation of a new consciousness around generational cohorts, generational units, and historical uniqueness. It describes a socialization process between generational cohorts which is never complete, and which allows the "fresh contact with the socio-historical milieu" (p. 26) to generate new consciousness, i.e. to "work up" (p. 26) differently the different historical experience and arrive at "new thought patterns, modes of behavior, and values" (p. 27). **This understanding of consciousness helps understand "change agents within generational units"** (p. 26) in terms of **the responsibility they feel to redefine socio-historical questions and solutions**. It also sheds light on content issues such as values and their historical redefining. It does not address the more universally applicable questions around consciousness raised by Freire.

Empirical studies of left wing activists in the 1960s found that these people did not dramatically change their convictions in later life, and that their life styles distinguish them from nonactivists.

> They are more likely to be found in the educational or social service professions. Their career histories do not indicate strong upward mobility. Their average income is less than that of persons of similar age or socioeconomic and educational background, and this seems to be a result of conscious and deliberate choice on their part. They have rejected many of the occupational and familial commitments of nonactivists from their own generation (McAdams, 1982, cited in Bembow, 1994, p. 28).

In direct contrast, it was found by Braungart and Braungart (1990) that right wing activists, who also retained their beliefs later in life, exhibited a very different life style, and "settled into prestigious and influential positions in national and state level politics" (Bembow, 1994, p. 29). These findings which clearly reflect basic values, are helpful in making sense of my interview data. They also help me **differentiate CC as centered around fundamental values of equality and justice from all kinds of political activism which may or may not reflect that center.**

Another helpful finding in terms of the contextual understanding of my interview data is that of the historical period effect. It proposes that "groups and individuals within a society respond to the existing social climate " (Bembow, p. 29), and that a more conservative or more liberal climate will influence the tendency of individuals

to think in certain ways. Although this effect may not affect the structures of thought, and may not even be statistically significant in terms of the sifting of perspectives and beliefs, it still helps **approach the data from a historically-aware point of view.** I examine my interview data against the **background of a current historical context characterized by profound global changes and polarization of interests.**

The literature on socialization which Bembow reviews offers a variety of partial explanations of the phenomenon of activism. The "new class" theory (Flacks, 1990) argues for the **socio-economic basis of activism** as a result of the existence within the middle class of a sub-group of people "proud of their intellect, [who] disdained conventional mass culture and imbued their children with a desire to serve humanity as opposed to acquiring wealth and status" (Bembow, 1994, p. 33). In contrast to this claim, Bembow's activists and Colby & Damon's (1992) moral exemplars, who all share a **common value - an urge to serve humanity**, do **not** show a **trend of belonging to a particular socio-economical class or group**, but come from all walks of life. Hence, I believe that this value has little to do with socio-economic class, although some class conditions may tend to foster it more than others.

Another study explains activism through the concept of "**crystallization of parental influence**" (DeMartini, 1983,

cited in Bembow, p. 34). I.e., although it may seem that activists of the 60s represent a break from their parents, they operate out of an effort "to bring the values of their parents to a logical conclusion" (Bembow, p.34), taking them in their pure form and carrying them further in a way that those values do not operate in their parents' lives. This finding directly points to **independent individual reconstruction of originally transmitted values, an important part of my definition of CC**. The lives of Bembow's and Colby & Damon's exemplars offer abundant evidence of such a reconstruction of internalized value orientations.

Psychological Approaches

Within these there are three different angles of understanding: the psychanalytical, the developmental, and the personality approaches. The psychoanalytical approach to understanding "radicals as deviant" (Bembow, p. 38) does not seem helpful to me since it roots efforts to bring about progressive change in pathology, namely in an unresolved Oedipal complex or mother separation neurosis. Although issues of authority and the sublimation of conflict may have some relevance, they seem to be continuously re-negotiated in the life of exemplars within much broader and more complex systems of meaning.

The developmental approach to the empirical study of radical social activists in the 60s, however, has produced some important studies, of which I will briefly review one.

Hampden-Turner (1970) portrays "both the social activist of the 1960s and radical ideology as developmentally advanced", encompassing "the attributes of perception, self-esteem and ego-development, risk-taking, capacity for intimacy and empathy, and moral reasoning" (Bembow, p. 42).

> His model [of psycho-social development] not only organizes thousands of individual research findings from nearly two hundred research studies, but it conceptualizes a large number of contemporary social and political events: student rebellion, Vietnam protest, the psychology of violence and militarism, the vogue of "sensitivity training", the anomie which plagues advanced industrial society, and the destructive effect of technology upon our lives (Hampden-Turner, p. iii).
>
> All of his evidence points to a depiction of the social activist as an individual who is more creative, competent, self-affirming, empathic, tolerant and loving; more willing to take risk, question authority and tradition, and act on moral principles than other humans (Bembow, p. 42).

The findings of this study converge with my understanding of CC as a whole-person phenomenon, as well as with the components of CC which I identify. The question still remains how these configurations come about and what transformations they undergo. My work on CC attempts to subject such findings to a more consistent structural developmental analysis.

Studies of personality and socio-political behavior offer some helpful insights, with personality understood as a "multidimensional concept" including affect, behavior, cognition, values, and "other belief systems about truth and social reality" (Bembow, p. 45). Among them are Fromm's

(1941) concept of the authoritarian personality, followed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford's (1950) study, The authoritarian personality. The F-scale they construct focuses on the Fascist personality and associates it with traits such as

> dislike and mistrust of minorities and other individuals who deviated from standardized social norms, (b) obedience to authorities such as parents, the church and the state, and (c) belief in the superiority of one's own group.... In this study, as well a number of subsequent studies, high F-scale scores correlated with both conservative beliefs and social attitudes, and with conservative political affiliations. Low F-scale scores were found to correlate with radical beliefs and social attitudes, and with radical or liberal political affiliations (Bembow, p.47).

Eysenck (1981) found that individuals at both extremes of the political and ideological spectrum possess these traits, although other research (Stone, 1980) shows that they are less common on the radical end of the continuum. Rokeach (1960, 1973), in his study of open-mindedness versus close-mindedness, concludes that at the heart of variations in political ideology lie "opposite value orientations concerning the political desirability or undesirability of freedom and equality in all their ramifications" (Bembow, p. 49). Finally, O'Neil et al (1988) used the I-E scale (Rotter et al, 1962) to find out the reasons for involvement in causes that do not directly affect individuals' lives. The results showed a significant relationship between "a sense of personal power, a values commitment to justice coupled with a belief that the world is unjust" (Bembow, p. 59).

These findings highlight **the central role of values in CC**, bringing into focus the fact that it is **not just how one thinks but what one believes that accounts for a person becoming a moral and caring agent in his/her world.** They also confirm one of the fundamental assumptions of my hypothetical model for the development of CC, namely that certain values contain in themselves the potential to spur social-cognitive growth while others would be more likely to deter further development.

In the next section, I examine the literature on cognitive-developmental psychology in order to connect the above insights with issues of intellectual, epistemological, ego development, and overall noetic development.

Developmental Models That Help Understand CC

I approach the study of CC from a basic Piagetian constructivist perspective on the nature and origin of knowledge. This approach allows a more rigorous developmental exegesis of Freire's (1973) understanding of CC as establishing conscious relationships with one's world, understanding causality, and being permeable to dynamic social influences, while developing a sense of historical perspective and choice.

My Piagetian approach to personality transformations is colored by a larger Vygotskian frame of reference which attempts to capture both the direct and the indirect,

mediated and diffuse effects of the social world on individual development. The Vygotskian developmental approach helps understand the role of the internalization of social realities in the formation of consciousness (Wertsch, 1985), and the development of cognition in the process of shared productive activity with adults from the community (Cole & Scribner, 198 ; Rogoff & Lave, 1984). This Vygotskian approach sheds a great deal of light on the internalization of moral and spiritual values through immediate environments, which is relevant to the formation of a moral sense of identity central to my definition of CC.

Hence, I see my preliminary thought as part of a recent tendency, discussed by Tudge & Winterhoff (1993), to build on the commonalities and mutually-complementing aspects of Piaget's and Vygotsky's perspectives on individual cognitive development in an effort to draw on the undeveloped possibilities of combining the contextualist and the organismic developmental paradigms. My thinking about CC has been informed by a wide range of neo-Piagetian models describing different aspects of adult development.

Social-Cognitive Development

A model which helps understand the developmental progression in cognitive complexity that underlies the emergence and gradual expansion of CC, is Weinstein & Alschuler's (1985) model for the development of self-

knowledge. It has the potential to shed some light on the cognitive microsteps involved in Freire's (1973) definition of CC. Three of the five components of Freire's definition were critical analysis of causality, responsibility to grasp the historical themes of the time, and conscious, responsible relationships with reality, i.e. agency. All three seem to require at different levels a basic ability to identify patterns in one's relationships with the social world, i.e. consistency across situations and stable internal responses to those situations, as well as a measure of self-reflection and a basic sense of being something more than a recipient of circumstance, having the choice to take a more active role in understanding, predicting and even choosing circumstances.

Weinstein & Alschuler's model traces the emergence of that ability through Elemental, Situational, Pattern and Transformational self-knowledge. They describe how people come to know about themselves through progressively redefining their accounts of the social situations in which they find themselves, as well as their role and place in those situations. I find this approach helpful in the following way. As Freire points out, we are beings of relationships; we come to know ourselves and our world to the degree to which we understand our relationships to ourselves and the world. Hence, our progressive cognitive ability to make sense of social situations and of our place

in them is directly relevant to our ability to be engaged with the world as moral and caring agents.

Weinstein & Alschuler describe Elemental self-knowledge as a rudimentary way of knowing oneself, characterized by "overt, external, observable" experiences "recounted in a fragmented list of juxtaposed elements" (p. 20), without drawing them together into a single, coherent, named situation. "The elements are not causally linked, classified, or interpreted", and the person's inner state has to be inferred because it is not explicitly present. The capacity to learn from such experiences is severely restricted.

The achievement of Situational self-knowledge is the ability to pull elements together and describe a whole situation, lasting from a few minutes to months or years, "although the phenomena described are still primarily external". The individual's experience and role in these situations may be described through global subjective states which "lack differentiated nuances", with "no reported consistencies across situations", no recognized relationships between situations (p.21). Hence, I would add that these subjective experiences are rather passive and suggest that one is primarily the receiver of situations.

Pattern self-knowledge brings about descriptions of "stable internal responses that are reactions to a class of situations or result in a class of situations" (p.21). With

that comes an ability to predict probable reactions, and eventually a description of not just overt patterns of behaviors but also of covert patterns - personality traits, psychological characteristics, dispositions, ongoing inner conflicts. I.e., the hallmark of this stage is self-reflection. At this point, the individual can be something more than a recipient of circumstances; they can take on a more active role in understanding, predicting, and perhaps even choosing circumstances.

Transformational self-knowledge describes how people "consciously monitor, modify, or manage their inner patterns of response... the repertoire of inner processes they use to alter their inner life" (p. 21). Hence, individuals can now fully be agents and consciously reinterpret situations in order to create different inner states, a very important capacity which Gandhi (1927) uses as a central strategy in his most trying encounters with social contradictions.

Hence, I hypothesize that the emergence of CC requires the ability to identify patterns in one's social environment, and the evolution of CC is related to the evolving ability to understand and reflect on one's place and role in more complex social and historical patterns. It would also be related to the growing sense of agency accompanying the movement toward Transformational self-knowledge. Weinstein & Alschuler's Elemental/Situational/Pattern/Transformational metaphor

serves as a helpful frame of reference to sort out the cognitive understanding of social situations and one's place in them that operates at a particular time.

Another helpful frame of reference is Commons et al's (1990) General Stage Theory, which combines a fine-grained analysis of logical and causal reasoning, as they precede the development of moral and political dimensions. The model traces the emergence and elaboration of abstract thought through Abstract, Formal, Systematic, Metasystematic, and Paradigmatic Operations, and informs my thinking of CC as an aspect of adult social intelligence. Commons' description of the emerging ability to understand abstract variables in one's social environment seems to underlie the ability to identify patterns. The progression he describes offers a detailed understanding of how the social patterns one can identify become increasingly broader and more complex.

Epistemological Development

In trying to understand the evolving ways of seeing the world, knowledge, and values, I have also relied on Perry's (1968) model of intellectual and epistemological development, which describes the movement from a fundamentally dualistic world picture, through multiplistic thinking to contextual relativism. I find very helpful the compassionate and dynamic way in which Perry (1991) describes

> the variety and ingenuity of the ways students found to move from a familiar pattern of meanings that had failed them to a new vision that promised to make sense of their broadening experience, while it also threatened them with unanticipated implications for their selfhood and their lives (p. 78).

I will not go into a detailed description of the nine positions and the transitions between them which Perry (1991) describes, since I will not be doing a detailed analysis of the reasoning of my subjects. I will simply rely on the fundamental distinctions between dualism, multiplicity, relativism, and commitment in relativism. Here is how Perry (1991) describes them:

> Dualism: Division of meaning in two realms-Good versus Bad, Right versus Wrong, We versus They, All that is not Success is Failure, and the like. Right Answers exist somewhere for every problem, and authorities know them.... Knowledge is quantitative. Agency is experienced as `out there' in Authority, test scores, the Right job. Multiplicity: Diversity of opinion and values is recognized as legitimate in areas where the right answers are not yet known. Opinions remain atomistic without pattern or system. No judgements can be made.... Relativism: Diversity of opinion, values, and judgement derived from coherent sources...allowing for analysis and comparison. Some opinions may be found worthless, while there will remain matters about which reasonable people will reasonably disagree. Knowledge is qualitative, dependent on contexts. Commitment: An affirmation, choice, or decision...made in the awareness of Relativism.... Agency is experienced as within the individual (pp. 79-80).

Kitchener & King's (1990) Reflective Judgement Model extends Perry's approach into a more detailed understanding of the assumptions about knowledge, its availability and ways to reach or construct it, which people bring to every

real-life situation. These assumptions appear to be what Freire (1973) tried to work with in his education for CC and empowerment. Hence, the way this model redefines critical thinking as a larger task than logical reasoning, dependent on context and contextual support, the nature of the problem, and the individual's assumptions, and optimal or functional level of functioning, allows for a better understanding of the complexity of people's real-life behavior.

Ego Development

My effort to understand how human beings respond to and engage with their world requires an examination of evolving ego-systems. The main context in which I examine the evolution of self as it relates to CC, is Kegan's (1982) Self/Other model of epistemological development, which describes how the way people make sense of their immediate environment depends on the zone of personal meanings, in which the definitions of what is self and what is other are constructed and reconstructed. I believe that people's expanding perspectives on what constitutes the self are at the core of the way individuals relate to their larger socio-political and historical environment as well. Therefore, I apply Kegan's levels of consciousness in trying to understand the ontogenesis of self as a socio-historical construction.

Kegan (1982) describes with compassion the evolutionary truces in "the basic organization of the psychological self['s]... emotional, motivational, and psychodynamic organizations, as well as the now familiar cognitive and sociomoral ones" (p. 74). This evolution involves

> a succession of qualitative differentiations of the self from the world, with a qualitatively more extensive object with which to be in relation... successive triumphs of `relationship to' rather than `embeddedness in' (p. 77).

The concept of the self progressively extricating itself from embeddedness in its context and continuously redefining its relationship with its world evokes Freire's understanding of CC. Kegan's theory helps describe in specific developmental terms the four types of social consciousness Freire examined. The main metaphor that Kegan uses is **the movement from being** one's impulses, needs, relationships, etc, **to having** them, implying the gaining of perspective on them and the ability to consciously redefine them. He sees this continuous evolutionary activity as "the fundamental ground of personality" and the phenomenological "source of our emotions" (1982, p. 81). As Kegan points out, this approach views cognition and affect as the two sides of the same process, and allows a more holistic approach to the understanding of human functioning in the world. It also argues for "new forms of emotions" (Kegan, Noam, Rogers, 1982, p. 126) to be expected at each developmental level.

I find most helpful the three adult systems of meaning Kegan identifies, Interpersonal, Institutional, Interindividual, as well as well as the microsteps in the movement between them. The Interpersonal meaning system regulates individual needs into "a single point of view", and evolves the ability to construct "mutually reciprocal relations built around trust rather than fair exchange" (Kegan & Lahey, 1984, p. 203). Relationships become intrinsically valuable and an inner dialogue around them emerges. The Interpersonal self is embedded in an interpersonal reality and lacks a separate sense of self. The movement toward the Institutional self implies the gaining of self which can author itself autonomously and "which maintains a coherence across a shared psychological space and so achieves an identity" (Kegan, 1982, p. 100). The self has for the first time become a system, embedded in its own organization and maintenance, lacking "the capacity for self-correction, for reflecting on the fundamental purpose of the organization" (Kegan & Lahey, 1984, p. 204). In terms of CC, I understand that to mean that the critical analysis performed will be mostly outward-bound, directed to the social environment. Hence, this stage is very ideological,

> a truth for a faction, a class, a group. And it probably requires the recognition of a group...to come into being; either the tacit ideological support of American institutional life, which is most supportive to the institutional evolution of white males, or the more explicit ideologies in

> support of a disenfranchised social class, gender, or race (Kegan, 1982, p. 102).

I rely on this understanding when I examine the formation of a sense of social identity. The movement to a post-Institutional system implies the discovery of a wider context beyond self-government, opening oneself up to a process, transcending the

> the self-sealing logic which insures that no matter how much information is taken in or how a conflict is resolved, the system's operating principle is always preserved. In the post-Institutional System of meaning the prevailing principle of organization is not ultimate, and a predetermined orientation to conflict and information is transcended (Kegan & Lahey, 1984, p. 204).

The individual is progressively able to reflect upon and coordinate his/her self and to construct a new kind of community,

> not as fellow-instrumentalists (ego stage 2 nor as partners in fusion (ego stage 3), nor as loyalists (ego stage 4), but as individuals - people who are known ultimately in relation to their actual or potential recognition of themselves and others as value-originating, system-generating, history-making individuals. The community is for the first time a `universal' one in that all persons, by virtue of their being persons, are eligible for membership (Kegan, 1982, p. 104).

This description of an Interindividual self helps to understand the progressive expansion of CC and the increasing role of self-reflection in it. Overall, Kegan's definitions of an Imperial, Interpersonal, Institutional, and Interindividual self, as well as the sixteen transitional stages between them, as defined in his manual

(Lahley, 1988), offer significant insights into the progressive self/other distinctions underlying the types of social consciousness Freire (1973) describes.

Semi-intransitive consciousness could be understood in terms of an early Imperial self unable to detach itself from its most immediate needs. The question arises, then, does the whole Imperial period have to be characterized by this inability or are there certain values that can be taught which can help even an Imperial self move towards some expanding of horizons. Freire's description of naive transitive consciousness evokes for me the basic characteristics of the early Interpersonal self. Fanaticized consciousness reminds of an entrenched conventional interpersonal identification with myths and dogmas related to the tendency to adapt dominating over the tendency to inquire into contradictions. According to Freire, fanaticized consciousness is not a necessary and unavoidable development. However, it seems to occur in that particular point in development, the Interpersonal self, which characterizes the functioning of two-thirds of the adult population. That may be a way to understand why we come across varieties of fanaticized consciousness every day in our lives. Fanaticized consciousness may in fact be a common variation of conventional thinking, a consciousness dominated by and interpersonally identified with particular internalized voices. The question, then, is what makes the

tendency to adapt dominate in some individuals over the tendency to inquire into contradictions; or, what makes some individuals freer than others to move in the direction of CC.

Rogers & Kegan's (1991) work in developmental psychopathology provides a context to understand developments such as fanaticized consciousness. The authors study the potential landmines in the transitions from an Imperial to an Interpersonal to an Institutional self, and show how the developmental changes in self-organization that are being negotiated at every level can turn into developmental traps. As I showed in my discussion of fanaticized consciousness above, the very movement toward interpersonal identification with shared realities and values, if happening in particular social contexts, may result in a fossilization. In their examination of the developmental characteristics of different kinds of leaders, Kegan & Lahey (1984) show how the Interpersonal and Institutional meaning systems can account for exclusive loyalties and problematic political decisions and social behaviors, such as the Watergate scandal, the Boston busing crisis, or the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Mideast.

Kegan's model touches to some degree on the emotional-motivational aspect of CC. In developmental terms, Kegan (1992) speaks of shifts occurring as a result of the "fatigue" of experiencing the limits of the previous balance

and the courage to redefine. However, a fuller understanding of why some people fall prey to fanaticized consciousness while others develop CC requires the thorough inclusion of the independent component of moral motivation as it develops out of particular contexts and impacts development. The implications from Kegan's model suggest that the preconditions for the emergence of CC are negotiated mostly within all the levels and substages of the Imperial and Interpersonal selves, and the emergence of CC itself requires the emergence of an Institutional self - stage 3(4) or 3/4 (Lahley et al, 1988).

Another helpful frame of reference to understand the ego-systems out of which individuals think of their lives and choices is Cook-Greuter's (1990) revised Loevinger (1970) stages. According to Cook-Greuter, 11% of the average American adult population scores at the preconventional stages 1 through Delta/3, which reflect the child's normal development till about 12. The presocial, stage 1 "nonverbal, need-oriented, helpless" adults, "unaware of themselves as separate entities", resurrect many of Freire's encounters with Brazilian peasants. I did not come across such individuals. However, I saw what appeared to be impulsive stage 2 thinking, reflected in "the first-person perspective" around "concerns with safety and the gratification of basic needs", as well as self-protective stage Delta thinking of adults "who see the world only from

the perspective of their own wants", "are incapable of insight into themselves or others", and exhibit the beginning of "purposeful social interaction" around "an `I win/you lose' mentality". I also encountered adult examples of the rule-oriented Delta/3 stage which discovers the second-person perspective around "concrete and external aspects of self and others only" (p. 87).

The majority of my sample seemed to reflect what Cook-Greuter considers to be 80% of the average adult American population, i.e. conformist stage 3, the self-aware stage 3/4, and the conscientious stage 4. The conformist reveals an early adolescent frame of mind, a sense of dependency, and an effort to define oneself solely in relation to close others, accompanied by total acceptance of in-groups and rejection of deviance and out-groups. Hence, I include the conformist ego system in the range of Pre-CC.

The self-aware 3/4 marks the emergence of third-person perspective including an ability to look at, and an effort to differentiate, oneself and define personhood. Cook-Greuter identifies in stage 3/4 the ability for Abstract Operations (Commons et al, 1990). I believe this stage represents roughly the developmental threshold for the emergence of CC, a hypothetical claim to be explored by further research.

The conscientious stage 4 "adds the concept of time...to the third-person perspective and expands the

meaningful social context to others within the same society with similar ideologies and aspirations" (p. 88). Introspection emerges, together with fully developed formal operations, and individuals believe in linear causality, progress as a result of the proper analytical approach.

Since only 9% of the average American adult population exhibits postconventional development, the emergence of CC at the conventional level is going to be more of a concern in this study than the later transformations of CC at the postconventional level. Nevertheless, Cook-Greuter's account of the individualistic 4/5 ego-system, the autonomous 5, the postautonomous 5/6, and the integrated stage 6 are important in understanding the continuum between the social consciousness of some activists and moral exemplars and that of ordinary people.

The individualistic ego-system discovers "the fourth-person perspective", i.e. the uniqueness of personal experience at different times and in different contexts, the possibility of personal distortions and the impossibility to be objective, the need to move away from socially sanctioned "role-identities" and redefine oneself independently. This ego-system operates out of a systemic understanding. The autonomous self develops metasystematic thinking and is therefore able to expand the fourth-person perspective by appreciating how people's experiences differ in the context of different societies and lifetimes. This self achieves

generativity, the ability and commitment to define for oneself a meaningful life of self-actualization.

The postautonomous 5/6 stage "describes the individual who has become aware of the paradigm of a consciousness that incorporates an ever-larger realm of experience and thought"; "the rational self has become conscious of itself and experiences its own boundedness as a constructed object" (p. 91). Understanding at the level of paradigmatic operations allows individuals to perceive their own insignificance in the totality of human experience, to appreciate the paradoxes of existence, and to experience transcendence. Cook-Greuter calls these individuals "postautonomous free agents" who "pursue their self-chosen lifepaths alone and with commitment" (pp. 92-93), and do not believe in the possibility of achieving truth since they recognize everything as a construct. In contrast, the integrated, universal stage 6 marks the evolving of a new paradigm within which human existence and consciousness are understood.

> Integrated persons have the ability to look at themselves and at others in terms of the passing of ages, of near and far in geographical, social, cultural, historical, intellectual, and developmental dimensions.... They can cherish the essence in the seemingly most undifferentiated beings and feel at one with them. They respect the humanity in others and, therefore, do not need them to be different than they are...from a unitary point of view, higher stages are not better than lower ones because all are necessary parts of interconnected human reality.... Truth is imminent in the universe and can be apprehended in

> this ready, open-process stance, but it cannot be rationally conquered (pp. 93-94).

Cook-Greuter draws an important parallel between stages of individual ego development and dominant paradigms through history. I see this parallel as important in beginning to understand the collective paradigms which provide the context for the formation of adult social consciousness. Her analysis provides a way to tie this discussion back to some of the points it began with, i.e. levels of critical and philosophical thought. Cook-Greuter writes:

> `Objectivity' (the denial of subject/object interrelationship) is a necessary condition for the abstract reasoning and the kind of scientific, rational analysis that becomes fully developed at the formal operational stage 4. Starting in the Renaissance, individuals perceived their ability to penetrate and investigate the laws of nature as evidence of the unique position of *homo sapiens* in creation. By most Western expectations, fully functional adults see and treat reality as something preexistent and external to themselves made up of permanent, well-defined objects that can be analyzed, investigated, and made to serve humanity. This view is based on a maximal separation between subject and object, thinker and thought. It epitomizes the scientific frame of mind that is concerned with control, measurement, and prediction and represents the terminus of much Western socialization.... With the discovery of the systemic nature of reality and the importance of context and interpretation at stage 4/5, the process toward a more moderate view of humankind and its position in nature is under way. The doors to other views of reality are opened (p. 96).

I understand that to mean that in the collective evolution of our understanding of the world there is room for paradigms which reflect the world in even more complex and adequate ways than modern positivistic (stage 4)

consciousness, and postmodern (stage 4/5) deconstructionist, interpretive and critical frames of reference. I will take up this point again in my discussion chapter. For now, it is important to understand that Cook-Greuter (1990) traces the evolution of world view from logical (3/4 and 4) to psychological (4/5 and 5) to metaphysical (5/6 and 6) in terms of what provides "the sense of permanency" (p. 97). In the logical world view the sense of permanency comes from "the logical construct of the permanent object"; in the psychological world view it comes from "the psychological construct of the ego"; in the metaphysical world view it shifts "from the self into the cosmos" (p. 97). These distinctions will be helpful in making sense of my interview data.

Noetic Development

A developmental model which has profoundly influenced my work in its later stages is Wade's (1996) holonomic approach to developmental theory. Her book, Changes of Mind, has recently provided a coherent context for many of the hunches and "unorthodox" questions I was entertaining with regards to traditional developmental accounts as my work progressed. Her holonomic theory of the evolution of consciousness brings together a large body of research from developmental psychology, brain research, new-paradigm

studies, and mysticism. As Michael Washburn points out in the editorial comments, she

> extends the boundaries of development in a way that leads us to rethink the nature of consciousness and the relation of consciousness to the brain.

Wade's (1996) model of noetic[1] development has served as a general baseline, against the background of which I explore the possibilities for the development of CC. This choice is due to the fact that hers is the most recent integrated developmental model which subsumes most other developmental theories, and, to my knowledge, the first one which focuses on the study of consciousness as a unifying structure. Although Kegan's (1982) model claims to describe levels of consciousness, it in fact describes ego development.

Wade examines the stages of development of consciousness rather than its derivatives, along spatio-temporal organization, personhood, and motivation. She differentiates ten stages of consciousness: Pre- and Perinatal, Reactive, Naive, Egocentric, Conformist, Achievement or Affiliative (alternative developments), Authentic, Transcendent, Unity consciousness, and After-Death consciousness. Below, I will review briefly the ones that pertain to my study of CC, as they provide the

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[1] referring to the overall development of the mind (Wade, 1996).

background against which I examine what I consider to be an alternative CC pathway.

Naive Consciousness

Naive consciousness is characterized by synchretic thinking, and reliance on ritual and magic. The young child naturally internalizes what s/he is exposed to, because at this stage "the world is as I see it" (Wade, 1996, p. 77).

This stage of consciousness is dominated by innate self-protective behaviors, the source of which is the lower Reptile brain (the R-complex). A **static, unstimulating, or unstable and hostile early environment**, **lacking larger frames of reference**, may be **instrumental in developmental arrests** into territorial tendencies, display, routinization, deception, and other hard-wired self-protective behaviors.

Familiar forms of related adult arrest are social rigidity, compulsive, ritualistic behavior, proclivity to prejudice and deception, negativism and resistance except to powerful authority, problems with self-awareness, lack of abstraction, ego, and future orientation, silent knowing with its accompanying passivity, reactiveness, and dependency (Wade, 1996). Related developments are the neurotic personality (Maslow, qtd. in Wade, 1996), dependent personality disorder, borderline personality, etc. All of these are examples of the lack of CC in adults.

It is important to remember here Freire's description of naive transitive consciousness in the adults he was

working to empower. He struggled with their sphere of perception which was only slightly larger than biological necessities, and with their limited permeability characterized by a magical quality. The above account of this noetic stage and its dangers sheds some light on Freire's broad-brushstroke descriptions, and on what the micro-developmental movement from this place to CC might involve. This will be further discussed in chapter 5.

Egocentric Consciousness

The movement toward Egocentric consciousness is characterized by the formation of separate self. Individuation and the establishment of boundaries and relationships with others is accompanied by self-centered power struggles. This is a time of high anxiety, pain, and paranoia, as well as aggression and hedonism (Wade, 1996). The nature of Egocentric consciousness can be summarized by "I have the right view of the world" (Wade, 1996, p. 97).

A substantial part of the adult population exhibits varying degrees of **Egocentric arrest in** some domains. That is especially true of **marginalized populations**, people from the inner cities, prisons, the military, etc. (Wade, 1996). Environments which stimulate the perception of the world as hostile and a threat to the self, lead to toughness and misanthropy, and in more extreme cases, to antisocial personality disorders or narcissistic personality. In cases of a little cognitive advancement, i.e. some cortical

overlays of conceptualization, such a manipulative mind frame can even be successful in business, and thus socially rewarded (Wade, 1996).

Conformist Consciousness

The movement toward Conformist consciousness has been described as the emergence of social behavior, since conformity with normative behaviors of all kinds is the basis of socialization. Social roles provide the structures of self-identification, and social behavior tends to be guided by concerns with self-image and reciprocity. Hence, **concerns with truth and justice can easily fall victim of a self-serving tendency to rationalize contradictory choices.** This inclination is due to the fact that thinking is not yet dominated by the cortex but by the limbic brain, which tends to be emotionally reactive and to organize experience into affective polar opposites (Wade, 1996). Hence, **the ability for and inclination toward critical moral examination of both oneself and one's social environment is likely to be limited unless the very social norms which provide the structures of self-identification contain a prominent critical moral aspect.**

The consolidation of Conformist consciousness into a permanent adult formation beyond adolescence is what we know as mainstream consciousness (Wade, 1996). It is governed by a self which identifies with social roles and group membership identities, and exhibits many contradiction

impervious to logic, in spite of a superficial appearance of reasonableness. This kind of consciousness, individual and collective, often creates culture as a particular form of rationalization of limbic emotions; challenges to it and to the self are met with a negative emotional response. The tendency to divide the world into member groups and out-groups, and to stereotype, is a common heuristic. As a result of the overall anxiety for ensuring safety through predictability, there is frequently a controlling, hoarding, and withholding orientation (Wade, 1996). There is a tendency to believe that social differentials created by authority are natural and right.

The dynamics of this kind of consciousness makes it prone to embracing any belief system that can be dogmatized. In some ways, **Conformist mainstream consciousness is the very antithesis of CC**. The need for safety and security, coupled with a tendency to be governed by affect, and to accept quasi-logical arguments in the service of emotional needs, results in a dangerous potential for fanaticism and blind following of extremist leaders who have an emotional appeal (Wade, 1996). **Unless there is a specific strong moral orientation and moral character, the content of normative structures, beliefs and group membership may be secondary to the sense of identity gained.** Hence, any belief system which can be dogmatized, can provide that identity (e.g. human

rights, religion, genocide). Xenophobia may also be a characteristic development. As Wade (1996) points out,

> Transition from the Conformist stage is usually very difficult, because the individual is in a fairly stable equilibrium with his social environment and will tend to rationalize away information that does not align with his world-view or self-image (p. 130).

However, **the solid achievements of this stage**, namely **socialization and respect for conventions**, can develop into a positive social phenomenon. This possibility will be explored in chapter 5.

Achievement/Affiliative Consciousness

According to Wade's (1996) most recent understanding, depending on the primary referent group, hemispheric dominance, and enculturation, this stage of consciousness can manifest itself in two non-sequential variations, Achievement or Affiliative.

Wade describes Achievement consciousness as predominantly characterized by a focus on one's relative position to social power, and a materialistic approach to constructing social roles and rules. The person tends to understand life as a game in which there are winners and losers, and therefore admires the more powerful, successful people, and discounts the unsuccessful ones. This is the approach of the separate knower (Belenky, 1986), who may tend to be manipulative (Graves, qtd. in Wade, 1996) in his/her success and marketing orientation (Fromm, qtd. in Wade, 1996). In more extreme, pathological developments,

that would lead to narcissism and/or Machiavellianism, both of which tend to be rewarded in a capitalist society. Overall, **this kind of consciousness subsumes what we most frequently encounter as non-critical social consciousness.**

In the Affiliative version, people derive their sense of self-esteem from a focus on love which is believed to conquer all. These are mostly sociocentric people, oriented toward building harmony, cooperation, and consensus-based relationships. They value intuition over logic and abstraction; they are connected knowers (Belenky, 1986). In more extreme cases, they may exhibit passive-aggressiveness as a method of non-confrontational manipulation of and control over others, and conflict-avoidance. Their idealism, just like the success orientation of the Achievement people, is limited to the same beliefs in progress and perfectibility within the system. I.e., **both types of consciousness operate within the social system.** Affiliative people, just like Achievement people, exhibit **some stereotypical and demographic categories of thinking**, and deal with exceptions and contingencies.

Overall, according to Wade, the Achievement/Affiliative noetic stage is the norm in Western liberal democratic societies, and is the foundation of secular humanism, which is an expression of both its strengths and its dangers. The strengths come from the ability of the procedural knower (Belenky, 1986) to take perspective on social realities,

evaluate them, and implement one's own understanding, selecting the best, most feasible option from within an infinite range. The danger comes from the tendency of the person to assume his/her own competence, frame of reference, and voice of reason as ultimate, and become ideological. In a secular society, where the human mind is believed to be the source of the best possible solutions, this reliance on the intellect can easily become exaggerated, self-serving, and closed-minded. A typical development is skepticism toward religious/spiritual beliefs.

Authentic Consciousness

As Esser (1974, qtd. in Wade, 1996) points out, up to this point, the noetic pathway from Naive consciousness on is characterized by a painful process of individuation, which leads to all kinds of escapes into a closed mind, unwilling to know itself. Extremes of Egocentric and Achievement consciousness represent escapes into selfish individualism, while extremes of Conformist and Affiliation consciousness represent escapes into mindless other-directedness. Wade (1996) integrates a diverse body of brain research which shows that Authentic consciousness has the alternative ability to be aware of the small minds (R-complex, limbic brain), i.e. aware of its triggers, open to dystonic information, hence more insightful and internally consistent.

The most important characteristic of Authentic consciousness is that it is "free from commonly recognized forms of ego-distorted cognitive and affective perception" (p. 161). As a result of ego maturity, this noetic stage exhibits a readiness to let go of the ego, and hence a marked spiritual dimension abundantly described in the developmental literature. The individual opens to contemplative development as his/her "cognitive and perceptual capacities become universalized beyond individual concerns" (Wade, 1996, p. 174).

A historical and progressively cosmopolitan frame of reference emerges in the general systems thinker. Knowing is probabilistic, and there is the capability to conceptualize abstract historical tendencies as governing the diverse cosm of human experience. Left and right-hemispheric cognition are united into whole-brain original thinking. Hence, infinite options for action are seen, including both linear and holistic ones (Wade, 1995). The individual develops **detachment** as a way to monitor internal patterns to the point where no ego distortions occur, fear and compulsiveness are minimal, and social situations are understood with lucidity. There is an ability to disembed from one's own values and goals and detect their bias, to see oneself as primarily part of the problem rather than only part of the solution. The person can now fully integrate previously compartmentalized sub-identities, and

is generative, tolerant, insightful, and growth oriented. S/he is free of enculturation, committed to a meaningful life through self-actualization, and full of empathy and respect for the personal agency of others (Cook-Greuter, 1991).

Wade (1996) describes people at this stage as able to identify with the whole human race and embrace the human condition. They are critical in the sense of discerning and clear-sighted, not condemning. They are general systems thinkers and radical innovators with broad social concerns with justice, a critical moral understanding of historical contexts. They exhibit true empathy, genuine tolerance, and habitual insightful introspection. They progressively operate out of an emerging holonomic understanding, which includes paradoxes as it stands in dialogue with history.

The developmental models reviewed above have allowed me to evolve a composite understanding of the development of structures of thought involved in the ontogeny of CC. I will return to a more specific description of composite development in chapter 5.

Summary of the Literature Review

As has hopefully become obvious by now, each of the five bodies of literature, reviewed in this chapter, has important understanding to offer to an integrated interdisciplinary account of the formation of morally and

socially responsible adult consciousness. The task of this study is to develop a beginning understanding of the mechanisms and interrelationships along which all the above-reviewed dimensions of human consciousness and behavior come together.

The literature review has shown that the interaction between social context, personality and social behavior can most productively be understood within the frame of individual social-cognitive development and moral values. The review also reveals extensive convergence of various branches of research in describing the dimensions of tension characteristic of social consciousness. They are:

1. the tendency to take limited socio-cultural reality for absolute and lack a historical perspective versus the tendency to **examine** it **critically** and **view it as humanly constructed and reconstructed**;

2. the tendency to compartmentalize socio-cultural reality versus the tendency to **seek interconnections** between different segments of moral and cultural, community and social life, and to try to **integrate one's public and private self**;

3. the tendency to feel trapped in the compartments of socio-cultural reality, delegate responsibility and isolate oneself versus the **sense of agency** across social and cultural experience.

I see these tension as characterizing respectively the relative absence or presence of CC in people's lives and ways of being. This high level of convergence in the literature concerning the central dimensions of social consciousness provides a foundational background to my study of the ontogeny of CC in the life-span. In chapter 4, I return to the dimensions of convergence identified by this literature review, hypothesize the relationship between them, and begin to examine this hypothesis in the lives of Gandhi and other secondary exemplars, in order to develop the hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC and examine it against the interview data.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODS

The above review of the literature that informs the hypothetical construct of CC provides the context within which my thinking about CC has developed. The scope of this study has required an open, evolving methodology. I rely on a deductive-inductive "bootstrapping" approach (Habermas, 1979; Loevinger, 1976; Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) in order to establish the points at which the above literatures intersect in describing the ability, opportunity, and inclination to disembed from one's immediate cultural, political, and social environment, engage in a critical moral dialogue with it, and actively define one's place with respect to it. This deductive-inductive approach is combined with with an effort to build grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) relying on qualitative primary and secondary empirical data.

The above approach attempts to reconcile the split between the theoretico-deductive historical European tradition, and the empirical-research orientation of the American tradition. My training in the two distinct research traditions makes me inclined to adopt Jacoby's (1975) claim that only to the degree that psychology studies the society and culture of which it is a part, does it become critical psychology, able to contribute to the theory and praxis of liberation, social and human transformation.

Hence, I approach the study of CC is an integrative psychological construct which describes the ontogenesis of self as a socio-historical construction, and the evolving social self. The current study maintains an on-going dialogue between different macro and micro theoretical discourses on the one hand, and secondary case studies and primary empirical data on the other. The resulting dialogue highlights the convergence between findings in different areas of research, and allows for a normative interdisciplinary understanding of CC as a dimension of citizenship.

The study, the way I conceptualized it, diverges from the "cult of empiricism" of American mainstream psychology, within which "empirical is often used as though it meant objective, quantitative, or even scientific" (Newton, 1995, p. 147). It tends in the direction of the kind of naturalistic empiricism which characterized much of the foundational work in the social sciences in the 19th century (Newton, 1995), as well as Piaget's own work. In some ways, however, it both relies on that tradition and transcends it. What this study attempts is part of an overall effort to evolve a new level of integration of theoretical and empirical understanding at the turn of the 20th century, as the physical sciences are confronting us with the need for an epistemological shift.

The compartmentalization of sciences throughout the 20th century, and the self-serving academic myth of objectivity which confounds the ideology of secular humanism with an "objective" approach (Aull, 1988), are both giving way as quantum physics, field and chaos theory, and holography are changing our current understanding of reality. It is becoming increasingly obvious, as Wade (1996) points out, that the classical Newtonian empiricist paradigm cannot adequately explain the phenomena of consciousness. An integrated noetic approach is evolving, which brings together psychology, philosophy, neurology, religion, etc., in an effort to understand the nature and essential characteristics of human consciousness (Abdullah, 1995). I see my work as part of this context of a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970).

This study is conceived as both theoretical and descriptive, analytic and exploratory. The end result is an integrated psychological definition of CC, and a generic model for the potential life-span development of individual CC, as well as some speculative insights about the social forces which play out in the actualization of this potential. This theoretical model, however, is also informed by first-hand cross-cultural empirical data.

This is not a hypothesis-testing study and it does not attempt to prove the hypothetical model for the life-span development of individual CC. At best, it highlights the

convergence of primary and secondary findings and illustrates the model. More stringent hypothesis-testing will have to supercede the current conceptual, descriptive study. Evolving a new hypothetical construct, identifying the psychological components in its integrated definition, developing a hypothetical model for its life-span evolution, and collecting empirical data to illustrate and elaborate it, required several loops between primary and secondary empirical data and data from developmental and other research. The study falls roughly into two phases described below.

Phase I: Preliminary Convergence Studies

The first phase focused on developing an integrated psychological definition of the hypothetical theoretical construct of CC and a hypothetical model for its evolution in the life-span.

Redefinition of Freire's Concept of CC

As chapter 1 describes, my cross-cultural observations of adult functioning on the boundary of public and private, and the initial intuitively formulated questions, led toward Freire's (1973) concept of CC. I analyzed Freire's broad-brush description of the movement toward critical social awareness, as shown in chapter 2, obtaining the main components in the preliminary definition of the construct of

CC. It became clear that a more rigorous exegesis of the construct would require a social-cognitive developmental approach.

I theorized that CC, understood as the ability to understand, relate personally to, and take action to influence larger social reality, would be an evolutionary capacity potentially present in every individual. I reviewed the literature to find possible preliminary understanding of how and why some individuals develop that potential, and what variety of contextual factors might be influential in that process. Chapter 2 outlines in detail the extensive convergence I found in the main dimensions of tension in adult social consciousness, as characterizing respectively by the relative absence or presence of CC in people's ways of being, and as related to social context. It became clear that CC is an integrative interdisciplinary construct, the study of which would require developing an understanding of how these dimensions of human consciousness and behaviors come together into morally and socially responsible adult consciousness. Overall, the literature review showed that the interaction between social context, personality and social behavior can most productively be understood within the frame of individual social-cognitive development and individual and collective moral values.

Pilot Study

A small pilot study allowed some initial insights into the nature of the consciousness which makes people engage with their social world. I selected two US individuals who had become involved in efforts to direct public attention to the problem in Bosnia and help the Bosnian people. I chose my subjects so that they did not belong to a specific interest group (e.g. Moslems, Bosnians, etc.), but became involved because they felt personally implicated in the tragedy unravelling on the Balkans. They exhibited CC according to the following research criteria. Within their developmental level and specific contextual conditions, they:

1) questioned the set of social relations in the larger social environment in which they found themselves;
2) felt compelled to make active efforts to redefine their relationship with those social conditions in congruence with their understanding;
3) sought an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with issues of justice and equity.

Each individual had experienced a sense of moral outrage at the pictures and news from the mass media coverage of the crisis, and had initiated active efforts to press for decisive international policy. Each of them had brought into that commitment all their professional

expertise (one was an artist, the other a journalist), personal principles and passionate sense of justice.

I used Kegan's (Lahley, 1988) Subject-Object semi-clinical interview in order to inquire how these people made sense of their involvement in an issue that bore no immediate relevance to their lives, and why it became important to them. This allowed me to probe into the individuals' epistemology and consciousness, and to explore the real-life social experience they described, bringing Kegan's content-free subject/object framework to bear upon the content of their moral commitment and choice.

Open and axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) of the interviews and informal structural assessment of the data suggested two sets of structural-developmental characteristics in their efforts to understand the specific social problem and their relationship to it:

1. social-cognitive skills allowing varying degrees of coordinations of patterns and aspects of the particular social issue, as well as of the possibilities for action;
2. self/other distinctions which color the way the events and one's relation to them are construed.

These two cases also suggested the primacy of moral motivation in feeling implicated in this seemingly unrelated social problem. The two individuals' moral motivation appeared expressed in a sense of moral identity and moral imperative, and strong empathic feelings. In both

individuals the **sense of justice** seemed **central to identity**; both defined themselves as people who care and who cannot remain indifferent in the face of blatant injustice and suffering. Hence, they experienced a **sense of moral imperative** related to their moral sense of identity; i.e. **an inner need to act morally**, which in the case of Bosnia meant to become involved (Mustakova, 1994).

Constructing the Hypothetical Model for the Ontogeny of CC

The results from the small exploratory pilot study pointed to the main components of CC: structural development and moral motivation. Since the field of structural development is not homogenous, but includes diverse theories and models, I had to define the most important dimensions of structural development which appeared to pertain to the ontogeny of CC. Those are social-cognitive development, ego development, and the development of moral reasoning. Based on advanced work with several developmental models (Perry's, Weinstein's, Kegan's), as well as an in-depth study of others, reviewed in chapter 2, I began to extrapolate a conflated composite to reflect the developing structures of thought in my hypothetical developmental sequence for the evolution of CC. This composite is not currently codable, which will have to be the task of future research.

I also needed to gain further insight into the nature of moral motivation, and into the way it interacts with

structural development. For this purpose, I decided to examine the life history of a prominent critically conscious individual from a different historical age and culture, in order to see how far the dimensions I was beginning to establish were generic. I chose Gandhi's autobiography for several reasons. First, Gandhi had a life-long commitment to the search for truth and justice for all, and was an independent thinker and a caring agent in his world, i.e. a remarkably critically conscious individual. Second, an autobiography would provide ample evidence of how he made sense of his life's experience. Third, Gandhi is world renowned for the impact he has had on his country and beyond it, and is considered a figure of almost religious significance. Hence, it seems even more important to understand where the young boy Gandhi started, how he developed his strong critical awareness of the world around him, and how he gradually defined his path.

Detailed thematic and informal structural analysis of his life story confirmed the role of the independent component of moral motivation, and allowed me to differentiate it into its main dimensions. His story also illustrated the developmental levels in the ontogeny of CC.

In order to counterbalance the artifactual nature of the conclusions from retrospective data, I also analyzed selected other secondary life histories of contemporary individuals who met my criteria for a developed CC (Colby &

Damon, 1992; Bembow, 1994). I decided that if the most vivid themes from the various life stories showed overlap, it would be safe to assume sufficient validity to build a hypothetical model which can be further validated later. The convergence was impressive, and the historical and contextual factors began to come into contrast. This retrospective data is discussed in detail in chapter 4.

On the basis of convergence between these life histories as a source of extensive secondary data on the components of a fully developed CC, and its evolution, and the bodies of literature reviewed in chapter 2, I elaborated the hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC, presented in chapter 5.

Phase II: Interview Data

This part of the study focuses on gathering cross-cultural interview data to explore the applicability and usefulness of the hypothetical construct of CC and the model for its life-span ontogeny. The data illustrates and elaborates the levels of CC and their contextual variations, and provides a more detailed understanding of the early stages of formation of CC.

The purpose of this empirical component of my study is to develop an understanding of the individual life-span evolution of CC in ordinary individuals, and to contrast it with the understanding of CC gained through the secondary

study of exemplary individuals. This allows a better understanding of the generic characteristics of the evolution of CC, as well as some insights into the role of familial and socio-historical contexts in the evolution of CC.

Sample

The cross-cultural sample included life narrative interviews with 20 US and 8 Bulgarian midlifers, aged 35 to 60. The US interviews constituted a statistically selected subsample of Colby & Damon's (1994) study of Midlife Social Responsibility, supported by the MacArthur Foundation Research Program on Successful Midlife Development (MIDMAC).

The original Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS) survey was based on a demographically representative sample of 6000 Americans in midlife, selected by the MacArthur Foundation Research Program on Successful Midlife Development (MIDMAC). Colby & Damon's study on social responsibility constitutes an in-depth follow-up study of a subsample of around 100, roughly half men and half women, residing in or around 5 urban areas throughout the country, namely Atlanta, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, and Phoenix, Arizona. I did the Boston area interviews and used that subsample of the Social Responsibility study to explore CC.

The subjects were selected by MIDUS, contacted by Dr. Colby, and the names of those 20 from the Boston area who

agreed to participate were passed on to me to schedule the interviews. The subjects were paid $50 for their participation through the Colby & Damon study grant. The consent form which was offered to the subjects made provisions for a follow-up telephone conversation and for the subjects' permission that other researchers use the data from the interviews (see Appendix 1).

The Bulgarian part of the study was carried out independently, and the sample cannot claim representativeness. I selected the participants in an effort to have them represent as diverse sectors of Bulgarian social life as possible. Four people were from the capital of Sofia, and four from a small country town. There were 4 men and 4 women.

Bulgaria was chosen as the cross-cultural setting for several reasons. First, the US and Eastern Europe share the same westernized materialistic and individualistic lifestyle, colored by a generally recognized Christian framework. In terms of the three main sectors in every society: economic order, socio-political order and spiritual order, both types of societies represent an imbalance: the overshadowing of the spiritual order by, in the case of the US and Western societies, the preponderance of the economic order; and, in the case of East European societies, by the preponderance of the socio-political order (Bushrui, Ayman, & Laszlo, 1993). Both types of societies manifest the signs

of "the moral and spiritual decline" discussed with reference to the US on the pages of Newsweek (Radcliffe News, November - December, 1995); both exhibit a rather frayed fabric of social life (Colby & Damon, Research Plan 1994-95). Therefore, it seems important to begin to understand how these phenomena, common to the western scene, are connected to some common themes in the social consciousness of the individual.

Second, similar as the US and East European societies currently are in the above sense, they also represent some important variations within the Western scene. In contrast to the fundamentally individualistic cultural tradition and collective discourse of the US, as described by Bellah et al (1985) and Wuthnow (1991), East European societies come out of more collective cultural, social, and religious traditions. My hypothesis is, therefore, that the generic themes of social consciousness may exhibit some significant variations which might shed some light on contextual factors influencing the life-span evolution of CC.

Third, the choice of Bulgaria as the particular East European country to be studied was influenced by the fact that I was born and raised in Bulgaria. I was able to use my understanding of the culture and the language both in selecting the interviewees, so that they could better represent predominant thinking in the country, and in carrying out the interviews.

Interview Format

The cross-cultural data was collected with the help of the Social Responsibility interview format (Colby & Damon, 1994). That was possible because of the interrelatedness of the two constructs of CC and Social Responsibility.

I define CC as the kind of consciousness which allows an individual to make sense of his/her socio-cultural experience in a way that makes him/her a morally responsible and caring agent in his/her world. Colby & Damon define social responsibility as "action taken for the benefit of others or for the welfare of society more generally" (Colby & Damon, Research Plan 1994-95). Hence, the interview format allowed me to seek evidence of consistent socially responsible behavior as the outcome of some level of CC. It also allowed insights into how people in different socio-cultural contexts negotiate the place of social responsibility in their lives, and how they understand and think about their social world in terms of values and obligations (i.e. on the generic features of CC), as well as how various cultural factors influence that (i.e. contextual features of CC).

Colby & Damon's definition of social responsibility and my definition of critical consciousness share the following main components: 1. <u>emphasis on behavior</u>, i.e. acting for the benefit of society; 2. <u>importance of moral commitment</u> felt and actualized through that behavior. Our definitions

diverge on two dimensions: 1. levels of analysis; 2. presence or absence of a structural developmental approach.

The testing of the interview protocol showed its capacity to capture CC as well as a broad range of individual socially responsible behaviors, although some of the interviewees who spoke about individual acts of social responsibility did not manifest CC. Therefore, not all 28 interviews yield direct data on CC. Nevertheless, some interviews shed light on particular conditions which were absent in the individuals' lives and may be related to the lack of CC.

The open-ended interview is structured in a way which allows the collecting of rich data about each participant's life and thinking, which can then be approached from a variety of angles. It took about three hours to conduct, and was audiotaped and transcribed. The interview falls into six parts.

In the first part, the participants are invited to construct the story of their lives as they see it falling into several main chapters. They focus on the main themes, events, relationships, which in their own understanding contributed to who they believe they are, as well as on the links that connect the various chapters. Then they focus on critical events and significant people in their lives. This initial overview reveals the main themes in the participants' lives, as well as the family and other

circumstances which contributed to the way these individuals prioritize their experience in their social world.

The second part of the interview revisits in greater detail each of the main areas of social responsibility, namely: work, family responsibilities, volunteering and donations, and political involvement. It focuses on the ways in which individuals prioritize their commitments and sense of responsibility, their motivation and the personal meaning they make of their choices. It also sheds light on how they think of themselves in relation to others, the degree to which they identify with others, as well as how their sense of responsibility to others influences their self-definitions.

The third part focuses explicitly on the participants' moral reasoning and moral sense of self. The fourth - on their sense of community involvement as they understand it, and the place of communities in relation to their sense of self. The fifth - on the participants' religion and/or personal philosophy as it plays out in their lives. The last part of the interview inquires into the participants' motivation for agreeing to participate in the interview (see Appendix 2).

For the purpose of the Bulgarian interviews, I translated the Colby & Damon interview tool and consent form into Bulgarian. The interviews were transcribed in Bulgarian and the related parts translated by me into English.

Data Analysis

The initial data analysis follows the pattern of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I looked for patterns and themes which emerged from the interviews, as well as from my notes and observations recorded in my research journal. I applied open and axial thematic coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) of the interview data. Then empirical patterns and themes were connected with levels of theoretical analysis, on the basis of which I developed profiles or case vignettes of some of the more illustrative cases. Each of the three chapters (chapters 6, 7, 8) devoted to the cross-cultural empirical data combines empirical data presentation, with empirical analysis and theoretical interpretation. This was necessitated by the complex nature of the research task, discussed below.

The purpose of this study is to develop an integrated definition and a conceptual generic model for the potential life-span development of individual CC, some understanding of the contextual factors which play out in the actualization of this potential, as well as of the variations within the generic pathway. For this purpose, I performed three types of analysis on both the primary and secondary data: generic, differentiation, and conditions type (Soltis, 1978).

In Soltis'(1978) definition, generic type analysis focuses on the features *x* must have to be called *X*. It

selects and examines standard or model cases, as well as clear contrary cases of *X*, in order to identify its generic features. The generic analysis of the construct of CC was performed in three steps. The converging secondary data on moral exemplars provided the model cases from which I extrapolated the main components and dimensions of CC. These components and dimensions were then verified by an analysis of the cases of ordinary individuals among the interviewees, who satisfied the three research criteria for CC. Finally, interviewees who satisfied the research criteria for CC were contrasted to interviewees who did not satisfy those criteria. In this way, the generic features of the construct of CC were extrapolated, and I was able to conceptualize the graph of the full human range from moral exemplars to thoroughly amoral people, along the CC/non-CC continuum of social consciousness.

With the help of the Constant Comparative Method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), I paired cases which revealed a similar structural developmental place, and illustrated the continuum between CC and non-CC in terms of motivational differences along four dimensions and many sub-dimensions. I combined the obtained sub-themes with insights from the literature, and developed an elaborated template of the four dimensions of continuums between moral and expediency motivation.

The differentiation type analysis, as defined by Soltis (1978), focuses on the different basic meanings of *X*. It attempts to classify or categorize the different standard uses of *X* into types, testing "the typology with examples and counterexamples schematizing relations between types". My differentiation type of analysis of CC focused on different levels of the development of CC, as well as contextual variations. Once I identified the generic features of CC, I examined the interviews in terms of the levels at which the moral motivational dimensions were structurally elaborated. I selected vignettes which illustrated different levels and variations in the ontogeny of CC, and attempted to outline the way the different themes within CC get reworked through the life span, producing different manifestations of CC as it evolves. I described the way people make progressively different sense of their social experience, define their own place in their social world, organize their lives around issues of social responsibility and moral commitments, and redefine the purpose of their lives. I also identified some patterns of cross-cultural similarities and differences in the ontogeny of CC.

The third, condition type analysis (Soltis, 1978) is defined as focusing on the context conditions which govern the use of *X*. It identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance of *X*. Since my study was not

designed to obtain conclusive evidence on the necessary and sufficient conditions of the ontogeny of CC, I performed a preliminary condition type analysis of CC. I began to examine the possible interplay between social-cognitive development and socio-cultural environmental interactions. The data did not allow any definitive conclusions, but allowed some speculation on the contextual conditions which might be essential for the emergence and evolution of CC.

Although all three levels of analysis provided a wealth of insights, the findings cannot be considered conclusive, but strictly exploratory.

Overall Research Philosophy

As has become evident, this is a qualitative research project which relies on extensive field work to develop some understanding of the studied phenomenon, and build grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The study reflects a belief in the "continually evolving...nature of experience"; it assumes "the active role of persons in shaping the world they live in". It emphasizes "change and process, and the variability and complexity of life", and focuses on the "interrelationships among conditions, meaning, and action" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 25).

My research relies on life histories, interviews, case studies, and observations to uncover, understand, and describe a phenomenon about which we know little, the

phenomenon of CC. The analytic procedures I apply are three kinds: coding techniques for conceptualizing the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), a more quantifiable developmental data analysis, and generic, differentiation, and conditions type conceptual analysis (Soltis, 1978).

In building grounded theory, I unite hermeneutical interpretations (Van Manen, 1990), which acknowledge the political, social, and personal nature of my approach to the study of CC, with my best developmental understanding of Neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian theory. In my case profiles, I both describe and interpret the data. I attempt to create rich descriptive and interpretive narratives which hopefully reflect how deeply moved I have been by the life stories with which I have been honored. At the same time I also apply to them abstract analysis and do not believe that this in any way detracts from the intrinsic value of these life stories.

My approach to CC explicitly transcends the ideology of a particular paradigm. I use interpretive methodology which attempts to bring into the research the voices and perspectives of the participants; yet, I also search for some regularities in our social experience, without assuming them to be absolute predictors. I use the approach of the critical paradigm to deconstruct the participants' historical experience, yet I also ground my work in a historically constructed knowledge base, recognizing that

historicity is a fundamental dimension of our experience and understanding, and we can only work within it.

I believe in causality; and I also embrace the Neo-Newtonian understanding of reality as patterns in perpetual flux and of the irreducible nature of consciousness. I believe that there is such a thing as a single, objective reality, an assumption traditionally ascribed to the positivistic paradigm (Merriam, 1990). However, I believe that this single objective irreducible reality is transcendent, and hence not fully knowable to us, except in its multiple representations in the multiple perceived realities which we know. Therefore, I believe that our approach to knowledge has to be one of successive multiple approximations. Hence, I see the dichotomous counterpoising of qualitative and quantitative research in the social sciences, as reflected in Lincoln & Guba's (1985) argument, as unproductive, although the distinctions are important. I understand my work as part of a larger effort to transcend the duality of our understanding of the world, and begin to operate more comfortably with paradoxes in which the causal and the transcausal can actually co-exist.

CHAPTER IV

SECONDARY BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS AS FOUNDATION FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL MODEL FOR THE ONTOGENY OF CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

This chapter performs a generic analysis (Soltis, 1978), and develops an integrated psychological definition of the construct of CC on the basis of model cases of CC as reflected in secondary sources. It connects descriptive empirical claims derived from an analysis of secondary biographical sources, with basic theoretical assumptions from developmental research, and builds the blueprint for my conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of CC.

Basic Theoretical Assumptions from the Literature

The extensive literature review showed that a diverse body of literatures converge in attempting to describe from different angles a whole-person, multifaceted phenomenon, which characterizes adult functioning on the boundary of public and private. Along with Freire (1973), I call it CC. Below, I will review briefly the main theoretical assumptions I have drawn from the literature.

I adopt Freire's definition of CC as **a way of knowing** which **problematizes the natural, cultural and historical reality** in which a person is immersed, inquires into contradictions in reality and tries to integrate them; i.e.,

an **empowered way of being**. This definition involves the following elements, which Freire identifies and I adopt:

(1) experiencing the world as an **objective reality**, **capable of being known**;

(2) engaging **in intentional, responsible and creative relationships** with the world which allow coming to know it;

(3) **critical knowing** through seeking to apprehend causality;

(4) **permeability**, i.e. the **power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions** arising in one's context, increased capacity to **enter into dialogue** with others and with the world;

(5) progressive gaining of **socio-historical perspective** and awareness of personal role.

In addition, the critical theorists explicated four other aspects:

(6) centrality of **moral and critical normative ends** and **ontological concerns**;

(7) immediacy and **wholesomeness of personal involvement**, lack of fear, compartmentalization, neutrality, alienation;

(8) presence of an **autonomous ego capable of resisting** social pressures;

(9) **ability to see through material and ideological appearances**, redefined by postmodern thought as **dereification** of reality and power/knowledge networks.

The above literatures converge with values discourse and empirical case studies in recognizing

(10) the centrality of **universal moral values** as a basic motivational source in people who exhibit CC.

The literatures converge in describing the following behaviors as part of this CC adult way of being:

(11) **struggle to overcome and redefine cultural heritage**, cultural myths, values and standard behaviors;

(12) centrality of **moral commitment**;

(13) a sense of self-actualization, **inner wholeness and union of emotional, sensory, and rational faculties and aspects of life**, and resulting freedom and empowerment.

They also describe

(14) a motivational source of CC behavior in a **sense of interconnectedness**, **empathy** and **compassion**,

(15) personal characteristics such as **moral certainty**, **moral courage**, **openness** to the redefining;

(16) the **strengthening presence of inner models and organizers of experience** (e.g. unselfish love, creativity, explicit moral and spiritual frames of reference, etc.)

(17) a snow-ball life-long growth.

Overall, the review of the literature shows that the construct of CC describes the motivation and social-cognitive understanding which underlie a particular type of adult behavior on the boundary of public and private. CC involves mature individualism, with **fully articulated links with others and with society** as a whole, and **dedication to the common good**. The CC path appears to be one of an

interplay of synchronicity and core values. CC should not be confused with adolescent rebellion, political or other activism which does not reflect values of equality and justice for all, personality traits or Freudian explanations such as an unresolved Oedipal complex.

The task of this study is to examine the degree to which the above 17, and possibly other, dimensions come together into a single whole-person phenomenon in the lives of both exemplary individuals and ordinary people. Further, I try to establish the main components of this phenomenon, the nature of the motivation and social-cognitive understanding involved, and the dimensions and levels of interaction between them.

Basic Developmental Assumptions

I brought to the theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of CC my Vygotskian methodological understanding of ontogenesis as the interaction between natural and cultural development (Wertsch, 1985). I assumed that the understanding of the formation of human social consciousness, as well as its critical capacity, would require integrating Neo-Piagetian knowledge about the organic development of structures of thought, with Vygotskian understanding of sociocultural mediation as it influences the formation of higher mental processes.

Neo-Piagetian Structural Developmental Understanding

My first analysis of the five elements in Freire's definition of CC, outlined above, revealed a Neo-Piagetian social-cognitive developmental evolution of how we make sense of our social world and our own relatedness to it, as well as of the increasing responsibility we take for that process as we grow and develop.

The first and the third components - namely, experiencing the world as an objective reality, capable of being known, and critical knowing through seeking to apprehend causality - seem to require formal operational thought. The second component - namely, engaging in intentional, responsible and creative relationships with the world - requires a differentiated sense of self, disembedded from its environment and able to engage intentionally with it. The fourth and the fifth components - namely, the power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions arising in one's context, an increased capacity to enter into dialogue with others and with the world, and progressive gaining of socio-historical perspective and awareness of personal role - seem to imply postformal development. Overall, Freire seems to suggest a movement toward what McAuliffe (work in progress) calls "constructive development", a predictable developmental movement toward greater differentiation and complexity, hence a greater ability to take perspective on and question social reality.

Hence, it seems legitimate to posit that **CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS** is an adult phenomenon, and its developmental threshold is the presence of at least early Formal Operational thought (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), Conventional Social System and Conscience orientation (Kohlberg, 1984), Pattern Self-Knowledge (see Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985), and a differentiated sense of Institutional self (Kegan, 1982; Lahley et al., 1988).

Such an understanding would account for the increasingly complex coordinations of aspects of social experience as a result of the progressive evolution of cognitive skills, described by Rose & Fischer (1989), and Commons et al (1987). Critical examination proper does not occur before one can operate with abstractions. Such coordinations and levels of abstraction translate into social perspective-taking (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), which accounts for one's understanding of causality within a meaningful social radius. The same coordinations and levels of abstraction bear on one's ability to understand social situations in terms of patterns rather than individual situations (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985), which opens up a range of possibilities for action; i.e. a new sense of agency. They also account for the emergence of an individuated sense of self (Kegan, 1992), able to make decisions about choice and agency, as well as for the nature of the accompanying reasoning (Perry, 1968) and assumptions

about knowledge, its availability, and ways to reach or construct it (Kitchener & King, 1990).

In view of Kohlberg's (1984) theory of the evolution of morality, and the development of values, moral judgement, and the relationship of the self with the broader social environment, it seemed legitimate to assume that morally responsible and socially aware behavior is the natural outcome of individual development toward post-conventional thought. Hence, I recognize social-cognitive development as a main component in CC. The degree to which one can take perspective on social reality, engage in a critical dialogue with it, have greater empathy toward fellow human beings in the larger social world, and integrate one's social experience, constitute a developmental movement towards greater openness to and engagedness with the world.

However, Neo-Piagetian understanding does not account for the motivational source of this kind of consciousness, and for many of the specific content components in the above description of CC. For example, the centrality of universal moral values as a basic motivational source, the centrality of moral and critical normative ends and moral commitments, the strengthening presence of inner models and organizers of experience, etc., require taking into account the role of context and culture in the formation of individual consciousness.

Vygotskian Understanding of Cultural Development

The Vygotskian tradition complements the Neo-Piagetian one in offering a developmental foundation to begin to analyze the phenomenon of CC. Vygotsky's distinction between elementary and higher mental functions, i.e. functions such as memory, attention, perception, and thinking first appearing in an elementary biologically-oriented form, and under cultural influences transforming into higher functions, helps me define my construct. **Within the whole range of consciousness-related phenomena, I study the nature of individual social consciousness, and the distinction between its CC and non-CC variation.**

The Vygotskian sociocultural historical approach recognizes the accumulation of human achievements and experience in collective social consciousness, and its impact on the formation of individual social consciousness through sign mediation. Vygotsky's study of sign mediation through the emergence of speech, allows me to hypothesize **the importance of the nature of family discourse as an early organizer of experience, and hence a significant influence on the formation of the young person's social consciousness.**

In order to understand the formation of individual social consciousness, I rely on the contributions of Vygotskian research to interpsychological small-group processes and intrapsychological functioning (Wertsch, 1985; Rogoff & Lave, 1984). The concepts of internalization and

zone of proximal development, and their more specific elaborations as **moral induction, moral internalization and self-attribution** (Hoffman, 1989), as well as **the developmental transformation of goals** (Colby & Damon, 1992), help explain the formation of CC. I specifically use the concept of internalization, both in its Vygotskian and in its Neo-Piagetian sense. As Wertsch (1985) points out, for Piaget internalization occurs in connection with what Vygotsky calls the natural line of development; i.e. the formation of generalized schemes in early sensorimotor intelligence. The Neo-Piagetian approach expands this into an understanding of the on-going internal reconstructions which characterize development in the interaction with the environment. Vygotskian internalization applies to higher mental functions, and refers to the transfer and internal transformation of social and cultural realities in the internal plane.

Integrated Neo-Piagetian/Vygotskian Approach To Social Consciousness

While Vygotsky's methodological approach unites natural with cultural development, his psychological approach focuses primarily on the impact of culture on individual development (Wertsch, 1985). The Neo-Piagetian approach helps understand the influence of individual social-cognitive transformation on the creation of culture, but it cannot account for the fact that many post-conventional

thinkers do not operate as morally responsible agents for positive social change, while some less complex thinkers reveal that capacity. A stringent micro-analysis of the interplay between the content and structures of CC requires an integration of the Neo-Piagetian and the Vygotskian approaches to development.

Hence, I hypothesize the existence of an independent moral component which is not an automatic derivative of development, and interacts with structural development. I see this moral component as motivational, and I believe that its understanding cannot be separated from the understanding of environments which foster it. I hypothesize that morally oriented family and cultural discourse as organizers of experience, as well as moral induction, moral internalization and self-attribution, would spur the development of empathy, social perspective-taking, and self-reflection, and provide a vantage point for the critical examination of reality. They may also have the potential to foster a more inclusive understanding of social justice and equity. **In other words, the evolving of a social consciousness which can be characterized as CC, is conceptualized as the outcome of a particular kind of education, namely moral education, coupled with social-cognitive development.** The intercation between the two may account for the on-going developmental transformation of goals and life-long development which characterize exemplary

individuals (Colby & Damon, 1992), i.e. the expansive quality of CC.

My conceptualization of an independent component of moral motivation was supported by the findings of two major grounded research studies of morally exemplary individuals, reviewed in chapter 2, Colby & Damon's (1992) and Bembow's (1994). Each of them offers some understanding of the possible independent source and path of formation of moral motivation.

Data From Biographical Research

Colby & Damon's Findings

Colby & Damon's (1992) groundbreaking study of people who represent "epitomes of human moral excellence" (p. x), moves the psychological understanding of morality away from developmental reasoning about issues of right and wrong, and in the direction of understanding the formation of moral character. In studying how moral character is acquired, grows, and fosters sustained moral commitments, the researchers study the lives of people exhibiting a broad range of developmental capacities. Yet, they all exhibit certain qualities, such as honesty, integrity, open-mindedness, love of and respect for people, etc., which function as personal continuities, and "provide individuals with repeated experiences that enhance their capacities as well as new challenges that stimulate their growth" (p.

187). In Colby & Damon's understanding, it is these personal continuities, cumulative and interactive, which allow the developmental transformation of goals in the lifespan, and the resulting "the paradoxical mix of lasting commitments and sustained capacity for change" (p. 184).

This finding suggests that it is **moral character** that is **at the heart of a person's openness to moral growth**, "directedness and receptiveness" (p. 15) to meaningful social influences, and "ever-expanding development" (p. 11) toward moral agency. Hence, there is **empirical evidence** which **supports separating the moral component from the developmental component**.

The question is how do some people develop moral character, and why do others not develop it. I pursue further this question about moral education in my own analysis of Gandhi's life and the lives of other exemplars. However, it is important to note the findings of an earlier study of European rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, ctd. in Colby & Damon, 1992). This study applied what Colby & Damon describe as a traditional psychological framework of personality and other psychometric tests, and found among the personal qualities of rescuers

> strong attachments to others, feelings of responsibility for others, a history of family closeness during childhood, greater empathy for pain, a willingness to see different types of people as essentially similar to themselves, and an inclination to befriend others on the basis of

> personal qualities rather than religion or status (p. 7).

These findings seem to suggest the influence of a morally-oriented family education, which may have interacted with and facilitated the formation of the kinds of personal continuities Colby & Damon describe. Colby & Damon do not consider the above a sufficient explanation of the readiness of those people to "routinely risk their lives" and the lives of their families to "shelter despised outcasts" (p. 7). However, when they explore the remarkable certainty and moral courage, and the enduring positivity of their exemplars, they reach an important significant conclusion about the powerful psychologically integrating effect of rootedness in faith and authentic spirituality.

> A true integration of reflection and action rests on a unifying belief that must be represented in all the cognitive and behavior systems that direct a person's life choice...The belief must be so compelling that it both preserves the stable commitments and guides the dynamic transformations of each system...Many of our exemplars drew upon religious faith for such a unifying belief...a far larger proportion of our exemplars than we originally expected. But even those who had no formal religion often looked to a transcendent ideal of a personal sort: a faith in the forces of good, a sustaining hope in a power greater than oneself, a larger meaning for one's life than personal achievement or gain...Although the substance of the faith and its ideals was too varied and too elusive to be captured in a final generalization, it can perhaps best be described as an intimation of transcendence: a faith in something above and beyond the self. The final paradox of our study is that the exemplars' unity of self was realized through their faith in a meaning greater than the self (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 311).

From the above findings, I hypothesize that at the core of moral character may be family environments and/or personal history which stimulated what Marcuse (Bronner & Kellner, 1989) calls "the depth dimension of human existence" (p.281). The **opening up and activation of this depth dimension through moral and/or spiritual education** may be the motivational source that accounts for the lifelong search for meaning greater than the self and the outstanding moral character in the lives of CC people. The other in-depth qualitative study of exemplary people, which I examined, further confirmed these early intimations.

Bembow's Findings

In Bembow's (1994) study of twenty contemporary activists who had committed their lives to work for radical social change, these people derive their sense of the meaningfulness of their lives, and the will power to persevere, from a mystical sense of being on a path. They speak about the unplanned, synchronistic way, in which this path unfolded for them, another way to describe the developmental transformation of goals (Colby & Damon, 1992), adding to it a clear spiritual dimension.

> I knew right away that was part of my path (p. 141).
> Even though I didn't understand where I was going at the time, I found this path (p. 141).
> My life has been much more like a path unfolding in front of me (p. 142).
> I knew that's why I was on the planet...I see myself as trying to influence the course of

> history...a tiny bit in the direction of more peace, more equality, and more justice (p. 165). In a sublime sense it was the best of all possible paths, for it is a path that serves some greater, righteous purpose (p. 142).

These people seem to feel that nothing was accidental in their lives, that the deeper awareness that somehow got activated in them, had a moral meaning and purpose to it. Some describe the spiritual nature of the path as one "of increasing ability to empathize with people and ideas", and see it as an interplay of "fate and choice" (p. 140-142).

Bembow concludes that there is no one, "linear way to explain how these individuals made the choices they made or came to be social activists" (p. 164), because events and circumstances were interconnected. She affirms "the multi-causal and transcausal nature" of consciousness she studies. However, she identifies "a **generative element or motivational source**" to the decisions these people made: "**a consistent set of core or fundamental values**" (p. 164). The most recurring ones are "learning how to love people who you don't like personally", integrity, political and social justice, equality, peace. Even more interesting is **the sense these people report of these values having always been with them**, often from a very young age.

> I always felt, even at a very early age, that I should not be associated with violence.
> I feel like at some level I've always been a critical thinker, and that I have always reacted to or rejected many of the values around my upbringing. Particularly the value that I should be trained to run corporate America or whatever.

> There are some general principles which in some ways have always been a part of me and of my work, but I was unable to articulate or act on them explicitly until I was conscious of my own oppression (Bembow, 1994, p. 168).

In other words, all these people report **an intuitive moral sense**, **which developed and became conscious and more differentiated with synchronistic circumstances**. They also report **a faith in the spiritual meaningfulness and purpose** of their lives, and they find themselves making decisions which were unique and novel even to themselves.

Converging Understanding of Moral Component

While Colby & Damon's findings suggest the centrality of moral character, Bembow's findings suggest the centrality of core moral values, the existence of an intuitive moral sense, and the activation of a spiritual depth dimension in the daily operating of exemplary individuals. Both studies suggest the centrality of faith.

The combination of Colby & Damon's and Bembow's findings seems to strongly suggest the presence of an independent moral component interacting with developmental transformation. The way I understand this component, it comprises an intuitive moral sense which gets developed and strengthened under the influence of family education and/or other significant relationships oriented toward universal moral values. The result is the formation of moral character, and an activated spiritual potential, or depth

dimension of experience (Marcuse, 1989), which becomes the source of both an increased awareness, a dominant moral motivation to find and serve purposes greater than the self in life, and a faith and endurance in pursuing that purpose.

This understanding of an intuitive moral sense or spiritual potential, and the role of moral and spiritual education in universal human values in its development, converges with the literature on universal values, reviewed in chapter 2. I adopt its theoretical claim that **at the core of every human being there exists a fundamental striving toward authenticity and fulfillment, which constitutes one's spiritual potential**, and which requires moral and spiritual education in order to unfold and not be thwarted by social circumstances. As Sorokin (Maslow, 1959) points out, this education has been provided for millennia by all the spiritual traditions of the world. Apart from the institutionalized religious dogmas which tend to grow around most of them, and obscure the message, these spiritual traditions foster the development of the human spiritual potential. The universal spiritual values they teach are: creative love as the heart and soul of freedom and all morality; transcendence of self, and the unity of duty and pleasure, self-interest and altruism, healthy individualism and selflessness; love of truth, justice, equality, and respect for life; wisdom, honesty, naturalness, unity of personality, differentiation of means and ends, etc. These

are the same values that we heard expressed by exemplary individuals.

As we saw, Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars derived their "stable commitments and dynamic transformations" from "unifying beliefs" which represented different versions of a "transcendent ideal" (p. 311). Fourteen of Bembow's participants pointed to "the significance of childhood exposure to religious or spiritual values" (p. 179), and most claimed that they "got their values from their families" (p. 175) and in some cases from their church. Clearly, the moral motivational component of CC involves what Bishop Desmond Tutu refers to as "the opportunity to fulfill" one's "human and spiritual potential" (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. xii).

Integrated Hypothetical Construct

On the basis of everything discussed above, I conceptualize the ontogeny of CC as an interaction between moral motivation and structural development. I consider moral motivation present where moral concerns seem to dominate over self-interest. I hypothesize the full range of human social consciousness as a continuum between CC and non-CC along the two main components of consciousness, structural development and motivation. This continuum is represented in Figure 4.1 on page 184. In it, the structural-developmental axis is shared by both CC and non-

CC. The motivational axis is bisected by the two forms of consciousness, with CC characterized by moral motivation and non-CC characterized by expediency motivation.

The overall development of social consciousness falls into three developmental levels, preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. In the case of CC, each of these developmental levels negotiates differently the independent moral motivational component. The outcome is three levels of the ontogeny of CC: Pre-CC, Conventional CC, and Postconventional CC.



A= MORAL INTEREST B= MORAL AUTHORITY C= PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D= EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E= SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F= PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G= HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 4.1 Diagram of the Full Human Range of the CC/Non-CC Continuum

The life of Gandhi has served for me as the chief illustration of the ontogeny of CC through the three levels described above. His autobiography describes the independent formation and elaboration of moral motivation which interacts with the evolving structures of his thinking, and produces a social consciousness which progresses through Pre-CC to Conventional CC and Postconventional CC.

The central finding from the analysis of Gandhi's life was **the centrality of moral concerns in the early formation of** his **consciousness**. Although his childhood and adolescence progress through Naive, Egocentric, and Conformist consciousness (Wade, 1996), and the accompanying negotiation of a sense of self, his dominant concerns are noticeably different and less selfish than what developmental theories describe as the norm. Even as a child, when his thinking about right and wrong could be expected to exhibit the characteristics of Heteronomous and Instrumental moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984), Gandhi's thinking appears to center around basic moral values such as integrity, justice, love and respect for others, service, etc., understood at the level of his current reasoning. His sense of self and identity seem to form early on around a moral center. This moral sense of identity provides a tension with the natural tendency toward egocentrism in childhood and adolescence. The outcome is a significantly increased sense of interconnectedness with others and awareness of

responsibilities to them, which have **a snowball effect in the later development of his consciousness**.

Although these findings can be argued to be an artifact of the autobiographic retrospective nature of the data, the fact that other moral exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992; Bembow, 1994) report a similar development is significant. I saw the same centrality of moral concerns again and again in the lives of other exemplars of CC. The next section describes in detail the wealth of morally colored themes as they ascend consecutively and are negotiated through Gandhi's life-span. After the analysis of the evolution of Gandhi's CC, I offer a comparison with one of Bembow's activists and two of Colby & Damon's exemplars, in order to highlight the significant areas of convergence.

The findings from the analysis of Gandhi's life have served as the blueprint of the hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC, described in chapter 5. As I describe the levels of CC and the progression of themes in Gandhi's life, I will not try to separate them from what appear to be significant influences on the development of his CC. Although no definitive connections can be drawn between the two, I believe it is important to highlight those influences, particularly since they show significant convergence with other life-stories of CC individuals which will be discussed later.

Levels of CC as Illustrated in Gandhi's Life

As Gandhi's social consciousness progresses through Pre-CC to Conventional CC and Postconventional CC, his life reveals a certain chronology of themes which elaborate progressively expanding moral concerns and gain consecutive ascendance. I identified nine themes: moral interest, moral authority, moral responsibility, expanding moral and social responsibility, social consciousness, political action, principled vision, philosophical expansion, historical and global vision, represented on Table 4.1 on page 188. Each of these themes emerges in an Eriksonian sense as a critical task at a particular point in his life, and each has earlier and later developmental elaborations. It is impossible in this discussion to present the full complexity of the life-long interweaving of these themes. The figure below offers a visual representation of their chronological ascendance.

Table 4.1. Chronological Ascendance of Themes in Gandhi's Life



The period of Pre-CC elaborates the themes of early moral interest, the negotiation of authentic moral authority both in significant others and in himself, and the negotiation of moral responsibility to community standards and for personal self-definitions.

Pre-CC

Moral Interest

Gandhi's childhood appears dominated by an **intuitive moral sense** which continuously **interacted with a morally oriented environment**, and gradually grew into a **passion for truth**. Below are some examples of those interactions.

Gandhi's early environment seems to have particularly fostered the truthfulness, **permeability to and fascination with authenticity** of his Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996). His mother made a lasting impression on the imagination of the young child with **her deep spirituality**, which Gandhi remembered as "saintliness". **Her uprightness and seriousness**, whether it was about the different vows she occasionally took and always carried through with equanimity, or the way she conducted her daily affairs, seems related to Gandhi's **truthfulness**, which later **grew into one of his strongest characteristics - fidelity and passion for truth**. Here is how he describes her **moral character**:

> The outstanding impression my mother has left on my memory is that of saintliness. She was deeply

> religious. She would not think of taking her meals without her daily prayers. Going to the Vaishnava temple was one of her daily duties. As far as my memory can go back, I do not remember her having ever missed the fast during the four months of the rains. She would take the hardest vows and keep them without flinching. Illness was no excuse for relaxing them...During one fast she vowed not to have food without seeing the sun. We children on those days would stand, staring at the sky, waiting to announce the appearance of the sun to our mother. Everyone knows that at the height of the rainy season the sun often does not condescend to show his face. And I remember days when, at his sudden appearance, we would rush and announce it to her. She would run out to see with her own eyes, but by that time the fugitive sun would be gone, thus depriving her of her meal. "That does not matter", she would say cheerfully, "God did not want me to eat today." And then she would return to her round of duties (pp. 2-3).

The **moral earnestness** which Gandhi developed, I believe has to do with the **internalization of this authentic model of moral character and authority** in the face of his mother. He was a shy and reticent child, with **reverence** for his mother's saintliness, and a passion for melodramatic devotion, as manifested in his fascination with two plays about courage and devotion, Shravana and Harishchandra, which he used to read and re-read. He **lived in an idealistic world of his own**, with clearly differentiated rights and wrongs, in which "to follow truth and to go through all the ordeals" (p. 4) that entails inspired him as an ideal. Although it can be argued that his truthfulness is nothing more but the literal-mindedness of a pre-operational child, his passionate earnestness is an important recurring

characteristic of other moral exemplars (e.g. Paul in Bembow, 1994).

Gandhi seems to have been constantly **on the lookout for models** in the world around him, and his **life was populated by men of significant moral authority, whom he could easily idealize**. As he points out, the men in his family were Prime Ministers in several states for three generations, and were all "men of principle". His father was "a lover of his clan, truthful, brave and generous", known for his "impartiality in the family as well as outside", and for his loyalty to the state. In the subservient position to the British, in which all Indians found themselves as members of the British Empire, Gandhi's father combined loyalty with dignity, and did not allow himself to be treated with disrespect by the British Political Agents. In contrast to many corrupt officials, in Gandhi's words, his father had no "ambition to accumulate riches", and left "very little property"; but lived a life rich in experience in practical affairs, and commanded the respect of people.

Young Gandhi himself seems to shrink instinctively from what he perceived as wrong, and believe literally what to him seemed right, with the evaluation happening somewhat unconsciously. For example, on one occasion his class was taking a spelling test in the presence of the Educational Inspector, and Gandhi had misspelt the word "kettle". The teacher prompted him to copy it from his neighbor's slate.

Gandhi could not believe what the teacher was suggesting; he acted as though he did not understand the teacher's suggestion, and did not cheat. He remained in denial of the teacher's act, until it turned out later that everybody else had copied in order to represent the teacher well in front of the Educational Inspector.

This **intuitive moral sense**, which recurs in the accounts of other exemplars, seems to have been **strengthened by the presence of moral discourse as an explicit organizer of daily life** around him. Moral values and moral induction practices, and on-going distinctions around duty, right and wrong, appear to have been extremely prominent in Gandhi's family and cultural environment, and seem to have been **internalized as the moral voices of significant adults**, continually evaluating what's "right, proper, and pleasing" (a repeated trio for Gandhi). At first, these evaluations are almost instinctive, but gradually they turn into an increasingly conscious habit of subjecting every experience or encounter to careful moral examination. This inner voice is reminiscent of Bembow's (1994) finding of her exemplars operating even as children out of a strong inner sense of authentic values, a sense which they claim was always with them.

Hence, what stands out as the earliest theme in his life, is an all-pervasive **moral interest**, a tendency to understand most experiences in terms of explicit moral

values. Gandhi's **moral earnestness**, and respect and trust for adults, gave birth to the next major theme in his life - the negotiation of external and internal moral authority. On the one hand, within the context of his time and culture, his moral interest began to be expressed as the desire to serve his parents, which later expanded to the idea of sacrifice in devoted service. On the other hand, with the advent of concrete operations, he began to carefully scrutinize the moral authority in the decisions of adults around him.

Moral Authority

It is important to understand the developmental nature of this period in order to appreciate how it played out differently in Gandhi's life. Early adolescence is characterized by the developmental tension between Egocentric (Wade, 1996) hedonistic instrumentality, and the early Conformist first signs of true personal authority found in "structured self-identification through the member role and intra-group relationships" (Wade, 1996, p. 119).

In Gandhi's account of his life, Egocentric **self-centered power struggles** (Wade, 1996) seem to have been **negotiated noticeably on the side, without dominating the scene**. He recollects having learned "in the company of other boys, to call teachers all kinds of names" (p. 3). He also challenged the authority of the cultural norm of vegetarianism by running away at night with friends to

experiment with meat. But it is interesting that even when he was violating his parents' trust in the act, and essentially using deceitfulness to resist their authority, his rationalizations were dominated by moral concerns. Under the influence of other children, he had arrived to the conclusion that "the Englishman is bigger and rules over the Indian" because he eats meat. So he concluded that reform was needed to give a fair chance to his countrymen to be free. We can hear in the birth of these first abstract ideas the **moral imperative** in his reasoning: "I wished to be strong and daring and wanted my countrymen also to be such, so that we might defeat the English and make India free" (p. 15).

The experiment involved secretly having a friend cook meat in various delicious ways every night, and running away to get his dinner, followed by **remorse**-filled dreams of dying animals. But over time, the burden of having to lie to his mother every night at dinner, and the knowledge of the shock his acts would bring to his father if discovered, made him resolve the dilemma in the direction of interpersonal trust. Here is a sample of his thinking as it reveals the **birth of principled decisions**:

> I said to myself: "Though it is essential to eat meat, and also essential to take up food reform in the country, yet deceiving and lying to one's father and mother is worse than not eating meat. In their lifetime, therefore, meat-eating must be out of the question. When they are no more and I have found my freedom, I will eat meat openly, but until that moment arrives I will abstain from it."

> This decision I communicated to my friend, and I have never since gone back to meat (p. 16).

This is a good example of how **Egocentric power struggles were morally redefined** in Gandhi's life, and **accompanied by powerful moral feelings such as remorse and moral imperative**. We have to remember here Hoffman's (1991) emphasis on the importance of moral self-attribution and empathy-based guilt in the evolving of genuinely moral motivation. The outcome of Gandhi's struggles was ultimately moral, and resulted in developmental growth: **moral values, earlier internalized from his environment**, were **subjected to scrutiny**, and eventually **consciously embraced as personal moral principles**. This way of handling tensions became a personal continuity which characterized Gandhi's life-long approach to moral issues, and his particular "dynamic mix of stability and change" (Colby & Damon, pp. 188-189).

In this developmental period of image-building, Gandhi took the age-specific concerns with reputation onto an explicitly moral level. He developed a **passion for personal integrity** and **for building character**, which was so intense that "the least blemish drew tears" (p. 10). He was his own most severe critic, and others' high regard for and trust in his character was very important to him. In this passion, external authority is very significant but is not blindly accepted. Gandhi is sensitive to, **open and receptive of authentic moral authority in others**.

Young Gandhi's **critical awareness of authentic moral authority** in adults seems to **have a lot to do with the models of integrity and substantive life meaning** which significant adults provided around him. Also, in colonial India, he grew up in a political environment replete with acute contradictions. Gandhi was exposed daily to conversations among adults who were trying to negotiate oppressive social and political reality with a measure of dignity. He was **socialized into critical social awareness**, in the context of a strong family unit which protected him from the direct influence of the outer world. This seems to have **strengthened his critical faculties and built resilience**. The exposure to serious adult conversations helped him learn to discern what is authentic and valid from what is just the outcome of vanity and lust for power. This awareness grew and later extended from interpersonal relationships to public life.

In this period, Gandhi's preoccupation with character leads to **aloofness from peer group activities and entertainment**, and a tendency to **develop his own standards** through lonely endeavors. Gandhi begins to evolve a strong sense of the authority of personal decision, an example of which is the authority he attributes to the vows he takes throughout his life, be it of vegetarianism or celibacy, etc. He also examines carefully the authority and moral integrity of the words and actions of others. This leads

initially to a self-righteous, dualistic understanding of the moral role he defines for himself - that of a **reformer**.

The young reformer Gandhi feels a need to exercise authority over others where he finds them lacking. In the early treatment of his wife, that tendency makes him a tyrant unable to recognize her right of choice. With time, the desire to control gives way to **active love**, and the moral demands that active love places on Gandhi eventually counterbalance self-righteousness. He does not lose his **passion to reform**, but learns to respect the freedom of those he seeks to reform. He redefines authority and power as the moral authority of service and a sense of mission: "He who would be friends with God must remain alone, or make the whole world his friend" (p. 13).

This is an example of how a Conformist (Wade, 1996) developmental task such as structured role identification, is negotiated in Gandhi's life in profoundly moral ways which have a life-long significance. The **moral roles that Gandhi defines for himself undergo life-long redefining and elaborating**, but there is also a **permanency and a sense of mission** to them, characteristic of the other exemplars as well (Colby & Damon, 1992; Bembow, 1994).

Overall, this period is characterized by the **evolving of clear and conscious inner standards of truth, justice, and integrity in interpersonal relationships**, as a result of relying on his inner voice and moral interest, and the

internalized and continuously re-examined standards and values of elders with recognized moral authority. Gandhi turns this moral authority towards himself and others of lesser authority.

Every once in a while the elders or external circumstances provided the external impetus to Gandhi's reviewing his ways and **rediscovering his own moral passion**. One such example is the case when he stole money and then gold from the family to buy cigarettes. Soon he could not live with himself, and wrote a letter of confession to his father, expecting corporal punishment. Instead, his father cried, and the memory of that violation of trust remained vivid throughout Gandhi's life. The death of his father, however, seems to mark the turning point from which on the theme of personal responsibility predominates.

Personal Moral Responsibility

This period negotiates the tension between responsibility to community standards and responsibility for personal self-definition. It gives birth of a unique Gandhian blend of respect and freedom of choice.

Gandhi's decision to go to England marks the beginning of his gradual emergence from embeddedness in his environment and culture. His encounter with his caste's refusal to allow him to go to England, and his firm decision to make the trip, are a good example of an **evolving new sense of self and responsibility** while still struggling with

the pull of shared realities. Once in England, and extricated from the embrace of his kin, he recognizes his **personal responsibility to live up to his own decision** and not be disheartened by the estrangement he felt in a discriminating foreign culture. Instead, he begins to apply to it his critical discernment, and to define his own relationship with the surrounding milieu.

He feels responsible to try to fit into English society because it was his choice to study there. However, the way he negotiates fitting in, is indicative of the process of gradually defining his own standards. He starts by undertaking "the all too impossible task of becoming an English gentleman", and compensating "for my vegetarianism by cultivating other accomplishments which fitted one for polite society" (p. 37). However, his evolving **critical perception and habit of scrutinizing and reevaluating** gradually brings about a critical awareness of the questionable character of his own goals, as well as the whole concept of a gentleman. He discovers that he "was pursuing a false idea", and his **self-critical spirit** gradually leads him to **a commitment to simplicity and humility**. That becomes not just a characteristic of his own life, but **a philosophical principle** of focusing on the important things in life and maintaining an acute awareness of one's own choices and their implications. Thus another fundamental critical skill is born out of Gandhi's moral

earnestness, namely, his **quest for a life based on principles with which he can identify**, in contrast with the unexamined principles of his social milieu.

Gandhi's discovery of vegetarianism is yet another example of his growing sense of self taking over. He had been a vegetarian by force of the standards of his own community. But after reading Salt's Plea for Vegetarianism, he becomes "a vegetarian by choice" (p. 35), i.e. he takes on the **conscious responsibility to examine and redefine his inner standards**. And once Gandhi takes responsibility for an idea, he devotes himself to examining and developing it in depth until it becomes a broad concept. This **importance of ideas** in his life path recurred in the lives of some of the other exemplars in Colby & Damon's (1992) and Bembow's (1994) case studies.

With the maturing of Gandhi's sense of personal moral responsibility, his moral motivation and critical perception **expand from immediate personal and interpersonal to social concerns**, which marks the period of Conventional CC.

Conventional CC

The period of Conventional CC elaborates the themes of expanding moral responsibility, the birth of social consciousness and political action.

Expanding Moral and Social Responsibility

As Gandhi's focus shifts progressively toward larger social reality, he develops further the life-long tendency to critically examine and redefine current social tastes or prevailing concepts. A good example is his encounter with the Eiffel Tower. Gandhi's evaluation of this marvelled architectural object cuts right through the general consensus of vain fame without any deeper purpose to it:

> the toy of the Exhibition. So long as we are children we are attracted by toys, and the Tower was a good demonstration of the fact that we are all children attracted by trinkets. That may be claimed to be the purpose served by the Eiffel Tower (p. 58).

This, more or less, is the point in Gandhi's development where I see his way of being characterized by a formed critical consciousness. I.e., he is engaged in an on-going critical moral conversation with himself and the world around him, and feels implicated in the moral realities he perceives. From this point on, he moves in the direction of increasing social awareness, as well as an awareness of the choices it entails.

The tendency to question and closely examine established realities leads Gandhi into an independent inquiry into religion in an effort to understand the fundamental principles of Christianity and Hinduism. These investigations led him to find common patterns between the Bible and the Bhagavadgita, and to think further about unifying principles such as nonviolence as the highest form

of spirituality. He studied the lives of religious teachers, compared theism to atheism, and embarked on a life-long effort to define his own relationship to God.
Eventually, this independent inquiry into truth allows Gandhi to define his own conventional balance between understanding and observing the norms of a given society while maintaining his independent investigation of truth and personal freedom of self-definition. This is what I see as the hallmark of **CONVENTIONAL CC**.

There is also an expansion of the earlier responsibility for moral character into **responsibility for self-actualization,** which Gandhi understands as the moral responsibility to make himself as competent and able to serve as possible. Through **consistent self-reflection** Gandhi recognizes that the best way to achieve that goal is to take **responsibility for bringing his inner and outer life into harmony**. He sets out to build for himself a life of economy, hygiene, and simplicity which corresponds to the moral principles that guide him: "As I searched myself deeper, the necessity for changes both internal and external began to grow on me" (p. 41).

Gandhi's **moral imperative, so far predominantly directed toward personal and interpersonal concerns, begins to turn toward leadership in the public sphere**. Before he knew it, he "was elected to the Executive Committee of the Vegetarian Society", and had to face his first public

challenge in the form of a **responsibility to speak out and side with what he saw as the right cause**, even though it was a losing battle. With time, Gandhi's **conviction in the power of truth to prevail** strengthens, and his life path is that of a tireless champion of truth in increasingly complex social battles.

Thus, Gandhi takes on himself not only to "resist the canker of untruth" (p. 49), but to be **a reformer by example** and start new projects which would bring the truth to others. It is important to understand that in all these endeavors, in his own opinion, Gandhi was **led not by an outstanding mind, but by a love of simplicity and moral earnestness**, which he was both able to foster in himself and identify in others. This is a period of **dynamic interaction between leadership and learning from others**, the beginning of the kind of open and receptive social dynamic and subsequent developmental transformation of goals which Colby & Damon (1994) identify in their exemplars.

Although Gandhi found many soulmates in this process, he never found a guru:

> in spite of this regard for him (Raychandbhai) I could not enthrone him in my heart as my Guru. The throne has remained vacant and my search still continues (p. 65).

I see this as the climax of the theme of responsibility - throughout, Gandhi remained fully **responsible for his own process**. He names **moral earnestness as the great passion of his life** and the criterion through which he selected the

people he trusted most. That passion was so great that no guru could satisfy it completely: "Infinite striving after perfection is one's right. It is one's reward. The rest is in the hands of God" (p. 64).

This high responsibility which he placed on himself, helped him face a confusingly multiplistic world after the end of his studies in England, and yet be able to carry on his reformist goals. Gandhi's first encounter with messy political and social reality back in India brought home the **awareness of broader social realities of power structure**. This lead to the gradual ascendance of the next theme in Gandhi's life: social consciousness. This theme is elaborated in two variations: social and political work.

Social Consciousness

Gandhi was born in the family of a minister, and exposed to a life without the extremes of deprivation or spoil. Basic family virtues, spirituality and stern traditions reinforced in him a middle-class tendency to see things on predominantly moral and individual terms. It took several clashes with social realities later on in his life to **expand his causal understanding of the social world beyond individual moral principles**.

Gandhi's first conscious clash with the abuse of power as a result of social status came after his return from England back to India. He was pressured by his brother to appeal to an English acquaintance and friend of his, who

held the position of Political Agent in the province of Kathiawad. The man behaved toward Gandhi with rudeness and disrespect, which he had never displayed in England, when he was off duty. This made Gandhi reflect on the negative effect of power on the individual: "power had intoxicated him to an inordinate extent" (p. 73). However, his focus was still more on general moral issues, and he was not quite making the connection with the realities of social inequality. Rather, he interpreted the experience as an incident of **individual learning**: "I pocketed the insult, but also profited by it. Never again shall I place myself in such a false position, never again shall I try to exploit friendship in this way" (p. 72). Nevertheless, this incident illustrates how the **extension of Gandhi's moral imperative to the public sphere** began.

His following encounters with "the petty politics of the country and the petty intrigues between states, and intrigues of officers for power", were still interpreted as a personal moral challenge of "how to remain unscathed" (p. 73). This marks the beginning of his social awareness, expressed in the growing realization of the moral conflict between personal values and social ways. It was only when he attempted to represent as a barrister the interests of the poorest Indian land owners, and was unable to get their cause sufficiently "carefully gone into" (p. 74), that he began to become **conscious of the fact that power and not**

justice was the law. His resulting exasperation and depression mark the beginning of his **shifting of focus from personal to social issues**.

Gandhi's trip to South Africa served as his **journey of initiation** into system prejudice. It took several naive blunders and encounters with the distinction between individual prejudice and system prejudice for him to gradually realize the all-embracing nature of the problem. He experienced being treated as a representative of an oppressed class, and being asked to submit to humiliating rules. That prompted him to subject the existing social system to careful analysis and to perform his first act of civil disobedience as a representative of a class.

From that point on, Gandhi **focused on understanding existing socio-political power relations** (i.e. the distinctions made by the Europeans in their dealings with different groups of Indians in South Africa). The way Gandhi dealt with this first class challenge (i.e. writing to the press, clearly explaining his position, and appealing to public sentiments), marks the beginning of his evolving **strategy of social opposition** within socially accepted boundaries. Soon, Gandhi was to face more class abuse and would be forced, through his self-critical spirit, to distinguish between social protest for the sake of personal gratification, and social protest as a result of a well-thought-out systematic approach to a chosen social cause.

> The hardship to which I was subjected (denied his first-class seat on the train) was superficial - only a symptom of the deep disease of color prejudice. I should try, if possible, to root out the disease and suffer hardships in the process. Redress for wrongs I should seek only to the extent that would be necessary for the removal of the color prejudice (p. 82).

In this process, Gandhi formed some early **allegiances**. They were mostly **with people, who struggled** just like him **to integrate moral interests with self-interests, and therefore remained more on the fringes of a society** operating mainly out of self-interest.

In the process of defining his own social position, Gandhi continued his religious exploration, this time not so much as a quest for authority or personal moral responsibility, but as an **effort to see a larger spiritual picture including its implications on social and political justice**. Not only was he trying to understand better man with respect to the divine, but he was also inquiring into the relative value of the different manifestations of the divine, and the authority that they gave to different religions. As a result of his **heightened awareness of discrimination on different levels**, he perceived Christianity's claims for superiority as deeply suspicious, and became aware of discrimination in religion.

An interesting sub-theme of the mature period of Gandhi's life is that of **synchronicity**. Both support and challenge seem to come his way when he is ready to take them. For example, the opportunity to work on the Bill of

Indian Franchise in SA comes at a time when he has completed his other obligations, has been speculating on the opportunities for larger action for some time already and is mentally ready, as well as on a crossroad. His Pretoria experiences and his studies of Christianity have prepared him to evolve a clear political vision. Thus the next significant theme in Gandhi's life of CC emerges: political action.

Political Action

In Pretoria, Gandhi makes his first effort to organize the community as an **educator and leader**, and appeal (to the Indian community in Pretoria) for group action. This appeal was accompanied by an extended and careful inquiry into the circumstances of the group whose needs Gandhi espoused as his goal. This first group effort reveals a lot about Gandhi's **method of public work**. He approaches the groups he wants to work for directly. He states the problem clearly and simply, confident in the ability of the group to understand. He thus empowers the group and lays the major decisions in its hands, at the same time offering a broader vision which helps unite people and points to a common goal. His understanding of a group tends to bridge the distinctions maintained within; hence his work is generally characterized by bridging differences and separateness. For example, he insisted that even the poorest Indians in South Africa legitimately constitute the Indian community and

cannot be excluded. In this first public initiative, we also see the first clear manifestation of Gandhi's **sense of group identity**: a sense of national identity, which brings him to undertake new responsibilities, such as educating the community and leading it politically to defend its interests.

Once he has **defined his cause** as the fight for national self-respect of the Indian community in SA, Gandhi begins to develop his political vision. His first initiative is to **empower** an illiterate and disunited **community** with little self-confidence, by helping it define its own goals and identity. He names the problem clearly, drafts a strategy and organizes people to work together. Gandhi maintains high moral standards and clear judgement, and does not accept the offer of the community to support him financially. He carefully chooses his battles, with **larger responsibilities in mind**. Here we see the birth of compromise as a principle of political work.

Gandhi's political vision soon expanded beyond specific group interests and into a growing understanding of the political and social system he was dealing with. This marks the transition into Postconventional CC, and the progressive elaboration of his principled vision.

Postconventional CC

Gandhi's Postconventional CC elaborates the themes of principled vision, philosophical expansion of understanding, and a growing historical and global vision.

Principled Vision

In the course of working to empower the Indian community in South Africa, Gandhi progressively moves away from the earlier balance between understanding and observing the norms of a given society, and his independent pursuit of truth and justice, which was characteristic of his Conventional CC. He increasingly comes to **understand the social power and knowledge networks which maintain oppression** in South Africa. His **cross-cultural experience** helps him gain perspective on three different socio-cultural systems, which eventually expands his understanding of power and knowledge networks to a more general one. This is the beginning of what Bembow (1994) refers to as dereification, i.e., an **ability to see through the hegemonic socio-political dynamic between power and knowledge, and to overcome its grip on consciousness**.

The outcome of this expanding political understanding is a principled political vision and growing agency. Gandhi begins to **open up and place before the disempowered specific alternatives for action**. He creates a **political body** to represent his group (The Natal Indian Congress), with subdivisions (Colonial-born Indian Educational Association)

and specific agenda (regular meetings, fundraising, propaganda, etc.). Gradually, Gandhi includes in his representation the poorest and most disenfranchised and draws them into the larger body, thus **taking political action beyond class interests and into principled issues of equality, loyalty, trust and unity** on a national level.

Gandhi's socio-political vision expands as the day-to-day public and political work with people stimulates his evolving contextual thought. With it, his **understanding of service deepens**, and the **concept of universal love** evolves. It **unites into a consistent spiritual framework his political work and his religious understanding of morality on all levels**. It is important to note that Gandhi's approach to religion is both respectful and appreciative of its role, and responsible for its careful and continuous reconstruction. Hence, Gandhi defines the service to India as his particular form of self-actualization. His focus slowly shifts from concrete political action to developing a broader conceptual understanding of the world.

Philosophical Expansion

This **expansion of thought to broader concepts and principles** was long coming, and in a certain way, the potential of it was always there in Gandhi's introspective approach to life. But once his political activity in SA becomes channeled, Gandhi's restless mind embarks on **a new re-examination and re-formulation of the basic truths that**

guide him, informed by his experience in political work. It is noteworthy that this period sets in when Gandhi is in his early thirties.

Out of his extensive studies of religion and contemplating life in England and in India, his concept of Western civilization emerges as one, which unlike the Eastern, is "predominantly based on force" (p. 142). About this time he begins to evolve his fundamental principle of non-violence, and shortly after he demonstrates it during his lynching by the mob in Natal.

This is a period of **evolving theories** around every particular issue that emerges. As a result of his work for The Natal Indian Congress, Gandhi evolves a theory about the purpose and most adequate organization of a public institution. In thinking about the education of his own children in SA, he begins to speculate on the natural schooling of disciplined home education and experience, as opposed to artificial literary education. As a "**student of the history of civilization**" (p. 150), Gandhi sees existing academic options both in SA and in India as part of a system of segregation and oppression, meant to prepare individuals to fit into the system. To him it becomes a choice of liberty or learning.

> Had I been without a sense of self-respect and satisfied myself with having for my children the education that other children could not get, I should have deprived them of the object-lesson in liberty and self-respect that I gave them at the cost of the literary training... The youths whom I

> called out in 1920 from those citadels of slavery - their schools and colleges - and whom I advised that it was far better to remain unlettered and break stones for the sake of liberty than to go in for a literary education in the chains of slaves will probably be able now to trace my advice to its source" p. 151.)

The **independent investigation of life and learning guided by moral principles rather than expediency and pragmatic considerations** leads Gandhi to advanced levels of consciousness. We see the emergence of a **metasystemic thinker**, who recognizes the limiting functions of the social system, and clearly formulates the importance of equality, justice and truth for all. This **slow opening up and growing permeability in the process of revisiting and redefining his major conceptual categories** characterizes the next long period in his life.

Another aspect of his maturing CC which becomes characteristic in this period, is the **constant alternation between self-examination and redefining of personal path, and critical examination of the state and needs of the world**. As early as his stay in England, Gandhi first spoke of bringing his inner and outer life and choices into harmony. The process of examining himself and his way of life, and trying to understand the ways of the world and respond to the needs of the time, ran concurrently and gradually grew closer. At this stage in his life, the two processes fully come together and become the two aspects of one process - that of living as a critically conscious human

being, who consciously sees himself as intimately related to and implicated in his world. This development in Gandhi represents what Colby & Damon (1992) call a mature individualism, manifesting fully explicated links with the world as a result of unity of self and morality.

This period is rich in **redefinitions and evolving universal principles**. Gandhi challenges every established pattern of thought both in himself and in others. One of the dramatic examples is his inclusion of the Indian caste of the untouchables into the communal living arrangement he establishes, a decision which challenged centuries of rigidly established social distinctions. Perhaps the main redefinition is that of freedom. Gandhi moves **from an emphasis on freedom of choice guided by moral imperative to freedom from self**. He discovers the liberating effect of the vow the observe celibacy, lets go of possessiveness, and frees himself of the passions of the self. Gradually that helps him free himself from attachment to family life and explore the dimensions of communal living. He also explores the freedom from the slavery to the senses and the "joy of vigilance" (p. 156), as well as the powerful potential in the cooperation between mind and body.

All of these and many others are examples of the **explosion of patterns that Gandhi identifies** all around him, and his focus on increasingly **bringing those patterns together into systems of thought**. Whether these are systems

of thought about "the simple life" (p. 159), or about social oppression, or about India's "poverty and subjection" (p. 174), we see Gandhi intensively bringing the threads of his thought and experience together. The result is that his political vision becomes far broader and more complex, including a lot of different and well-developed categories.

For example, he offers a brilliant analysis of autocratic vs. democratic methods of public government and of their sources in political structure. He examines the role of journalism in social life. He turns Ruskin's utopian vision of community into reality by introducing democratic and deeply innovative social reforms with utmost understanding and patience. He develops a holistic approach to body and health through critically examining hydropathy and allopathy. He develops further his principle of non-violence by making an important distinction between a person and his deeds, and the principle of resisting the second but not the first.

> It is quite proper to resist and attack a system, but to resist and attack its author is tantamount to resisting and attacking oneself. For we are all tarred with the same brush, and are children of one and the same Creator, and as such the divine powers within us are infinite. To slight a single human being is to slight those divine powers, and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole world (p. 206).

The political and spiritual complexity of this vision does not need discussion. What is important to notice, however, is that his **personal, social, political, and**

spiritual vision are becoming increasingly integrated into a historical and global vision.

Historical and Global Vision

It is remarkable to trace Gandhi's progression from the understanding of social injustice to a historical understanding of the global roles of nations. Since it is impossible to do justice to that transformation in this limited format, I offer a few quotes which give no more than a taste of that vision:

> A nation that wants to come into its own ought to know all the ways and means to freedom (p. 285).
> My South African experience had convinced me that it would be on the question of Hindu-Muslim unity that my Ahimsa (non-violence) would be put to its severest test (p. 334).
> Before one can be fit for the practice of civil disobedience one must have rendered a willing and respectful obedience to the State laws.... A Satyagrahi (a person practicing passive resistance) obeys the laws of society intelligently and of his own free will, because he considers it to be his sacred duty to do so. It is only when a person has thus obeyed the laws of society scrupulously that he is in a position to judge as to which particular rules are good and just and which unjust and iniquitous (p. 357)
> To safeguard democracy the people must have a keen sense of independence, self-respect and their oneness, and should insist upon choosing as their representatives only such persons as are good and true (p. 380).

Formulation of the Construct of CC as a Result of the Gandhi Analysis

The above thematic and developmental analysis of Gandhi's life shows how his spiritual potential, even as a child with Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996), was fostered by

his morally-oriented environment in the context of Hindu practices. Although Gandhi's understanding of the universal moral values taught became richer, and much more conscious and complex, with progressive social-cognitive development, the presence and centrality of these values, even in the most undifferentiated form in his early life, appears to have had a tremendous significance in terms of his life-long development.

Hence, we see how the moral motivational component stands side by side, and interacts with, lifespan social cognitive development in the formation of CC. Moral motivation seems to spur structural development, while structural development provides the social skills and understanding required to put one's intuitive moral interest into practice, and become a moral agent for positive social change. The outcome of this synergistic interaction between moral motivation and structural development is a qualitatively different kind of social consciousness, namely CC. Overall, CC is a fundamentally moral phenomenon, a moral way of understanding one's world and being in it, which contains the potential for unlimited growth and complexity. Such a definition is consistent with Freire's (1973) understanding of CC as a way of being which establishes relationships with the world impregnated with consequence.

This finding made me begin to use the term moral in a way different from the Kohlbergian tradition. Within the

Kohlbergian tradition, the term moral refers to any kind of reasoning around issues of right and wrong (Kegan, 1994). I had to differentiate between morality and the evolution of thinking about moral issues, and I found their interchangeable use confusing and unproductive. I disagree with Kegan's (1994) claim that "the sociopath is not without morality; he is simply without the one we want" (p. 40). In my understanding, the reasoning of the sociopath around issues of right and wrong cannot be considered morality because it is not grounded in a moral way of being and universal human values. I see morality as distinct from reasoning about questions of right and wrong in that it is centered around universal moral values, which are themselves an expression of the search for truth and meaning in life.

The chronological thematic progression we saw in Gandhi's life (from moral interest to moral authority, moral responsibility, expanded moral and social responsibility, social consciousness, political action, principled vision, philosophical expansion, historical and global vision) is the outcome of the snowball effect of the synergistic interplay between moral motivation and structural development in the life-span. The extraordinary expansiveness and interconnectedness of his concerns may also be the product of Gandhi's creative genius, in terms of which his life has been studied by other researchers (Gardner, 1993). However, the chronology of themes itself

appears to be a logical elaboration of central moral concerns as they both spur and get filtered through progressive structural development. A similar progression appears in varying degrees of completeness in the life stories of exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992; Bembow, 1994) and of the CC people I interviewed.

A closer examination of the moral concerns elaborated throughout this chronological progression reveals the continuous simultaneous negotiation of four themes which cut through the above chronology of themes. They are: moral identity and imperative, moral authority, meaningful and engaged relationships, and the meaning and purpose of life. I consider those the four basic dimensions of moral motivation, which exist independent of the level of operant structural development, and are developmentally elaborated through every level. Although to try to separate these four dimension of moral motivation from their actual developmental elaboration at any particular point in time is in itself an abstraction, it is important to note that their presence or absence is not dependent on developmental processes. Any effort to describe them, however, will have to present them in their dynamic elaboration:

1. **Moral imperative**, i.e. an inner need to do the morally right thing, which is **stronger than self-interest**. This moral imperative strengthens and expands in the course of life. It is the outcome of a life-long preoccupation with

authentic moral concerns with right and wrong, progressively more complexly understood. The source of this moral imperative is a **moral sense of identity** anchored in **universal moral values and moral character**.

2. The negotiation of **external moral authority**, and the growing critical discernment of and receptiveness to authentic moral authority. **Authentic moral authority is progressively internalized as personal moral responsibility**. This process is accompanied by the **emerging sense of internal moral authority** and the tendency to reconstruct continuously internalized **personal moral responsibility**. Eventually, a clear sense of **moral agency** is born, and it prevails over the tendency to experience oneself as the victim of circumstances.

3. **Empathic concerns** with interpersonal relationships, with good and bad, with being loyal and not hurting others. The centrality of **engaged relationships** accounts for a **growing permeability** and **active receptiveness to a progressively larger circle of meaningful social influences**. This stimulates the expansion of concerns with justice and not hurting beyond the interpersonal sphere. **Concerns with social justice and equity** evolve, and grow into **social consciousness, social and political action**.

4. The life-long **search for authentic meaning** through continuous elaboration of the connections between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false. This search for meaning

larger than the self develops in an explicitly or implicitly spiritual environment which operates with faith in the meaning and wisdom of life, and recognizes one's responsibility to align oneself with it. **The search for truth provides a larger frame of reference, which serves as a vantage point from which to reflect on self and experience**. The idealistic quest for principles one can identify with itself spurs **intense self-reflection** and **critical examination of reality**. These eventually expand into principled, philosophical, historical and global vision.

These four moral motivational thematic dimension appear to be at the heart of the phenomenon of CC. Different life stories reveal a dominant preoccupation with one or another of those four dimensions as a result of different contextual conditions which have stimulated it. In Gandhi's case, as well as in the case of Paul (Bembow, 1994), whose case vignette I will contrast with Gandhi's further in this chapter, the starting point was the **search for truth and meaning** expressed in an **inherent moral sense**, and a strong sense of **moral identity grounded in moral values and moral character**. In Virginia Durr's case (Colby & Damon, 1992), it was a strong **empathic concern with relationships and justice**, as well as a blueprint of **character**, that helped her extricate herself from the prejudices of her own upbringing and become a champion for human rights. In

contrast, Freire's work on CC and empowerment focuses on **authority, responsibility, and agency** and **social consciousness**. Clearly, there are different trajectories and profiles of the development of CC, depending on which themes become dominant and in what configuration. However, all four themes seem to be present at least in some degree in the secondary life-stories of moral exemplars I examined. Hence, I posit that the centrality of moral motivation in a person's life is characterized by the presence of and interaction between these four dimensions.

What I find central, however, is that, regardless of its specific trajectory, CC is not a primarily intellectual but a moral phenomenon, a moral consciousness. Gandhi's life reveals the centrality of authentic moral concerns in the early formation of his consciousness, and their snowball effect and on-going redefining throughout his noetic development. This leads me to the conclusion that when the familiar structural developmental evolution of human consciousness is colored by a dominant moral motivation, it leads into a personal and social path so different, that it almost looks like an alternative developmental pathway.

Gandhi's social- and self-awareness mature early, and his sense of responsibility to his own conscience, to others and to the world is strikingly deeper and more expansive than that of an ordinary individual progressing through the same stages of development. Gandhi's life path offers a good

example of alternative, optimal possibilities for social development when grounded in universal moral values. Colby & Damon (1992) also documented the life-paths of outstanding moral agents of positive social change, such as Suzie Valadez, known as "Queen of the Dump", whose life-long commitments were fueled not so much by complex moral reasoning and social-cognitive understanding, but by a powerful moral imperative rooted in spiritual values. This rootedness in faith and authentic spirituality, in fact, fosters, as the researchers show, the developmental integration of the whole person, and produces an expansion in moral and social agency.

My interviews with ordinary individuals, discussed in chapters 6, 7, and 8, reveal similar alternative optimal functioning and self-fulfillment in those people who exhibit a level of CC. In contrast to them, the non-CC people seem to struggle with life, and appear to be a lot less happy.

The understanding of the dimensions of moral motivation, gained from the analysis of Gandhi's life, allows me to hypothesize that identity, authority and responsibility, relationships, and the meaning of life are in fact basic motivational dimensions, in terms of which we can analyze the way of being of every individual. Depending on whether these four dimension are colored by moral concerns or not, we witness the operating of moral or expediency motivation.

If we return for a moment to the integrated hypothetical construct of CC, presented earlier in this chapter, we will remember that the full range of human social consciousness was hypothesized as a continuum between CC and non-CC along the two main components of consciousness, structural development and motivation. Since structural development is shared by both kinds of consciousness, it is important to understand the dimensions along which we can differentiate between moral and amoral motivation. I posit four basic motivational dimensions, which can be colored by either predominantly moral or amoral preoccupations. Them are:

1. Identity
2. Authority, Responsibility, Agency
3. Relationships
4. Meaning of Life

I hypothesize a motivational template of the continuums between the predominantly moral or expediency-oriented elaboration of the four dimensions, as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2

Template of the Dimensions of Continuum between Moral and Expediency Motivation

Dimensions	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	identity predominantly rooted in social conventions (**social identity**) & **lack of moral imperative**	identity predominantly rooted in moral values (**moral identity**) & **moral imperative**
2. Authority, Responsibility & Agency	**limited personal authority & responsibility; lack of agency** (fear, helplessness, skepticism in the face of external authority)	**personal moral authority & critical discernment of external authority; expanding sense of moral responsibility; moral agency**
3. Relationships	lack of empathy, **alienation, impermeability**, lack of concerns w/ justice & not hurting	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting**
4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals**	**larger frames of reference** as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection; **life purpose greater than self**

The analysis of Gandhi's life allows some tentative conclusions about the nature of the environments which might foster the formation of a predominantly moral versus amoral motivation. In Gandhi's familial and cultural environment, **fundamental moral values were the explicit organizers of experience**. This factor appears to play out in two different ways.

On the one hand, they seem to become internalized to some degree, and to strengthen the intuitive moral sense of the young child, leading to the formation of an inner moral voice which guided Gandhi through every decision in his life. Moral induction childrearing practices also appear to have been instrumental in the formation of moral self-attribution and moral guilt as motivational sources of many of Gandhi's choices. These early experiences appear related to the formation of personal characteristics such as honesty, integrity, moral earnestness, and a passionate love for truth, clear inner moral standards, a strong sense of personal authority, and an ability to resist questionable outside pressures. They also seem related to life-long habits of self-examination and listening to one's inner voice, as well as openness and receptivity to authentic moral authority. Colby & Damon (1992) identify all of the above as personal continuities in their moral exemplars.

On the other hand, the centrality of universal moral values as organizers of experience seem to have put Gandhi in a bind between his commitment to moral ways, and the need to deal first with the authoritative presence of his father and other elders, and then with the authority of South African and British officials. When encountering oppression and injustice, he could not just afford to resent it. Because of his moral commitment to love of and service to people, he had to find a positive way to negotiate and

transcend it, which seems to have fostered his becoming a moral agent for positive social change.

The above conclusions find further confirmation in the comparative analysis I performed on the case studies which Bembow's (1994) and Colby & Damon's (1992) offer of some of their exemplars.

Comparison with Other Secondary Case Studies

The understanding gained from the detailed thematic and structural analysis of Gandhi's life, offered above, will now be compared with a briefer analysis of the empirical data Bembow (1994) provides on Paul Landford, a prominent peace activist. Then, I will do the same with two of Colby & Damon's exemplars.

Paul Landford

Regardless of significant cultural and historic differences, the story of Paul, a contemporary American gay peace activist, reveals the life-long elaboration of the same moral motivational dimensions which characterized Gandhi's CC, and their expression in a similar chronology of themes. He describes the same **moral sense of identity related to a home environment explicitly oriented toward moral and spiritual values**, as well as the same **early self- and social awareness, and expansive development of social consciousness**.

Paul talks about his early evangelical fundamentalist upbringing, the **earnestness** with which he internalized all the dualistic, literal explanations of Jesus' teachings, and the **on-going moral discourse that surrounded him**. The parallels with Gandhi's early environment and earnest way of being are striking. Paul relates being guided by the same **intuitive moral sense** which we saw operating in Gandhi's incident with the spelling test. Paul speaks of **a moral sense always having been with him**, and illustrates it with his spontaneous moral decision at the age of 12 to preach a sermon on why it was God's will that there be racial equality. He applied literally the principles he had been taught; his naivete as to the realities of his white middle-class church caused him shock at the cold reception of his sermon.

Paul's **moral imperative** was reinforced by a broad range of **personal continuities**, both cumulative and interactional, as well as by a strong **moral and spiritual family environment** in his early life. When he stole a dime from his mom at the age of 7, "although she was into paddling", she sat down and cried, and talked about the importance of being truthful and consistent. That incident reminds strikingly of Gandhi's single experience of stealing, confessing to his dad, expecting corporal punishment, and his father's crying. Early on, Paul developed a **deeply spiritual sense of there being something larger to life than immediate living**, an

unconscious accepting of a larger spiritual reality and **the importance of being guided by moral choices**.

> my understanding of Jesus at that time was that going Jesus' way was different than going the way of the crowd or "the world"... Later I rejected most of those ideas, but what I retained... was this sense of there being a transcendent dimension to our lives and that it's not enough to live our lives by public opinion polls.", Bembow, 1994, p. 86).

Paul's initially **undifferentiated moral interest** sought and founds environments that fostered and reinforced it, a phenomenon Bembow (1994) describes as synchronicity, and Colby & Damon (1992) refer to as interactional continuities. Paul relates his moral diligence in pursuing every serious religious activity available to him as a youth. His **preoccupation with right and wrong** is comparable to Gandhi's, as is his **identification with authentic moral authority** and his commitment to follow it.

> I never questioned whether I was right. I was very consciously using Jesus as a model; and I had this image that Jesus sometimes had a lot of people saying `right on, right on', and other times he'd look around and no one would be there (p. 75).

Gradually, clear values emerged and the issues of external and internal moral authority, and trust, began to be negotiated. For both men, "**righteousness, moral purity and clarity**" (p. 94) became very important early on, as they defined the role of reformers for themselves.

> At one time I believed that one's powerfulness in making history was a direct reflection of one's moral purity and clarity. So I was very much into righteousness. Righteousness was really the center of my life (p. 94).

Just like Gandhi was enthralled with the melodramatic devotion expressed in his favorite plays as a child, Paul relates a fascination with the early Christians. In both men, **moral earnestness and moral imperative** was transferred to others in a **passion to be a reformer**. This strong sense of **righteousness** gets temporarily expressed in a condescending attitude to the close ones (Gandhi's wife, Paul's parents), but gradually it gets redefined as **active love** and a **reformist commitment to service**.

In the process, Paul exhibits the same **critical questioning**, **aloofness from group norms** and **emerging authority of personal decisions** which Gandhi reveals at that age. At 16, Paul refused to sign McCarthy's loyalty oath and perceived it as a "massive attack on the trust relationship between citizen and government" (Bembow, 1994, p.). At the same time, both men manifest **an openness to genuine moral authority in others**, and are discovered and supported by significant individuals until the awareness grows on them that they are somehow **different and need to break away from their immediate environments**. Paul leaves his small town; Gandhi goes to England. This manifests yet another common characteristic - the **presence of a strong inner awareness, inner voice** and the ability and tendency **to listen to it**.

Both men take on the responsibility of character-building and self-definition, and embark on an **independent inquiry into religion seeking fundamental guiding spiritual**

principles. Both perceive service as a particular form of religion and self-actualization. With this, a sense of **social identity** evolves. Paul:

> By the age of 19 I knew my vocation was with social change, and with struggling for justice and peace. I knew that's why I was on the planet.... I don't know how I came to know that. I remember environments in which I became aware of it (Bembow, 1994, p. 90).

It is important to remember that Gandhi's **quest for life based on principles he could identify with**, was also what lead him into the public sphere; it was part of the responsibility he took to **bring inner and outer life together**. It was part of what Paul calls "a growing awareness of my nature", and what Bembow calls "being in touch with our real values, and acting out of our values openly and consciously, which builds true commitment and gives a sense of home-coming". (Bembow, 1994, p.)

What follows in both cases is an **analysis of existing power relations** and a gradual **expansion of political vision** through consistent efforts to educate and organize the community. It is also interesting to note how, initially spurred into social action by a desire for "**righteousness**, **moral purity**, and **clarity**", both men soon found themselves on a spiritual path which was "one of expansion, an increasing ability to empathize with people and with ideas" (Bembow, 1994, p. 140). **Empathy** becomes a prominent characteristic as they become leaders and reformers and **charismatic figures** around whom movements form.

As the two men subject social and political reality to further questioning, they develop an **understanding of the dynamics between power and knowledge**, i.e. we see the emergence of systematic thinkers. Paul says:

> I have learned that theories and what experts know are influenced by many things other than the truth (Bembow, 1994, p.95).

An example of Gandhi's counterpart thinking is his refusal to proceed against the people who lynched him in Natal because he believes they acted out of what they knew, out of what they were told. Both men arrive at the conclusion that not only structures and policies, but values need to be changed. Both reach the idea of **nonviolence**, and **see their mission as part of history**. Paul does not think one can have an identity without a history and a heritage. Both men define their lives' tasks according to their understanding of their own historic mission. For Gandhi it is the fate of India; for Paul it is the work for peace. Paul even explicitly talks about his "**dance with history**" and orienting it towards social movements. It is important to remember here Freire's words:

> In the **act of critical perception**, men **discover their own temporality**. **Transcending a single dimension**, they reach back to yesterday, recognize today, and come upon tomorrow. The dimensionality of time is one of the fundamental discoveries of human culture. In illiterate cultures, the "weight" of apparently limitless time hindered people from reaching that consciousness of temporality, and thereby achieving a sense of their historical nature. A cat has no historicity; his inability to emerge from time submerges him in a totally one-dimensional "today" of which he has

> no consciousness. Men exist in time. They are inside. They are outside. They inherit. They incorporate. They modify. Men are not imprisoned within a permanent "today"; they emerge, and become temporalized.
> **As men emerge from time**, discover temporality, and free themselves from "today", **their relations with the world become impregnated with consequence**. The normal role of human beings in and with the world is not a passive one. Because they are not limited to the natural (biological) sphere but **participate in the creative dimension** as well, men can **intervene in reality in order to change it**. Inheriting acquired experience, creating and re-creating, integrating themselves into their context, responding to its challenges, objectifying themselves, **discerning, transcending**, men enter into the domain which is theirs exclusively - that of History and Culture (Freire, 1972, p. 4).

This **sense of historicity, of place and role in history**, seems to be among the latest and most complex achievements of CC. In both men, it comes accompanied by a **profound sense of loneliness** amidst all their followers. Loneliness, however, is not seen as a sacrifice, but is accepted as part of their mission of being ahead of their times. **Life is experienced as profoundly fulfilling**.

> The loneliness has to do with finding other people who can appreciate life on the edge. Because some of the things I do I'm just really scared to do... The other part of feeling alone is that sense of being different. I have always felt different and at the same time I have always fought against the ideas that I was different... But in spite of the danger, the loneliness... I can't imagine living a more fulfilling life than the one I have lived (Bembow, 1994, p. 96).

Overall, Paul's life exhibits the same themes sequentially gaining ascendance, with earlier ones getting progressively reworked and later integrated into larger and

more complex ones. From a generic moral interest, truthfulness and naivete, Paul moves to a conscious passion for truth. Gradually, issues of moral authority and trust come to the fore, followed by a tension between responsibility to community standards and responsibility for personal self-definition. Social awareness emerges and gradually expands; a social and personal identity as a reformer is established. Paul's political vision expands progressively, concurrent with an ongoing self-reflective re-examination and re-formulation of personal choices and basic guiding principles. This leads to conceptual and philosophical expansion, and an emerging sense of historicity.

Different Pathways of CC

The above thematic and developmental analysis of Gandhi's and Paul's life-stories presents two men, in whose lives the ontogeny of CC seems to have been prompted by a strong sense of moral identity and moral imperative, preoccupation with issues of moral authority, responsibility, and social justice and equity, as well as an intense search for truth and meaning in life. In a way, they each experience what Bembow (1994) describes with regard to most of her activists as **cognitive dissonance early in life, being exposed to social contradictions, or "catching culture in a lie"** (p. 153). For Gandhi, it was life in colonial

India under British rule; for Paul, it was the hypocrisy of his early religious experience. In each case, not having experienced a monolithic culture, but a rather ambiguous and contradictory one, made them embark on a life-long path of questioning.

Although that is frequently the case with activists and moral agents for positive social change, it is important to understand that such an intellectual passion is not necessarily always the starting point for the development of CC. Below, I offer two very brief vignettes of two of Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars - women, whose empathic concerns with others, and heartfelt spirituality, were dominant in the ontogeny of CC in their lives. Each of their life stories shows the primacy of moral motivation in a unique configuration of the four moral motivational dimensions, quite different from that of either Paul or Gandhi. The greatest difference, perhaps, is that instead of embarking on an intense intellectual search for truth and meaning, redefining every concept and idea they encountered, as Gandhi and Paul did, these two women started from a place of having a greater frame of reference with which they could identify.

Both of them were socialized into a holistic transcendental framework, that of Pentecostal Christianity, from which they developed a system of values, a sense of purpose, and a source of faith, positivity and endurance.

Each woman drew from that system in a creative and independent way, continuously redefining it as she expanded her commitments and her understanding. Unlike the two men, whose main motivational source seems to have been the **search for meaning**, these women are moved by the desire to **bring meaning and hope back into the lives** of the deprived and disempowered. They illustrate compellingly Gilligan's (1978) redefinition of Kohlberg's (1984) ethic of justice through the female voices speaking of the ethic of care.

In each of the two cases, the absolute moral motivational component appeared in a slightly different configuration, and interacted with the developmental component, producing a snowball effect of life-long growth and personal integration. Hence, the two cases briefly outlined bellow will hopefully illustrate the rich variety of ways in which moral motivation and structural development can interact in a person's life to produce CC.

Suzie Valadez

Suzie Valadez, known in South Texas as the "Queen of the Dump", spent her life feeding, clothing, and providing medical care to thousands of poor Mexicans living in the surrounds of the huge Ciudad Juarez garbage dump. When she first felt herself called upon to undertake that, she was 36, a single mother of four young children, with tenth-grade education, no job experience, and no means. She was naive

about social reality, having been born and raised in a protected, though modest, environment. She grew up loved, in a strong, close family with deep religious conviction and a love for people. It was her genuine compassion and caring that helped her become aware of a basic, undifferentiated pattern of need out there - that of utmost poverty and desolation. She responded by committing herself for life.

Suzie illustrates the power of **CONVENTIONAL CC** to search for more humane solutions within existing social structures. She does not question the social system that produced that social ill, but neither does she fail to see the problem and the need, or try to rationalize it away. When her church in California, where she lived, brings to her knowledge the destitution of thousands of Mexicans, she responds in a spiritual, wholesome way. Her moral imperative makes her feel directly implicated and responsible to find a solution. She does not reason or create a theory about it; instead, she feels interconnected, engaged with that crying need, and called upon to help.

At the time, much like Bembow's (1994) activists, she did not know exactly what her mission was or how she would carry it through. She started out of an Interpersonal (Kegan, 1982) identification with her religion, with the needs and shared realities of the people she was trying to help, and a simple, straightforward, and clear unity of morality, social and personal responsibility, and self-

interest. She endured enormous tests and moments of deep self-doubt, but, as she explains, she gradually found her way, and her faith strengthened.

Suzie evolved her own standards of understanding and evaluating the social environment she operated within, and the class of situations which relate directly to the lives of the poor. She learned to understand their needs, what avenues exist within the system to re-direct funds, and how to make the best use of those funds on their behalf. She continuously re-examined and strengthened her inner standards as she gained experience. Over time, her moral agency expanded: her goal became not just to feed and help those people, but to reach the young, and help them become aware of their own potential as human beings, and gain hope. She became a moral agent for social and personal transformation for many people, acting out of a spiritual vision of a better world. In that sense, Suzie is a wonderful example of the capacity of Conventional CC to bring about positive social change.

Suzie was guided on her path by a deeply spiritual sense of identity and personal responsibility, which was more heartfelt than the outcome of an intellectual elaboration. Her parents were models of authentic moral authority, combining truthfulness and uprightness with empathy and caring, in a simple lower class life of dignity and honesty. The meaning of life was seen in aligning

oneself with the spiritual wisdom of existence, and finding spiritual and personal solutions to social problems. In other words, Suzie exhibits all four dimensions of moral motivation negotiated through what appears to be formal operational thought, an understanding of global, undifferentiated social patterns, and a differentiated sense of self.

Because of the particular spiritual configuration of her moral motivation, the critical element in Suzies's Conventional CC is expressed in a somewhat different, apolitical way, and may be confused with a lack of critical social understanding. Since life is seen as a journey of personal transformation, critical discernment of social needs and contradictions serves the larger purpose of helping that transformation, and is therefore less visible as a separate preoccupation. However, what is indicative of Suzie's CC is the fact that she does not remain locked in the limited interests of a membership group, but engages in a meaningful relationship and dialogue with a larger humanity. Her love of God and respect for life prevent her identification with fundamentalist Pentecostal Christianity from becoming a source of exclusive self-righteousness. Instead, it is a source of moral certainty, service to humanity, endurance and faith. Below are a few excepts from Colby & Damon's (1994) brilliant portrayal of this

remarkably integrated and self-actualized woman, reminiscent of Mother Teresa:

> In all, Suzie will put in a fourteen-hour day. At the age of sixty-six, she shows no trace of exhaustion at the fast-paced life she leads. Nor does she express any irritation at her material discomforts or humble surroundings; nor any worry about the obvious hazards of her trips through the squalor of urban Juarez and up to the desolate garbage dump hills. Through it all, she shows only a love of life, a love of God, and a tangibly shining presence...Her operation is run through Christ for Mexico Missions, a charitable religious organization she started in 1963 and now manages along with three of her four children...She has confronted a seemingly bottomless pit of need, but she does not become discouraged or give up, and she has stuck with her exhausting task for almost thirty years now. She doesn't seem to worry that what she does, as impressive as it is, can never be more than a drop in the bucket of the overwhelming poverty of Mexico...Like other moral leaders, Suzie set aside her own pressing needs and those of her family as she directed most of her attention toward helping others. This is not a trivial issue. Suzie's children were required to make real sacrifices in the interests of their mother's cause, as were the children of another exemplar, Virginia Durr, a civil rights activist. The Valadez children grew up with little beyond the bare necessities...It was her abiding faith that God would provide for her and her family that allowed her to give so much to others...(pp. 41-46).

It is important to recognize that Suzie Valadez exhibits all the most important moral motivational characteristics which we identified as common between Gandhi and Paul within her different approach to social transformation. She shows both the intuitive moral sense and moral interest which grew into a simple and sincere passion for truth; the negotiation of external and internal authentic moral authority, responsibility and agency, and an

expansive social consciousness, critical self-awareness and spiritual vision - all of these expressed in a less verbal and mental, more holistic way. Her path is also one of interconnectedness, synchronicity, and social empowerment of the oppressed.

Charleszetta Waddles

Charleszetta Waddles, known in Detroit as Mother Waddles, is said to be a "one-woman war on poverty" (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 202). Called by Colby & Damon "Patriarch of Faith", she has established and runs The Perpetual Mission for Saving Souls of All Nations, which "serves 100,000 people a year, offering food, clothing, furniture, emergency assistance, housing referrals, tutoring, legal services, and vocational education classes" (p. 202). The way this amazing woman has defined her goals reveals a systematic approach to what she has identified as her cause, as well as an ability to dereify social realities. In that sense, she exhibits early **POSTCONVENTIONAL SYSTEMIC CC**. However, what brought her so far was not so much the cognitive dissonance that she herself experienced as a poor black woman, but her genuine spiritual sense of identity and her faith in the authentic moral authority of the spiritual teachings she has embraced.

Charleszetta grew up in poverty and worked all her life to support, first, her ill mother and younger siblings, and later, her own ten children. Yet, she did not feel

victimized, because she took to heart the teaching of Christ that anyone can "become the light of the world", and that "as you think, that's what you'll be" (p. 220). She felt the church was not doing what it preached in order to help the poor "believe in their own capacity to take control of their lives" (p. 227). So she challenged "the prevailing view of the church's role" (p. 212), and established her own ministry as an alternative to existing churches, to feed the hungry. She relies on a systemic approach to the Scriptures as a source of guidance on how to truly help the poor, recognizing the complex patterns of human needs to which she tries to respond. As Colby & Damon (1992) point out, for her it is not a struggle to live according to the teachings of Christ, because they "are completely interwoven through the fabric of her being" (p. 228).

Mother Waddles sees poverty not as a single pattern, as does Suzie Valadez, but as a complex system of patterns, the result of systemic conditions. She understands how city- and government-funded programs for the poor are limited in focus and treat the poor as helpless victims, "handing down to them" rather than lifting them up. She sees clearly the injustices and imbalances that the system perpetrates.

However, Charleszetta has evolved a personal philosophy of empowerment, which is consciously apolitical. She acts like a moral agent for positive social change, out of a spiritual philosophy and vision. She is aware of

discrimination and sees herself as the representative and "mouthpiece" for the social class of the most disempowered, "for people who I don't know", be they "young, old, black, white, rich, poor, drunk, and sober" (p. 202). Yet, her goal is primarily to return to people their sense of personal dignity, and "offer sustenance for a change in their values and stance toward life" (p. 226). In undertaking so big a goal, Charleszetta operates without any self-righteousness, with what Colby & Damon see as a sense of perspective and "charming humility" (p. 206):

> I feel unworthy too. As long as you keep that unworthy feeling, I believe that we can make it. Once we get to feeling worthy, we might miss something...I would really like to travel, and especially among junior colleges, and psychology classes across the country. Somehow imploring people that "Don't forget the basics." Because the Letter can kill and the Spirit can keep alive. If you put them together, they can balance out. But sometimes we get all caught up in the rhetoric and we lose all sense of responsibility to human beings...I say to people today, "You don't have to look poor, you know. You don't have to look down. For money is a medium of exchange, that's all; but it's not a mind regulator unless you allow it to be" (Colby & Damon, 1992, pp. 206-210).

Mother Waddles is happy, fulfilled, and confident, although challenged daily and hourly. She recognizes as the most difficult part of her work

> being able to forgive seventy times seventy...Because people will fail. People will cheat, you know. And one of the things I've used in my work is my commitment to God...(p. 219).

Her personal path is one of tremendous growth through the life-span, of being developmentally alive, open to and

profiting from dynamic social influences, and a continual re-examining of the principles on which her work is based. She has received, as Colby & Damon say, "hundreds of awards" (p. 203): the Distinguished Citizen Award from Michigan State and Wayne State Universities, the Community Service Award from the Ford Motor Company, letters of commendation from Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Richard Nixon. Her Mission has inspired sister Missions in Ghana, Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Togoland, Cameroon, Zambia, Benin, Liberia, and Kenya.

Mother Waddles does not choose to do political work, but the transformative impact of her visionary social work is quite comparable to a larger political goal. She illustrates convincingly the possibility for multiple paths to critical consciousness and community, national and global citizenship.

In order to summarize the comparative analysis of CC in the lives all the above moral exemplars, on Figure 4.2 on page 245, I show their hypothesized position on the diagram of the human range of the CC/non-CC continuum.



A = MORAL INTEREST B = MORAL AUTHORITY C = PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D = EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E = SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F = PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G = HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 4.2 Place of the Moral Exemplars on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Integrated Definition and Summary of Empirical Claims

Critical consciousness is a moral kind of consciousness, characterized by two relatively independent components: **moral motivation** and **structural development**. These two components interact synergistically, producing a qualitatively different pathway of development of social consciousness, the CC pathway. Moral motivation seems to spur structural development, while structural development provides the social skills and understanding required to put one's moral motivation into practice, and become a moral agent for positive social change. This synergistic interaction brings about more optimal personal integration, self-fulfillment, and expansive moral and social growth, which appears to make CC not only an alternative but also an optimal developmental pathway.

The moral motivational component can be understood in terms of four dimensions which are at the heart of the phenomenon of CC. They are: moral identity and imperative, moral authority and responsibility, meaningful and engaged relationships, and the meaning and purpose of life. The centrality of moral motivation in a person's life is characterized by the presence, in some configuration, and the interaction between these four dimensions. The prominence of some dimensions over others varies from person to person, reflecting specific formative contextual conditions, but all four of them have to be present to some

degree in order for CC to form. The centrality of authentic moral concerns in the formation of consciousness is independent of the level of operant structural development, although the moral motivational dimensions are continuously developmentally elaborated through every level.

In the case when the motivational dimensions (identity, authority and responsibility, relationships, and meaning of life) are not colored by predominantly moral concerns, or only some are, we see the operating of predominantly expediency motivation, and the person exhibits a non-CC pathway of development of consciousness. Whether the individual will negotiate developmental levels of consciousness in the direction of CC or not, seems related to contextual conditions. The centrality of universal moral values as explicit organizers of experience in one's immediate environment, appears to facilitate the formation of predominantly moral motivation. Moral motivation can become central to the individual at any point in the life-span and cause a shift to the CC pathway.

Regardless of when an individual moves in the direction of CC, central to the critically conscious person is the striving toward integrity. This is expressed in a sought consistency of personal meaning with the perceived larger meaning of life, regardless of the level of developmental complexity at which this consistency is interpreted. What is important, is that the motivation for self-preservation is

at least counterbalanced, if not, overpowered, by a motivation toward internal and external consistency with a central moral meaning larger than the self. This is yet another way to describe the formation of a sense of self around a moral center (Colby & Damon, 1992). When the sense of self is sufficiently established, the person will begin to operate as a moral agent in his/her environment, i.e. become a CC person.

The morally motivated striving toward integrity fosters a progressively deepening inner honesty which keeps the person aware of contradictions, self-reflective, critically perceptive, and open to re-examination at any point. I.e., it keeps CC growing and transforming, and becoming progressively more all-encompassing, while the person's "grip on core ideals remains unwavering" (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 185). Groundedness in universal moral values such as righteousness, trustworthiness, integrity, constancy, justice, compassion, patience, humility, active love, service, knowledge, respect for life, also helps build moral character. As Colby & Damon (1992) point out, such character is both solid and lasting, and exhibits unlimited capacity for growth through goal transformation in a life-long context of morally meaningful social relationships.

The real-life expression of the interplay of moral motivation and structural development along the CC pathway is a chronological progression of ascending themes. During

the period of Pre-CC, when the four moral motivational dimensions are formed and the structural developmental threshold of adulthood is reached, the themes of moral interest, moral authority, and personal moral responsibility are negotiated. Conventional CC negotiates expanding moral and social responsibility, and social consciousness, with or without political action. Postconventional CC negotiates principled vision, philosophical expansion, and historical and global vision.

Everything discussed so far has allowed me to construct the hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC. This model is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

HYPOTHETICAL MODEL FOR THE ONTOGENY OF CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The purpose of this chapter is to construct a generic description of the hypothesized ontogeny of CC as defined in chapter 4, and to elaborate further the theoretical claim that CC represents a qualitatively different pathway of the development of social consciousness. In describing each developmental level of CC, I attempt to show the transformative power of moral motivation, which accounts for the contrast between the CC pathway and the familiar development of adult consciousness. For the later, I will refer to the developmental models reviewed in chapter 2.

The conceptualization of a hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC presents a significant challenge at this point in developmental theory, because it attempts to describe a holistic progression of moral consciousness. In the case of a synthetic construct such as CC, we are looking at webs of interrelated influences, which generate ways of being, and which can be at best teased out, but not causally organized in view of "the chicken or the egg" question.

A second level of difficulty comes from the fact that this study seeks a way to describe the ontogeny of CC as an outcome of the interdependent operation of individual social-cognitive development and socio-cultural interactions. This task in essence means bringing together

Neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian understanding into an integrated model, a task which has not so far been accomplished by developmental theory.

In view of the lack of models on how to tackle these two levels of difficulty, the hypothetical model for the ontogeny of CC offered in this chapter will evolve its own logic of organization. It will attempt to describe:
(1) the main levels and stages of CC as morally centered ways of being, characterized by certain important dimensions but not reducible to those dimension;
(2) the interdependent operation of individual social-cognitive development and socio-cultural environmental interactions which seem to account for the ontogeny of CC.

As has already been established in chapter 4, CC is a moral kind of consciousness, characterized by two main components: **moral motivation** and **structural development**. The interaction between these components results in three levels of the ontogeny of CC: **PRE-CC**, **CONVENTIONAL CC**, and **POSTCONVETIONAL CC**. In describing the first two levels of CC, I do not focus on stages within each level, but show the broad-brush developmental elaborations of the four moral motivational dimensions of CC, as they are filtered through the developmental component. In describing the third level of CC, I had to differentiate two stages to help understand what I see as the convergence of the alternative CC pathway with the non-CC pathway in advanced development.

As chapter 4 explains, I hypothesize the full range of human social consciousness as a continuum between CC and non-CC along the two main components of consciousness, structural development and motivation. Both types of social consciousness, CC and non-CC, share the same structural-developmental levels and stages. However, in the case of CC, moral motivation interacts with structural development, and results in a qualitatively different, optimal pathway of the formation of social consciousness. The relative lack of moral motivation leaves structural development more vulnerable to circumstances, and thus results in what I see as a sub-optimal pathway of the formation of social consciousness.

The levels of CC synthesize stage characteristics from various existing developmental models with a degree of approximation, capturing the large movements, as well as the possibilities, limitations and challenges at each level. They describe the generic transformations in CC with the general movement from concrete to abstract, formal, and postformal thinking, as it interacts with environmental and personal motivational factors. Although the large movement is hypothesized as universal, there is ample room within it for multiple developmental pathways related to difference in cultural and historical background, and personal history; the full range of dynamic processes underlying this movement is by far not yet understood.

Level 1 - Pre-Critical Consciousness

The criteria for the emergence of CC are the formation of the four dimensions of moral motivation, and the achievement of the structural-developmental threshold for adult consciousness. That developmental threshold was established in chapter 4 as the presence of at least early Formal Operational thought (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), Conventional Social System and Conscience orientation (Kohlberg, 1984), Pattern Self-Knowledge (see Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985), and a differentiated sense of Institutional self (Kegan, 1982; Lahley et al., 1988).

These conditions occur during the period of **PRE-CC**, which ideally begins in early childhood and reaches into young adulthood. These conditions, however, may not occur fully in childhood. If the structural-developmental conditions do not fully occur, but the moral motivational ones are in place, the individual is likely to continue to operate with **PRE-CC** into biological adulthood. If the moral motivational conditions do not occur, the individual will embark on a **non-CC pathway** of adult development. In this case, there is always the possibility for circumstances to occur later in life which will stimulate the formation of the moral motivational dimensions and allow the person to embark on a **CC pathway**.

The section on **PRE-CC** relies on existing knowledge of structural development in childhood and adolescence. It

examines how familiar Neo-Piagetian dimensions and characteristics of consciousness are in an interdependent interaction with the content and nature of the socio-cultural environment, and how the nature of this interaction influences the degrees of presence, centrality, or absence of moral motivation in the individual. The focus is on the nature of the interaction which may have to do with whether an individual embarks on a **CC pathway** or on a **non-CC pathway**. This section also establishes the general characteristics of moral motivation along its four dimensions which make it sufficiently developed for a person to evolve **CC**, given the structural-developmental threshold.

In order to understand the difference that the presence or absence of moral motivation in a child's life at this time would make, I need to bridge the discussion in this chapter to the integrated stages described in chapter 2, and to highlight the potential for CC at each point.

Potential for CC in Early Noetic Stages

The tendency of Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996) toward synchretic thinking and internalization of models makes the child very vulnerable to its immediate environment. Given meaningful moral guidance, the child's natural reliance on authority offers a tremendous potential for positive growth. His/her intuitive sense of interconnectedness can be strengthened with positive modelling, or undermined by an

alienated or fragmented adult world. The later may account for the naive transitive consciousness, with a sphere of perceptions slightly larger than biological necessities, which Freire encountered in adults.

As we know from Freire's work, CC is a reflection of one's relationships and relatedness to the world, which begins to be negotiated with the formation of a separate sense of self at the Egocentric (Wade 1996) stage. Whether one's relatedness to the world will be negotiated in a context implicitly or explicitly modelling self-centered alienation and compartmentalization, or in a context emphasizing meaningful moral interconnectedness, would be greatly influential in the ways of being that emerge. A larger meaningful frame of reference counterbalancing the power struggles of this stage may facilitate the transition beyond this stage and the evolving of faith in an ultimately moral and meaningful universe with which one has the responsibility to align.

Conformist (Wade, 1996) consciousness, with its reliance on social roles, poses new questions concerning the available social forms of self-identification, and the nature of the values they promote. If environments foster self-identification through empathic reciprocity and oneness with a greater humanity, they may stimulate concerns with justice and not hurting. Maintaining the centrality of moral concerns in such a way may counterbalance the tendency of

this stage of consciousness toward stereotypes, prejudices, and contradictory rationalizations as a path to safety and control.

In summary, this developmental macro-period negotiates issues of identity, external and internal authority, responsibility and agency, relationships and life purpose. I see these as central developmental tasks in a Levinsonian (1978) sense, because they build a sense of personhood. Although personhood continues to be negotiated throughout the lifespan, its central characteristics are formed in this period, and, I believe, become motivational sources of choices and behaviors. The next section will examine the possible formation of personhood around a moral center.

Formation and Centrality of Moral Motivation

The period of Pre-CC is a time when the natural developmental negotiation of Naive, Egocentric, and Conformist consciousness interplays with a positive family and/or community environment, which fosters the formation and centrality of moral motivation. This process may occur along a number of different pathways depending on what the environment tends to emphasize most. The lives of the exemplars discussed in chapter 4 illustrate different trajectories of the formation of moral motivation.

I offer a generic description of the developmental elaboration of each moral motivational dimension. Although I

have attempted to isolate the trajectory of each dimension, in reality, these dimensions and their trajectories overlap, and form a web of moral influences unique to every individual. In that sense, the linear descriptions below are an abstraction that does not capture the flux, richness, and complexity of real life. Hopefully, more of that will be reflected in the case vignettes in the following chapters.

Formation of Moral Identity and Moral Imperative

Concerns with right and wrong are not naturally central to a preconceptual child (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), with Heteronomous reasoning around moral issues, and a punishment-and-reward orientation (Kohlberg, 1984). The child's Elemental self-knowledge (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985) is limited to overt, observable, fragmented, and juxtaposed elements of situations, not causally linked, classified or interpreted. Hence, the opportunity to learn from those experiences is limited and greatly depends on the external models and voices which guide and restrain.

Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996) has no ability to conceptualize; the child's synchretic thinking is prone to a magical internalizing of ready models. This internalization is not a ready transfer of social processes into the internal psychological plane, but involves internal restructuring (Wertsch, 1985). It is a combination of Piagetian formation of schemes, and Vygotskian mediation through collective social activity and language (Wertsch, 1985).

The lives of the exemplars I examined showed that each of them had in their early childhood **an intimate model of the kind of morality which later became central to them as individuals**. In Gandhi's case, it was the genuine spirituality and uprightness of his mother. In Paul's case, it was the earnest integrity of his evangelical minister father. In the case of Virginia Durr, one of Colby & Damon's (1992) other exemplars, it was the warm, empathic, embracing, and dignified presence of her black nanny. Both Paul's and Virginia Durr's significant adults suffered social injustice because of the moral principles they exhibited; both exemplars became champions for justice and human rights. Gandhi, on the other hand, identified most of all with uprightness and a search for spiritual solutions, and that became the theme of his life.

In all these cases, the particular attraction of these young children to the models of authentic moral authority in their lives suggests the presence in Naive consciousness of an **intuitive moral sense**, which responds to authenticity. This may be another way to refer to the **human spiritual potential** expressed in the striving toward authenticity and fulfillment (Maslow, 1959). However, this intuitive moral sense is negotiated in a tension with developmental differentiation and ego formation. Hence, the tremendous significance of authentic moral models early in life.

The fascination and **unconscious identification** with intimate role models leads to a sincere, trustful and open attitude to adults, which allows for more explicit moral guidance through external moral induction. The values taught are gradually embraced by these children more and more consciously, and a moral earnestness develops, related to the second dimension, that of moral authority and responsibility, as well as the third dimension, that of empathy and concern with relationships. With the advent of adolescence, this snowballs into a passionate personal integrity and preoccupation with character, the formation of conscious inner moral standards, and an evolving identity of a reformer or champion for positive social change.

Hence, a morally oriented familial (and cultural) context, which emphasizes universal moral values such as honesty, righteousness, trustworthiness, constancy, justice, compassion, humility, respect, service to others, active love, provides **models** and **external voices of moral guidance and restraint**. Even when these values cannot yet be conceptualized, their modeling **strengthens the natural impulses of the heart**, and helps **build habits of behavior** and **positive personal continuities**, which evolve later into what Colby & Damon (1992) identify in their moral exemplars as habitual morality.

It is important to understand a little better the role of the **external voices of moral induction** in the formation

of moral character and identity. As the child begins to make increasingly conscious sense of its experience, these **external moral voices** begin to function both as **explicit organizers of experience**, and as **frames of reference** in the tension with which the child is cognitively challenged toward progressive conceptualization. They will be **both resisted and internalized** to some degree, and with this ego-building tension moral character is formed.

As the child moves toward Egocentric consciousness (Wade, 1996), with the strengthening of the Imperial self (Kegan, 1982), and Situational self-knowledge (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985), the ability emerges to distinguish one point of view from another, and to perceive self-interest. The Individualistic instrumental purpose and exchange orientation (Kohlberg, 1984) brings about the **prominence of self interest** in every situation. The continuous **counterbalancing** of this developmental tendency **by an environment emphasizing the centrality of moral values**, will have an impact both on what becomes central to the person's identity, and on what frames of reference become the main organizers of life's meaning.

The child's level of abstraction, Primary Actions (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), accounts for the early cognition of duality with an accompanying tendency toward stereotyping. With explicitly moral organizers of experience, the right/wrong dualistic (Perry, 1968)

distinctions characteristic of this age can acquire new meaning beyond the inclination to believe that what suits one's interest is right and what does not is wrong. This **constant redefining of right and wrong by the environment can facilitate the movement of self-interest in a moral direction**. The degree to which the moral point of view of significant adults will be adopted and become central to the formation of a moral sense of identity, has to do with the degree of genuine moral authority that those adults exhibit, and the nature of the relationship that develops.

As the young person moves toward Concrete Operations (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), single abstract concepts are formed. In a morally defined environment, **values begin to be conceptualized**. The most significant abstraction born at this stage is the social role. Since reasoning is profoundly dualistic, and intolerant of ambiguities (Perry, 1968), the way social roles are understood depends greatly on dominant influences. What the young person will identify with has increasingly to do with the role models in the culture. As Erikson (1968) points out,

> the adolescent mind becomes a more explicitly ideological one ... searching for some inspiring unification of tradition... ideas, and ideals. And, indeed, it is the ideological potential of society that speaks most clearly to the adolescent who is eager to be affirmed by peers, to be confirmed by teachers, and to be inspired by worth-while "ways of life" (p.130).

What kind of ideologies an adolescent will be exposed to may have a significant impact on the kind of identity

that the young person develops. In a society dominated by class, racial, ethnic, gender, and other group status identities, the possibility for developing a core moral sense of identity predominant over status identities will depend on family background and experience, and synchronistic encounters with and permeability to other kinds of social influences.

Since an adolescent generally operates out of Conventional Interpersonal Concordance (Kohlberg, 1984), i.e. a belief in reciprocity, goodness rewarded, or the "golden rule", we see the birth of true morality around values such as belonging, love, affection. Nonetheless, these values are colored by the developmental motivation toward safety and security through predictability and control, and being liked (Wade, 1996). I.e., these values are still self-serving. To become genuinely moral and self-transcending, and develop a moral sense of identity and moral imperative, the young person needs consistent exposure to a fundamental orientation beyond the self, which fosters the natural adolescent inclination toward idealism.

Internalizing of External Moral Authority as Personal Moral Responsibility and Agency

The presence of significant figures of adult moral authority in childhood seems essential for the building of both **strength of character** and **meaningful frames of reference**. Even when it is not intellectually understood but magically accepted, **positive authority gives a sense of**

permanence, security and orientation. With the formation of a sense of self, the child begins to identify partially shared goals with significant adults, and the Vygotskian process of **goal transformation** sets in (Colby & Damon, 1992; Wertsch, 1985). The adults lead the child to **engage in regular communication** through which the child's own goals get progressively redefined. To the degree that the adult figures are sources of authentic moral authority, and hence moral expectations play a role in how the child's choices are viewed by significant adults, a **sense of moral responsibility** is progressively internalized, and **moral earnestness** develops. This lays the foundation for the formation of the **sense of moral imperative** and **moral agency**.

Situational self-knowledge (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985) accounts for the tendency to experience oneself as the passive receiver in critical situations, and to describe one's experience in undifferentiated subjective states (mad, pissed, nervous, etc.). Consistent **moral induction** by adult authority helps organize these subjective states around moral content, and emphasizes **moral self-attribution** (Hoffman, 1989), which helps develop personal moral responsibility. Erikson (1968) points out the importance of the inner/internalized voice as the child negotiates personal initiative and finds out what kind of person s/he may become.

> The great governor of initiative is conscience. The child... now not only feels afraid of being

> found out, but he also hears the "inner voice" of self-observation, self-guidance, and self-punishment... This is the ontogenetic cornerstone of morality" (Erikson, 1968, p. 119).

Modelling by adults is extremely important, because at this age roles are anticipated.

> Adults by their own example and by the stories they tell of the big life and what to them is the great past, offer children an eagerly absorbed ethos of action in the form of ideal types (Erikson, 1968, p. 120).

The child's emerging sense of personal moral authority begins to be derived from structured identification with moral roles. This is the age when **idealism** can emerge out of the earlier literal-mindedness and truthfulness, given the right circumstances, as illustrated in my analysis of Gandhi's life. With the movement toward adolescence, and the emerging ego-relational tendency to exist within shared realities, this idealism becomes expressed in a strong **receptiveness to authentic moral authority**, coupled with an aloofness to others. The **growing sense of personal moral responsibility to emulate these ideals** may lead to a level of self-righteousness, associated with dualistic reasoning (Perry, 1968). However, in a positive social development fostering empathy, this self-righteousness will be counterbalanced by **prominent empathic inclinations** and eventually by the **birth of active love** for others.

Idealism fosters a sense of moral agency, which does not fully develop until the emergence of the Institutional self (Kegan, 1982) in adulthood. Hence, the presence of

genuine external moral authorities in a young person's life can be a remarkably strengthening factor. The **open receptivity** that develops, together with the **critical discernment** and on-going comparison against internal moral standards, can become a life-long inclination to learn from others, take responsibility and be an agent for positive change, following the example of significant others.

On the other hand, repressive and/or bigoted authority may either build resistance of character, or stronger defenses which render the individual a more closed system, guided by self-protectiveness rather than the tendency to take responsibility. The lack of significant authority figures, as Marcuse (1989c) points out, weakens character and undermines determination, the ability to take responsibility, and ultimately agency.

Developing Empathic Concerns with Relationships, Justice, not Hurting

Early childhood is the time of the formation of neuropsychological predispositions as a result of environmental stimuli acting on genetic potential (Wade, 1996). Hence, it is very important at this time to **stimulate** the **natural human capacity for empathic arousal through moral induction** (Hoffman, 1991). Such child-rearing practices strengthen the child's natural tendency to empathize with others' feelings, help him/her learn to recognize his/her impact on others, and promote the further development of the child's cognitive sense of others. They

also facilitate the formation of **personal continuities oriented toward caring**.

Moral induction develops a progressive acceptance and self-attribution of moral norms, and a gradual internalization of the motive to consider others. A warm, empathic environment, which combines moral concerns with concerns about relationships, encourages a young person to orient him/herself toward behaving morally in order not to hurt others. Such an awareness of good and bad with regards to others fosters responsibility, and will grow with time into social consciousness.

Search for Truth and Meaning, Evolving Critical Self-Reflection and Discernment

The lives of exemplars examined in chapter 4 show that a lot of what we observe in them as **moral motivation** is in fact an earnest effort to make meaning of their environment, to understand the world of adults and reconcile contradictions. Meaning-making is the most human activity, and, as their lives show, **the essence of morality is an effort to pursue truth and meaning in life, and honestly align oneself with one's best understanding of it**. As we saw, the understanding of truth and meaning undergoes on-going developmental redefinitions. From the early intuitive moral sense, with the emergence of a second person perspective, there is a progressive movement toward seeing truth and meaning more and more relationally, i.e. as serving and doing good. All along, the critical examination

of what seems good and right is carried out in every situation, and the integrity of the words and actions of others is continuously scrutinized.

With the advent of adolescence, this honest **self-searching effort to be truthful and devote one's life to something meaningful** and good acquires a more abstract, **idealistic** form. Simultaneously, the young person becomes less directly dependent on his/her environment, and more inclined to subject to a critical inner examination all that is offered. The increasingly conscious responsibility felt to examine in terms of truth or falsity, and continuously redefine, both his/her inner standards and his/her expanding social commitments, leads to evolving critical reflection and self-reflection.

Integrated Description of Pre-CC

This is a large period of an individual's life, and also a period of intense developmental changes. The level of abstraction evolves from Primary Actions to Concrete and early Abstract Operations. Social perspective-taking progresses to a second person perspective, a concept of generalized other, and social role abstractions. Self-knowledge in social situations progresses from Elemental to Situational 2. Reasoning is dualistic; and reasoning around moral issues evolves through Heteronomous, and Individualistic, to Interpersonal Conformity. Self/other

differentiations move through Impulsive, Imperial, and into Interpersonal balance. The overall noetic stages negotiated are Naive, Egocentric, and Conformist.

Within this developmentally significant period, **critical person-environment moral interactions occur**. Internalization, both through observation of models and the formation of moral schemes, and through mediation through moral discourse and goal transformation between child and adult(s), leads to the centrality of moral values in the individual's emerging frames of reference. External voices of moral induction are initially heard within, as Pinnochio's cricket, and later, increasingly reconstructed. They strengthen the person's intuitive moral sense, and moral self-attribution, building habitual morality. The constant moral orientation toward meaning-making provides dynamic cognitive tensions in organizing experience. In the moral tension with the environment, moral character is formed.

The young person's intuitive synchretism develops toward empathic predispositions, and an orientation toward relationships and relatedness with the world. Personal continuities form which seek out further reinforcing situations.

Gradually, moral conceptualization, moral self-attribution and moral earnestness lead to **individuation morally understood**. The preoccupation is with building

character according to some concrete internalized moral values and standards, and with a certain aloofness from groups. The focus is on establishing authentic moral authority in others and developing personal moral authority through identification with morally defined roles. There is a growing righteousness, perhaps at times tending toward self-righteousness. Choice, active love and the idealistic desire to reform become very important to the person. Empathy and empathy-based guilt provide strong affective motivation. The individual develops responsible relationships with family and oneself.

Identity formation and group memberships are governed less by circumstances than by an intense sense of moral responsibility to others, to the community. The internalized moral frame of reference seems to give the individual a **sense of moral choices**, and a **responsibility to make the right ones**. **Idealism** becomes the **alternative of random pragmatic group loyalties**. People may still be judged by externals, but even those have a moral overtone.

A moral sense of identity and moral character are formed, and the social roles with which the individual identifies are morally defined, and frequently oriented toward service. What prevents this kind of consciousness from becoming fanatical, given the Conformist proneness to embracing dogmas, is its commitment to honesty, humility, and moral self-attribution and self-examination. Moreover,

with the emergence and internalization of the second person perspective, the **tendency toward critical self-awareness and self-reflection** is strengthened.

PRE-CC builds on its best structural potential. For example, the very orientation toward conformity to the expectations of others leads to the reworking of all the earlier themes in order to define responsibility on every level. Moral responsibility to others and to community standards has to be harmonized with the responsibility to live up to one's own evolving inner moral standards. Idealism expressed in a quest for life based on moral principles one can identify with also becomes prominent at this time. **Self-actualization is understood often as the responsibility to serve others**. The individual develops responsible relationships with family, immediate others, personal calling, and oneself.

At the transition to **CONVENTIONAL CC**, the moral motivational dimensions are developed as follows:

1. There is an **abstract predominantly moral identity grounded in moral values**, a level of **habitual morality** and **moral imperative** to put moral concerns before self-interest.
2. There is an ability to differentiate **authentic external moral authority**, and an **openness and receptiveness to** it, as well as an **emerging sense of personal moral authority**, an **abstract sense of moral responsibility** and some **vague sense of moral agency**.

3. Empathic concerns with relationships are developed in varying degrees, as well as an orientation to not hurting others, to justice and reciprocity.
4. There is an **idealistic critical discernment** and **inclination toward self-reflection** within an **abstract belief in the meaningfulness of life and one's responsibility to align with it**.

All these abstract achievements of content and frame of reference undergo dramatic differentiation with the emergence of CC proper. **CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS** is an adult phenomenon. I differentiate between two levels of **CC** according to a structural-developmental criterion: the presence or absence of systemic understanding of one's socio-cultural reality.

Level 2 - Conventional Critical Consciousness

Conventional CC adds a critical moral dimension to late Conformist and Achievement/Affiliative consciousness (Wade, 1996). The individual struggles with all the pulls and challenges of these noetic stages, which are negotiated at their optimal capacity to the degree that moral motivation prevails over other primary motivations. The person operates within conventional socio-cultural frameworks, and tries to reconstruct different aspects of them, while lacking the systemic understanding to encompass the whole. The outcome is a distinctive, yet limited, moral agency for positive

social change. The moral motivational dimensions are not fully formed, but can be identified as dimensions of tension which are continually elaborated.

Moral Motivation: Dimensions of Tension

Dominance of Moral Identity over Other Forms of Identity, and of Moral Imperative and Normative Concerns over Self-Interest and Pragmatic Concerns

This dimension exhibits a **progressive differentiation, strengthening and expansion of moral identity, moral values, and moral imperative** as they get tested against a widening range of social experiences, and are progressively more complexly understood.

Identity is a central issue for people with conventional consciousness. As the individual begins to understands variables (e.g. race, class), and gains a concept of a neutral other (e.g. government, society), the meaningful social radius expands beyond immediate others (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990). The ascending Institutional self (Kegan, 1982) maps out from personal experience to what is perceived as the truth for a group, faction, class. The identification initially tends to be interpersonal, and global, undifferentiated. However, with the emergence of a separate sense of self, the choice is open to the individual to embrace particular moral, social, and historical values which, in the individual's judgement, bear upon the well-being of others.

The person on a CC pathway searches for models and principles with which to identify, as s/he evolves the critical capacity to identify patterns of incongruity and injustice in social reality, and extends her/his moral imperative to those social patterns. His/her identification progressively centers around moral values which allow a measure of consistency between public and private life. Most commonly, those are the Enlightenment social values of reason, justice, freedom, equality (Bembow, 1994).

As the growing independent self begins to redefine fundamental moral values internalized from one's early environment, concepts such as honesty, humility, love, service to others, etc. begin to be subjected to an on-going reconstruction in the course of dynamic social interactions, as we saw with young Gandhi. The effort is to define a personal balance between respecting group and social norms and retaining the freedom of self-definition.

At this point, the moral sense of identity is fully formed, and self-definitions center around core moral/spiritual values and beliefs more than around class, ethnic, racial, gender and other identification. Because of the centrality of moral values, the overall sense of identity of the critically aware individual exhibits a prevalence of normative over instrumental concerns, and a sense of nobility predominating over struggles with low self-esteem. The person operates with habitual morality in

spite of the pull of Conformist insecurity, yearning for safety and control, self-interest, and the resulting tendency for limbic rationalizations. The developmental movement is toward the progressive unifying of self and morality.

Self-actualization is progressively understood as the capacity to serve, and moral earnestness and moral imperative are progressively extended to the public sphere. As Wade (1996) points out, a typical development is respect for work, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice. The person with Achievement or Affiliative consciousness may experience some tension between his/her moral imperative and personal goals with regards to self-esteem, whether gained through success and the power to excel, or through being needed in close, unconflictual relationships (Wade, 1996). However, the CC person will tend to resolve this tension in the direction of moral imperative.

Dominance of Moral Sense of Responsibility and Agency over Fear, Helplessness and Skepticism

External moral authority continues to be negotiated and **critical distinctions drawn** between authentic moral authority and other external authorities. **Personal moral responsibility** is progressively adopted, and it differentiates and expands in the encounters with real-life contexts. There is a vacillating between the **sense of moral agency**, and the tendency to experience oneself as the victim of circumstances.

Conventional CC marks the expansion of moral responsibility from interpersonal to larger social concerns. The person increasingly understands self-actualization as the moral responsibility to serve larger concerns. The individual feels an increasing moral responsibility to be consistent in his/her private and public life, which means that s/he takes up specific social issues where contradictions are identified, and tries to make a difference. The degree of a sense of agency present will define what roles will be adopted; whether those of reformer and perhaps even leader, or of contributor to a common cause.

The strength of the sense of agency, as we saw earlier, has to do with social-cognitive developmental and more general personal history (Vygotskian) factors. The personal history factor is related to the degree of authentic moral authority present in a person's earlier life, the scope of that authority internalized as responsibility, and the agency modelled by those figures. The social-cognitive developmental factors are described in more detail below.

The Interpersonal/Institutional self's (Kegan, 1982) social, moral, and spiritual commitments still tend to be oriented toward interpersonal validation, and the individual is not yet truly empowered. Initially, the sense of choice is limited to global, undifferentiated social and moral patterns, but the openness to meaningful social

relationships characteristic of this moral orientation progressively leads to further differentiation of patterns, redefining of ideas, and goal transformation. With the establishment of the Institutional self, multiplistic thinking (Perry, 1968), and Pattern 2 self-knowledge, the more emotional social and/or spiritual commitments of the previous stage get reinterpreted and demythologized (Fowler, 1981).

Another limitation of this early form of CC is that it cannot quite yet gain perspective on its own stereotyping, but has an easier time identifying social stereotyping motivated by a strong moral imperative. Hence, its concerns are mainly oriented outward, and there is not yet a real balance between social transformation and self-transformation. Dualistic, generalized and highly emotional reactions may at times make individuals inclined to delimit themselves from what they find morally unacceptable, and take no responsibility for it, experiencing themselves as recipients, as victims. However, moral agency tends to be stronger than fear, helplessness, and skepticism.

Overall, **moral self-attributions and sense of responsibility dominate over tendency for passive withdrawal**. What the individual sees as the unit of their moral responsibility progressively expands even if s/he does not feel fully in control. Moral character tends to compensate for uncertainty, and the individual will attempt

to **exercise moral agency to the degree that his/her immediate context allows it**. The Conventional CC person characteristically stands in responsible relationships with family, friends, social group, nature, calling, oneself.

Dominance of Empathy, Relatedness, Permeability to Meaningful Social Relationships over Self-Protective Compartmentalization, Closedness, and Prejudice

In this period we see a fully-formed capacity for empathy for another's experiences beyond an immediate situation, i.e. empathy for general conditions and future prospects (Hoffman, 1989). The overall dominance of affect, when filtered through a moral orientation, produces a breakthrough of moral feelings such as empathic anger and guilt, sympathetic distress, etc (Hoffman, 1989). The awareness of race, class, and other social variables, and the understanding of causality, generate experiences of social injustice. The wealth of empathic feelings and the moral sense of social identity may lead into **prosocial activism**. As Hoffman (1989) points out, there will be "some continuity between empathy development in childhood and the beginnings of prosocial activism in adolescence" (p.81). The individual tends to fluctuate between being enmeshed in those feelings and being able to define some boundaries and achievable goals in terms of social justice.

The **scope of empathic relationships progressively expands**, and **concerns with justice and equity** outgrow the interpersonal domain and develop into **social awareness, and**

socio-political consciousness. The orientation toward interconnectedness, empathic and meaningful social relationships makes the individual relatively permeable to dynamic social influences in spite of the security and control orientation of conventional consciousness. There is a **growing permeability** to meaningful social relationships, and a resulting tentative expansion of horizons.

The tendency to respond and give dominates over self-protectiveness. Choices and inner decisions come out of an inner place which increasingly includes others and the outer world. With increasing self-reflection, the person moderates his/her ideological commitments, so that they do not hurt others or cause injustice. Dynamic relationships spur a progressively more mature understanding of socio-political power relations, even when self-interest might be at stake and there might be an inclination toward compartmentalizing and closure.

Personal continuities such as positive response to challenges and openness to learning and growth facilitate active interaction with the environment, and bring about **progressively, if cautiously, expanding commitments**. Different individuals will exhibit different choices within a general orientation toward work for the betterment of society.

Dominance of Larger Frames of Reference, Critical Discernment, Self-Reflection and Larger Life Purpose over Compartmentalizing Contradictions, Negative Criticism and Short-Term Goals and Circumstances

Real-life responsibilities stimulate an increasing **explication and differentiation of the connections between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false**. The person's earlier intuitive sense of the meaningfulness of life is progressively explicated into an implicit or explicit spiritual understanding of his/her place in the world. The person's **larger frames of reference are continuously reconstructed**, with **critical moral introspection** and **critical examination of reality** gaining prominence. The individual enters into what Freire sees as the cornerstone of CC, i.e. progressive problematizing of reality.

This process is uneven, because the Achievement/Affiliative values of esteem and self-esteem are insufficient in themselves to guarantee a social consciousness oriented to the common good, and engaged in an equally critical dialogue with all the identified social patterns. In fact, these values could potentially lead the individual toward ideologies which exclude important aspects of reality, and are self-serving. It is the person's moral identity and moral imperative, as well as empathic concerns with relationships, which brings about the **continuous re-defining of moral and spiritual values of self-searching, humility, unity of means and ends, service**, although these values may not be explicitly recognized as spiritual. The

centrality of such values would reinforce and make central introspection, the full developmental capacity for which has emerges at this time.

The proliferation of identified social patterns, which vary in complexity, are increasingly critically examined, although reasoning is multiplistic (Perry, 1968), and the social system itself is not yet understood. The individual whose sense of identity revolves around a critical moral center engages in a critical dialogue with both inward and outward realities, and is not prone to exclusive ideologies. S/he seeks increasing moral consistency of understanding in concord with moral and spiritual principles.

Integrated Description of Conventional CC

This level of CC clearly has tremendous potential for work for the betterment of society, because the understanding of how one fits within social patterns, as well as one's understanding of self-esteem, do not remain self-serving. With self-esteem grounded in progressive unity of self and morality, and accompanied by the practice of spiritual values such as unity of means and ends, self-searching, humility, service, as well as permeability and empathy for whole social groups, this consciousness is capable of meaningful social activism on many levels.

The person increasingly sustains a critical moral dialogue with social reality; i.e. we see the birth of

problematizing, a fundamental characteristic of Freire's definition of CC. Individual energy may be invested in moral leadership. The person defines a cause, identifies socio-political choices, and makes decisions about degree and character of involvement. Creative participation in social and/or political action is progressively coordinated with perceived personal skills, and focuses on concrete and specific projects. Allegiance with others within social activism are carried beyond affect, and increasingly critically examined. Activists seek legal avenues to address specific forms of social injustice. Work is geared toward community empowerment.

That is not to say that the individual is yet fully disembedded from his/her socio-cultural reality and empowered. S/he might still experience some interpersonal pressures around the need to identify with group feelings on major social and/or political issues, the need for community membership and the difficulty of taking a stand different than the group. Ideological allegiances may still be strong. But it would be the Institutional self that would view and name these difficulties, set boundaries, and ask pressing questions around socio-political identity. This process brings about a more mature social consciousness and activism, less reactive and more governed by logical, causal, and moral reasoning. The individual stands in

responsible relationships with oneself, family, friends, society, nature, calling, God.

Overall this level of CC is characterized by embeddedness in conventional realities and efforts to operate morally and responsibly within them, finding legal and caring ways within the existing social paradigm. The main limitation of Conventional CC is its lack of systemic understanding, the result of which is that multiple social patterns and pathways of activism may be experienced as overwhelming when one is committed to bringing about positive change. In this sense, what Bembow calls CC, i.e. dereification, has not yet occurred. This is a phenomenon that characterizes the liberating movement toward Post-Conventional CC.

Level 3 - Postconventional Critical Consciousness

By this point, the person exhibiting CC has evolved a moral motivation characterized in varying degrees, as shown above, by:

1. relative unity of self and morality;
2. moral responsibility and agency in the socio-political domain;
3. relative disembeddedness from and engaged relationships with one's social environment; socio-political allegiances; growing permeability to meaningful social relationships; social consciousness, and possibly socio-political activism

4. problematizing of one's social environment, bringing moral frames of reference to it; attempts to apply spiritual understanding to socio-political reality; self-reflection and efforts to bring inner and outer life into harmony.

The further development of these moral motivational dimensions is in the direction of systemic and metasystemic thought (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990). In the process of this growing complexity, these dimensions progressively blend together into a new expansion of horizons, concerns and commitments, guided by principled vision. This vision itself undergoes philosophical expansion, as it acquires a sense of historicity and a progressively clearer spiritual dimension capable of embracing all opposites.

The section on **POSTCONVENTIONAL CC** differentiates between two stages: **Systemic CC** and **Authentic CC**. Within the **Systemic** stage, I still draws distinctions between **CC** and **non-CC pathways**. I hypothesize that the **Authentic** stage sees the **convergence of the two pathways**.

Systemic Critical Consciouness

Noetic Nature of Consciousness

With the expansion into post-formal thought, the individual thinker is now able to coordinate hierarchically social patterns, variables and laws into a fully post-conventional understanding of the system that binds them together. First, people coordinate linear causality with

hierarchical social organization, and **begin to dereify social phenomena**, i.e. understand them as products of a particular social organization of power and knowledge. Then, with the movement from Systematic to Metasystematic Operations (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), they become able to compare systems by coordinating various principles. This intersystemic cognition brings about a **growing emancipation of the individual from socio-political conditions and the expansion of horizons beyond one's socio-cultural context**.

Social perspective-taking progresses to a new level, where events and persons are coordinated into social systems, with each person holding a place in a chain of interaction. This level marks the advent of relativistic reasoning and contextual thought (Perry, 1968). The contextual nature of a person's epistemology and social experience is understood, and others are seen as integrated systems of traits, beliefs, and experiences. The Individualistic ego system (Cook-Greuter, 1990) exhibits a reliance on self-directed, autonomous thinking. Guided by its distrust for larger frames of reference, it may tend to create its own ideologies, this time ideologies of relativism; i.e. a commitment <u>to</u> relativity, not a commitment <u>in</u> relativity. Deconstructing and dereifying may become an ultimate end, an intellectual exercise and a way to achieve self-esteem, as is sometimes the case with postmodernism, feminism, multiculturalism, social

constructionism. The general goal of these approaches, to deconstruct and re-construct social reality, is democratic in principle; they represent critical proposals for greater social equality and diversity. However, it is how these proposals are held by the individual that makes them an expression of the **CC pathway** or the **non-CC pathway**.

This noetic stage is characterized by transitions between Achievement and Affiliative consciousness, because the paradigmatic issues for each type of consciousness can be resolved by solutions represented by the other (Wade, 1996). These transitions involve shifts in the parameters of consciousness to a new epistemology, and access to the non-dominant hemisphere (the left for Affiliative, the right for Achievement consciousness)(Wade, 1996). In both cases, however, the underlying primary motivation is still toward self-esteem. Hence, both Achievement and Affiliative people can be primarily self-serving.

The difference between a Systemic CC thinker and a Systemic non-CC thinker is a matter of motivation. If social deconstruction is carried out from the point of view of a personal moral imperative, and sense of moral responsibility and agency, it is part of a commitment larger than the self, and in that sense is an expression of CC. If social deconstruction is an intellectual exercise which does not engage one's way of being in the world, it is largely a self-assertive act. With the progressive deconstruction of

the social system, the options for action become infinite. The person is focused on a compound present as it shapes a desired future (Wade, 1996). What those actions and desired future would be depends on the nature of the dominant motivation.

Centrality of Moral Motivation

The social consciousness and socio-political activism of the previous period develop into principled vision, guided by a progressive unification of self and morality. The person can now enter into a conscious, intentional relationship with the social world, and seek positive social change and justice on a systemic level. There is a capability to be an agent, and consciously re-interpret experience in order to modify inner and outer patterns (see Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985). Hence, there is a newly-gained perspective on one's own stereotyping tendencies and -isms as part of the social problem, and a sustained effort to transform them.

The Interindividual self (Kegan, 1982) transcends the earlier self-sealing logic and principle of organization, and is capable of true self-reflection on its own transforming institution. The dawning understanding of oneself as part of one's socio-cultural context allows the individual to see his/her own place in the system, and have a sense of socio-political role, and a resulting sense of empowerment. This personal liberation leads to the formation

of a new sense of community of fellow thinkers, each of them value-originating, system-generating. There is a preoccupation with laying bare hidden dimensions, expectations, and cultural assumptions (Cook-Greuter, 1990), as well as a tendency to distrust conventional wisdom and rationality.

Empathy for others is less and less inhibited by stereotypes and demographic distinctions. To the degree that it comes from a spiritual place of humility and self-transcendence rather than from a mental posture, it increasingly recognizes the common human condition. With overall development, the dimensions of moral motivation begin to blend more and more. At this stage, they are still not completely integrated, producing a difference in consciousness depending on the degree of development of spiritual understanding.

Philosophical expansion progressively brings about expanding principled moral understanding of the meaning of life, and one's own place in it, and the evolving of a spiritual vision. This vision subsumes and integrates all four dimensions of moral motivation, and liberates the full potential for human agency and interconnectedness, transcending the illusory intellectual concept of individual freedom in isolation (Bellah et al, 1985). In essence, this process may be described with what Marcuse (1989b) calls

"the opening up and activation of the depth dimension of human existence" (p.281).

The gradual convergence of the four moral motivational dimensions into a single, progressively more explicit spiritual dimension, accounts for the distinction between systemic thought as an intellectual characteristic, and Systemic CC as a way of being. In its full expression, this spiritual integration is the characteristic of the next stage of CC, but the movement in that direction is noticeable at the stage of Systemic CC.

Integrated Description of Systemic CC

The CC alternative of this noetic stage is characterized by a commitment in relativity. The social system or culture is deconstructed and understood not in a vacuum, but within an unapologetic spiritual frame of reference. The knower is truly brought into the process of knowing, and both social reality and individual consciousness are dereified from the point of view of explicit moral and spiritual values. Individuals functioning at this level of CC will manifest what Colby and Damon identified as a "paradoxical mix of lasting commitments and sustained capacity for change" (p. 184). They may have a variety of personal styles, but will all exhibit a striking openness to moral change and active receptiveness to particular social influences. Interactional continuities which reinforce the individuals' "open, reciprocal,

generative, truthful and self-reflective" personal styles will spur lifelong moral growth and "establish open systems of feedback between the self and others" (Colby and Damon, 1992, pp. 196-197). Those individuals will also exhibit a faithfulness to the "overarching original values, which endured the flux of frequent change and growth, and in a fundamental sense contributed to the shape of that change and growth" (p. 185).

Collective dialogue and permeability are no longer the ceiling of social achievement, nor is postmodern cultural sensitivity considered the most progressive possible form of social consciousness. Moral commitment brings about a vision of a future. Existential skepticism, locked in its own biased claim that a secular humanistic understanding of the Enlightenment values of reason and empathy provides a "greater objectivity", is transcended. The secular/spiritual, reason/intuition, mind/soul dualities are increasingly reconciled.

People examine past, present, and future from the point of view of moral principles, and with an understanding of the relativity of one's socio-political role within a larger historical process. The sense of history brings about unlimited agency and creative leadership, characterized by a historical perspective and an understanding of epochal themes, fundamental to Freire's definition of CC. As a result, the individual can go a long way in helping social

transformation. An example of this capacity is the way Gandhi helped organize the Indians in Natal, South Africa, into a political body with a political agenda which ultimately challenged the system of apartheid.

The Systemic Critically Conscious person exhibits a **dereified consciousness**, **capacity for creative leadership**, **collective dialogue and permeability**, **empowered moral and spiritual commitments**. This stage truly meets Freire's definition of CC. The movement toward the next stage is one of a deepening sense of history, and symbolic, holistic ways of knowing reunited with conceptual meanings.

Authentic Critical Consciousness

With the movement toward Authentic consciousness, I believe that the CC and non-CC pathways converge. I hypothesize that what Wade (1996) describes as Authentic consciousness operates as CC. The openness and internal consistency characteristic of Authentic consciousness seems less of a dramatic development from the point of view of the CC pathway then it is from the ordinary noetic pathway.

Authentic consciousness blends the love-and-power solutions of Affiliative and Achievement consciousness into a synergy of fulfilling one's own personal mission, even if it is not quite understood, and supporting the personal growth of others. There is increasing psychological integration of masculine and feminine, body and mind/soul,

and other dichotomies. According to Maslow (Wade, 1996), it is characterized by spontaneity, problem-centering, detachment, creativity, appreciation, integrity, etc. This stage is marked by philosophical expansion and constant alternation between self-examination and redefining of personal path, and critical examination of the world.

The main characteristics of Authentic CC are the understanding of history, and the principled commitment to justice, human dignity, freedom, equality, the value of life for all in the face of a relativistic universe. Self and morality are fully united into a way of being which involves standing in responsible relationships with oneself, family, friends, nature, calling, society, culture, country, history, the world, and God. This way of being is guided by a progressively expanding spiritual, philosophical, historical, and global vision.

Conclusion

My understanding of the CC pathway leads me to be believe that the high moral standard which distinguishes the CC pathway represents a constant challenge to the individual to remain open and examine him/herself in spite of other primary developmental motivation. This is not to say that moral standards cannot be subjected to compartmentalizing and lower-brain rationalizations, but if genuinely held, the above occurrences will be temporary and eventually

transcended with less of a likelihood for developmental arrests and pathology. The diverse stories of a large range of exemplary individuals are a testimony to that claim.

My hypothesis is that this constant neuropsychological stretching of the structural boundaries of each stage accounts for the optimal functioning of CC individuals, and the openness to growth characteristic of them much before the Authentic level. In this sense, each level of CC represents a higher level of functioning within the structural characteristics of the noetic stage, and in some ways foreshadows the next noetic stage.

Having thus hypothesized a model for the ontogeny of CC in the lifespan, on the basis of an integration of secondary biographical data and data from the developmental literature, I now move toward its illustration and further exploration through cross-cultural empirical data. The interview data in the next three chapters will be presented in the form of interpretive vignettes, followed by analysis, rather than full-length chronologically factual narrative, in order to encompass a broader range of suggestive patterns and interrelationships.

CHAPTER VI

EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS: SUBSTANTIATION AND ELABORATION OF THE MOTIVATIONAL TEMPLATE

This chapter and the next two chapters are devoted to the analysis of the cross-cultural empirical interview data. The purpose is to offer empirically based descriptions of the different levels of CC, hypothesized in chapter 5, as well as to document the central empirical claims summarized at the end of chapter 4. I will try to show that:

1. The CC pathway is a qualitatively different pathway of development of social consciousness, the outcome of the synergistic interaction of moral motivation and structural development. I will also try to illustrate through specific cases why I consider it a more optimal pathway.
2. Moral motivation, i.e. the centrality of moral concerns over self-interest concerns, is independent of the level of operant structural development, while the moral motivational dimensions are continuously developmentally elaborated.
3. For moral motivation to be dominant over self-interest, all four moral motivational dimensions have to be present in some configuration. If that criterion is not fulfilled, the person operates with predominantly amoral motivation, and exhibits non-CC.
4. The striving for integrity and consistency is central to the CC person.

5. The real-life expression of CC is the chronological elaboration of progressively ascending central themes, from moral interest, to moral authority, personal moral responsibility, expanding moral and social responsibility, social consciousness (and possibly political action), principled vision, philosophical expansion. Depending on where the person is on the CC pathway s/he will exhibit the centrality of one of those themes.
6. Contextual conditions appear consistently related to the presence of CC. I will also try to highlight the recurring specific conditions.

I approach this part of the study with great trepidation, because I have been honored with 28 moving life stories to which I feel challenged to do justice in these three chapters. I have found myself having to make some difficult decisions about how to balance the wealth and complexity of real-life experience, and my own reverence for these people's journeys, with the task of highlighting important distinctions and characteristics of the presence or lack of CC.

Decisions around how to summarize and present the data were particularly difficult for two reasons. First, CC is a whole-person phenomenon, and in order to capture the richness of facets and the complexity of people's different ways of being, and of the family and childhood experiences which helped make them who they are, I needed to provide a

wealth of real-life detail. Also, the existence of multiple pathways and configurations of CC, meant that each case was unique and contributed in a different way to the overall understanding of the phenomenon.

The second difficulty came from the fact that CC is a qualitatively different kind of consciousness, regardless of the level at which it is expressed, and this qualitative distinction can only be understood in contrast with a non-CC consciousness. Hence, I had to present roughly comparable paired examples of CC and non-CC, which illustrate each of the three developmental levels described in the hypothetical model. Moreover, it seemed equally important to understand the lack of CC as its presence, and to develop some vignettes which reveal how the lack of certain conditions may be related to the lack of CC. Each life-story, regardless of whether a particular informant exhibits some level of CC or not, sheds added light on the phenomenon of CC and the necessary and sufficient conditions for its emergence and evolution.

The organization of the data analysis which emerged in trying to address the above tasks and difficulties is as follows. This chapter is devoted to a contrasting analysis of the profiles of two American midlifers who exhibit comparable developmental places negotiated within the two different kinds of social consciousness. I explore in depth the dimensions along which they differ, as they illustrate

the motivational template developed in chapter 4. On the basis of a synthesis of the sub-dimensions that emerge, and insights from the literature, I elaborate further this template, and develop an expanded version which I then use in the analysis of all the other cases in chapters 7 and 8.

For the above purpose, I have selected two extreme cases - one of the clear presence and one of the clear absence of Conventional CC - and I position them on the diagram, developed in chapter 4, of the continuum between CC and non-CC. I decided to focus on conventional consciousness for two reasons. First, conventional thought is most common among adult populations, and it seems important to understand the distinctions between CC and non-CC in the majority of adults. Second, there is a tendency in the literature I reviewed to associate CC with postconventional systemic thought. I believe that an important goal of this study is to show that a person does not have to be an advanced thinker in order to operate as a CC individual.

Chapter 7 applies this expanded template to a better understanding of the rest of the US data, positioning accumulatively every case on the diagram of the CC/non-CC continuum. I offer examples of each level of CC. Chapter 8 does the same with the Bulgarian data.

Before I proceed with the analysis of the data, in Table 6.1 below, I offer a brief descriptive statistic of the informants from the US and the Bulgarian samples.

Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics of Interviewees

Psuedonim **U.S. Sample**	Unique Characteristic	Age	Gender	Education	Occupation	Evaluation
Lin	Chinese-American (Taiwan)	50+	F	16 yrs (English/Span.lit)	univ. research asst	Pre-CC
Tom	town activist former policeman	50	M	11 yrs quit H.S.	florist	Pre-CC
Sim	former drug addict	39	M	11 yrs	truck driver	Pre-conv. non-CC/early Conformist
William	lodge member	60+	M	12+2 college	retired comp. tech.	Conventional CC/Achievement
Finnigan		48	M	12+2 college	after school counselor	Conventional non-CC/Achievement
Agnes	cancer patient	64	F	16	retired teacher	Conventional non-CC/Achievement
Ann	Jewish-German Immigr.	60	F	16	teacher, buyer	Conventional CC (borderline)
Ken	former drug addict	48	M	16 (sociology)	airline caterer	Conventional non-CC/conformist
Loyd	gay	36	M	16+2 MA	town commissioner	Systemic CC
Jim	black activist Vietnam veteran	49	M	12+3 (biology/chem)	train conductor	Systemic CC
Manny	rape victim	50+	F	12	retired computer trainer & insur. agent	Preconventional non CC early Conformist
Ben	alcohol problem	62	M	12	carpet installer/cleaner	Conventional CC/Conformist

Continued next page

Table 6.1 continued

Mac	alcoholic	52	M	13	unemployed	thoroughly amoral
Ron	Vietnam veteran	48	M	16 (psychology)	tax examiner	Conventional non-CC
Mansueto	Italian	60	M	12+ coll. cour.	glass blower	Conventional non-CC
Cathy	rehab. suicidal alcoholic	44	F	12+ 3 Bible sch.	clerk	Systemic non-CC
Margo	"all Am. Businesswom.)	30+	F	16 (psyc/socio)	clothing buyer	Conventional non-CC/Achievement
Landorf		59	M	16+ cont. ed.	pharmacist	Conventional non-CC
Don	"Mother Terese of cats"	48	M	16+1 job tr.	components tester	Preconventional non-CC/early Conformist
Cynthia	upper class	50+	F	16	nursing	Conventional non-CC/Conformist
Bulgarian Sample						
Ivan	communist	52	M	18 (crim. law)	Internal Affairs Police	Preconventional non-CC/early Conformist
Eliot	political activist (democ.)	37	M	18 (medical)	dentist	Conventional CC/Achievement
Ada	communist allegiances	55	F	18 (med.)/PhD	pediatrician/professor	Conventional non-CC/Achievement
Danton	Bulgarian Jew	49	M	18 (med.)?PhD	psychiatrist	Systemic CC
Emily	single mother/retar. child	38	F	12 +1	chemical lab. tech.	Systemic/Authentic CC
Ramina	conservative democr.	40	F	16+ 2 special.	res. chemist/business	Conventional/Systemic border. non-CC
Katja	democrat/communist	37	F	19 teacher+	day care school director	Conv. CC/ (borderline Postcon.)/Achieve.
Nat	democrat	45	M	16+ special.	high school music teach.	Systemic CC

A Pair of Conventional American Midlifers

Agnes and William are both in their sixties, recently retired competent professionals, with impressive work experience, pleasant manners, and a neat, conservative-looking appearance. Agnes was an elementary school teacher in the same public school system for over 20 years; William did not complete his engineering degree, but was a qualified computer service representative for IBM for 31 years. Both show consistency and pride in their careers; both were valued by and loyal to their respective employers. Both are independent thinkers with minds of their own. Both divorced partners to whom they had long-standing commitments, and went through self-doubts and inner struggle around their decision; in neither case was divorce something lightly undertaken. Both proved to be responsible and successful parents of children who turned into good people in their parents' descriptions.

According to my informal structural assessment, both Agnes and William are conventional thinkers, who seem to operate out of predominantly Institutional self-systems (Kegan, 4/3 or 4(3)). They construct their own understanding of their social roles and the norms by which they live. At the same time, their sense of identity appears to be somewhat Interpersonally derived from belonging to a particular group, class, occupation. They both exhibit Achievement consciousness (Wade, 1996).

In the case of Agnes, her pride in and control over her own self as "institution" comes through in her descriptions of how she kept her unfaithful former husband at arm's length, and did not agree to get back together with him in spite of his repeated invitations to do so over the years. She maintained friendly terms, and let him stop by and visit, as well as see the children, but she cautiously avoided any kinds of complications. She maintained her independence and protected her property, with a firm belief that "slow and steady, wins the race". Asked about the happiest time in her life, she points to the years when she was an elementary teacher, and raised her kids alone: "They [the kids] were manageable, and I loved my job. I felt important and needed". Her occupation gave her a sense of identity: "[Y]ou know, when you were teaching, you were somebody. You were employed, you were somebody. Those kids depended on you."

William's Institutional self-definitions get expressed in many ways: from the personal moral norms which he establishes and lives by, frequently notably against the tide, to the pride he takes in organizing his present life as a retired person around the setting and achieving of goals with his second wife. His goals center around successful investment and managing of financial resources. He is a member of a lodge, was elected to its top organizing body, and has become a trustee. Just like Agnes, William's

occupation gave him a sense of identity. He takes pride in his competency, in being "the best technician, the best person I could", satisfying his customers, and "being appreciated". He likes "working with people, and doing the job".

Both Agnes and William operate successfully within the social system, with a sense of self relatively separate from social reality, and exhibiting varying degrees of materialism in constructing social roles and rules. They both see themselves as honest, hard-working, law-abiding citizens. Their self-esteem is central to them, and is derived from their ability to accomplish their goals, as well as, in greatly varying degrees between the two of them, from being needed. They both identify important patterns as they reflect on their personal lives and choices, and social experience. Their self-knowledge is limited, and their critical discernment is mostly directed outward.

In spite of all these developmental similarities and common conservative tastes and tendencies, Agnes and William represent two significantly different categories of people in terms of CC. I see William as exhibiting Conventional CC, and Agnes as operating from its conventional non-CC counterpart, with a more uneven developmental profile. Hence, it becomes all the more important to identify what makes them so different. In order to do that, I will draw

two separate vignettes, and then highlight the main dimensions along which they contrast with each other.

William

William spoke about his life with a clarity and coherence which revealed a habit of reflecting on his experience. He was **open** and forthcoming with his personal understanding, without being profuse in either words or emotions. He seemed to **take the task seriously**, and with practically **no avoidance behavior** set out to help me understand what his life was about.

William divided his life into three parts: schooling, his life as a father of six children and service representative for IBM, and his present retired life with his second wife. He described himself as "a pretty **good student**, both through grammar school and through high school: a member of the National Honor Society in high school". He "**loved the teamwork, the camaraderie, the competition**" in sports, and was offered college scholarships in football. It seemed as though sport offered him an opportunity to bring together his solid sense of responsibility to others, his sense of loyalty, and his desire to excel.

However, William did not follow his dream and pursue a football scholarship; instead he **honored his father's dream** and went to engineering school. His father was "a hard

worker, a blue collar worker", who dreamed to see his son become one of the white collar engineers he was in contact with every day. William does **not** describe his father as **a figure of significant moral authority**; rather, his father's low self-esteem somehow parallel William's later **not so prominent sense of agency in life**.

William's **sense of responsibility to others** is a dominant theme throughout his life. As a young person, he tried "to keep everything together", combining athletics in an engineering school which offered no scholarships, with engineering studies, with social life, and commuting to school; finally "everything fell apart". He sought **external solutions** - an Army Security Agency school in combination with the GI Bill - in order to both "**do my duty**" and "**do something I have control of**". He got married while in the service, had children, and had to go to work instead of continuing his studies. Throughout this account runs a sense of **limited agency**, and **external locus of control**, with which he continued to struggle in the second part of his life.

His married life was dominated by **relationships**. He describes himself as someone who is "more **sensitive to people**... I like to satisfy". Both his family and his job gave him an opportunity to do that, as well as a valued **sense of familiarity, solidity, rootedness, predictability, and a sense of accomplishment and control**. Asked how his

family life contributed to his sense of who he is, he turns the question around:

> How did my family life contribute? I think, how did I contribute to my family life, how did I contribute?

This is another theme that runs through everything he has to say: **I am what I can give, what I can share with others!** His **habitual morality** is expressed in the **sense of satisfaction of giving** to his six children and grandchildren both financial assistance, and understanding, love, support, and shared experience. In the same way that he gives to his family, he also gives to others. Through his lodge, he volunteers in a VA hospital where he spends time with the veterans, distributes food baskets for holidays, gives blood, raises funds for charities. He does not see his own contributions as anything extraordinary because, in his understanding, the veterans have given to their country amply, and deserve some **reciprocity**. He speaks about his volunteering at the VA hospital with **humility**:

> It's nice to give back-- You know, if you've gotten a little, it's nice to give back something. It's a good feeling. It's a sense of **sharing**. Doing what you have to do to help others.

Giving and **sacrifice** seem to be constant companions in William's life, and **self-interest** is **notably lacking** in his priorities; his **sense of self** appears **united with his sense of morality**. This **unity of selfless love and a fundamental moral orientation** in William becomes most evident when he talks about raising his children. He talks about "the times

we had together and the love we had together, from the times when they were small". Even though he and his wife could not afford to do too many exciting things with 6 children, it was the **togetherness** that mattered. He also speaks with a lot of love about his lost seventh child, a girl who was born severely retarded, started having grand mall seizures at one, and died at two. "It was a joy to have her. It was a very innocent child, had a start in life, and was taken away. She just didn't have a chance."

William's love for his children was combined with a **strong sense of moral responsibility to teach his children some moral values** and **standards** to which he believed the children needed to be held.

> You give the kids a sense of value at home, and then they went to school, and it seems like whatever you gave the kids, they'd come home and say they don't have to do that. We're our own boss. You can't tell us what to do. Kids weren't disciplined. I guess they don't believe in that any more...It's entirely different than the situation I was brought up in. I went to a parochial school, where they had **discipline**, taught **a sense of values**, taught to **respect authority**. Authority was your parents, anyone older than you were. You could **question authority, but** you had to **respect it** too. And I think that all that started to go in the sixties. Everything started to change, and I don't know if it's for the better or not... And you can be a friend, but you have to be a parent also. There are times when you got to make some decisions.

In spite of this ambivalence about his own agency, William **draws some important distinctions** which I did not hear in too many other interviews. William was among only four out of the nineteen American parents I spoke to (one

had no children) who identified a need, and felt a strong moral responsibility, to resist the cultural tide and teach his children alternatives to prevailing values. His **discerning critical understanding** of the surrounding cultural pressures allows him to differentiate between being a loving and appreciative parent, and trying to please one's children by becoming their friend and peer, relinquishing authority and the responsibility that goes with it. He met the resistance of his wife who "just wanted to be a friend instead of a parent", and he had many self-doubts, but he did not give up what he felt was his responsibility.

He also differentiates between **respecting authority** and being able to **question authority**; he **questions the dominant cultural tendency** to couple critical questioning of authority with an unwillingness to respect any authority. He does not exhibit absolutist thinking, and does not reject the changes that came with the sixties, but contemplates them with some fundamental concerns. These concerns reveal the **presence of a high internal moral standard** in spite of his multiplistic reasoning (Perry, 1968).

When William talks about how his children came out as adults, he defines successful adulthood with **having a sense of responsibility**, and **accomplishing things**. With love and sadness he recognizes that some of his children became **truthful**, **respectful** people, with the **integrity** to go through hard times with **dignity**, **work hard**, and teach their

own children right, whereas others were rebellious and untruthful, and had all kinds of problems. He does **not** come across as **judgmental or self-righteous**; rather, he **feels responsible** and **struggles with self-doubts** about whether he did all he could have done to help his children find their way.

At the same time he talks with **pride** about how **rewarded** he felt in his parenting efforts as he watched his daughter courageously find her way through a painful divorce, raise her two children, get an education, find a real partner late in life, a good job, and see her children through to college and into becoming what William calls "**true gentlemen**". He had tears in his eyes as he talked about his grandsons, who have both **respect and self-respect**, **perform up to high academic standards** and are both excellent young sportsmen.

Altogether, William struck me as a man **in touch with his feelings**, **self-reflective**, **caring**, **morally responsible** and with tremendous **integrity of character**. He also struck me as a **connected** human being. All the moments of supreme joy he describes are moments of **being at one** with himself, nature, a team, etc. The very language he uses to describe his happy moments is markedly different from the even-keeled, low-key, pragmatic and slightly indifferent cultural norm which I came across over and over again. He talks **without inhibitions** about being "**elated**" when his first son was born, about "having produced this beautiful looking

baby", having produced "life that could mean something to a lot of people, to the world"! He describes a comparable feeling of elation when watching the sunsets over the mountains of Tucson, the scenery, "seeing what God has wroght", the "amazing, amazing sunsets and the beauty". He reveals **an ability to be inspired, to marvel** at beauty and harmony. What comes across in all these examples, is William's **faith in the ultimate meaningfulness of life, and his sense of awe and oneness with it**. His whole life is a **consistent, deeply responsible effort to align himself with that meanigfulness**. That appeared to be at the heart of his fundamentally **moral sense of identity, and unity of self and morality**.

Interestingly enough, **the significant people he describes unite the two aspects of his character**: on the one hand, **love and caring**; on the other, the **ability to go against the cultural tide, make difficult moral decisions, and operate out of character and inner moral standard**. From his second wife he says he learned "a lot of love and caring for people". They had both of their mothers living with them for a couple of years before they died, and took care of them. That didn't seem to have been a difficult decision, rather a natural outcome of **habitual morality**:

> That's just the way we were brought up. You took care of your parents. And that's what we did. We felt that was our responsibility, and so we welcomed them in our house. That's social welfare at its best, you know; it was our responsibility and we did it. . .

That is a good example of how William understands **personal and social responsibility**: he feels that if people were to reclaim their personal responsibilities instead of rationalize them away, socially responsible choices would follow. **Reciprocating receiving with giving** is his way of **decompartmentalizing moral concerns in both private and public life**, and living in a **morally committed way**. His circle of friends constitutes of people with a similar goals. What unites them is having sought and found within the social system an institutional way (the lodge) to help others, share, and address social needs. The routes chosen for social activism are conventional and do not involve challenging the system. They rely on traditional roles, and appeal to conservative men like William, who have always worked hard, and are responsible people, but have a difficult time exploring their inner experience and making dramatic changes in their ways. These routes offer an opportunity for interpersonal identification: in William's words, he enjoys "the camaraderie of the social life too" because "we have a sense of a social organization". Nevertheless, there is a **moral and socially responsible motivation** behind all these choices, which makes them manifestations of Conventional Critical Consciousness.

William displays the characteristic limitation of Conventional CC: the inability to understand the social system and have a coherent guiding vision of positive

change, as well as the inability to include one's own institution in a similar critically discerning examination. As a result, he exhibits many contradictions. Notably, for example, most of the significant people who have influenced his life, with the exception of his second wife, are not people with whom William was in a close relationship. Rather, they are the high school principal, different coaches, and his first sergeant in the army, all of whom he describes as **men of character**. Asked to elaborate, he explains:

> It's kind of a sense of who you are, a sense of being honest with people. A sense of responsibility. A certain attitude. Posture. How to approach things with a positive attitude. Their attitude, their work ethic, the sense of responsibility...Just the way they carried themselves.

William, who struggled all his life with self-doubts, lack of self-confidence and agency, is drawn to people who give the impression of strength. He doesn't question the emotional price that is paid in some of those cases; introspection and intimacy with others are clearly issues he has compartmentalized somewhat. He respects, and identifies with, people who have the **courage to make difficult decisions**, and resists invitations to re-examine those decision. For example, he admires Roosevelt:

> He was a good man and did what he had to do to bring the people out of the Depression...to solve the problem...Whatever his policies were, but he was a leader. He led us during the Second World War...Started some social policies. I don't know if they are good now or not, but he started them

> and they were good for the times. And Truman, the same thing. Him and MacArthur. MacArthur went in Korea...tried to place himself above everything else, and Truman kind of was a man for the times, says you can't do that. He was the guy that successfully brought the Second World War to conclusion. Gave the ok to drop the atom bomb. He had to make the tough decision...They were the right decisions for the right time. Now people try and revise history and I don't know how you can revise that. They did what they had to do for the times. They seemed to make the right decisions. Guys who were willing to make the tough decisions are the guys that stick out in my mind. The real leaders. Tom Watson sticks out in my mind...Here again, started a company from scratch, made the company into one of the greatest companies in the world at the time...They weren't afraid to make the decisions. And they stuck by their decisions.

William's multiplistic reasoning cannot reconcile the contradictions in his thinking. On the one hand, he admires these tough and successful individualistic men. On the other hand, he values cooperation, team work, and team accomplishment. In his work in IBM, as well as in his current lodge commitments, he loves working with his peers.

> Going to your peers, getting some knowledge from them, getting their experience, kind of working together, I enjoyed that. I do that now. I'm retired, but I work in a fraternal organization. We do the same thing...Here again, working with people, getting a job done...Bringing a not so successful business operation in line and making it successful. I enjoy that... And the profits we get out of the business, we disperse to charity. That's a good feeling.

In William, we see a **constant struggle between wanting to maintain open communication with people, and be permeable and actively receptive, and his inner resistance and need to protect his institution**. He responds defensively to questions concerning his sense of who he is: "I never think

who I am...I don't have a difficulty with who I am". But then he elaborates:

> I try to be outgoing enough. I try to be friendly enough. I think I'm an introvert sometime...I extend myself to people, and hopefully they are going to reciprocate...So they all relate to who I am, I guess. They all give something back to me. They give me their knowledge, their experience. I give it to them, my knowledge and my experience. And so, that all comes together and tells me who I am...Our common experiences, our common goals...I guess that all relates to who I am. Their love, their concern... I really don't know who I am. I hope I'm wise enough, experienced enough, have enough knowledge to impart and give to others. I hope that's who I am.

The **dominance of Achievement orientation** (Wade, 1996) in William seems related to a **less developed empathic inclination**. He finds it easier to empathize with immediate others, especially his family, and also the people to whom he gives of himself personally through the community work of the lodge, i.e. VA veterans and others. The more distant and impersonal the causes, the harder he finds it to relate. He does not express any empathy with other social groups than the veterans with whom he has personal contact. I.e., his **CC** is **mostly limited to his more immediate environment**, although his **moral imperative and critical discernment extend beyond immediate concerns**. A good example of that are his political beliefs.

William **resists ideological pressures** and will not "be affiliated with either Republican, Democrat, or whatever party", because he feels strongly about voting independently, voting his mind, as he says, as the issues

arise. Although he deals multiplistically with issues as they arise, and creates the impression of having no overall systemic understanding or frame of reference, on closer scrutiny it becomes evident that he **operates out of a fundamental moral frame of reference** and takes a lot of responsibility to orient himself. He studies issues closely, "keeping an open mind" as he reads and follows the media, and trying "to listen to what these people are saying, and see where they're coming from". He tries to identify the different "slants", and to understand "what's at the heart" of the issue in order to decide where he stands. He does not rely on particular sources to feed him information; instead, he has an **active approach to seeking a better understanding of issues**, and is guided by "common sense". He draws an interesting distinction between the ideological significance that's placed on practically every issue, and its common sense value. Although his position can easily be categorized as conservative right, his judgement defies such simplifications:

> We have to get back to basics and common sense again. I think we've lost that. Everything has become too politicized. You <u>have to do what's good for the country and what's good for the world, what's good for us</u>...The budget issue is common sense, and yet we're trying to make big politics out of it...And one party won't give in to the other because it's not their issue. They've taken over an issue. And we've got to get together with this thing. We <u>have one issue</u>: the budget.

William reveals the same **moral imperative** and unity-and-common sense-above ideology approach when he shares his

thoughts about international issues such as the war in Bosnia.

> Let's stop the fighting. Let's get together. What are the issues here? There's no sense in what they are doing...The nonsense that's going on in the world...Killing of innocent people. What? Just a political--'cause I'm right? You don't believe in the other person, what they're doing is right? They're just as right as you are. Or that your faith is a little different than somebody else's faith? People have been killed in the name of God, it's ridiculous. it's terrible. I'm sure God didn't want that.

William does not use words as cliches, but takes the responsibility to examine the meaning behind the words. When he talks about the leadership responsibilities of the US, another mainstream conservative preoccupation, he takes it to a deeper level:

> We <u>have to be serious</u> about our role as a leader in the world. And show leadership in this world--whether it be the ebola virus, whether it be Bosnia, whether it be South Africa. Don't shirk your duty if you are a leader...We have to be consistent in the roles we take in the world.

In suggesting that the US has not really acted as a leader, he is not particularly implying Mr. Clinton any more than Mr. Bush or any other President. His focus is more on the **sense of seriousness** itself. The same **critical discernment** comes through a seemingly conservative position on welfare:

> I think we've gone overboard in welfare. People lost sense of their work ethic because of welfare...We have to have common sense in that, because I think welfare is just a gift from people to another group. It's a way of redistribution of the wealth, but it's actually a gift...Talk about Roosevelt at the time. He instituted some type of

> welfare, social security, but the welfare he instituted, as I remember, was a civilian conservation corps, the public works projects, where he gave people jobs, and that wasn't welfare because they worked, they were given jobs so they could exist and pull themselves up. Now you don't have to work. We've lost that work ethic...It's great to give, but you got to be careful.

It is important to remember that William has the same approach with his own children: he loves giving, but is careful not to undermine their own sense of responsibility; i.e. he is **consistent in the moral principles** with which he lives. His distinction between giving in order to help people build themselves up, as opposed to handing down, is similar to a distinction drawn by one of Colby & Damon's (1992) moral exemplars, discussed in chapter 4. Mother Waddles has made it her life's purpose to come up with ways of helping the poor that do not undermine their dignity and treat them as victims, but actually lift them up. Although Mother Waddles exhibits a systemic critical understanding of the issue, which William does not have, this parallel shows how **genuine morality brings about optimal understanding within one's developmental limitations**.

Asked to define his own understanding of morality, William describes it as "a sense of **honesty**, a sense of religion, a sense of good, bad". He elaborates: "religion should give you probably a sense of what's good and bad in life, a sense of spiritual goal, and how you attain that spiritual goal...a sense of values". I.e., as my hypothetical model suggests, William's fundamental moral

values are in fact **spiritual values** (in his case explicitly so). He tries to practice them with integrity.

His particular struggle with his religious commitments to the Roman Catholic Church exhibits all the tensions of trying to **operate from core moral beliefs** when church practices seem arbitrary, yet feeling a conventional need for continuity of ritual which resists change and rethinking. What is significant, though, is that he **struggles with the contradictions in his own thinking with the same genuine moral imperative** that we see operating in other domains. He both **regrets the loss of sacredness and respect**, which is yet another critical observation, and **realizes the need for more openness and acceptance**. William draws another difficult distinction with regards to changes in the Catholic church; he differentiates between "a breath of fresh air" and "pollution".

William's multiplistic reasoning gets overwhelmed, and does not allow him to reach any satisfactory resolutions. His **sense of external moral authority has not yet developed into a sense of internal agency**; however, he continues to genuinely struggle with his own contradiction.

> I think there's the same God for all denominations, no matter what they are. I feel sorry for the people that say there's a difference between your God and my God. They have to fight because there is a difference. I think there's one God, and in your heart, if you believe that, and he's a loving God, I don't think he wants us to suffer. I don't think he wants us to go to war. And whatever the ritual is...I'll go attend... where they say you congregate to honor and adore

> this God...And I'm not going to change the religion I was brought up in. I still hold some of those truths...even though the Church thought, in their wisdom, was going to change for the better...If they've changed, I've changed a little too. But I still believe in God.

William makes another interesting distinction between his beliefs, which he thinks have not changed, and "the constraints that religion has put on people", some of which he saw changing within the Roman Catholic Church. He clearly **believes in the need for some external constraints on people's choices**, and tries to respect them, at the same time **recognizing that some of them are arbitrary**, and experiencing a sense of betrayal around that. Here we see once again the strengths and limitations of the conventional thinker: his **ability to appreciate the wisdom of a convention and honor it**, and his **difficulty when there is a need to rethink the convention**. This finding raises some important questions about the frames of reference from which people need to be educated toward CC; I will take them up in my discussion chapter.

Summary of William's Case

William is one of the three cases of **Conventional CC** in my US data, and a compelling example of both the strengths and the limitations and contradictions of this level of CC. He combines a high level of integrity and unity of self and morality, with typically limited agency. He questions his social environment, makes active efforts to redefine his

relationship to social realities in congruence with his understanding, and seeks an alternative vision of how things should be, although his concerns with justice and equality are less prominent among his overall moral concerns.

His sense of self is still vulnerable, and structural limitations make it difficult for him to confront his cultural heritage, and fully take on issues of justice and equality. Yet, because his sense of self appears to be built around a moral center, he grapples with his cultural context, and personal contradictions, with courage and integrity, and is engaged in a moral dialogue with his world.

In the above sense, he provides a benchmark of **early Conventional CC**, with a centrality of moral motivation, developed along all four dimensions, and the limited agency which corresponds to the central theme his life elaborates at this time, Expanding Moral and Social Responsibility.

The configuration of his moral motivation shows a leading role of moral identity and imperative; search for meaningful larger frames of reference, and critical examination of reality; moral responsibility. Moral authority and agency, empathy and permeability are less optimally developed. Below is a brief summary of each moral motivational dimension as it is expressed in his life.

Dimension 1: William has a distinctly moral sense of identity which dominates over all other forms of identity,

as father, worker, husband, lodge member, etc. He experiences a strong moral imperative, and lives with a remarkable for this level unity of self and morality. He operates from a clear inner moral standard of truthfulness, integrity, constancy, justice, love, compassion, humility, respect for life. This standard enables him to resist cultural and social pressures, and take responsibility to define his own path.

Dimension 2: William is still negotiating external moral authority, and grappling at times to differentiate authentic from unauthentic authority. He does not have a particularly strong sense of moral agency, which may be related to the lack of prominent intimate models in his life. Around some issues, he feels helplessness. However, he is guided by normative rather than instrumental concerns, and by a strong sense of personal responsibility. This makes him if not a leader, certainly a respected figure in his community.

Dimension 3: William is a caring and connected person. However, the circles of his empathy are predominantly interpersonal, and we do not observe higher levels of empathy such as empathy for the prospects and social conditions of others. Relationships are central in his life, if not particularly developed. He shows limited permeability to social influences; however, he builds allegiances with others within his domain of social activism, based on a commonality of purpose rather than lifestyles. He does

community work within the system, balancing the strengths of both Achievement and Affiliative orientation.

Dimension 4: William lives with a deep sense of the ultimate meaningfulness of life, and aligns himself with his best understanding of it with humility and awe. He maintains a critical moral conversation with social reality, and problematizes the proliferation of social patterns he identifies. He practices some critical moral introspection, although he is mostly looking outward. He seeks spiritual consistency and grapples with contradictions with varying degrees of openness and permeability. He stands in responsible relationships with himself, his family and friends, his society, his calling, nature and God. In his own words,

> I know we can't all run for President. We all can't be CEOs. But in our own way, we hope we contribute to society, whether that be with our own families, with our work and our organizations, with whatever people we come in contact with. And we hope we impart certain positive things. I don't think we have to be big politicians or corporate managers to do that.

A natural question stemming out of this analysis is to what degree William is oriented and open to further growth and development. He recognizes some limitations in his own perspective and does not absolutize it, but at the same time tends to limit his social relationships to people within his own circle of commitments, to a private social organization where he takes pride in being a life member. Given his level of integrity, it may be that, as Colby & Damon (1992) find

with their exemplars, his commitment to honesty itself will prompt a continuous reexamination of his inner contradictions. Or it may be that Conventional CC requires external conditions to prompt its further development. That question remains unclear.

Agnes

Agnes, just like William, comes from a working-class background with the accompanying initially low self-esteem and desire to succeed in mainstream culture. Like him, she has managed to overcome her self-doubts by establishing a clear and firm course in life; and also like him, continues to struggle with some to this moment. However, the way she negotiates her self-doubts, and the course she took, are in direct contrast to William's. The difference in choices may have to do with the difference in their childhood home environments.

As we saw, William's father, although a blue collar worker with low self-esteem, was a hard-working honest man with some clear goals in life. He wanted to see his son educated, sent him to parochial school, and then to engineering school. Agnes's father had a poultry farm, and was also a hard worker in her words, and someone significant in her life. However, despite my probes, she could not explain what he stood for in her life. What comes across is that he was a good man for whom she had a lot of compassion,

because he was unable to cope with the fact that his wife, "a cold Finn" in Agnes's words, "ran around". His **helplessness** developed into a drinking problem. When Agnes's mother finally left him, he married a woman who also loved drinking, and in Agnes's words did not have "everything upstairs". They let the farm fall to ruin, and their son (Agnes' half-brother) became a drug dealer. So Agnes "just divorced herself from the whole situation".

In the course of negotiating this family environment, Agnes developed **no prominent personal goals**:

> I had no specific goals. I remember in high school I started out with the college courses: Latin, algebra, and all that, and then sophomore year switched over to commercial courses. Figuring that, well, I'll graduate high school and then try to get some office job.

What became important for Agnes early on was social status, being able to live the life of her girlfriend's family in down-town. At some point, she decided she wanted more from life than to become, in her words, a factory worker. So she

> buckled right down, and the following year entered Fitchburg State teachers' college...A couple of girlfriends and I just decided, let's do it...What, with $75 a semester! That's what it cost my father... Which was another four years...it was fun, and it was informative to me, and I didn't have any idea that I wanted to be a teacher...I did really good in college, as far as practical on how to be a teacher. I presented a very good teacher so I got a job in one of the really good high school systems.

What stands out most in the above quotes is a **fundamentally pragmatic, instrumental orientation** with

practically **no moral concerns**. Agnes seems to feel no appreciation for being helped through college by her father, but rather takes it for granted, unlike William. She exhibits **materialism**, as well as a **concern with appearances**; what she considers the most important thing about the school system she entered as a teacher, was the fact that it was "top rated" and "the highest paying". She speaks in a **language** that is somewhat **distant, indifferent, cliched** ("fun, informative"), in contrast with the way we hear William speak. Like William, she exhibits an **external locus of control**, a tendency to be guided by circumstances, and a **sense of little agency**. However, while William's strong moral imperative makes him grapple with the moral implications of these circumstances, she just tries to make the best of them, with **no moral imperative** involved.

In the early part of her life story, the only time I heard Agnes refer to some moral concerns was in regards to her mother's choices. Those concerns were noticeably mixed with her concern for appearances, for how her mother's choices impacted the image Agnes was able to present to the world. "She hurt me as I was trying to present myself, you know, to the world". This painful early experience made **self-image an important issue** for Agnes, and may have prompted her to develop the defensive and impermeable personal style which I observed in the interview.

Another thing that may have contributed to her noticeable **disconnectedness** from people, was the **failure of her early environment not just to introduce any moral frames of reference other than hard work, but to foster empathy** of any kind. Noticing that she hardly mentions her two brothers in her life story, and is obviously not connected to them in any significant way, she explains:

> We were not an affectionate family. There was no affinitive sense...My mother was born in Finland. Very cold, never showed emotions. So that's the way we grew up in the family. I recall I never saw them kiss. And I can remember my mother even saying to me "Don't cry". You know, you grew up holding everything inside. Or if I'd complain, or said things about what I thought about what she was doing...she said to me, "If you don't be quiet, I'm going to send you to boarding school"...That's the way we grew up: with **no communication**; we just...grew up. We **never discussed feelings or what you think**. I remember I told my father one time something that I saw my mother do. And he confronted her, and she confronted us about who told him. Well, I wasn't going to say I told him. So she blamed my older brother. And I let it go.

Agnes expresses practically no other feelings related to that period in her life but **fear** and **resentment**. Surprisingly, she describes her mother as "a good mother", because her mother cared for her in what appear to have been physical ways; i.e. Agnes had elocution lessons because she was shy, piano lessons, and remembers going to a chiropractor after she had polio as a toddler. Interestingly, that is the kind of **external, physical approach to parenting**, **lacking emotional engagement**, which she describes with her own children. She has become so

accustomed to this **unemotional approach to life** that she is surprised when she finds herself crying while telling me her childhood story.

> I can't believe that I'm getting, you know, emotional about this. But...we maintained some sort of relationship. I suppose I loved her in my way but I didn't respect her at all.

Agnes' life seems to have been completely deprived of figures of authentic moral authority, whom she could learn to respect. **Lack of respect** for anybody became a lasting characteristic of Agnes. She speaks **harsh**ly of people, is very **judgmental**, and at one point called her own mother "a whore". Her early hostile and autocratic home environment not only did not foster her emotional and empathic development, but left her in some ways trapped in **egocentric individualism** which comes through in different domain in her life.

The one significant person Agnes spoke of with a measure of good feeling was her girlfriend's mother, at whose house she spent a lot of time as "a freshman in college". She said she felt closer to that woman than to her own mother, because they sat and talked and spent time together. Yet, when asked what that person gave her, Agnes does not focus on the caring or the listening, but on a much more pragmatic consideration. What she appreciates most is that she dissuaded Agnes from dropping out of college and dating a young man with whom she was in love, and believes she still feels love for. At my surprise, she elaborated:

> If I hadn't, where would I be today? Probably at work in some factory, marrying some home-town boy. Yeah, I probably wouldn't have known any different.

These **class and role stereotypes**, and disdain for working class people, which dominate the conversation with her, seem to be further developments of her early preoccupation with appearances and self-image. **Getting ahead in life** became the most important thing; she had no other significant relationships in her youth, and remained **impermeable to meaningful relationships**. She "can't think of anyone else who influenced me in a positive way".

The one significant relationship that dominated her life was with her former husband, and it noticeably **lacks intimacy and reciprocity**. She was attracted to him because he was "a fantastic athlete, very popular", and she "really admired him and clung to him". When they got married, their circle of friends constituted her husband's softball buddies. Neither then nor in her later friendships does she report **any deeper connections or common goals with people**. Her preoccupations during her married life were notably **materialistic** and **role-and-class-conscious**. She talks at length about the **lifestyle** they tried to maintain although they could not afford it, about her roles as a "housewife and mother", and about **competing** with "sophisticated Harvard girls" when school subbing. When her relationship with her husband started going wrong, she recurred to a pattern of

disconnecting, which reminded me of her mother, and which she recognizes as her life-long strategy.

Agnes describes her husband as an unfaithful "Narcissist with no humility", who "loves himself more than he could ever love anybody else, to this day". It struck me that she used explicitly moral language for the first time when judging her husband's choices; this **self-righteousness** is characteristic of the way she talks about other issues too. At the same time, she shows **no capacity for reciprocity**, and **no real need to give**. After her divorce, she dated and liked one man very much, but she "never fell in love. Everybody has a certain degree in which they can love...I can't get too close."

She mentions that her former husband was very nice to her during her struggle with cancer, and came and helped her daily, and at the same time expresses no discomfort with refusing to care for him during his heart operations. When she talks about his struggles through life, there seems to be **no compassion**, only resentment. She explains that she didn't marry some of the nice people whom she dated because she knew that she

> had a tendency not to be so nice if I don't care enough...if they don't move up to my expectations, so to speak. But I was never ready to get married, and I'm glad I didn't...Too complicated. Now you have his, hers, ours, yours, this, that. Just **too complicated**, and I'm not, as far as estates, in the mood for that... It was just easier. And that's the way I wanted, I **wanted the easy way**. Go about your business...So I wouldn't get married

> again but I'd like to have someone, a male companion, to squire me around, so to speak.

Agnes exhibits an **inability to commit to anything or anybody in a way that would engage her way of being**. She operates out of a typical Conformist **orientation to safety and security through predictable routine and control** (Wade, 1996). In contrast to William, who was what he could give, Agnes **is what she can feel in control of**. She **shrinks away from everything that's unknown**, and **retreats into her self-protected space**. She even admits she contemplated refusing to do the interview because she suspected it would engage her too much.

Agnes says that her children came first in all her decisions, but when she talks about them, no emotions come through. She had **no particularly high standards** for them, and seemed satisfied that "they were average students" and "weren't into drinking, drugs, or things like that". She does not mention any efforts to teach them anything; it seems as though there were **no moral concepts or frame of reference involved in raising her children**. When she faced challenges, she "yelled a lot", or "if their father was around, I'd have him take care of anything that might have to do with police or lawyers or something like that". The one time her son was arrested for marijuana, she was more concerned with whether or not he'd pay his ticket for having his car towed. As far as marijuana, she says: "I don't care about it - probably all of them tried it".

If anything at all stands out in her initial account of them, it is that they are both "very **gamefully employed**", have all the things that exhibit a **good standard of living**, and "are all set; they're going to take care of momma". The same **materialistic, pragmatic, instrumental concerns** run throughout everything she says.

Agnes **never took responsibility to help her children negotiate** her divorce or any questions they might have about their father. Rather, she left it at their feet; she would answer if they had a question but invited no conversation. She made sure they **lived in a matter-of-fact routine way**: "there wasn't too much to discuss unless they asked questions, because our lifestyle was very routine". She tried to be there for her children, and provide "a stable home", and made sure they did all the "mainstream" things, such as hockey, etc.

Agnes has at first glance successfully **compartmentalized her own consciousness and her life**, to the point where her children know little about her "family history", or that her "mother was a whore"; and she doesn't keep in touch with her extended family, or even her brothers. In fact, Agnes used a striking metaphor to describe her life:

> I started to run my life like a post-office. Incidents and events that I couldn't do anything about that there were bothering me, I just had to put them in the slot, and put them away, forget about them, and not dwell on them, because it was hurting me too much.

Agnes talks about all this with **honesty and directness**. She knows she has a problem with feelings, and that her daughter's problems have to do with that too. She admires famous people like Eleanor Roosevelt who try to do good, but doesn't go into any depth to establish what she admires. It seems like in her heart she yearns to do good, but has **no frames of reference beyond herself** toward which to orient her life and choices, since she had no models in her immediate life space.

Her yearning to do good becomes even clearer when she talks about her work with special needs children. She is drawn to these children in spite of the fact that she somewhat sharply calls them "the slowpokes". She can identify with them because she also didn't have "a very sophisticated background"; she talks about these "low-achieving kids" with more compassion than she reveals toward anybody else, although she still sounds distant. She **takes responsibility to try and make a difference for them**, and experiences frustration when she cannot. For the first time, she allows herself to speak with some **involvement**. Her **need to feel connected, to relate, to give** comes through loud and clear: "I was important to somebody".

Yet, she resumes her **bitterness** as soon as she starts talking about their parents who didn't always appreciate her work because, in her understanding, they want to see their children "cured". I.e., her approach to the special needs

children exhibits the same **stereotypes** which her thinking always shows: they are less than normal and need a cure. Another stereotype is that of the Jewish neighborhood and its tendency toward class and lifestyle competition. Such observations come in the same breath in which she most innocently expresses her own **class-conscious competitiveness**: she taught in "the school", in "the neighborhood".

The above reveals Agnes's **lack of self-reflection** and **inner contradictions**. She is **ready to criticize others**, but **shies away from examining her own way of being**, and would rather **focus on things she would like to do**. In this sense, she struck me as an easy **victim of the American culture of action**, which emphasizes doing rather than being, and doing as a way to feel good. Because Agnes seems to have no internal frames of reference larger than the self, all **her frames of reference are external**: she feels fine when she is **socialized into a carefully chosen, protected environment**. She **adopts the most standard solutions**: eat well, exercise, get out, socialize, and do something fun. Her struggle with cancer leaves her feeling out of control for the first time in her adult life, and she frantically seeks external solutions to the acute anxiety attacks she experiences every morning. She believes it is routine that she is missing. "**I thrive on routine**."

Agnes reveals an **inner battle** between her **honesty** and her **self-protectiveness**. At times, she will admit that she is not "a very in-depth type of person"; she even expresses regret for not having given her children sufficient affection as they were growing up. Then she retreats into defiant laughter, and describes herself as seen through the eyes of her brothers as "independent, distant; I don't keep in touch". She **recognizes the need for more "warm communication"**, but is **afraid of real relationships**, and remains **isolated in her individualism**, taking care of "numero uno first", and responding to others only upon request and in guarded ways. For example, if her children need financial help, she will loan rather than give them money, and will make a point of how she herself cannot afford it. Asked whether there are people (neighbors and friends) that she finds herself doing things for, she replies that she hasn't been asked. But when a particular friend asked for **help**, she was there **in concrete, physical, unthreatening ways**; i.e. transportation, cooking, etc. Altogether, she tries not to think too much about relationships, and talks about them almost as furniture, the "people I know", the "people I associate with" are just "part of life".

This is not to say that Agnes never volunteered help: she helped the school PTA, tries to call friends and keep in touch, has done ESL tutoring and contemplates doing it

again. She exemplifies the distinction Wuthnow (1985) draws between external voluntary activity done as part of a cultural norm of giving back something to society, and the work done out of compassion, and a heart-felt moral investment. In Agnes's case it seems like going through the motions. She also contributes money to charities, another safe way to give something back without engaging emotionally. Her **choices** of charities are **guided by personal reasons, not a moral vision**: she gives to the things she can relate to, i.e. cancer for herself, heart for her former husband, Special Olympics for the special needs children she felt committed to.

Agnes has no interest in politics, because "it's like a monopoly game". Her **critical perception** is **coupled with cynical skepticism**, in contrast to William's **critical perception coupled with moral imperative**. She feels no compulsion to study political issues any more than on a "shallow, surface level". The only political issues that really holds her attention is the medical care for the elderly, and she is quick to observe that "this country, as we all know, does not respect the elderly." Again, her **critical discernment is guided by self-interest**, and her use of concepts such as **reverence to elders** is contradictory. It seems to be guided by a personal fear that her own life is not valued enough. Again and again, the Egocentric self fearful of the Alien Other (Wade, 1996) comes through. In

one sentence she praises the Chinese for having respect for their elders, and in another, expresses her prejudice against Asians in the US, whom she sees as the source of crime because of their disrespect for human life.

Agnes's **internal contradictions** to the point of **bigotry** are best captured in her thoughts about morality. Her moral domain reveals a constant **tension between some genuinely held values, and a strong inclination toward self-righteousness and concern with appearances and self-image**. For example, she considers herself "a great one to dictate morals and morality, that's how my kids were brought up". She takes pride in running her life in such a way that she doesn't get herself "into a situation where the morality is questioned". She has strong convictions about honesty; condemns cheating and stealing, and is proud to be "a conservative; a black and white person, unfortunately for some who don't agree". This statement captured an inclination for her **self-righteousness to become confrontational**. Such **morality, motivated more by self-interest than by a genuine sense of moral responsibility and moral imperative**, struck me as **reminiscent of extreme right-wing postures**.

Although Agnes values consistency and "following through on commitment", she recognizes that she does **not have the courage "to stand up for what you think is right**, even though it's not popular". Self-interested concern with

appearances comes in the way. She concludes by compartmentalizing the whole issue: "I face difficulties, but to me they don't have to do with morals."

Although Agnes says she believes in a "Supreme Being", and uses Bible language to talk about morality, her Interpersonal and Institutional morality (trying to be "a morally good person...a good Samaritan, a good citizen") is not guided by any frame of reference larger than herself. She keeps the rules, is "not too groupy", does not belong to any community or organization, and is planning to shop around for a church which can hold her interest. In the meantime, she lives in deep fear, anxiety, and isolation, which appear to be an extreme case of the cultural isolation Bellah et al (1985) describe as common in the US.

Summary of Agnes's Case

In the same way that I found William a compelling example of **early Conventional CC** in the context of his culture, I found Agnes a compelling example of the lack of CC on the conventional level. She captured for me the human struggle and misery of a person deprived of genuinely moral frames of reference, and having to negotiate her life in loneliness and isolation. I left the interview, feeling deep sadness for her, compassion and some respect for her courage in confronting the egocentric trap which personal history

and cultural heritage seemed to have combined to create in her life.

Agnes came closest from the US sample to exhibiting consistent lack of development along the four moral motivational dimensions, without being a dysfunctional antisocial personality. Below is a summary of the four thematic dimensions in their amoral version, as I saw them play out in her life.

Dimension 1: Her sense of identity seems rooted in class and role stereotypes, and self-image concerns. To the extent that she exhibits genuine moral values, they do not appear central in her life. Instead, she is guided by pragmatic self-interest and instrumental, materialistic concerns. She exhibits some moral character (a measure of honesty), but it is full of contradictions which she seems unwilling to examine; i.e. there is no evidence of moral imperative.

Dimension 2: Agnes had no figures of authentic moral authority in her life, and no opportunity to develop either discrimination or respect for authentic external moral authority. Early authority was mostly hostile; hence, distrust, resentment, and power struggles became predominant over concerns with moral responsibility or agency. She dealt with the legacy of her father's helplessness by turning it into skepticism.

Dimension 3: Agnes appears fairly unempathic and disconnected, much like her mother. Relationships never

became important in her life, and there is no permeability to meaningful social encounters. She is self-protective, compartmentalized, and prejudiced, and exhibits little social consciousness beyond the Law and Order orientation (Kohlberg, 1984).

Dimension 4: Agnes has no frames of reference larger than herself to give meaning to her life, or to use as a vantage point for reflecting critically on herself, her personal experience and culture. She has only short-term, self-interest-oriented, circumstance-driven goals, in which action and ritual predominate over meaning. She exhibits practically no self-reflection, and compartmentalizes contradictions as a life-long strategy. Her intelligence serves negative criticism and bitterness, rather than constructive critical discernment. In spite of her intelligence, she appears trapped in the most arid aspects of American culture, and adopts the most standard solutions without any creativity or critical discernment. She is as alone in a meaningless, hostile world as a human being could be.

Summary Comparison Between William and Agnes

As I explained at the beginning of this chapter, Agnes and William represent two extremes within Conventional consciousness. They both exhibit the developmental threshold for CC, social-cognitive development characterized by a

formal operational understanding of causality and social patterns, social conscience, and a differentiated sense of Institutional self. Hence, Agnes and William are similar in terms of the developmental component of CC.

Their psychological makeup differs along the other main components of CC, moral motivation, and the resulting overall differences in consciousness. As pointed out in chapter 4, the centrality of moral motivation in a person's life can be seen as a continuum, on one end of which are people who show complete unity of self and morality, as described by Colby & Damon (1992), and on the other end of which are people for whom self is separate from and dominant over morality. Moral exemplars are such relatively rare individuals whose unity of self and morality makes them capable of remarkable accomplishments in the service to humanity (Colby & Damon, 1992). On the other end of the spectrum are thoroughly amoral individuals, whose self-interest is guiding, and completely detached from morality, to the degree that they are willing to sacrifice other human beings to meet their own perceived needs. The majority of people are in neither one nor the other end of the spectrum but somewhere in between, so that the differences are differences in degree.

Agnes and William capture a somewhat narrower range, that of the majority of ordinary people, who tend to be conventional thinkers, and neither exemplars nor thoroughly

amoral. Figure 6.1 helps visualize where I see Agnes and William within the whole range from exemplars to thoroughly amoral people.



Figure 6.1 Agnes and William on the CC/Non-CC continuum

Because of the qualitatively different nature of their respective social consciousness, Agnes and William negotiate very differently the culture that they share. The American cultural context of individualism, "suspended in glorious, but terrifying isolation" (Bellah et al, 1985, p. 6), is evident to some degree in both their lives. They are relatively isolated, with few, if any, significant relationships outside the family. They struggle with the low self-esteem related to working-class backgrounds in a social context of class distinctions and competitive social status. They both face a materialistic, success-oriented culture, and try to find a place for themselves within their culture of action.

Yet, William exhibits more optimal functioning and appears happy, self-fulfilled, inspired and hopeful. One of his main goals is to learn more about life. He comes across as a generative human being, whose CC has equipped him to deal with the challenges in life. In contrast, Agnes exhibits suboptimal functioning, and a much more uneven developmental profile, fluctuating within a broad range from Egocentric arrests in some domains to Conformist self-protectiveness to Achievement orientation. She does not appear self-fulfilled and generative, but anxiety-ridden, unhappy, and with an inner emptiness. Her non-CC consciousness does not seem capable of reliably seeing her through the challenges of her life.

The contrast between these two cases provides an opportunity to appreciate the power of motivation to shape consciousness and overall functioning. It brings into focus the significant distinctions between a predominantly moral versus an expediency motivation along the four dimensions established in chapter 4. Along each of the above dimensions, Agnes and William illustrate the two opposite poles, and show a wealth of sub-themes.

Along dimension 1 (identity), their lives reveal that when the sense of identity is rooted predominantly in moral values rather than social conventions, it is less precarious and more solid, as is the case with William. That is not to say that moral values are necessarily opposed to social conventions. Rather, universal moral values such as integrity, righteousness, constancy, trustworthiness, justice, compassion, patience, humility, active love, service, knowledge, respect for life seem to mediate the socialization process, and make the person less vulnerable to changing social conventions. Conversely, direct socialization into social institutions and their function-specific values, such as class in the case of Agnes, leaves the person in a position of having to protect their sense of identity against both the sense of internal contradictions, and against changing social circumstances.

An interesting sub-theme is the relation between what one's sense of identity is rooted in, and the centrality of

self-image and appearance concerns. Although self-esteem is a sensitive issue for both Agnes and William perhaps related to their background, self-image is less of a concern with William. On the other hand, Agnes shows a constant preoccupation with class conventions and appearances. William's concerns are predominant with normative ends while Agnes is self-absorbed, and expresses mostly instrumental and consumer concerns.

Another important sub-theme is the presence or absence of habitual morality as related to the degree of centrality of moral values in one's character and identity. William exhibits prominent habitual morality. Agnes exhibits some only around limited issues of personal honesty and trustworthiness, which are the two moral values her character reveals.

Along dimension 2 (authority, responsibility and agency), the Agnes and William show a comparable level of differentiation of self and a noticeably different degree of agency and scope of responsibility. The difference seems related to the presence or absence of figures of authentic moral authority in their lives. Where there are figures of authentic moral authority in a person's life, as is the case with William, several things seem to happen. First, these models come into contrast with other authority figures, so that the young person has the opportunity to develop his/her intuitive moral sense into critical discernment of and

respect for authentic moral authority. Second, the on-going negotiation of such contrasts seems to generate an internal conversation around issues of moral authority and responsibility, which becomes central to the person. Third, authentic authority figures provide examples of moral agency. All of the above translate into a sense of personal moral authority, degrees of empowerment, and moral responsibility. In contrast, the lack of such figures in Agnes' life seems related to her inability to explain what she values in the occasional figure she has some admiration for; i.e. her lack of critical discernment, and overall sense of helplessness, fear and skepticism.

Along dimension 3 (relationships), the contrast between Agnes and William also reveals a wealth of sub-themes. First, their capacity for empathy and relatedness seems to parallel the nature of their respective early environments. In Agnes' case, it was a hostile environment, and she developed almost no capacity for empathy. She also did not develop relatedness, but appears alienated from herself, and from people around her, including her closest ones, and describes mostly contacts. In William's case, it seems to have been a generally benevolent, though not a noticeably empathic and relationally oriented environment, which may account for his general sympathy with people, limited range of empathy, and some difficulty with relationships. There seems to have been, however, a basic bond of relatedness in

William's family, and in his life, William appears rooted in relatedness to his family, to other people, and to nature.

Second, Agnes' and William's differing capacity for empathy and relatedness accounts for what becomes central to their lives and from what they derive their sense of fulfillment. For Agnes, it is "numero uno" receiving from others. She shares no common purpose with anybody, and does not feel compelled to give. William derives his sense of fulfillment from his common purpose with others, and from the opportunity to give. He attempts to throw bridges from his private life to public life, and connect his personal fulfillment to a sense of community.

Third, related to the above is the value each places on open communication and permeability to others. Agnes shows no interest in communication and appears impermeable. William values communication although he feels he has a lot to learn there. He shows some permeability and makes efforts to improve it.

Fourth, empathy and relatedness seem to translate into concerns with justice and equity, and not hurting others. Agnes expresses no such concerns. William does, with regards to his family and the interpersonal circle to which he is committed. His concerns, however, do not outgrow that interpersonal circle and develop into social consciousness.

Along dimension 4 (meaning of life), William exhibits a general faith in the meaning and wisdom of life, and his

life purpose seems to be to align himself with his best understanding of life's meaning. Agnes shows no larger frames of reference than the self, and resulting limited goals. The sub-themes are as follows.

William's faith in a life meaning greater than his self prompts a continuous elaboration of connections between right & wrong, good & bad, true & false, and in this sense provides a vantage point for critical discernment and self-reflection. Agnes' sense of the meaninglessness of life beyond the pursuit of self-interest renders her concerns with right/wrong, good/bad, true/false distinctions peripheral. In the place of critical discernment she shows a tendency toward negative criticism from the point of view of bitter self-interest. In the place of self-reflection, she shows reliance on ritual and habit.

While William tries to integrate his understanding of reality and grapples with contradictions, Agnes shows no interest in establishing consistency or grappling with contradictions. William problematizes socio-political reality from the point of view of a larger moral framework. Agnes seems embedded in socio-cultural reality, takes the status quo for absolute, and tends to be satisfied with opinions, stereotypes, polemics, and fragile arguments. She shows little perspective or interest in problematizing.

Williams is permeable to suggestions and questions arising from his context; Agnes appears impermeable. His

faith in life activates the depth dimension of his existence, and makes him engaged in a wholesome and immediate relationship with reality. In contrast, Agnes is disengaged and alienated, and exhibits surface functioning.

Expanded Motivational Template

A closer look at the wealth of sub-themes along the four motivational dimensions exhibited by the contrast between Agnes and William reveals a fascinating convergence with the understanding gained from the secondary life histories analyzed in previous chapters, as well as with the insights from the literature review. Table 6.2 below offers a synthesis of sub-themes, which represent continuums between moral and expediency motivation along the four motivational dimensions. This synthesis incorporates theoretical insights from various literatures as they speak to issues I see emerging from the interview data. The main theoretical sources included are Freire (1873), Marcuse, Adorno, Fromm, Horkheimer (Bronner & Kellner, 1989), Bellah et al (1985), postmodern thought (Bembow, 1994), ontological and humanistic value discourses (Maslow, 1959), Hoffman (1983, 1989, 1991), Colby & Damon (1992), Vygotsky (Wertsch, 1985).

Table 6.2

Expanded Motivational Template

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization b. strong character grounded in virtues c. peripheral self-image concerns d. normative ends e. habitual morality f. moral imperative
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority c. moral self-attribution & sense of internal moral authority d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

Continued next page

Table 6.2 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relation-ships k. compartmentalization & prejudice l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness b. levels of empathy c. rootedness in relatedness d. engaged in relationships on every level e. centrality of giving f. inner place inclusive of others & larger world g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others j. permeability to meaningful social relationships k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice l. integration of private & public life m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n. social consciousness o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society

Continued next page

Table 6.2 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals** a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning b. no larger purpose than individual self c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest d. negative criticism e. reliance on habit & ritual f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. surface functioning j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection** a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point d. critical discernment e. self-reflection f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. depth dimension of existence activated j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relationships w/ reality

Conclusions From the Comparative Analysis

The motivational dimensions of difference between CC and non-CC, which I identified in the contrasting analysis of William and Agnes, represent a helpful template for identifying the level and degree of CC in individuals. Understood in terms of their relative dominance in people's ways of being, these dimensions allow me to construe CC not as another way to categorize people, but rather as a way to

view the human continuum and its potential for development. Most interviewees presented cases that were less clear-cut than Agnes' and William's, and exhibit an in-between status along these dimensions of tension between the CC and non-CC pathway. Hence, these dimensions allow me to understand the interview data not just in terms of the current way of being of an individual, but in terms of the dynamic change in the active operation of self on social reality, as well as the potential for intervention and education.

Since each of the above dimensions represent a flux, and the question is one of predominance, not of absolute values, the evaluation of whether an individual's current way of being can be said to exhibit CC was guided by the research criteria established in chapter 3. I.e., I asked whether a particular individual, within his/her developmental level and specific contextual conditions, exhibits a predominant inclination to:

1) question the set of social relations and the larger social environment they find themselves in;

2) feel compelled to make active efforts to redefine their relationship with those social conditions in congruence with their understanding;

3) seek an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with issues of justice and equity;

The comparison of William and Agnes suggests that CC is not associated with predominantly liberal or conservative loyalties. Rather, it is people's motivation and thinking beyond obvious labels and categorized forms of activism or social behavior that reflects the presence or absence of CC. There are clearly many different ways to use one's CC, and it is not the prerogative of a particular group, culture or context.

CHAPTER VII

EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS: CASE VIGNETTES AND THEMES U.S. SAMPLE

Chapter 6 began to document the central empirical claim of this study, namely that CC represents a qualitatively different pathway of the development of social consciousness, the result of the interplay of moral motivation and structural development. For the purpose of that initial analysis, the chapter focused on a Conventional pair which represents the clearest contrast between CC and non-CC within the representative US sample. A detailed examination of the two cases allowed the substantiation and further elaboration of the motivational template developed in chapter 4.

In this chapter, I focus on the rest of the US cases, most of which fall somewhere in-between the clear-cut poles set by Agnes and William. I apply the elaborated template to five of the remaining 18 cases, in order to understand the motivation operating, and the resulting overall consciousness. All the US cases are placed accumulatively on the CC/non-CC continuum, developed in chapter 4, along with moral exemplars.

In examining less clear-cut cases of CC/non-CC in this chapter, I attempt to show how the motivational dimensions and sub-dimensions interplay in shaping the overall motivation. I argue that for CC to be operative, all four

motivational dimensions have to be colored by central moral concerns. I also illustrate the particular energy and generativity of CC individuals at each level along the CC pathway, and explore the cases for insights regarding the possible sources of that energy.

The less clear-cut cases also help illustrate the fact that a CC person is not an ideal human being nor necessarily even a more likable person. According to the research criteria, it is a person who questions the social relations in his/her environment, feels compelled to make efforts to redefine them in congruence with his/her understanding, and seeks an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of concerns with justice and equity. Such a person values and seeks integrity, understood as consistency across his/her private and public life, and does not tend to remain limited to his/her private priorities. That is not to say that there will be no acts of lesser integrity or no inconsistencies; it simply means that the person grapples with inconsistencies in an effort to bring integrity to his/her way of being, and to contribute to the betterment of society.

I start with another pair which represents Conventional consciousness in its CC/non-CC versions. Each person in this pair exhibits some moral and some expediency motivation, one showing all four dimensions of moral motivation operant in some form, the other showing only a few of them operant. I

will try to show how that translates into an overall respectively CC and non-CC way of being. In examining the two different developmental trajectories, which center around one moral motivational dimension or other, I will show how contextual factors relate to the development of a full range of moral motivational dimensions in an individual's life.

Then, I examine two adult cases of Pre-Conventional consciousness, one Pre-CC, and one non-CC, who share a moral motivational dimension in common. They will illustrate the importance of the structural developmental threshold, and will examine the possible connections between some contextual factors and the developmental and motivational profiles of each person. Finally, I will offer a vignette of Postconventional CC, illustrating how contextual, developmental and motivational factors interplay to form a fully developed critical consciousness.

Since this is a cross-cultural, as well as a conceptual study, its purpose is also to differentiate the generic from the contextual features of CC. Therefore, this chapter also attempts to capture the culturally-specific contextual factors which might be influencing the development of CC in the US. The final part of the chapter summarizes what I believe to be the specific contextual characteristics of US consciousness as related to the motivational and developmental components of CC.

Vignettes Illustrating the Criteria for the Formation of CC

Complexities on the Conventional Level

The pair I will discuss in this section, the case of Conventional non-CC, Finnigan, and of Conventional CC, Ann, both exhibit the developmental criteria for CC: social-cognitive development characterized by a formal operational understanding of causality and social patterns, social conscience, and a differentiated sense of Institutional self. They each function out of a fully developed conventional level of consciousness. However, they exhibit significant motivational differences which result in important differences along the three research criteria for CC.

Ann questions and problematizes aspects of the social reality in which she lives; Finnigan questions some social relations, but remains distanced and mostly adjusts. Ann tries to redefine her social roles, choices, and contributions in congruence with her social understanding; Finnigan seems to have compartmentalized away the larger public arena, and is satisfied to fulfill his limited roles in private life. Ann continuously contemplates an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with issues of justice and equity; Finnigan shows some critical discernment, but seeks no alternative vision of how things should be; he is laid back

and unperturbed by such concerns except on rare occasions and not for long.

Hence, this pair helps reveal the way motivational differences, a lot less dramatic and more subtle than in the case of Agnes and William, translate into differences in the overall operating consciousness. They also help understand the significance of all four dimensions of moral motivation and their intricate interplay in forming the overall motivation of the person.

The Case of Finnigan

Finnigan is a compassionate person, with empathy for other human beings, especially helpless children, young people, and the elderly. Around those issues, he expresses concerns with justice and some social consciousness. However, these concerns remain peripheral to his life, which centers around private interests and priorities. Whatever larger understanding he has, gets compartmentalized away because of presumed helplessness to induce positive social change. His case raises the question why an individual with such potential along moral motivational dimension 3 (relationships) did not develop an overall moral motivation and a CC way of being. His profile allows some important distinctions between what the general cultural norm may consider a "nice" person and a CC person.

Finnigan is a pleasant, relaxed, and friendly man in his late thirties, with an intelligent, attentive, and

gentle manner. He seems composed, in no hurry to accomplish anything, and somewhat prematurely aging. His humble and cozy environment indicated a close-knit, loving family, in the physical maintenance of which he seemed quite engaged.

For the past 20 years, Finnigan has worked with kids 8 to 18 in an afterschool day care program. His work appears to be a lot more than a job to him; it is **a calling**, because he sees himself as someone who is always ready to help people. He **loves helping** children to "find the person within themselves", steering them "in the right direction", helping them "believe in themselves". He invests extra hours talking to young people about their personal and family problems, making sure they have safe rides home, and doing what he calls "outreach" as a self-defined part of his job. He does not just provide day care; he **takes personal responsibility to love and support all the young people he works with** "through the growing up process". In his own words, he considers all the kids that walk into his building as his own. His reward is "watching a kid, so to speak, going from being a wiseguy into **a good, responsible person**".

He shows **patience**, **understanding** and **respect** for children. He sees his work as "service to kids". His **caring, nurturing nature** is extended not just to his family and the kids he works with, but to all friends, neighbors and extended family who need help. Moreover, he feels for all helpless people, whether young people abused or molested, or

elderly people mugged, or poor people not able to receive medical help. He **expresses concerns with social justice**:

> Well, as far as the elderly and kids go, when those two groups get preyed upon, I wish the laws were different for the fact that, you know, mugging an 80-year old person or molesting a child, they're helpless to an adult... There are people that don't get medical attention that need medical attention, and they're denied that fact because they don't have health insurance...I think we'd better off, maybe, with a socialized medical system, only for the fact that it would reach people that haven't been getting reached and would offer services to those that are denied that for the sake of what their economic situation is.

Yet, Finnigan does not go beyond expressing those concerns in the manner of general wishes. He makes it clear that if he had enough money, he would not be working at his job but would, perhaps, open a CD store because of his love for music, and because he "would become bored...hanging around the house". There is obviously **no strong sense of purpose or life commitment**, although while working, he is committed to his young people. His **social concerns appear peripheral to his life**, and mainly recognized because of his personal contact with the issues. There appears to be **no strong sense of moral imperative** to his concerns:

> if issues on a person by person basis, if they affect you directly, then, you know, it's going to be more prevalent in your mind. I mean, there's probably thousands of issues I could bring up, but they don't pertain to me individually at this moment...Plus I think part of it too is you get caught up in your day to day routine.

Asked about his social and political involvement, he explains that he doesn't really follow up on issues, "'cause

then you have to become active, and I have never really become active". He identifies himself as a liberal Democrat because

> the Republicans who are out, it's a more a capitalistic type of thing, and the Democrats are more, you know, out for the little guy, so to speak. But even the Democrats aren't always out for the little guy.

Finnigan does not see himself as a politically involved person because he does not believe it really matters. He offers his disillusionment with the political system and its corruption as the reason for his **withdrawal and skepticism**. What comes across, though, is a **general dissociation from larger life**, not because of lack of critical discernment, but because of **lack of larger commitments and sense of agency**, and a **tendency to compartmentalize larger social reality**. There seems to be no particular motivation to investigate into issues. Finnigan reveals **critical discernment verging on negativity** as he discusses the rottenness of the legal and medical systems, the bureaucracy at all levels of government, and the overly liberal tolerance of all kinds of excesses in society, including violence. He expresses ambivalence in trying to make sense of social reality, and reveals the **lack of clear moral frames of reference**:

> How do you determine what's right...morality itself is just a person's values, and everyone's values are different... People think differently. Unless someone infringes on you, then you might have to say, hey, wait a minute.

Unlike the CC individuals I came across in the interviews and secondary case studies, who, regardless of their developmental level, always seemed to "know **what that fine line is**", Finnigan seems **at a loss**. So he recurs to basic "common sense moralism" as he calls it, or conformist interpersonal morality.

> For me to be a good person is to respect and be responsible for your own actions. I would not go out and physically harm anybody. I would respect another person's viewpoint, whether it be different from mine or not. Moral judgement, in terms of, you know....I'm not going to go out and sell my kids. You know, people do things like that...I come from a Catholic background. I don't even remember the ten commandments. I can't name them. But that's what I grew up on, and that's what I would say I believe in, so to speak, in terms of day to day life.

The above is an illustration of his laid-back and rather **un-self-reflective approach to morality**. I heard **no intense self-searching efforts at internal or external consistency**. In the moral dilemmas he describes, his **ultimate frame of reference** is **not** so much particular **values but** rather **the outcome** or how people will see it. He is **not willing to fight difficult causes** or engage in defence of justice even around the most specific decisions in his daily work. For example, giving a kid a ride home in the evening and running the risk of being accused of molestation is not something he would be willing to do because it would be difficult to protect his reputation afterwards.

Finnigan's **moral, social, and political ambivalence** seems related to his **individualistic frame of reference**.

Asked why it is important to stick up for what one believes, he explains that "if you don't, then you're not an individual... you're just a sheep following the rest of the sheep". He considers himself an individual and believes

> there's probably maybe something beyond, but I look more from the idea of Darwin, which we're just another animal on this earth, and when we die, we go into the ground and feed the worms, so to speak, if you want to call it that. I just think we're a more intelligent animal than most of the rest. But you can look at it two ways. Are we actually that more intelligent? We're the ones that are destroying the environment and everything else. Polluting and everything else. So how smart are we really? For people that have faith, I think it's great for them. I have a tendency to---I believe in myself more so than a God or anything along those lines.

This is yet another example of how his **critical discernment does not get too engaged in efforts to find meaning in life**. He is satisfied with a rather global, somewhat negative critical approach. Suspended in his own small world, he takes pride in standing by his wife and adopting and loving his step-son as his own. Apart from that, he admits that he "was **never**, you know, a devout, **devout anything**, I don't think...**I believe in individuals**".

Finnigan's case made me ponder why an intelligent man with such a good heart, and empathy for human beings, has not developed CC. He exhibits a developed moral motivational dimension - **empathic concerns** with relationships, **with justice and equity**, with not hurting others, which grow in the direction of **social consciousness**. His work to help educate good, responsible people, is essentially work for

the betterment of society. In spite of his commitment to supporting the positive growth of young people, however, his social consciousness does not appear central to his way of being. He takes only limited responsibility, even within his calling. It struck me that the extent of what he took responsibility for in his own life, matched the scope of the moral authority of the only significant authority figure of his childhood - his mother.

Finnigan had a close relationship with his mother (his father died when he was a baby, so his mother raised him, and his brother and sister). He describes her as "God's gift" because she was very loving, understanding and supportive, and met her life's challenge of raising three children as a widow with scanty means with quiet dignity and kindness. He does **not** remember ever having any real **tension with his mother**; the only punishment that stands out in his mind is when she wouldn't talk to him after he tried to steal a magazine and got caught. She believed in him and trusted all of his choices, allowing him to **grow "happy go lucky"**, an **average student**, with reasonably mature judgement and ability to protect his self-interests; an overall nice person who generally stayed out of trouble. There seem to have been **no strong passions** in his childhood; always a decent **middle ground** in a safe, protected environment. He feels that things may have been different had his father been alive because he was "very religious" and "I would have

been brought up a little bit differently, a little more rigid". As it was, there were **no strong frames of explicit moral reference** beyond basic niceness although his mother was a genuine Catholic.

Finnigan's older brother helped compensate for the lack of a father by teaching him how to excel in sports and be **performance-conscious**. It became very important to Finnigan to be given the opportunity to play "the better people" rather than the "lousy kids". He does not question the "lousy/better kids" distinction, but just **focused on finding a niche for himself in the system** of things. His interests center around achievement, overcoming his own insecurity by developing competence, and helping other kids do the same. He did **not** have any **big dreams**, or, as he says, "I **never took myself too seriously**", but had what he calls "that reality check". **In the place of** adolescent inspiration and **search for ideal models**, a certain **casualness and laid-backness** set in. He repeated in his life the relaxed, honest, intimate, casual relationship he had with his mother.

> I'm very easy. My wife thinks I'm so laid back that I'm asleep sometimes, but I don't let---If I cannot change something, I don't let it affect me, or at least outwardly affect me. I've enjoyed my life.

I believe that Finnigan's case exemplifies **the importance of having explicit moral authority in one's life**, in order to develop expansive and morally colored sense of

responsibility and agency, as well as a moral purpose in life. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the construct of agency has a dual nature, both a structural developmental and a moral motivational. As a structural developmental phenomenon, it is related to the degree of differentiation of the self. In this respect, Finnigan, like Agnes, is not lacking; he manifests a formed Institutional self. Nevertheless, he tends to remain a skeptical, helpless, passive observer. His story suggests that **the scope and degree of authentic moral authority in early life may have to do with the scope and degree of personal moral authority, responsibility, and agency which the young person develops as an adult**. This insight initially emerged out of the analysis of the lives of moral exemplars.

Finnigan had only one authentic moral authority figure in his life, his mother; and her authority was limited. The content and degree of her moral authority seems to translate into the same content and degree of moral responsibility which he undertakes. He lacked other central figures who might introduce tension around responsibilities in his life, and stimulate the development of broader responsibilities and agency.

The figures of authentic moral authority in Finnigan's life appear related to the kind of identity he formed. To the degree that his mother modeled virtues of character such as honesty, fidelity, constancy, kindness, patience, and

compassion, he developed moral character and some moral identity. However, he shows more moral character than identity, which, I believe, reflects the fact that his mother raised him without much in the way of explicit references to moral values. His case, as well as others, suggest that **moral character may be formed more through direct imbuing and internalizing of virtues from models in the immediate environment; while moral identity may need more explicit references to moral values.**

Finnigan's home environment was not dominated by moral induction and critical moral discourse as organizers of experience. Values which require a higher level of engagement, such as earnestness, righteousness, high standards, courage, active love, do not seem to have been emphasized. Instead, he was encouraged into a direct socialization into sports and peer groups, which may account for his preoccupation with performance and somewhat precarious self-image.

Finnigan shows a strong social role component to his overall sense of identity as a helper, and a well-adjusted competent "institution". **The moral aspect of his sense of identity is rooted in a relativistic moral framework which does not recognize universal moral values, and does not offer a basis for enduring commitments beyond the self.** His concerns with right and wrong seem to balance out with his concerns with self-interest. He has no framework for

thinking about community in the context of larger society; no sense of purpose in common with other people. His moral understanding is self-referential and does not have the power to fuel a strong inner sense of imperative; rather, it vacillates between normative and instrumental concerns.

Finnigan's environment does not seem to have been particularly open to or aware of the larger world; it did not promote cognitive and affective decentering, and his inner horizons remained narrow. Finnigan expresses some racial prejudice when he comments that his town is "too racially mixed". His life story does not reveal permeability to meaningful social relationships; rather, it exhibits compartmentalization and an alienation from public life.

Finnigan shows what appeared to be a debilitating lack of development along the moral motivational dimension of meaning of life, which struck me as disturbingly common among most of the interviewees in my US sample. His **environment did not engage him into an inquiry into contradictions and critical examination of reality from the point of view of a larger moral framework**. He relates no major questions about meaning. In his relatively direct socialization into a pragmatic individualistic framework, his critical mental faculties do not seem to have been substantially drawn upon. He grew up seeing himself as "a happy child" with "a good grasp on life in general", and with a tendency to adapt within a statically understood

causality or logic of things (Wade, 1996). **Problem-solving took the place of problematizing**; he became well-adjusted and generally content.

In spite of the mother's spirituality, **the depth dimension of Finnigan's existence appears unactivated**. This may be equally related to both the mother's reluctance to explicitly teach him moral values, and her preference for a laisser-faire approach, and to the cultural values of secular, laisser-faire individualism. In any case, no idealism stirred his successful socialization and adjustment.

If Finnigan comes across any concerns with truth, they are mainly around his personal interests in interactions with social reality, and, as we saw earlier, he does not let anything upset him too much. His Conformist preoccupation with security through common standards (Wade, 1996), mutuality and trust, allows him to stake out a narrow territory within which he feels competent and can avoid conflict or the need for self-reflection. As he became more and more entrenched in his way of thinking, his ability to be influenced by larger frames of reference that may have come his way through encounters with people with a greater purpose in life seems to have decreased. He appears safely compartmentalized, relatively impermeable and closed to further growth, and expansion of interests.

Finnigan's case shows the significance of all four moral motivational dimensions and their interplay in developing a moral motivation central to the person. Rating him on the expanded motivational template reveals an overall balance in the direction of expediency motivation, as Table 7.1 on page 369 shows. On Table 7.1 and all later applications of the expanded motivational template to individual cases, I use an asterics (*) to mark the dimension or sub-dimension that I see the person exhibiting to some degree.

Figure 7.1 on page 372 shows where I see Finnigan on the graph of the full human range of the continuum between CC and non-CC.

Table 7.1

Snapshot of Finnigan's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity***	**moral identity***
	a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values, precarious	a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization
	b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues	b. strong character grounded in virtues*
	c. centrality of self-image* & appearance concerns	c. peripheral self-image concerns
	d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns*	d. normative ends*
	e. absence of habitual morality	e. habitual morality*
	f. no moral imperative*	f. moral imperative
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility***	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility**
	a. absence (or scarcity*) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models	a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized*
	b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it	b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority*
	c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness	c. moral self-attribution & sense of internal moral authority*
	d. limited sense of moral responsibility*, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes	d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed
	e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility*	e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility
	f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority*	f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

Continued next page

Table 7.1 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation*, impermeability*, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others* d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others*; no sense of community* h. cognitive & affective provincialism*; limited membership in immediate interest groups*; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships* k. compartmentalization & prejudice* l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life* m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society*	**empathy*, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness d. engaged in relationships* on every level e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others* &larger world g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. value placed on open communication* & permeability to others j. permeability to meaningful social relationships k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice l. integration of private & public life m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society

Continued next page

Table 7.1 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference* & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection**
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life*; no search or questions about meaning*	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions
	b. no larger purpose than individual self*	b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest*	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point
	d. negative criticism*	d. critical discernment
	e. reliance on habit* & ritual	e. self-reflection
	f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions*	f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions
	g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality*; status quo taken for absolute*; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments	g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework
	h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context*	h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context
	i. surface functioning*	i. depth dimension of existence activated
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world*	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relationships w/ reality



Figure 7.1 Finnigan's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

The Case of Ann

In some ways the case of Ann parallels Finnigan's individualism and independent-mindedness, as well as some of his laid-back self-protectiveness. She claims to be a nurturing and helping individual, although she appears a lot less so than him. The difference seems to be that Finnigan adjusts to things as they are, and is not moved to change either himself or social realities, while Ann has had a broader exposure to morally-minded people living socially-involved lives, and tries to emulate them. Although she operates out of a strong self-interest, she tries to be guided by moral concerns, and shows some beginning moral agency within the limitations of her conventional consciousness. She questions her social world, responds and gets involved where she perceives a need. Her life reveals an alternative social vision: a civic theme, and central values of freedom, brotherhood, and inclusiveness consciously held.

In Ann's case, it becomes particularly clear that although the moral motivational component of CC includes values and virtues, it does not include issues of temperament and personal style. She is not what may be commonly considered "a nice person". At times, her intelligent and individualistic spirit tends toward ironical, overbearing assessments of others, and an overall harshness and lack of humility. Her way of being reveals

some of the complexities of the real-life operation of CC at an earlier level.

Ann is a first generation American, who immigrated from Germany with her parents as a child during Hitler's persecution of the Jews, since her father was one. When the persecution openly began with Krystalnacht, Ann survived in hiding with her mother. "Krystalnacht I went to school, as this was hochschule, I was the only non-Nazi, hid in the school, and spent the day fighting for my life, practically". As soon as her parents were able to get her out of Germany, she was sent to a boarding school in England at the age of ten, and her parents eventually joined her when they could escape. In spite of this dramatic disruption of her childhood and the harsh conditions that followed it, Ann talks about her life with **positivity** and appreciation, repeatedly noting that she had been lucky in many ways.

Ann's father was a dental surgeon; her mother didn't work, and the family belonged to "a higher class" in Germany. That meant living in a big house with servants and a gardener. However, Ann's sense of identity does not seem primarily rooted in class. Her family underwent a huge shift in status with coming to America: her father had to become a factory sweeper, her mother a housekeeper, and Ann had to live with another family for a year and a half because her parents could not support her. Yet, Ann exhibits little bitterness about it. The dramatic shift in life

circumstances has not left her insecure and with self-esteem problems. Identity never became a big unresolved issue; just the opposite, she seems **securely rooted in the strong family** and solid environment of her early childhood. In all the roles in her life, whether as a mother, wife, worker, or as an American citizen, she reports a **moral sense of identity**, along with other forms of identification.

The main thing that seems related to her secure rootedness is the fact that Ann's **childhood** in Europe is **populated with significant adults**. These people seem to have been actively engaged in their world, and to have served as models of **rootedness in a creative relatedness to the world**. She recalls her father's broad interests and tendency to always gather around him brilliant people, intellectuals. She was never excluded from the challenging, stimulating conversations between friends and family. The **world political events and social and cultural issues were a daily part of her family life**; and an **openness to and awareness of the social world** became **part of the inner place** from which she negotiates her life and choices.

Ann was the baby of the family, and seems to have been somewhat spoilt by both parents. She does **not** exhibit any **particular moral intensity**, and is **acutely aware of her self-interest and needs**. However, she has also internalized some of her father's **respect for intellectual understanding and high standards**, and her mother's **courageous spirit**, and

she tries to balance them out with her other inclinations. Although she does **not** appear **guided by a particularly strong moral imperative**, in most domains of her life, she **tries to incorporate** in varying degrees courage, reliability, justice, compassion, respect for life, active love. That makes her a rather mixed character.

Ann is **strong and independent**, a quality her parents encouraged, and prone to becoming a rebellious outsider. She is alert, intelligent and **critically perceptive**, and deals with circumstances she does not like by opposing to them her own, **somewhat self-righteous** alternative. In her own words, quoted below, I hear **a measure of manipulativeness** coming from a woman of strong individuality tending toward **overbearing individualism**.

> I was the Little Green Man most of my life. I am more intelligent than the top two percent, I am taller, I was tall as a teenager, I've always been kind of odd man out which fortunately, due to my very loving and very protected and very wonderful childhood, never has bothered me. I've been able to draw people to me whom I've wanted to and the rest of them I've never have bothered myself. I consider myself extremely fortunate. I know how happy I am.

Ann's selfishness is counterbalanced by a **wholesome immediacy of experience** and ability to marvel in awe of beauty in nature.

> my nickname was Bukmar, which means "Oh, look there!" because walking along or whatever, I always, I never learned to shut up, I always tried to show the visual beauty that was there, you know something as simple as dew on a spider-web, you know, simple things. I got great enjoyment out of, and the rest of the kids thought I was amazingly

> amusing, I got constantly laughed at, which I always shrugged off.

This appreciation also comes across when she talks with pride and positivity about her children, including about her challenges with them. She says she had "three gifted, wonderful children". Her oldest son was born with a ventricular septal defect, and she considers it fortunate that nothing worse developed: "I felt thankful to God that this is all that happened". Although she comes across as trying to present herself to be humbler and more positive than she may be in reality, Ann does seem to live with a sense of being fortunate, and an effort to not indulge her own less noble inclinations. She tries to give credit even to people with whom she did not have an easy relationship. Talking about her husband with whom she gradually grew apart, she says

> he was a wonderful father, and a good man, but a weak man. That isn't fair, he supported me in anything I wanted to say; but he was never able to stand up for his rights or our rights. Which meant that I am the one who always had to stand up, I always had to be the strong one, I always had to be the fighter, and I grew to resent it, I'm afraid.

Ann is **self-aware** enough to be able to recognize that she is "an exceedingly strong woman probably hard to put up with", and to appreciate her second husband's ability to accept her as she is. She developed a **stubborn resilience** which helped her deal with life, working very hard at all her jobs, **shouldering many responsibilities** with her first

husband, taking care of him when he became sick, providing for her children. Her **character** reveals some of the hardness of a fighter.

> I'm used to getting my own way, most of my jobs, I've had to be a strong woman most of the time I was advanced and promoted into being the first woman at whatever I was being advanced to, which means you have to be twice as good as the men, and then after you're twice as good as they are for a year, they actually deign to accept you, I mean how good of them. But I was one of the ones who opened doors most of the time.

On the other hand, Ann is **compassionate**. She feels for her former mother-in-law, who, in Ann's judgement, had every reason to resent Ann for finally leaving her husband when he was very sick, and yet "was enough of a lady" to be civil to Ann at his funeral. Ann empathizes with the step-son of her mother-in-law's daughter, who died of AIDS and who "was a lovely boy". It is hard to appreciate the degree of Ann's **empathy** for people because she comes across as conflicted. Yet, it is evident that she extends herself, **takes responsibility** and **makes sacrifices**, although she tends to be **somewhat self-aggrandizing** about it too.

For example, she was a teacher for a couple of years because she felt that children at the elementary school level were often not understood and intelligently guided by teachers to the point where they would become drop outs in high school. She wanted to go into elementary guidance counseling in spite her qualifications in high school science teaching because she felt "it's elementary guide

where its needed; high school is too late; we've lost them by that time". Although she makes it sound like she was the only one concerned, it is impossible to question her concern.

Ann **takes the perspective of other people**: her first and second husbands, her children; and she develops **lasting commitments**. For years, she regularly visited the old lady with whom she once lived when she first came for America. She felt committed to taking care of her first husband years after they had become estranged and he was making himself very sick with heavy smoking. When she finally left him, she continued to take care of him on a daily basis, and felt guilty for leaving. She committed herself to night shifts for two years volunteering at a shelter for abused women and children while she had three children at home because "it needed doing".

In spite of the fact that her own life was not easy by any stretch, and she was in many ways a hard woman, Ann manifests a **strong sense of responsibility to respond to every need** she perceives, **both on a personal and on a social level**. Knowing her own strength and resilience, she **takes on hard tasks**. Asked what her rewards were for social volunteering, she says:

> America took me in, and I've wanted to pay it back to America. One of the reasons why I wanted to teach, one of the reasons why I did this kind of thing, because I felt I owed.

To every task Ann brings her most **earnest** and **intelligent** efforts and **critical discernment**. Here's how she describes her goals when working at the shelter:

> Many of the women needed to have their egos strengthened, in a more positive direction, rather than being strident and being willing to fight at the drop of a hat. Just trying to make their sense of self more secure and therefore quieter, more self-content.

She did tutoring of children who needed help, and is contemplating volunteering to tutor again through the Unitarian church to which she belongs. Her **goal is to help children** "out of difficulties, getting them over whatever they step on". She explains: "teaching is probably the most giving back job I've ever had."

Ann is not always a very likable person. She fluctuates between a real mix of overbearing harshness and irony which seems to come from her identification with intelligent men, and specifically her father, and a deeper caring which she associates with her mother. However, what moves her is a **moral motivation** to fulfil what she perceives as her **civic responsibilities** within what seems to be a general Law and Order moral reasoning orientation (Kohlberg, 1984). **Duty** is a central theme for her. She takes pride in fulfilling her jury duties regularly, voting, making active efforts to be well-informed, including going to town meeting, etc. She explains her political involvement in the following way:

> it's duty, right, and honor to be allowed to do it; there's so many countries, but none of this occurs. I grew up under Hitler, remember. So just

> being in a free democracy is a wonderful feeling. All of the rights that so many of the born here Americans just take for granted and shrug off, they aren't aware of how lucky they are.

She values her freedom of choice and **exercises her critical discernment in every issues she addresses**. With regards to welfare and Medicare, she takes a **responsible**, **thoughtful** approach that social assistance should be accompanied with education in order to help people maintain themselves and break the cycle of "generation after generation of abuse". She feels it is a shame that, in the richest country in the world, medical help cannot be extended to everybody.

Ann exhibits a practical, reasonable approach to most of the issues she addresses, as well as a **sense of responsible citizenship**. Her morality is expressed in "doing good, not in a religious way, but in a psychological, sociological way". She differentiates herself from organized religion, in the name of which "much harm is done", and which she perceives as "too tight, too limited, too self-righteous". Yet, she expresses a **spiritual understanding of life**, and treasures her quiet time of **reflection**.

> I believe in a overall God, which is a good name for this as any, I do not believe that it is pure randomness that has formed the firmament and the earth. Somehow or other, just pure mechanistic universe does not explain everything. There must be somehow something spiritual in all of them. Also just it's simple, it makes me sit in Church and look at the Church to find a couple of hours of quiet peace, I find enriching. If I'm listening to something that makes sense, not if I go to

> somebody who's thundering idiocy at me, but that's one of the reasons why I'm Unitarian.

She sees herself as Unitarian because "they reach out to anybody, to everybody"; her **spiritual values** are "**inclusiveness**, not believing in the Trinity, **brotherliness**, **positiveness**, looking to the good, no dogma". Spirituality to her is purely a thing of the heart, from which she derives warmth and joy. Her religious beliefs are "closely interrelated with ethical beliefs, again without any dogma involved". She sees herself as a humanist. Ann's morality seems related to her **spiritual understanding of life**. She is self-reflective and needs regular "self-time, just me alone, in order to maintain my balance".

Ann **holds herself to a high moral standard**. She is **self-critical**, and shows **little evidence of defensiveness and compartmentalization**. She entertains many self-doubts: "I'm sure there were many ways when I acted as a coward". Yet, she exhibits a clear sense of habitual morality: "in major things, I don't ever have conflicts. I'm usually quite sure of the right way to go". In talking about moral courage, she exhibits a movement toward contextual relativistic thought (Perry, 1968):

> It meant standing for what you considered was right. But again there is, the one thing that I have learnt in my life, there is no one way, no one answer, no moral dilemma, it only seems...Speaking up for what I, for what we consider right in Germany, would have meant not only myself getting killed, but many people I loved getting killed. It changes completely when you are in a free democracy, where you can speak

> up, where you can stand up for yourself, moral changes from one extreme to the other, depending on circumstances.

From a moral point of view, she takes pride in being true to herself. She thinks of herself **primarily as an individual** and distrusts groups because of the "political infighting that always develops, no matter who the group is, no matter what church it is, it always develops, two parts bickering over something". Yet, in all the communities to which she relates, the chorus in which she and her husband sing, the church, the extended family and friends, she values "the feeling of **sharing**, of **intimacy**, of **communication**".

At the end of the interview, Ann returns to the powerful role model of her father, who was a German chess champion, and "a brilliant, vibrant dominating man, who allowed her to stand on her feet, and to learn to stand up for herself". In her later life, she **admires many people deeply**, "leaders who have tried to help their people", such as Nehru. She admires the fact that he stood for his principles, and he was **dedicated to working for the good of his country** as he understood it without war or force. Ann said Nehru was not some outstanding example of a person she admires, because she can think of **many other people who tried to better the life of others**, their countries, or other countries, in peaceful, non-violent ways. Asked her how she sees herself as similar to those people or

different, and she said that she feels she tries to do the same things in smaller ways, and is not as active as she should be.

Ann's moral motivation is uneven, just like Finnigan's, but she shows some degree of development of all four moral motivational dimensions. Her profile exhibits a prominence of moral authority, responsibility, and agency, while the other dimensions seem to develop around it and are less guiding. I will briefly summarize my understanding of this process below.

Ann was raised within a strong family unit with clear moral standards, and two strong and mutually complementing figures of authentic authority, her parents; as well as a host of other significant and notable adults. She developed a predominantly moral sense of identity, although her class awareness and self-interest are far from fully united with her sense of morality. She also developed a strong character, grounded in the virtues she imbued, and resistant to massive social conformity.

Her **early environment was inclusive of a larger world, and engaged her in an on-going critical examination of reality**. Under the influence of a predominant identification with a highly intelligent father, who **valued education, knowledge and better understanding of the world**, Ann's **critical mental faculties were continuously developed**. She **learned to not take reality for granted but try to penetrate**

Nevertheless, Ann seems to have learned from her early role models that thought functions mainly to provide alternatives to existing social reality, not just to adapt and adjust. She had the opportunity to compare three cultures, and gained a **sense of historicity and intentionality in her relatedness to the world**. She is not embedded in her reality but **in a wholesome, creative relationship to it**. Her early exposure to intellectual stimulation seems to have **activated the contemplative, depth dimension of her consciousness**, and made her an agent of choice rather than a victim.

Ann's life experience has helped her **decenter from cognitive and affective provincialism**, and has enlarged her interests. This tendency is strengthened by her empathic inclinations and personal ethic of care, and makes her concerned with issues of social justice. However, Ann does not exhibit strong empathic feelings of anger and distress in the face of social injustice, which would motivate more than a common sense practical involvement in issues. She does not relate consistent moral induction disciplining in childhood, and her **moral self-attribution**, although prominent, is **not particularly powerful**. Nevertheless, her moral imperative is grounded in universal moral and spiritual values of brotherhood, inclusiveness, and justice, and a moral character combining warm and cold virtues.

Ann has adopted from the strong moral authority figures in her life a sense of personal responsibility and agency. However, just like the intellectuals she so admires, she tends to be more intellectually and philosophically than emotionally involved. She has not defined a purpose for her life greater than her individual self, but she **tries to be consistent in the responsibility she takes in her private and public life**.

Some of the limitations of Ann's CC have to do with her particular developmental trajectory, others are the limitations of conventional consciousness which cannot yet deconstruct and reconstruct social reality, and define a personal purpose in accordance with a vision of an alternative social organization. Overall, to the limited degree that she exhibits Conventional CC, she is negotiating the chronological theme of Expanded Moral and Social Responsibility.

Table 7.2 below illustrates in detail Ann's motivation, while Figure 7.2 shows where I see Ann on the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 7.2

Snapshot of Ann's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image* & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed*, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization* b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility*** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority* c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed* e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency*

Continued next page

Table 7.2 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others* d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others*; no sense of community h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing* j. impermeability to meaningful social relation-ships k. compartmentalization & prejudice l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy*, relatedness, permeability*, concerns w/ justice &not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness d. engaged in relationships* on every level e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others & larger world g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community* h. cognitive & affective decentering*; sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others j. permeability to meaningful social relationships* k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society*

Continued next page

Table 7.2 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference* & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment* & self-reflection***
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life*; search for it & on-going questions*
	b. no larger purpose than individual self*	b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point*
	d. negative criticism	d. critical discernment*
	e. reliance on habit & ritual	e. self-reflection*
	f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions	f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions*
	g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions*, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments	g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework*
	h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context	h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context*
	i. surface functioning	i. depth dimension of existence activated*
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



Figure 7.2 Ann's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Complexities at the Preconventional Level

The Case of Tom

Tom's case is an illustration of the possibility, discussed in chapter 5, of a biological adult operating with **PRE-CC**, otherwise characteristic of adolescence. He exhibits a centrality of moral motivation with all four dimensions developed within the structural limitations of a mostly situational social understanding, concrete to abstract operational thought, and an Interpersonal self (Kegan, 1982). Tom has not reached the structural developmental threshold for CC, and operates out of Conformist consciousness (Wade, 1996).

In spite of that, he reveals some critical discernment with regards to social realities, tries to act in ways that are consistent with his convictions, contributes in meaningful ways to the social life of his town, and is a respected and positive influence. His story illustrates the better impulses of the heart, the potential for goodness and morality which operates in people even in developmentally disadvantageous environments. His case raises important questions about the role of family, cultural and social environment, and education in development.

Tom is a friendly, talkative, simple, **honest all-American man** who "loves his government", has spent his whole life in his suburban home town, knows everybody's lives and struggles, and **lives and breathes through his community**. His

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Tom is a friendly, talkative, simple, **honest all-American man** who "loves his government", has spent his whole life in his suburban home town, knows everybody's lives and struggles, and **lives and breathes through his community**. His

florist shop is well-known in town, and he is highly respected because he has been **actively involved in the life of the town** for most of his life. In his words,

> I've done everything, I was a policeman for seven years, I've been in politics, I ran for office, and I worked for the mayor of our city for thirty-five years.

He is full of stories and, he makes sense of all his experience through specific situations. **No** prompts were able to obtain any descriptions of **patterns of social experience or understanding** from him, and every "why" question brought out another long, detailed, and sometimes jumbled, stream-of-consciousness story. However, at the heart of all his confusing accounts was an unfailing **kindness, humility, and love for people**.

Like Agnes, Tom came from a poor family, with seven children and limited horizons on life; like her, he is very **conscious of appearances**, and **self-image is a central issue**. He was a sickly child with **low self-esteem**. He "felt like a failure in school", "hated school", and wanted to prove that "one doesn't have to be smart to be rich, to be successful, should we say, not rich". **Identity** became an **issue he struggled with** for most of his life, and into his fifties.

Tom strikes me as an adolescent at heart, still caught in a **quest for social identity**. His **early family environment** seems to have lacked any **character-building moral tension**, but was warm, empathic, accepting, much like Finnigan's. It seems to have **fostered direct socialization**. Tom dropped out

of high school "because I didn't like the teacher they were giving me", and went into the Navy at 17 under minority enlistment for two and a half years. Before that, he managed to get himself into the National Guard at thirteen because he

> liked being in it, and I liked weapons and guns and so forth, you know, I qualified with everything, even a tank, driving a tank, at fifteen years old, I was a corporal, at fifteen years old...I also wanted to go into the Air Force and Marine Corps. I wanted to do them all, you know. Couple of years in each of them.

Both then, and in later life, his reasons show the same **impulsiveness** and **naive sincerity**. He takes pride in having been "on the state police for seven years, as a special state police officer". He liked the idea of the job because it required "political connections" and involved carrying a gun. The first impression he creates is a childish fascination with authority, and all institutional forms of power. However, it becomes clear in the course of the conversation that in spite of his self-image issues, his **predominant motivation is not self-interest**. What he really **likes is "working with people", having the authority to help** them.

> There were thousands of people around the harbor, you know, you could direct people and assist people, and certain things, you know, help them aboard the ship, and you know, guide them this way or that way, they want to talk about where to go in Boston and go and have dinner, you'd tell them, you know, things like that, it was, you know. I liked it.

Tom seems to be still **negotiating issues of moral authority**, frequently in concrete operational ways. He associates authority with certain roles, those of a policeman, a mayor, etc., and **takes responsibility** to either fulfill some of those roles himself as best he can, or help elect people who would do right. In some ways, he seems to be still **on an adolescent quest for role models and identity**. His dream was to be a cop, "one of the smartest cops around". Here is how he describes his dream come true:

> I was even a cop in the service... I was Military Police, smart looking, you know, and you had respect, and you were... you had to be **respectable** too, and that's the way I was, you know, I am **compassionate** yet I could be hard when you had to be.

Throughout Tom's search for social identity, I saw two prominent themes. One is his **idealism**, in terms of which I could only compare him to William; although, as the examples show, his idealism was expressed in more undifferentiated, adolescent forms related to his structural level of development. The second theme was the **undercurrent moral nature of all his social identities**. Tom, much like Finnigan, seems to have intuitively found a deeper, **moral source of identity**, that of **a helper**. In both men, these better and wiser impulses of the heart seem to have been fostered by the strong bond with a loving and generously giving parent. Just like Finnigan's special life-long bond with his mother, Tom relates the **significant presence** in his life of a step-father, whose **loving heart**, **generosity** and

dedication made him **a role model** for Tom. This man married Tom's mom with all her children, and genuinely cared for all of them, gaining Tom's **life-long love, respect, and gratitude**.

Tom responded to the gift this man gave him with a level of **loyalty** and **commitment** which I did not hear in Finnigan. Although Finnigan seemed painfully attached to his mother and does not seem to have quite resolved her loss, his account was more about his experience and needs at the time of her death. In contrast, Tom's account is solely about what he tried to give to his dying step-father. I heard **a level of habitual morality** and **an open heart capable of giving** that indicated a strength quite surprising in this man, who was a "hypochondriac" himself, and one with obsessive fears and constant health problems.

When his step-father was terminally sick, Tom quit his job, and, without a second thought, devoted himself to his step-father's care. He refused to give him up to a nursing home. "He worked too hard for the house we're in, so I says, well I'll take care of him home." After his step-father underwent a lung cancer operation, Tom was afraid to leave him in the hospital lest "somebody would try to end it for him, and I didn't want that, I wanted him to have whatever life he had to have, that's the way it should be, anyway". This choice speaks of Tom's **intuitive life philosophy and respect for life**. He learned how to give his step-father the

daily shots he needed, "how to aspirate and so forth with a syringe", and "used to shave him every morning...do his hair, men's things... he would look forward to it". In spite of his "hypochondriac" fears, Tom did not shrink away from accompanying his step-father through the worst last stages of cancer.

> he was getting worse and worse, and harder to shave him, because he was getting away to just the bones, he only weighed sixty pounds when he was buried. I could pick him up myself, and his legs were, you know, bigger than an inch and a half, and his arm...When he died...that was really tragic for me...he was my step-father, he wasn't my blood-father, he was the only father I had since I was six months old.

In this account, I heard something very different than Finnigan's or Ann's accounts: the **theme of** the step-father's **self-sacrifice**, which seems to have **stirred** the capacity for **appreciation and idealism** in the boy's heart, and the **desire to reciprocate**. I believe that relates to the **moral imperative** which Tom exhibits, and which I did not see in Finnigan or in Ann.

Tom's **loyalty** and **commitment** to his step-father carried over to his mother, because just before he died, his step-father said: "take care of Mom, so that's what I've been doing, since he died, taking care of my mother, who's very sick, she's eighty-seven years old". He **took that responsibility** in the same **generous spirit**, alone from among seven siblings, some of whom became alcoholics like his biological father, and contributed nothing to the family.

Tom kept the house together, and manages his mother's limited resources with great care so that she could be financially secure for the rest of her life. And again, **in these efforts he shows the best part of himself**, because he reports himself to be "spend-free, an impulsive buyer", always in debt; but with regards to his mother, he is very cautious. His **habitual morality is expressed in the best impulses of his heart**.

Tom's **bond of loyalty and love** to the man who adopted and raised him, translated into a life-long, **empathic response** to all the unloved, struggling ones. His **levels of empathy** appear much less restricted and more **expansive** than Finnigan's or Ann's, and so is the **degree of moral responsibility he takes**. If he sees a boy with ripped, worn out shoes in the street, Tom calls him over, buys him a pair of shoes and sends him on his way, feeling rewarded by the happy look on the child's face. These acts of **selfless love and compassion and desire to give** run through everything he does. He says if he wins the lottery, he'd give it all away to charities. One of his favorite charities is "the poor farm...for indigent old people". His **compassion** and **concern with relationships** come through in the way he sees others' choices; he thinks it's "terrible...that people drop their mothers off and who the hell cares". For years since he has been a florist, every Mother's day he sends a bouquet to every old lady (he says there are thirty-six of them!) and a

red carnation to each of the men on that farm; he also does jobs for free for the farm, or tries to buy them something to make their lives there more cheerful (a TV, etc.).

> They never met me, and I've walked up there and gone right by, and nobody's even said anything, and I feel prouder about that, I wouldn't want them mauling me, you know. I just have that feeling that I know that I did that, they don't have to know who I am, it's not important.

Tom sponsors a child in Africa, and gives to a lot of charities, "to almost anybody that comes through the door if they are wearing a collar", poor priests or nuns who "feed the homeless". In one breath he expresses his complete and **naive trust in the institution** of priesthood, as well as in many other institutions; in the next sentence he tells a story of how he once asked the priest to identify himself and show Tom his papers. Tom clearly **struggles to differentiate authentic moral authority**, and fluctuates between naive trust and suspicion in a **dualistic** and **undifferentiated** way characteristic of adolescence. But in his decisions, **giving** seems to **take precedence over not being cheated**, and the standards he uses to orient himself reveal both **simplicity** and a level of **critical discernment**. For example, "Salvation Army is always a favorite for my heart", because when he was in the National Guard during Hurricane Carol in 1954, during the public safety operations, the Salvation Army offered all the officers on duty coffee and doughnuts for free, and the Red Cross came later and charged a dollar for the same. In these simple,

first-hand experiences Tom shows a **tendency to observe people** and **distinguish purity of motive**.

His **empathy extends to concerns with social justice and equity**, although understood interpersonally and with minimal abstraction: "there's some people that I'd like to see have something, that have nothing, you know". Asked how all these concerns relate to his sense of who he is, Tom expresses little sense of self, and a **natural tendency to operate with the best impulses of his heart**: "it's not a feeling of importance, it's a feeling of satisfaction". **Humility**, **kindness, sharing,** and **respect for other human beings**, go far back into his childhood. They may have to do with the way his family lived and his parents operated, as well as with his own **openness and receptiveness to** the **authentic moral authority** of his parents, and his tendency to observe, internalize, and be guided by his **inner voice**, unlike some of his other siblings. His case seems to illustrate, no less than Gandhi's, the point made in chapter 4 about the potential of the impressionable Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996) of a young child as fertile ground for the development of both empathy and truthfulness with proper guidance and moral induction.

> Ma used to give us a dime to go to church, or a quarter to go to church, we'll put it that way, probably fifteen cents. So we go out to church and put a nickel in, and keep the dimes, and now we go to the theater, we had thirty-five cents, but the other kid only had fifteen cents, so we gave him a dime, now we both got twenty-five cents, that's the way it was.

This quote seems to give some insight into the differences between Finnigan's and Tom's moral motivation. Finnigan grew up as an individualist, taught by his brother to compete and make up for the lack of a father in his middle-class life. Although a giver, helper, and nurturer, he **learned** early **from his cultural context** to **filter the better impulses of his heart through his self-interest**. Tom imbued **examples of selfless sharing**; he seems to have grown in a **less materialistic** lower class **micro-culture**, with a humble respect for the larger meaning of life. He appears to have an **activated depth dimension** of experience, a **wholesome engagement with life**, and a **ways of being** which seems more **authentic** and **less distorted by ego**.

Tom's **innate moral sense extends into every realm of his life**, integrating the public and private domains into one inseparable whole. He is politically involved, and operates around political issues with the same level of **moral imperative**: "I get involved. I'm not one to stand back, if I see an issue that I'm against, or for, I go and fight it, or support it."

As a Democrat, he holds President Kennedy as his **boyish ideal**. He talks about **social justice**: "I don't like the rich to get the breaks, and the poor to pay for it". He protests the political corruption he sees in some concrete examples such as big government salaries State representatives vote for themselves, etc. He cannot describe patterns but

enumerates many situational examples. His **situational critical discernment** and **innate moral sense** allow him to see the political bashing on TV as the source of negative attitudes, in spite of his love for talk shows.

> I used to listen to Rush Limbaugh, but I'm sick and tired of hearing him bashing Democrats. Why should anybody bash anybody? Why don't they let Bill Clinton try to do the best he can, even if he is the stinkiest President we ever had, let him do what he can. Why are we constantly bickering between them two, they get nothing done over there, in Washington. And you get guys like Rush Limbaugh that constantly, constantly turning the people against government.

He sees the bombing in Oklahoma as an outcome of "warmonger" attitudes, sparkled by such TV shows and political bashing. His **personal philosophy** comes through again, as in the case of his step-father's death: **life is about kindness, working together, giving people a chance**. He cannot name his beliefs or talk about how these principles are to be ingrained into social life, but his heart responds to the plight of innocent victims of all this political fighting.

> The bombing in Oklahoma will stand out in my mind forever...I saw the little black kid there with glass embedded into his face, and I'll never get over that in my life. I wasn't even there, when I felt so much hurt in my heart, that this is America. I couldn't sleep at night, thinking about somebody's crushed underneath, crushed so bad the firemen couldn't even tell if they were humans or not, they were paper thin. Just the thought of it, and how could anybody do this, what was he thinking about?

Tom's **cognitive decentering** and development seem **far behind his affective decentering**, which accounts for the

contradictions in his thinking. For example, with all his compassion for people, he makes blanket racist statements like: "I don't like the Japanese...probably Pearl Harbor is within my mind...I treat them respectful, I just ignore them".

> I'm against open borders, I'm against all these aliens coming into our country. Our country is everybody's country because we are everybody, I know that, but we having two million people a week coming in from California, and we're paying for them...These people are ungrateful...they come over there, and now they start rioting...When they gotta come into this country, they have to be educated...And if they come here, they can only be on welfare, for six months...our country's going broke on some things like this.

However, Tom, like William, **grapples with his contradictions**. He also loves his next door neighbors who are also "aliens" and whom he volunteers to help in every way he can think of because he believes they are nice people. What seems to come most in the way, is his **inability to summarize his specific situational experiences with "aliens" into pattern understanding**, and his **resulting reliance, although with discomfort, on ready attitudes**. I was left with the impression that Tom had not been sufficiently cognitively challenged in his childhood, because he came out of an impoverished environment with low self-esteem and limited horizons. His step-father was "from the home for little wanderers", and his mother was "a barmaid". With all his kindness and generosity, his step-father's explicit teaching was mostly around how to be

frugal and manage money. There was not much in his environment to stimulate intellectual tension or build confidence in his intellectual capacities. When Tom dropped out of school, and there was no social support system to help put him back on track. He was on his own, in an individualistic context, learning to find his way around his low self-esteem by focusing on interpersonal relationships and being liked:

> I like people to talk nice about me...I don't want to be important...I always say to myself, you didn't really have to ever have an education to be anything.

Tom developed **integrity** because that was what his parents modelled; and he learned to do the best he can with humility, a good heart, and an innate and internalized moral sense. He did **not** develop any **sense of agency**, but feels somewhat helpless and inadequate; asked how he deals with difficulties, he says he goes to the doctor and has a pill prescribed. His sense of helplessness got him trapped into some illegal money soliciting by a politician, and while he resented it deeply, it took him some time before he could extricate himself from the pressure. The worst part of it for him, given his **life-long commitment to honesty**, was being summoned to the Grand Jury. In fact, his interpersonal concerns often put him in a dilemma in trying to maintain honesty. But when it comes down to things he believes strongly, he exhibits **strong moral motivation** and **moral**

courage, and he stands up for what he thinks is right. **Morality** in Tom's understanding **equates sincerity**.

When Tom relates stories of confronting moral dilemmas, he seems to act consistently from a place of **moral imperative**, **concerns with justice and not hurting others**, **moral responsibility** and **respect for life**, as well as common sense. He **holds himself up to a high standard**: "When I do a job, I want it a hundred percent". He loves community policing "because a cop has to be liked" and respected for his efforts to work. Also, being a cop captures the **individualistic cultural ideal** of single-handed defenders of justice, law and order; and Tom is **an idealist at heart**. He worked hard to receive permission to dedicate a square to the name of a Police Detective Sergeant whom he admired, and to organize its execution. He has a strong sense of **civic responsibility**; he always votes because "it is a right and a privilege". He ran for city counsellor because there were some things he hoped to accomplish for the town, and for the same reason he is a member of a lodge and a trustee.

His **civic responsibility** and **habitual morality** come through again when he explains how at one time he chose to work for the same amount that he would have gotten through unemployment, because he had no better job options, and he would not feel right to collect unemployment benefits. In spite of his cognitive limitations, he exhibits **intuitive critical moral discernment** in virtually every situation he

confronts, whether he talks about churches and priests, or about his concerns with both the Democratic and the Republican Party.

In conclusion, Tom is a **connected** human being, who identifies with his town, with every person's needs, and is a **caring and responsible moral agent** within his limited capacities. Table 7.3 below shows a snapshot of his motivation, and Figure 7.3 shows his position on the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 7.3

Snapshot of Tom's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity***	**moral identity***
	a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values, precarious*	a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization*
	b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues*	b. strong character grounded in virtues
	c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns*	c. peripheral self-image concerns
	d. self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns	d. normative ends*
	e. absence of habitual morality	e. habitual morality*
	f. no moral imperative	f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency* & limited responsibility**	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility***
	a. absence (or scarcity*) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models	a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized*
	b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it	b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority*
	c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness	c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority*
	d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes	d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed*
	e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility	e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility
	f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

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Table 7.3 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community h. cognitive* & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships k. compartmentalization & prejudice* l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy*, relatedness*, permeability*, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness* d. engaged in relationships on every level* e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others*& larger world g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community* h. cognitive & affective decentering*; sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. value placed on open communication* & permeability to others j. permeability to meaningful social relationships* k. lack of compartmentalization* & prejudice l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society*

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Table 7.3 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals** a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning b. no larger purpose than individual self c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest d. negative criticism e. reliance on habit & ritual f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. surface functioning j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment* & self-reflection** a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life*; search for it & on-going questions b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood* c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point* d. critical discernment* e. self-reflection f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions* g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework* h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context* i. depth dimension of existence activated* j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



Figure 7.3 Tom's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

In summary, Tom shows a compelling moral profile, in which the most debilitating factor is the lack of a formal operational understanding of causality and social patterns. Hence, he **problematizes and exercises critical discernment within great structural limitations**. The absence of a differentiated Institutional self (Kegan, 1982) limits his capacity for internal conversation, self-reflection and agency. Nevertheless, Tom is **a wonderful example of the capacities of PRE-CC**.

Tom's case illustrates, in my understanding, **the socio-cultural limitations of a micro-culture of poverty and low self-esteem within a larger cultural context of individualism**. Tom seems to have negotiated this debilitating cultural context fairly successfully, perhaps because the better impulses of his heart found some outside support in individual role models, and were able to strengthen his resilience. Although he **did not develop intellectually, and remained naive about his social scene**, he comes across as a connected and fulfilled human being.

In contrast to him, the next case I will discuss, the case of Sim, shows how the same better impulses of the heart, when unsustained by any role models, and continuously squelched by a hostile, individualistic, impoverished environment, cannot bring the joy of fulfillment, and leave the individual stranded in inner agony.

The Case of Sim

Sim is a 39-year-old truck driver. I was struck by how angry and threatening his whole appearance was, as though he was ready to explode with the least trigger. He could not sit still at first - his whole body was shaking. But as the conversation progressed, his blues eyes started laughing, he relaxed, and I saw his gentle, loving side. The conversation was difficult, because he could not sustain and develop a thought, and gave short and fragmented answers, believing he did not have much to say.

Sim struck me as the perfect example of an adult with an uneven dysfunctional developmental profile and no CC. However, he also surprised me with his moving life story which offered insights into environments which stunt the fulfilling of the human potential.

Sim grew up in the projects, which, he said, were a lot safer at the time. Now he tries to keep his children away from there because, according to his account, with the arrival of Blacks and Puerto Ricans, territorial drug wars between them and the white dealers have begun, and there's a lot of shooting. Sim's father was retired when Sim was born, and he stayed home and took care of the children, 3 boys and a girl, while Sim's mother worked at night. In Sim's words, his father was "just a good guy", laid-back, and "didn't really bother", but let the children have fun as long as they stayed out of trouble. His mother was more strict,

"into yelling", and did not approve of Sim's friends who were mostly "a crowd...known for trouble". One of his brothers went to live with their aunt, started drinking and died in a car accident. His other brother and his sister were retarded.

Both parents were loving and caring to their children in their different ways, but it appears to have been a rather **impoverished**, **dysfunctional**, **alienated family**, with each individual occupying their own corner. His mother was "a bingo nut"; his father used to say "Hey, she's not here; she's out of your hair. Don't worry about it." In Sim's memory, his mother was from "a broken family", grew up with an uncle and was very bitter. There seems to have been **no explicit moral discourse as an organizer of daily experience** in the family. The family morals are summarized by Sim in the following way:

> My mother was the enforcer of the family. My father...would just `Let him do what he wants. As long as you don't get into trouble and he's ok.

Relationships seem **casual**, and **centered around avoiding trouble**, providing material comfort and joys. The mother expressed her love by giving him a money-related treat after some disagreement between them.

Sim described himself as a "tough kid" growing up. He "just didn't take any shit from anybody", "had a short fuse", and "didn't listen to anybody", but "did what I wanted, when I wanted, and how I wanted it". He struck me as

operating frequently out of a Self-Protective ego stage D (Cook-Greuter, 1990), or Kegan's stage 2/1, 2(1) (Lahley, 1988), i.e. a mix of Imperial and Impulsive self. His impulses were almost unmanageable in the past, and he would get into trouble "just to blow off steam", because he was "always hyped up". He was thrown out of school because he punched a teacher. His impulses still seem to frequently get the better of him, and he needs his wife to keep him out of trouble. He seems to see the world mostly from the perspective of his own wants, and is incapable of insights into himself or others.

Sim operates with a **"I win/you lose" mentality**, and exhibits an **anti-social**, even hostile individualistic attitude to the world. His attitude corresponds to what Wade (1996) describes as Egocentric arrests into toughness, misanthropy, and antisocial personality disorders in marginalized adult populations, who experience and interpret the world as hostile, and adopt a self-protective stance. Sim reports an inclination "to aggravate people". As a driver at the hospital, he will "aggravate everybody in general, doctors, anybody that comes at us". When asked why he likes to do that, he described his mother's dysfunctional patterns of connectedness: she used to aggravate his father for no reason and he thinks he takes after her.

His accounts of himself and experiences with others are disjointed, often acausal, external, fragmented lists of

juxtaposed elements (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985). He cannot take the perspective of the listener, and the language he uses is cliched and undifferentiated. He only occasionally recognizes that his own behavior leads to personal outcomes (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990).

However, as the conversation progressed and we moved into the more intimate context of his life, Sim began to reveal orientation to love, affection and belonging, which showed more clearly when he talked about his children. He takes pride in being able to provide for his children a decent life, clothes, food, and a good education, and he talks about each of them with compassion. He asks for nothing, and is happy to contribute all his earnings to the family needs while, in his words, he needs nothing but his cigarettes. He understands the needs of his two boys who are both learning disabled. He pays for his daughter to go to a private Catholic school because "she has the brains". He says, "I want them to learn. I want them to make something of themselves." His greatest reward in raising his children is "seeing them do everything right...seeing them smile", and giving them the opportunity to accomplish what his impoverished environment did not allow him to accomplish.

Sim also has a step-daughter, the daughter of his former girlfriend, whom he has a close emotional relationship although he was separated from her mother 15 years ago. Sim also loves the little girl his wife babysits

for, and takes care of the three sons of his deceased brother and his girlfriend.

Although my observations of Sim's interactions with his younger daughter and son showed rather abrupt and explosive threat-and-punishment-oriented parenting strategies with few coherent explanations, it struck me that when he spoke about his children in their absence later, his account became more coherent than usual. Every time he spoke about someone he loves, there was a complete situation described, an awareness of a second person perspective, and some attempts at internal references. On those occasions of optimal functioning, his language, although still full of cliches, revealed that he is better than he talks, as Bellah et al (1985) would say. Here is an example of how he talked about his daughter's education:

> She did her work, but then there's peer pressure over there, you know. And I said to hell with this. And that's when I put her in over at St.Anne's.

In his intimate family relationships, Sim exhibited a vacillating point of view, concerns with concrete external aspects of self and others, and increasing orientation toward interpersonal mutuality. He also showed an early Conformist (Wade, 1996) identification with his friends; complete acceptance of and direct socialization into group norms: "we drink like fish". He identifies himself as a truckdriver, and takes pride in never failing his job obligations, and showing up for work every day regardless of

circumstances. His job context supports his identification because he is valued and rewarded, as well as needed.

Asked what keeps him going in the face of greater demands from his job, he answers, "my kids...I close my eyes and I see the three of them in front of me, and then I just shake my head and go and do what I have to do." Working and being productive is so important to his self-identification, that he believes he would continue working even if he came into a lot of money. His definition of purpose and responsibility in life is summed up in "just do our job, go home, be with your wife, your kids. Or if you're not married, with your girlfriends or whatever."

Sim's **kind and compassionate heart** becomes most evident as he talks about his retarded brother and sister, his love and care for them, and his hurt when others mock retarded people. He used to participate in camp and other activities for retarded children together with his mother, be their "counselors" with his friends, organize parties and hikes for them. He refers to them lovingly as "exceptional children", his **commitment to them was steady** for 8-9 years, 4-5 hours a week. He does not consider what he did a sacrifice: "I did it because I wanted to do it". He and his family, including his children, take regular care of his retarded sister (his brother is diseased). Sim also knows and helps all his neighbors.

Sim manifests a sad **sense of lack of agency**, a **helplessness** characteristic of an Imperial/Interpersonal self (Kegan, 1982), best expressed in his past addiction to cocaine, which cost the family its life savings. When he refers to the neutral others, "they", who have the power to make decisions, be it around the activities with retarded children, or around politics, he feels there is nothing he can do. He does not vote because "there's nobody in there that's worth caring for". In Sim's opinion, Clinton does not know what he is doing, nor did Regan; and Bush "somewhat". Sim's sentimental yearning for opportunities to have interpersonal trust in his country's leader, as well as his **sense of betrayal and helplessness**, is expressed in his nostalgic comment, "The one that knew what he was doing, they killed him. Kennedy there, he was President." This nostalgic idealization of the past and fatalistic attitude to the present is characteristic of what Freire (1973) calls naive transitive consciousness.

Sim **astute**ly summarizes the O.J.Simson trial: "it's beginning to look like a cartoon, because he is guilty but knows he'll be free". Sim concludes "Money talks, bullshit walks...If that was back...that would have never happened." When Sim feels his trust betrayed, he retreats to a self-protective place: "I'm still registered, but I just don't vote because there is nobody that's worth my while to go in and vote for".

Overall, Steve is a **kind-hearted and caring** man hidden behind a surface of bitterness and anger, who feels **empathic distress** with helpless souls in need of protection, family, neighbors, friends. He even tries to reason with others and teach compassion to the best of his social skills.

> Come on, use some judgement, will you? Look at him. The kid has a retarded problem. Don't make fun of him...It's not his fault he's that way. He was born like that.

His empathic anger often gets the better of him.

> Because I have a brother and a sister that way. They should be thankful to God they don't. You know, then if they make fun of them, that makes me mad...I'm not going to let it---lose control over everything...

Sim's understanding of morality is making others happy, doing good by the one's you love. He even attempts some more explicitly moral parenting strategies with his daughter whom he believes his mother spoils with her material indulgence. "I told my mother, stop. You're going to create a monster." But Sim has **never** been **exposed to an explicit moral frame of reference** that would organize his experience around certain values, and strengthen and develop his **heart's best impulses and his critical faculty**. In the absence of models, he gropes in the dark, following his intuition to the degree that he is aware of it and can trust it. He does **not** have the **confidence to define himself as a moral being**. His **best efforts at self-constructed honesty and integrity** without guidance are summarized in his pride in home and family, and

in "I hold my head up. I go to work every day". When asked what moral courage means to him, he answers:

> Nothing. I'm not a wimp or anything, and I'm not trying to be a tough guy. I'm just mellow...Nobody is going to hurt my kids. Nobody is going to hurt anybody in my family, or they're going to contend with me.

When faced with dilemmas, Sim goes to his father's grave and tries to listen to his internalized voice as the best source he has of wisdom and connection to his own heart. But he has **internalized** a lot of **conflicting voices**: a kind and caring, but laid-back and morally ambivalent father; a frustrated mother trying to do the best she knew how; external, physical ways of dealing with life. He is **searching for a clearer frame of reference**; sometimes he even goes and sits at his retarded brother's grave, but he finds **no sense of empowerment**, only a general embarrassment with himself. Asked to talk about his belief in God, he limits himself to, "I just believe in God. That's it...There's birth, baptism, Communion, Confirmation, Marriage, and then there's death".

I believe that Sim's social-cognitive development, which appears arrested at the stage of pre-adolescence or early adolescence, reflects the lack in his life of more systematic moral rules and authority to negotiate and define himself against, of more positive challenges with regards to which to define personhood. The lack of moral induction in his childhood has failed to stimulate moral self-attribution

and internal dialogue. Instead he has been exposed to hopelessness and capitulation to overwhelming reality as a result of the lack of any values greater than the individual's interest or expedient concerns. He has a heart and he is a committed human being, but he is a victim caught in his world.

Table 7.4 below illustrates in detail Sim's motivation, and Figure 7.4 places Sim on the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 7.4

Snapshot of Sim's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity***	**moral identity**
	a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values*, precarious*	a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization
	b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues*	b. strong character grounded in virtues
	c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns*	c. peripheral self-image concerns
	d.self-absorbed*, instrumental consumer concerns	d. normative ends
	e. absence of habitual morality*	e. habitual morality
	f. no moral imperative*	f. moral imperative
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility***	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility**
	a. absence* (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models*	a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized
	b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it*	b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority
	c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority* or its opposite: self-righteousness	c. moral self-attribution & sense of internal moral authority
	d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes*	d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed
	e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility*	e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility
	f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority*	f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

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Table 7.4 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation*, impermeability*, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting***	**empathy*, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting**
	a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness*	a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness
	b. lack of/limited* empathy	b. levels of empathy
	c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others*	c. rootedness in relatedness
	d. lack of/mostly casual* relationships; just contacts*; deficiency of attachments	d. engaged in relationships on every level
	e.centrality of receiving	e. centrality of giving*
	f. inner place not inclusive of others	f. inner place inclusive of others* &larger world
	g. no common purpose w/ others*; no sense of community*	g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community
	h. cognitive & affective provincialism*; limited membership in immediate interest groups*; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity*	h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity
	i. limited communication & sharing*	i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others
	j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships*	j. permeability to meaningful social relationships
	k. compartmentalization* & prejudice*	k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice
	l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life*	l. integration of private & public life
	m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting*	m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting
	n. no social consciousness*	n. social consciousness
	o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society*	o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society

Continued next page

Table 7.4 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection**
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life*; no search or questions about meaning*	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions
	b. no larger purpose than individual self*	b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest*	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point
	d. negative criticism*	d. critical discernment
	e. reliance on habit & ritual*	e. self-reflection
	f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life*; no grappling w/ contradictions*	f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions
	g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality*; status quo taken for absolute*; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments*	g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework
	h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context*	h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context
	i. surface functioning*	i. depth dimension of existence activated
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world*	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relationships w/ reality



A = MORAL INTEREST B = MORAL AUTHORITY C = PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D = EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E = SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F = PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G = HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 7.4 Sim's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Personal Integration With Postconventional CC

The Case of Jim

My encounter with Jim was a whole different experience from any of the ones described above. I felt in the presence of **a liberated, expansive spirit, of a person whose human potential had been released, and whose life integrated a wealth of different threads and levels of meaning**. A simple-looking, short and stout black man who works on the railroads and lives in one of the poorest and most crime-ridden slums of a big city, he turned out to be as remarkable an individual as his appearance is inconspicuous.

Jim exhibits a mature CC along both structural developmental and motivational components, and truly meets Freire's definition of CC. He manifests a **dereified consciousness**, **capacity for creative leadership**, **collective dialogue** and **permeability**, **empowered moral and spiritual commitments**. He illustrates what my hypothetical model in chapter 5 describes as **Systemic CC**. Jim's level of CC has the characteristics which Bembow (1994) describes in her activists; he shows most of the themes which she identified, and which have been discussed in chapters 2 and 4. He also exhibits the main characteristics Colby & Damon (1992) found in their exemplars. I will highlight these in the course of my vignette.

In terms of structural development, he exhibits systemic understanding of causality, contextual thought

(Perry, 1968), and a Transformational capability to be an agent, and consciously re-interpret experience in order to modify inner and outer patterns (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985). His ego development shows an ascendance of the Interindividual self, which begins to transcend the earlier self-sealing logic and principle of organization, and opens up to true self-reflection on its own transforming institution (Kegan, 199). He seems to manifest a combination of Achievement and Affiliative consciousness (Wade, 1996).

In discussing Jim's moral motivation, we have to be aware that **the dimensions of Jim's moral motivation exhibit a new level of integration** which we have not come across so far in the other vignettes, and which is discussed in chapter 5 as characteristic of Systemic CC.

The first thing that struck me as Jim started speaking about his life story was how **populated** his **world** was. Although he has a large core family, three brothers and sisters and an adopted brother from Senegal, it is not just the number of people around him that account for this impression. In other interviews, I had come across similarly large families where each individual seemed to inhabit a world of their own and the connections appeared feeble. In Jim's case, it is a **united family**, in spite of the fact that the parents are divorced, with a strong and **securely connected** extended family holding together the core family:

"we all functioned pretty much into one unit". In this populated universe of siblings, cousins, other relatives and neighbors, there are **significant figures of authentic moral authority**. The two most central ones are two remarkable African-American women, Jim's mother and his grandmother on his father's side, who are the pillars around which the whole extended family revolved.

When Jim's parents divorced, the extended family put pressure on Jim's mother to give up the children. However, Jim's mother had **resilience** and **character**: she "refused, and she did a fine job raising us" without relying on welfare. Her mother-in-law, Jim's grandmother, whom he describes as "a **peacemaker**" and "a **tough woman**", supported his mother, helped her, and kept the extended family together in spite of the disagreement. Jim says about his grandmother:

> She was a union leader in the garment industry, and...she didn't mince a lot of words. If there was something to fight for, she'd be there. She would stand up, and I think that's one of the things that my mother respected.

Jim's **life** seems **guided by the example** of "these good women", and he exhibits many of the **values and virtues of character** which he describes in them. He was most impacted by his mother, and in talking about her, a theme pervasive throughout his life story came up, the **theme of personal growth shared with others**. He says his mother was 17 when she got married, and they all (he and his siblings, and his mother) practically grew up together. His mother "had such

an impact on" his life that he calls her "the rock of the family". Jim describes her as a **woman of remarkable courage, spirit, and understanding**. In spite of serious heart problems, as a result of which she died at a young age, she was "involved in many organizations":

> She was always there for a lot of people. She **started at least three organizations that revolved around the issues of women, and the issues of workers, and the issues of professionalizing workers**. Even today I get called from people that sometimes forget that she is not with us. And it's just amazing, the things that she accomplished in ten years... she **reached her potential**. I think that she took her innate native skills of communication, organization, and ability to be brutally honest with people without tearing them down. She **had a way of looking into people**, and also **very spiritual**. My mother was extremely spiritual, and she could tell people what they already knew, and she could tell them in such a way that they would be **able to come in peace** with that... And a lot of times she'd gather groups of people together that would want to work on an issue, and she **had the ability to keep that group together** for long periods of time until that process was completed. She was voted Greyhound woman of the year. She got another award for a community organization as the **community activist** of the year...She was a woman of the '90s way back in the '70s.

In Jim's words, "of five siblings three have Masters degrees". He believes that the success of all her children was due largely to "**her strength and ability to show the way**". He sees his oldest daughter becoming like his mother, going "through this same process of growth and development".

Jim describes a traditional black close-knit extended family and community, in which his **sense of identity** seems **securely grounded**. He also talks about other influential

figures - school teachers in math, history, geography, who, he believes, helped him develop his interest in learning. He seems to illustrate powerfully how the presence of authentic moral authority figures in childhood helps develop **critical discernment of and receptiveness to other authentic authority figures** later in life. He succinctly summarizes the solid foundation he had in his early life: "my family first, my teachers second, and third, I guess it would be my church...These churches did a lot in shaping---opening my eyes to the whole world".

The importance of education in his life is a significant sub-theme which recurs in William's life too. Altogether, Jim seems to have received what appears to be the ideal foundation for CC: **strong family rootedness**, **good education**, **spiritual awareness**, and an **openness to the world**. This **dynamic**, **solid**, **connected**, and **open** early environment seems to have fostered the formation of an **inner place which progressively included not just the immediate community but the wider world**. Hence, he shows another important theme, which Bembow (1994) also identifies with her activists: the early exposure and receptiveness to the dynamic presence of other significant figures, who synchronistically crossed his path.

> I was exposed to a lot of people that are today kind of movers and shakers in the world, at a very young age, and they were young at the time, and I think we all grew together. Bishop Burgess for one, and Ed Ridnor for another. All these people today are **movers and shakers**, not only in the

> church, but also in the community. Reverend Father Avery, and Reverend, you know, Hastings...All these people. And I think that along with my educational base, they gave me **a thirst for wanting to learn**, to try and understand not what's being said, but what's behind what's being said.

Just like Bembow's (1994) activists, he talks about **being on a path of life-long growth**, the role of his family values in staying on that path, and **taking the responsibility to learn and to investigate reality**. Jim shows **respect for life** and **spiritual understanding of its purpose and meaning**:

> this thing called a life is not a guarantee. So if you don't treat it like it's important, you miss the whole thing. And it's tragic: too many people miss it...

He is an example of what Freire (1973) refers to as being **engaged in meaningful relationships with life on every level**. Jim understands the systemic predicament of the black men around him, including his father, while retaining a **strong sense of personal moral responsibility** and **agency**.

> My father was a very productive person up until his mid-twenties, and then he began to drink alcohol. And he was an alcoholic for a long time. And it's kind of interesting to know because most of his friends kind of went through the same kind of process, and they're a group of bitter black men. On one level, they had very good lives, and on another level, they probably never reached their potential, and a lot of that had to do with opportunity, basic education... I think that my father was---**I can't call him a victim of this system; I think he's a product of it**, 'cause **I believe you have some control in your destiny**, and he proved that in his last 20 years of his life. He cleaned up his act.

The whole conversation with Jim was suffused with **self-reflection**. He is now 48, and he says he feels his mortality because his mother died at 49, having accomplished an impressive amount of things. So he is **in a continuous dialogue with himself concerning the purpose in his life**. As a parent, he feels **responsible to help his children gain a better understanding of themselves and the world they live in**. His belief that people are only equipped to live to the degree that they understand themselves and life, reiterates Freire's (1973) belief that one only knows one's reality to the degree that s/he problematizes it.

Jim's life philosophy exhibits **larger frames of reference** which serve as a **vantage point for critical discernment and self-reflection**:

> Understanding that everything that happens to you is not always not always what you want. In other words, bad things happen to you too, but they happen for a reason, and that you have to take your good and the bad, and just make the best of it.

Jim's social consciousness developed early. He went to college in the sixties and was an excellent student on a full scholarship. However, he "wasn't ready for the compromises I would have to address, and was **not willing to compromise my ideas** for a mark or a grade". At that age, he was already an **idealist**, with **strong and clear inner standards**: "I just knew it wasn't for me". So he left school and joined the civil rights movement, in which he became very active.

> I went down South. I had worked heavily on the desegregation process. I was involved with a group of people from North Carolina that went and struggled for educational and human freedom in their town...

When his family (his mother and siblings) needed his financial support, he went to work for a shipyard. It sounds like that was not a hard decision to make, but a matter of **habitual morality** to follow his convictions, as well as to take responsibility to help his family. In that and later seemingly unfortunate turns in his life, he shows a remarkable **positivity**, reminiscent of Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars. He sees the positive outcome of every difficulty. For example, in the shipyard, he was apprenticed to an "old Irish guy who had a very heavy brogue, and he seemed to hate everybody". Yet, Jim talks about him as "the best mechanic on the property" from whom he learned a great deal: "Patience was really what he was all about. And I began to understand that". Jim not only has the **moral character** to respect and get along with a person like that, but takes every opportunity to meet different people, "sailors and stuff", and learn from them. **Permeability to meaningful social relationships** is a theme that runs throughout his life.

Much like William, his desire to see the world prompted him to go to the Air Force, which turned out to be a disillusioning experience. Unlike William, however, he **faced** much more **severe tests** there, which **may have something to do**

with his remarkable growth. In the Air Force, Jim had to deal with "truly combative, racist attitudes that were around me every day". This was a time that Bembow (1994) describes as "**experiencing cognitive dissonance**", or "catching culture in a lie" (p. 153). Jim remembers that as the time of the greatest despair as a black minority in the Air Force, subjected to various forms of overt and covert racism, a time which coincided with the assassination of Martin Luther King.

Jim was humiliated in many ways. Finally, like Bembow's (1994) activists, he was noticed by a black Chief Sergeant who recognized his potential, stood by him, and gave him a chance. Even in the worst moments there, Jim refused to compromise his principles and give out other people's names in order to save himself from an undeserved and unjust accusation. Although many of his friends betrayed him and "turned their backs on" him when he was reduced to "a pariah", he kept his faith in people: "I met some wonderful people there, and we're still friends today". He showed both **spirit in the face of hopelessness**, and little bitterness when he spoke about it. His ability to forgive and his ultimate faith in human nature is reminiscent of Mother Waddles (Colby & Damon, 1992), discussed in chapter 4.

In the long run, his **competence and intelligence** prevailed in the Air Force. He was "Airman of the Month twice". Jim wanted to go to medical school, so he majored in

biology and chemistry, and was "on the President's list". He wanted to go to Harvard, but was turned down. Again, the **high standards of achievement**, which he kept putting for himself, ran into social walls. In fact, the frequency with which he seems to run into social obstacles and prejudice reminds one of Gandhi's life; and every time, just like Gandhi, he comes out **strengthened**, with an **expanded understanding and experience**. Another such example was his transfer to Tufts, which he experienced as "stifling", because he "had intellectual conflicts with teachers" and felt treated as a juvenile student. His **critical thinking** allowed him to **entertain a critical conversation** with the courses taught and the reasoning out of which they were taught.

Jim stands by his convictions with **courage** and **determination** which remind one of Virginia Durr (Colby & Damon, 1992). When confronting injustice, he bore himself with the utmost **dignity** and **character**. Here is an example:

> The professor in the embryology class would go right to the end. My chemistry class was way over on the other side of campus. So I would get there, there would never be a seat. So I would sit alongside of the wall. Then finally the instructor breaks his chalk on the board, and he walks right up to me. I'm the only black in this 200-person class, and he walks right up to me, and he says, what the hell are you doing sitting on the floor? So I said, I can't see the board from the back, so I have to sit up here. He says, well you wear glasses. Maybe you should get some new ones. So now, I said, Excuse me sir, but you might not have noticed that I'm not a child. I said, Maybe you're used to teaching children. I don't know. But, I said, I'm not a child. I said, I have a name. I

> said, if you wanted to talk to me about this, you (could) simply say, please see me after class. I think that's the proper way...

When he took this to the Dean, Jim was met with more insensitivity and injustice. When he faced the wall of system racism, he **had enough perspective** to see the pettiness of all these encounters, and not to allow himself to become consumed with it. So he withdrew from school and pursued an alternative path. **No**thing in the way he tells his story suggests the slightest **sense of victimization**; he remains a **moral agent** in his life, and **takes responsibility to find opportunities to work for positive social change**.

He started working for the railroads and found in that a wonderful opportunity to combat racism and help other black men build lives for themselves. He has stuck with that job for 17 years, grown in it, and discovered ways to make changes happen. He continued to face other "waterloos", as he calls them, but he sums it all up in the following way:

> I have had a very rich, long life. There's no doubt about it. I mean, there's been a lot along the way; I've packed a lot into it, and I'm thankful for it. I'm able to take care of my family. I'm able to help friends along the way, and I have relatively decent health. I make it to work every day. That's the good life.

Jim has done many things in his life. It seems that in every new domain which synchronistically presents itself to him through encounters with people who have an impact on him, he **finds an opportunity to do social service**. Like William, **he is what he can give**. But unlike William, he is

in charge of his own growth process. The main source of that inner power seems to be his **activated depth dimension of existence**. Jim's **spiritual identity** takes his moral values to a new level of integration. In Jim's case, William's concerns with righteousness, loyalty, trustworthiness, constancy, justice, kindness, and compassion, are integrated into an **overall spiritual philosophy of love, growth in understanding, peace and integrity as the purpose of the journey of life**.

In this sense, Jim illustrates what I described in chapter 5 as the progressive blending of the four moral motivational dimensions in **SYSTEMIC CC**, and their gradual convergence into a single, increasingly explicit spiritual dimension.

For example, the dimension of relationships is both very richly developed in Jim's life populated with meaningful human connections, and impossible to separate from his overall philosophy. Talking about all the significant people in his life, he says: "I've been blessed this way. At critical times, I've had people either open the door or close the door...".

Jim exhibits a **deep faith in the wisdom and meaning of life, and an on-going quest to align himself with life's meaning as best understood**. In none of the previous cases is this particular theme so clearly expressed. He had his pitfalls, "dabbled with gambling", marijuana, and drinking;

fought anger and negativity; put his family at risk. But through it all, he "learned to accept and count my blessings". His **struggles** only **deepened his compassion and understanding for others**, but never crushed him. The **spiritual nature of his path** is expressed precisely as one of Bembow's (1994) subjects describes it, as "one of an **increasing ability to empathize with people and ideas**" (p. 140).

> It's hard for a man to maintain his dignity if he can't take care of himself. I think that is essential. I've seen it in other people; I've seen it in myself. The only difference is that some people roll over, and other people find strength to keep on. I found that through my friends.

Jim's **vision of social change** comes from an understanding of the conditions of ordinary people, and an **appreciation of the role of social networks and interconnectedness**. He exhibits **unity of self and morality**, which Colby & Damon (1992) describe as "**little separation between moral, personal, and professional life**", and **no compartmentalization of concerns** (p. 16). His life is a perfect example of what he believes. His home and heart are always open to people, and in the community he is "kind of like a resource type person": "I'm always the one to get called upon, round the clock". He provides financial and physical help, counsels people, gets men into detox programs, helps them find jobs, connects them to support programs or the right people, etc. His **habitual morality** makes responding the most natural thing.

Jim's history of volunteer work is so closely knit into his life, that it is hard to separate the two. In fact, his life seems characterized by continuously **expanding circles of empathy**. In the military, he volunteered to work with dependents and help them with their homework, because he felt for their "nomadic" life and lack of opportunity to become rooted in place and friends. Then he worked with youths in the prison system. At Tufts, he helped young people from out of town, "trying to give them a sense of community". In all these different places, he set up structures to help involve youths, and give them supporting frames of reference. He gained **humility** from raising his own daughters and dealing with their struggles, and translated that into a better understanding of how to help other young people. He raised the daughter of a friend who died from cancer. In his community, he did "a lot of volunteering around housing issues", as well as crime watch. At work, he does a lot to keep others employed, and help them deal with racism. In every sphere, he is a **leader**, an **organizer,** and a **visionary**, a **moral agent** with a **high standard of personal moral responsibility**.

> I look at life like this: If in fact you're not responsible for yourself, who the hell are you responsible for? So when people approach you in negative ways, if you play into that negative way, then in fact you become part of the same game. If you refuse to play the game, then in fact you've insulated yourself against that. And no matter what, no matter how unfair that might be, that you have to play your life that way, that's a reality of your existence. There's many times that

> negative racist things have tried to impact me, where I've refused to play the game. And I've accepted the fact that I don't have the same deal that some other people have in this world. I wasn't born rich. I wasn't born famous. I'm a black man in an essentially white world. All these things I've accepted. But I've also accepted the fact that doesn't limit me, how I have to lead my life. I don't have to play into that. And the fact that I'm five-foot-four tall also plays into that. But, you know, I mean, all these things I don't---I just don't play it. I don't play that way.

Jim sees as the **source of moral knowing** in "maintaining a spiritual base in your life, a belief in God". He **grapples with his own moral contradictions with honesty and humility,** and **combines a differentiated understanding of social patterns with a spiritual life philosophy**. He takes on the responsibility to break the cycle of hostility by transcending it. And for others, who do not seem strong enough to do the same, he builds networks of support, seeking the cooperation of similarly-minded souls both on the job and in the community. His high personal standards and **lack of self-pity** are tempered by **humility and compassion** for others struggling.

We see Jim moving toward a **progressively more principled understanding of social justice**, transcending the limited point of view of the grievances and interests of his racial group.

> It's not just black people. We've addressed the issue of women, which has been handled, actually, a lot better than the issue of black males. We've addressed also the issue that there are other people involved, whether they be Asian people or whatever... So the issue goes beyond just black

> people. We can't afford just to fight for just black people anymore. We all have to open up the workplace. It has to be a policy, an institutional thing, and they can't hide behind all these little other subissues.

This is an example of the gradual consolidation of Jim's **Systemic CC**, some aspects of which are more fully formed than others. The social-cognitive developmental component of his CC reveals a transition toward postformal operational solutions, while he still fluctuates between an inclination to seek local social remedies, and a growing intellectual grasp of systemic realities. The moving force behind his **increasing dereification of socio-political reality** seems to be not so much intellectual astuteness, but the high level of spiritual integration of the dimensions of his moral motivation. Here is an example of how he identifies the structures of power behind what appears to be reality:

> I'm a politically involved person. I think that if you breathe air on this planet, at some point, yes, you have to be politically involved. Everything in your life, at some point, has a political impact, whether it be the amount of times they pick up trash on your street, or whether it be the fact that you have a job, and your neighbor doesn't. I think that politics is interwoven into the fabric of life. A lot of people don't want to open their eyes and see this politics, but it's there.

In struggling to evolve a fully **Systemic CC**, Jim **grapples with historical processes**, as well as with the increasing recognition of **the relativity of his own point of**

view. Throughout this negotiation, he tries **to remain open and permeable to reconstructing**.

> America is changing. It's changing too fast for me in some instances, and too fast perhaps for other people, but that's America. It's changing...We always think that our politics is the only real politics, and I guess I'm becoming kind of like a centrist, that I'm willing to accept other points of view and hopefully shape them more to be mine. I'm willing to accept more into my life than before.

He applies his **critical discernment** global politics, as well as local and national issues, and shows an astute assessment of international problems, such as Bosnia. He **ponders questions of** no lesser magnitude than **global peace**.

> the policies that I perceive that are taking place -benign neglect, letting something grow until it's almost out of control...It just seems to me that somebody is pushing a button for war. I mean, I know it's big business. I know everybody makes money. But it just seems like that's always the solution to get the world going again.

This quote continues the theme of the tension Jim experiences between his own **creative leadership role**, and a **fluctuating, not yet fully formed sense of agency**, limited by his early systemic understanding. In the face of political corruption, he chooses to maintain intelligent political involvement on the local level, and focus predominantly on **grassroots social activism** in the neighborhood and the community. Jim has some understanding of class issues, but tries not to become consumed with them, **guided by a spiritual vision of** transcending differences and alienation, and uniting around **social justice**. He wages his

"own personal battle against becoming cynical". To the degree that he struggles to "stay the course" (Bembow, 1992, p. 142) and not lose his sense of agency, he reminds me of Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars and their **unfailing positivity and faith**.

> I love the human race. I think that we're destined to better ourselves at some point....If you read the Bible carefully and listen to what people are saying, the whole human experience can't be for what we're experiencing now. It just doesn't make sense...There has to be a kind of coming together.

Table 7.5 below describes Jim's motivational profile, and shows that he is **the first of the seven US cases discussed who shows a consistently moral motivation**, and a high level of unity of self and morality. Figure 7.5 on page 447 shows his position on the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 7.5

Snapshot of Jim's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization* b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns* d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultutal stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility*** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority* c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed* e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency*

Continued next page

Table 7.5 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stiffles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relation-ships k. compartmentalization & prejudice l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness* d. engaged in relationships on every level* e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others &larger world* g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community* h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others* j. permeability to meaningful social relationships* k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice* l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society*

Continued next page

Table 7.5 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals** a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning b. no larger purpose than individual self c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest d. negative criticism e. reliance on habit & ritual f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. surface functioning j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection*** a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions * b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood* c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point* d. critical discernment* e. self-reflection* f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions* g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework* h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context* i. depth dimension of existence activated* j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



Figure 7.5 Jim's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

General Findings From the US Sample

The limitations of space do not allow an adequate discussion of the remaining 13 cases. From the whole statistical sample of 20 interviewees, I found two cases of **PRE-CC**, 3 cases of **CONVENTIONAL CC**, and 2 cases of **POSTCONVENTIONAL CC**. Figure 7.6 below represents the whole US sample on the CC/non-CC continuum.



Figure 7.6 Position of All US Cases on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

The sample seems to reveal some specific contextual characteristics of US consciousness as related to the motivational and developmental components of CC. They were highlighted in the seven cases I examined. Below is a summary of those contextual characteristics, as they seem to foster or pose a significant challenge to the development of the various aspects of CC. In summary, the US context seems most conducive to the development of permeability to different cultural and other ways, and broader empathic concerns with social justice. It also seems to encourage the formation of social consciousness and a sense of moral agency. It appears less conducive to the development of an enduring moral sense of identity, personal moral authority and responsibility, and larger frames of reference than the individual self.

Moral Motivational Dimensions

Moral Identity

I consistently came across a certain **fragility in establishing identity**, which appeared related to the mobility, and **lack of rootedness** and continuity in American society. Since family connections appeared to have progressively lost their strength, I encountered a strikingly high occurrence of either dysfunctional or weak family contexts, which did not seem able to mediate socialization. Hence, relatively few people exhibited a

sense of identity primarily rooted in moral values. On the whole, **social configurations** such as class, role, interest group, and lifestyle enclave seem to dominate **as primary sources of identity**.

The cultural moving away from explicit moral induction and moral discourse as organizers of experience, and relegating them to hypocritical pseudo-religious or political practices, seems to create a vacuum for the individual. In this vacuum, individuals seem to resort to either one of two extremes. One is becoming very prone to religious or political ideologies, from which a person derives his/her sense of identity. The other is choosing to build character and identity in isolation, relying on occasional models and collective values, which emphasize courage, liberty, self-reliance, righteousness, self-respect, honesty, kindness. Overall, there seems to be a general lack of holding environments, which may account for the vulnerability of identity I observed.

External Moral Authority, Personal Moral Responsibility, and Agency

I observed a **relative absence or scarcity of moral authority figures** in the immediate or extended families, and a general distrust for authority. Even in families which appeared more traditional in terms of gender and other roles, there seemed to be a **shying away from explicit moral induction**, and a preference for more casual, peer relations. All of these seemed to speak to the significant difficulty

of the interviewees in developing moral self-attribution, and establishing a broader sense of moral responsibility. However, the general context of self-reliance fosters the development of agency, which is predominantly colored by either self-interest or moral motivation. Individuals with a predominantly moral sense of identity, moral imperative and responsibility, exhibit expansive moral agency, for which there seem to be unlimited possibilities.

Meaningful Relationships, Concerns with Justice and Not Hurting, and Social Consciousness

I observed a significant **disintegration in relatedness** in the lives of the majority of US individuals I interviewed, which, coupled with the relative scarcity of significant figures, appears related to the **predominantly casual, circumstance-driven, temporary nature of relationships**. People seemed to have a hard time engaging fully and wholesomely in relationships, and appeared somewhat precarious in their commitments beyond the self.

In spite of the split I observed between public and private life, however, the cultural context seems to foster substantial permeability to differences and meaningful social influences, as well as increasingly inclusive concerns with social justice. Hence, even people who clearly tended to compartmentalize their empathic concerns, like Agnes, related volunteering and other socially aware practices, which sharply differentiated the US scene from the more traditional Bulgarian scene. My conclusion was that

the cultural context is relatively more permeable to the greater world than most other contexts, in spite of the fact that the rest of the world beyond the US seems not really present in the inner place from which people make sense of their lives.

Meaning of Life

I encountered a general pragmatic cultural definition of life around success and material well-being, also described by Bellah et al (1985). This **cultural slant did not appear to stimulate ontological concerns with the meaning of life**. Hence, **critical discernment and self-reflection** appeared somewhat **secondary to problem-solving** for the purpose of immediate outcomes and more successful social adjustment.

Structural Development

The specific cultural contextual characteristics influencing the developmental component, to the degree that they can be separated from those influencing the moral motivational component, appeared to be more balanced between advantageous and disadvantageous influences.

The main advantage I observed was that the ideal cultural norm seemed to challenge individuals in the direction of greater differentiation and a higher order social-cognitive development; i.e., what Kegan (1994) calls a fourth order of consciousness. As a result, I saw a

greater awareness of boundaries and responsibility taken for self-definitions than I have observed in other cultures. The Institutional (Kegan, 1994) fabric of social life seemed to place before the individual an abundance of opportunities to exercise civic responsibility in different domains. Both individual freedom, and the opportunity to exercise agency and individual responsibility, seemed greater.

The cultural disadvantage seemed to be what Kegan (1994) identifies as inadequate social support systems which foster the movement toward higher orders of consciousness. However, what I found to be the inadequacy of the support systems is different than Kegan's understanding. What I observed was a significant gap between the social support systems available for people from higher and lower classes. People like Sim and Tom received such minimal education, and, as a result of the general social alienation and compartmentalization, had so few social networks to fall back on, that their development became locked in Egocentric or early Conformist ways of being. They did not start with the same opportunities as William, Ann, Finnigan, Jim, first, because their families exhibited the characteristic dysfunctionality of cultures of poverty, and second, because there was no all-embracing social frame of reference to offer what they did not receive in their families. Many of my other interviewees showed similar developmental pathways.

As Kegan (1994) notes:

> The great religions of traditional cultures, a paradigmatic example of one kind of effective culture-as-school, make use of all the regularly frequented arenas of ordinary human conduct to induct and inspire their members in the faith. How we eat, do business, make love, honor our mother and our father - supposedly private domains - are not handed over to independent, idiosyncratic, variably meaningful rules. The contexts for education are not shrunk down to the narrow confines of periodically attended church or school. On the contrary, the regularly frequented arenas of human conduct provide the most important opportunities for teaching (p. 44).

In the current fabric of US society, there seemed to be no comparable, all-embracing frameworks to hold descendants of the culture of poverty. Hence, I saw a significant developmental gap between those who managed to make it within the social system, and those who found themselves on its outskirts early on.

All the above specific contextual characteristics of US consciousness are of particular interest as we move to the Bulgarian sample, and will be taken up again in chapter 8.

CHAPTER VIII

EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS: CASE VIGNETTES AND THEMES BULGARIAN SAMPLE

This chapter focuses on the Bulgarian sample, the purpose of which is to help differentiate the generic from the contextual characteristics of CC, and to shed more light on the different pathways and configurations of CC. As we saw in the previous chapters, both the moral motivational and the structural developmental components of CC are influenced by contextual factors. Hence, it seems important to compare cross-cultural pathways and identify the kinds of contexts which may stimulate CC. This chapter examines some of the similarities and differences in the consciousness exhibited by people in the Bulgarian and the US samples, and the characteristics of the contexts that play into them.

In analyzing the Bulgarian data, I continue to use the expanded motivational template and place each examined case accumulatively on the diagram of the CC/non-CC continuum. In this way, by the end of this chapter, we can truly see a snapshot of the full human range from moral exemplars, i.e. individuals with a unity of self and morality, and a high level of personal differentiation and integration on the one hand, to thoroughly amoral individuals on the other hand, as well as the full range of ordinary people in-between.

Before I proceed to discuss the Bulgarian cases, I need to reiterate some of the important overall contextual

similarities and differences between the two cultures, which have been discussed in chapter 3. It helps to remember that the US and Eastern Europe share a similar westernized materialistic and individualistic context, colored by a generally recognized Christian framework. However, there are differences in the degrees of materialism and individualism, and their particular expressions, which need to be generally understood in order to appreciate the significance of each individual case.

The US and Bulgaria represent some important variations within the Western scene. In contrast to the fundamentally individualistic cultural tradition and collective discourse of the US, as described by Bellah et al (1985) and Wuthnow (1991), East European societies come out of more collective cultural, social, and religious traditions. Individualism developed there as a reaction to the oppressive totalitarian claim on consciousness, and is not so deeply rooted in the fabric of the society itself.

Both societies represent an imbalance between the three main sectors: economic order, socio-political order, and moral and spiritual order (Bushrui, Ayman, & Laszlo, 1993). While in the US the imbalance is in the direction of a preponderance of the economic order, East European societies have been characterized for the last 50 years by the preponderance of the socio-political order, and currently, by the speedy rise of the economic order. Hence, it is safe

to assume that neither society particularly stimulates moral motivation.

These social configurations translate into collective and individual consciousness by creating culture-specific images of the ideal self (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993). In the US, the predominantly economic order fosters predominantly sensate individualistic ideals. In contrast, in East European societies, the preponderance of the socio-political order fosters idealized collective ideological images, as well as idealistic individualistic counter-tendencies. Overall, the resulting culture is much more dominated by ideas, and there is a deep rift between ideology, raw materialism, and idealism.

In spite of the somewhat more idealistic images in East European culture, people in both societies struggle with CC. This chapter will attempt to capture the specific contextual characteristics of Bulgarian culture which may stimulate or hinder the development of particular dimensions of moral motivation, as well as overall structural development in terms of the formation of CC. At the end of the chapter, I will summarize these characteristics in a way similar to the last part of chapter 7, and I will compare them with the US sample. However, comparisons between the two samples are tentative because the Bulgarian sample is not representative.

The Bulgarian sample consisted of four men and four women, five of them currently living in the capital, and three living in a town in the heart of the country. The goal was to interview people who represent, as much as possible, the fabric of Bulgarian society, which is currently mostly urban, with predominantly elderly peasants left in agriculture. The interviewees's occupation and specific characteristics are presented in Table 6.1 on page 297.

This chapter will follow roughly the pattern of chapter 7, and offer five interpretive vignettes: a pair of conventional thinkers, one CC and one non-CC, one pre-conventional non-CC person, and two postconventional CC individuals. I will compare them with their US counterparts, both in their similarities, and as they represent the unique possibilities and limitations of their context.

Vignettes Illustrate the Criteria for the Formation of CC

Complexities on the Conventional Level

The Case of Ada

Ada was perhaps the most difficult Bulgarian case for me to analyze in terms of CC, because she showed such a mix of moral responsibility, intelligence, and impermeability. In some ways, she was one of those people whose way of being under communism made me ponder the research question which lead to this study. The combination she exhibits between a critically discerning, independent mind, and the tendency to

compartmentalize and rationalize amoral social ways, and to reconcile irreconcilable issues, is overall on the side of Conventional non-CC, and characterizes the predominant ways in which people operated in communist society. I believe that the ability of the components and dimensions of CC to help explain her way of being in itself constitutes evidence of the feasibility of the construct.

Ada is a **committed** Bulgarian **pediatrician** in her fifties, who takes pride in her profession, and for whom medicine is no less than **a lifelong calling**. A person of **high educational standards**, she took her father's legacy of solid commitment to the medical profession (he was a well-respected vet), and worked her way up from a small village deep in the country, through all the hurdles of a rigid totalitarian social and educational system, to a most prestigious position in the Medical Academy in the capital of Sofia.

At first glance, Ada reminded me of William with her **pervasive sense of moral values** of honesty, loyalty, responsibility, hard work, righteousness, truthfulness, constancy, perseverance, and knowledge. Her values made her withdraw from what she saw as unsatisfying social contacts throughout school, and limit herself to her love for books, becoming an honors student. The same values did not allow either her or her father to use political privileges, which her family could have taken advantage of due to the earlier

contributions of an uncle to the communist idea. In a society where political privilege was the surest door to good education and career, she **took pride in working her way through** a series of competitive contests for progressively better professional opportunities. She never entered the communist party although prompted to do so in order to be considered more reliable in the more and more responsible positions she held. She spoke her mind and **did not compromise her understanding and principles**, but worked hard to earn her own professional standing in spite of interpersonal conflicts with authoritarian superiors. She distrusted the pompous sloganeering and ulterior career motives of open party meetings in the workplace, and remained **ideologically aloof**. Altogether, she shows a **consistent concern with normative issues**.

Ada's **personal and professional integrity** made her condemn careerism. As a result of the restructuring of the Medical Academy, she had to make a choice between remaining within the Academy and enhancing her career but abandoning her commitment to prophylactic pediatrics, since that clinic had to be moved outside the Academy, or accompanying her clinic at a new place where she would not be able to take a higher position. She chose the second. She felt **committed** to defending the importance of prophylactic pediatrics through her own work and personal reputation; she also felt a loyalty to her colleagues in prophylactic pediatrics who

were working toward the same goal. Ada did not feel it would be professionally ethical to move to a different clinic within the Academy and take a higher position than people who had worked within that clinic for many years, in spite of the fact that the Board of the Medical Academy was willing to offer her that. In her professional choices, she appears **guided by normative rather than instrumental concerns**.

As we see, Ada's **work ethic**, **high standards**, and **sense of personal moral responsibility** within her own context parallel William's. She is also a **devoted** and **self-sacrificing** parent and daughter, who responds to every need in the family regardless of how great a load for her that entails. Her greatest reward is the success of her children and the well-being of her parents whom she deeply respects and appreciates. Within her much more communal and interconnected culture, she **extends herself**, just like William, **beyond her immediate responsibilities**, and offers her medical expertise and other forms of help to a network of colleagues, old and new friends, and neighbors. An Institutional self with clear boundaries, she juggles all her **self-defined responsibilities** remarkably successfully, with self-respect and without bitterness.

Yet, a closer evaluation showed that her questioning of social relations is rather selective, and out of a **more self-aggrandizing than genuinely moral motivation**. Although

she takes responsibility to redefine her relationship with social conditions in congruence with her understanding, she does **not** appear **guided by a search for an alternative vision** of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with issues of justice and equality. Instead, she shows a tendency to rely on **self-righteous, negative criticism**, reminiscent of Agnes, and remains **impermeable to social influences**.

Ada struck me as an **individualist who does not identify with any community**, not even her professional community to which she is very loyal. She feels morally superior to people around her, and exhibits some of the warrior hardness I saw in Ann, and the same lack of humility, and **self-righteous tendency to dismiss other points of view**. She spoke patronizingly of her fellow-students at school, and later of her husband, and exalted herself over colleagues who had different political convictions. She condemned the student movement during the fall of the communist regime in 1989, because, in her opinion, the students had no reasons to protest. Asked to elaborate how she reached that conclusion, she said that the students at her university did not strike, which was supposed to be evidence that there were no serious grievances. I found out from other sources that, in fact, some students at that university <u>did</u> go on strike.

Ada shared that she asked her own medical students what they thought of the student strike, and they said it was nonsense. However, in Bulgarian universities, professors have a lot of power and authority over their students, and, more often than not, represent the establishment and enforce its expectations and strict limits. The students' choice to speak their minds to their professors is not a simple matter and may have grave consequences. During the events in question, the faculty was as polarized as the rest of society between supporting the democracy movement, and supporting the communist party line and dismissing student concerns. The pro-democracy professors suspended classes and went on strike with their students. The pro-regime ones continued classes. Hence, Ada had every reason to know that by actually teaching during the strike, she was making her position clear to the students who chose to remain. Yet, she seemed willing to use her power and authority to obtain from the students the answer she wanted, and was not entertaining any discomfort on retrospect. She did **not** appear **willing to question the power distribution** which gave her the authority to do that. She also did not show **self-reflection** in terms of how her own actions did or did not support justice and equity.

In the same vein, she **refused to recognize the legitimacy of the political discontent** of many people with the communist regime, continuously pointing out how

courageously she had been able to work her way, and that other people could have done the same instead of complain and cause havoc in society. I probed further in order to find out whether her concerns may have been primarily with the methods used by the democracy movement and the impact they had on the fabric of social life, given that she seems to exhibit a Social Law and Order orientation (Kohlberg, 1984). Since she **appeared to be such a socially responsible person** and familiar from personal experience with the struggle to fulfill one's potential under the rigid totalitarian regime, I thought that she may be critically aware of some of the issues involved, but disapprove from a moral point of view of the extreme methods used.

The more I listened to her, however, the clearer it became that her **seeming critical discernment disguised a tendency to rationalize her own emotional needs for safety and security** in a way described by Wade (1996) as characteristic of Conformist consciousness. Ada seemed **intolerant of ambiguity**, and tended to react with irrational emotions **seemingly logically rationalized**. As we saw in chapters 5 and 6, in the case of William and others, a person with predominantly moral motivation and some self-reflection tries to at least grapple with contradictions, and is less prone to indulge readily into rationalizations the way Ada appeared to do. That led me to conclude that she

was **guided by self-interest predominant over moral motivation**.

I became increasingly convinced of that as I listened to her thinking in criticizing the social changes during the current attempts at democratization, and idealizing the secure and familiar communist past through a semblance of reasonable arguments. For example, she objected to the restitution of government-appropriated private land on the grounds that the grandchildren of the owners whose land was once taken away should not have a claim on it now, because had it not been taken away, it might have been squandered by the family itself by now. The semblance of logic was that if we want to start from a better place now we should all start equal and create better social structures. On closer questioning, it became clear that she was bitter that she had no land to gain from the restitution, and would be falling behind and losing hard-won social status as a result of that law. I was led to believe that Ada's sense of **identity** actually had a **stronger class component** to it than she was willing to admit, and that the fact that she had learned her way within the totalitarian communist system had a lot to do with her attachment to it.

Ada had **adapted** remarkably **well** to the repressive ideological society and managed to be quite successful, although she did not like certain things. She expressed frustration with the way the democratization process has

tried to revert a lot that had been done in the last 50 years of communist rule. She quoted her cousin as an example of a disagreeable extreme, because he is a staunch Democrat and is not willing to compromise and leave the past behind. She minimizes the fact that her cousin has an acute understanding of the social injustices done, because his own father had been close to the king and was, therefore, sent to a labor camp by the communists. Asked whether she herself would not have felt somewhat differently about the communist regime had her father been sent to a labor camp, she replied, with **no trace of empathy**, that her uncle had only been in a camp for a couple of years. In her view, so much had been accomplished during the years of communism that these things needed to be left alone, as things of the past.

The same **impermeability** and **self-protective closedness** is expressed in her **refusal to examine other points of view**, preferring to ban inconvenient conversations even within her family. Since the political changes of 1989, she has felt a growing resentment toward the social chaos of the transition to democracy, and has become a staunch supporter of the Communist party and the old social order. She **understates the social and political injustice** of the communist regime, **refuses to discuss controversial issues**, and puts down her husband and older daughter who support the Democratic party. With her friends, she avoids political discussions, and **refuses to draw any connections** between professional medical

and social issues, **compartmentalizing** them thoroughly instead. Altogether, she **does not encourage open communication**, and is **not open to learning from significant social relationships**. Her choices and decisions come from an **inner place which does not include others and the outer world**.

In trying to understand why this intelligent, responsible and caring woman was so blind to some issues, and such a distanced and closed individualist, I went back to her family experience growing up. Ada's sense of identity was formed in a profoundly ideological and polarized environment, where beliefs and ideas were defining, and contrasts between moral and amoral choices were clear-cut. She came from a family which united high ideals and educations, and a prominent social profile on her father's side, with simple working class honesty, warm-heartedness, generosity and work ethic on her mother's side. Some of her father's brothers were political figures; one of them close to the king, another - a close collaborator with one of the most prominent Bulgarian socialist thinkers before the communist revolution. Because of this mixed heritage, after the revolution, her father was forced to leave the capital and go deep into the countryside, as was the practice with many intellectuals who were considered of questionable allegiances. He made the choice to remain there for the rest of his life, and, like many other professionals at the time,

adopted a **neutral** political stance, **buried family history in silence**, and **focused on family and personal values**.

Ada grew up **rooted in an idyllic country life** amidst the goodness and hard-working generosity of villagers, and their genuine respect for her father. She was a happy, joyful, and free child, "the daughter of the vet and the school teacher", the two most prominent figures in a village. She loved books and grew up with children's classics such as Maine Reed, Jack London, Karl May. She was deeply influenced by the **strong moral authority figure** of her father, and developed a **prominent sense of moral responsibility**. She also **internalized** her mother's **warm-hearted generosity and self-sacrificing love**. However, it became clear from Ada's story that it was the powerful authority figure of her father, a respectable, uncommunicative, unempathic, righteous man, that she most completely identified with. He raised her with clear moral values and standards, but they were one-sided and upheld in an authoritarian manner, rather than used as explicit organizers in an on-going moral discourse around daily life.

Ada's father's own moral standards revealed the limitations and contradictions of patriarchal ways. On the one hand, he was an honest, hard-working, and dignified man; yet, on the other hand, his strict norms did not prevent him from having an extramarital affair which eventually ruined his marriage. He taught his children work ethic and self-

reliance. Yet, he made Ada his favorite because she never opposed him or confronted him on his choices, while penalizing financially her brother for speaking out and condemning his behavior.

Altogether, Ada seems to have internalized her father's compartmentalized sense of loyalty, responsibility, and constancy, more than her mother's compassion, love, service, kindness. That may have to do with the fact that her mother had a traditional secondary role in the patriarchal family. Ada exhibits more capacity for empathy than Agnes, but her **empathy** is **minimal** and **limited to her close relationships**, mostly to her father, some to her mother and daughters, some to close friends and to the children to whose medical treatment she feels dedicated. Beyond that, she is **judgmental** of people, and, like Agnes, **distrusts and stereotypes** others who hold a different understanding.

Ada's **environment did not stimulate critical moral discourse or self-reflection**; discussions of the father's extramarital relationship were discouraged; silence was rewarded. Even though the father, who had worked at the ministry in the capital, was banished to a village by the communists, this was never discussed in the family, and Ada did not find out until late in life. In this **philistine patriarchal environment with its characteristic inconsistencies**, in which the security and well-being of the immediate family required observing conventional social

mores, Ada **learned not to question** or confront things as long as she could find a niche for herself. She was encouraged to study and excel, and so she did, **in order to adapt to the existing social structure**. Her life-long Achievement orientation does **not** exhibit any **other life purpose than personal and family well-being**. Neither her family **nor** she herself manifest a dominant **search for life meaning larger than the self**; the furthest stretch is a traditional patriarchal Institutional identification with professional career. In relating her youth, Ada remembers **no significant quests**, and her definition of happiness constituted a reasonable level of comfort and freedom. Asked about her personal philosophy or spiritual beliefs, she translates that into observing concrete rituals and traditional Bulgarian Orthodox Christian holidays.

Why was Ada, who exhibited so many solid moral values, ultimately **moved by a self-interest dominating over moral imperative**? Ada relates her experience of shame around her father's extramarital relationship in a small village where everybody knew the family. Her **concern with her own image** and her later prominent **concern with appearances** struck me as parallelling Agnes's story. Ada's defenses seem to have grown just like Agnes's; both responded by **strong class identity and stereotypes**, **self-righteousness** and **emotional estrangement**. Neither one exhibits any more than **minimal self-reflection**. Ada identified as the daughter of the vet,

materially much better off than the peasant children around her. She tried to excel and took pride in her own high standards but it was always in competition with others, proving her own worth, and making a place for herself. Her moral sense of identity seems to have been formed in reaction to her personal history. I found **no** evidence of **self-searching** remotely comparable to the critical eye directed at others; **little effort at internal consistency**, and a predominant **self-protectiveness, compartmentalizing, and contradictions**.

It helps to remember William for a moment. He also exhibited many contradictions, but he was self-searching in his efforts to do his best, moved by a moral imperative and a humble desire to serve and give. Although limited by his developmental capabilities, he seemed to direct his critical awareness inward as much as outward. He expressed a strong sense of responsibility to live his life as meaningfully, and search as honestly, as he could. In that sense, although with many self-doubts, William seemed a happy, generative man. In contrast with him, and much like Agnes, Ada appeared **suspended in isolation**, trying to find a way to improve her situation (an estranged relationship with her husband, financial difficulties, **social alienation**) and hold on to something external.

Table 8.1 offers a snapshot of Ada's motivational characteristics, and Figure 8.1 on page 477 places her on the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 8.1

Snapshot of Ada's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity*** a. rooted in social conventions, unmediated by values, precarious* b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns* d.self-absorbed*, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility*** a. absence (or scarcity*) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it* c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness* d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultural stereotypes* e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism*, helplessness*, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency* &expanding moral responsibility** a. figures of authentic moral authority*; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment* of& respect for authentic authority c. moral self-attribution* & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

Continued next page

Table 8.1 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy*, alienation*, impermeability*, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting***	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting**
	a. hostile,authoritarian* environment stifles empathy* & relatedness	a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness
	b. lack of/limited empathy*	b. levels of empathy
	c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others*	c. rootedness in relatedness*
	d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments	d. engaged in relationships on every level*
	e. centrality of receiving	e. centrality of giving*
	f. inner place not inclusive of others*	f. inner place inclusive of others & larger world
	g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community*	g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community
	h. cognitive & affective provincialism*; limited membership in immediate interest groups*; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity	h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity
	i. limited communication & sharing*	i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others
	j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships*	j. permeability to meaningful social relationships
	k. compartmentalization & prejudice*	k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice
	l. split b/n public & private life* &alienation from public life*	l. integration of private & public life
	m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting*	m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting
	n.no social consciousness	n. social consciousness*
	o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	o. enduring commitments* beyond self & work for the betterment of society

Continued next page

Table 8.1 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference* & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection**
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning *	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions
	b. no larger purpose than individual self*	b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood*
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point*
	d. negative criticism*	d. critical discernment*
	e. reliance on habit & ritual*	e. self-reflection
	f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life*; no grappling w/ contradictions*	f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions
	g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality*; status quo taken for absolute*; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile* arguments	g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework
	h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context*	h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context
	i. surface functioning*	i. depth dimension of existence activated
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world*	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relationships w/ reality



A = MORAL INTEREST B = MORAL AUTHORITY C = PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D = EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E = SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F = PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G = HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 8.1 Ada's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

The Case of Eliot

Eliot's story parallels Ada's in many ways, while illustrating her CC counterpart within Conventional consciousness. He also grew up in the countryside, in a strong patriarchal family. Similar to Ada, Eliot is **committed to his profession** as his **life calling**. Along with his family, it represents the main axis of his life. Also like Ada, he describes a **patriarchal family culture dominated by the authority of strong male figures**; an environment in which women have a secondary role. However, unlike Ada's childhood, his life seems **populated by significant adults in the extended family**, each of whom contributes in an important way to his sense of identity.

Education is very **important** in the family, and there seems to be a tradition in the professions: Eliot's father and brother are dentists, one of his uncles is an architect, the other - a chemistry professor. His mother is semi-skilled - an accountant with "only" secondary education, because she was not allowed to pursue college education with the advent of communism, but was penalized with physical labor instead, for the fact that her father was considered well-off. Two generations back, Eliot's grandfather had a trade - he had a store for books and stationary, and his grandmother was a housewife. The family tradition and pride had a material expression in the beautiful old Bulgarian house of his grandfather, which had traditional

architecture, and was situated in the center of town. The town itself has a cultural and historic center, which preserves the best Bulgarian spirit and tradition of over 10 centuries. Eliot's whole childhood is inseparably associated with that house and what it represented. Clearly, his **identity** is **securely rooted in a rich patriarchal culture and family tradition**.

Ironically, Eliot's story captures in succinct ways the recent history of the country. After the communist revolution in 1944, the house was knocked down by the populist totalitarian government, and an ugly apartment building was raised in its place. Eliot has never quite forgiven this violation of his family pride and tradition. Nevertheless, he chose to remain in the town of his grandfathers, and established a professional standard in dentistry there which is his family's particular contribution to the town. **Every decision** Eliot describes, **every detail of his life**, seems **morally colored**, and a reflection of his family's **resistance** to the political and cultural changes that came with communism.

Eliot speaks about the history of his family as it intertwines with the history of the nation. He identifies with the political convictions of one of his grandfathers who was a member of the House of Representatives before communism, and supported a prominent Bulgarian political leader with a Western orientation. Given the general Russian

orientation and the rise of communism, that was a brave and unusual stand at the time. Overall, Eliot, reveals impressive knowledge and understanding of the history of Western civilization, and **rootedness in time and place**. In this sense, he is a typical representative of the Bulgarian intelligentsia, with both its solid historical understanding, and its conservative bent and stereotypes.

Every member of his extended family had to deal with some form of social injustice, oppression, and persecution, because of the ideological distrust of communism for educated professional people. Each stood with **courage** and **dignity**, **preserved his/her values and beliefs**, **worked hard** to survive and educate him/herself, and **transcended** the socio-political circumstances. The family is rich in examples of how **character is built, grounded in virtues**, examples of **high personal moral standard**. Eliot remembers his grandmother, who was "a very religious woman of refined character" and remarkable composure, and who would never blame anybody for life's misfortunes but always took responsibility herself. Although the family was victimized, none of these significant adults in his life acted like victims; each was a **moral agent in his/her limited environment**. The family **found a sense of community with other families** in the neighborhood, also struggling to preserve their integrity against the waves of the tide, and their children grew up together, sheltered into a carefully

protected, loyal, interconnected, and morally aware environment.

Eliot himself appears to be the perfect product of this family, cultural, and historical background. He has a **strong sense of moral identity** which underlies his family and professional identity, as well as **strong moral character**, **habitual morality** and **moral imperative**. He exhibits prominent **critical discernment** and **respect for authentic moral authority**, as well as **sense of personal moral responsibility and agency**. His commitments repeat those of his family, and are primarily limited to an interpersonal circle, and noticeably less permeable to the rest of the world. The meaning of life is limited to sticking with one's family and class values and remaining true to oneself regardless of circumstances. This form of **individualism**, which, I believe, is uniquely East European, appears to be the **outcome of a sense of identity formed in existential resistance**. However, it is also colored by an **implicit faith in a meaning and wisdom of life larger than the self, a higher truth to which one has to remain faithful**. This faith appears to be the motivational source of the continuous elaboration of connections between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false, which serves as a vantage point for critical discernment and self-reflection.

Here are some examples from Eliot's life. He remembers schooling as his first direct encounter with the repressive

political system which created rigid educational structures to socialize children into the mainstream ideology. At the time, he **resisted intuitively**. His **intuitive moral sense** internally compared school requirements with the authentic sources of moral authority which he knew in his life, and found those requirements wrong and morally lacking, thus gradually developing critical discernment, much like Gandhi's. As he entered adolescence, **freedom of speech and convictions became an ideal**, and he stood up for it openly for the first time when he was 13, running serious personal risks for his future.

As he looks back at how he negotiated the repressive regime, Eliot **talks about the oppression on a systemic level** - yet another important characteristic of the Bulgarian sample. People who grew up in morally-grounded political resistance, learned early to discern systemic ideological manipulation. Hence, their **moral choices** in those circumstances seem to have **provided an optimal challenge to their cognitive capacities**. As a result, although most may still operate as primarily conventional thinkers, they show a level of systemic understanding, which Wade (1996) describes as the upper cognitive reaches of Achievement or Affiliative consciousness.

Eliot learned early to separate education from schooling into the establishment; he **valued education** and worked hard to gain the **knowledge** which he was raised to

believe was his **only legitimate path to freedom**. He **did not identify with prevailing standards** but **developed a personal idealistic moral standard**, linked to the family's tradition. In this, he resembles Gandhi and the other exemplars, as well as Bembow's (1994) activists.

He chose a profession which could provide relative independence from party politics. During his two-year obligatory army service, Eliot developed further his principled convictions against the use of force. After his release from the army, he **dedicated himself** to his degree in stomatology, and responded to his father's trust and financial support with steady motivated work, prudence, economy, and a strong sense of responsibility to not let himself slip. Like Bembow's (1994) activists, he was always **different**: **earnest**, **serious**, determined to not just get by, but become an outstanding dentist. And with the professional help of his father and brother, he did.

Eliot's professional life is a story of taking on greater and greater challenges against big odds: insufficiency of current professional information, inadequate material conditions, absence of laws which support and foster private practice. But he wanted to be an **innovator** in his field; he wanted to change the low public standard which had come to be the unfortunate outcome of socialist free medical service and low paid medical professional work. He acts out of strong convictions about

what medical service should and should not be about, and he put his and his family's well-being at risk to be a path-breaker and show the way. Here are some examples of his thinking:

> In 1992, I decided I had to break away from government medical service and start private practice. I was the first person in the town of Sliven who left a government job, and many colleagues couldn't understand. Today, 5 years later, there are only 5 of us dentists solely on private practice, and 60 who hold both government jobs and private practice. Personally I cannot justify the decision to combine the two. Morally speaking, this is a prerequisite for corruption. Most of my colleagues practice transferring patients they get through their government jobs into their private practice by convincing them that the service they need cannot be done in the government clinic. In addition, they steal materials from the government clinics. I do not want people talking behind my back that that's what I do. I want my clients to come to me because they want my service...Also, if I have to serve 30 people today in the government clinic, I cannot do it up to the standard I want. I don't believe one should work that way...

It is important to note how Eliot's professional standards are colored by **moral convictions**, **normative concerns** guiding his decisions, and an **overall consistency**. His professional approach requires a lot of sacrifices and is financially uncertain in an inflation-ridden economy. However, he is not intimidated, but **positive**, **grateful and appreciative** of the experience he is gaining. The lowest point in his life was when he graduated stomatology before the fall of the communist regime, and saw no hope for real professional development in the stigmatizing social system.

As I probed deeper into his professional motivation, it became clear that there was a lot of **self-interest** operating. Eliot was **self-reflective** and **honest** enough to recognize that his sacrifices mostly revolve around his family, and he is not really eager to extend himself beyond his own private practice. He is a dedicated father of two young children and a husband who works hard to support his wife's professional development as a dental surgeon herself. Beyond that, he **admires people who give freely of themselves to others**, and knows he is not that way.

> In France, my wife introduced me to a man, extremely intelligent, extremely good-hearted, a man who does everything with love. Such people are very few and I'd love to be like him. But I cannot even understand how you can do something that you are in no way obliged to do, and perhaps that's how it should be in life. Not to do things by obligation, but because you feel you have to do it and help the other person. This is what I admire in that man. And there are others I admire, who are ready to help and give all of themselves. But I think in Bulgaria such people are few...

In this excerpt, we hear a level of **skepticism** characteristic of the Bulgarian intelligentsia he represents. The sources, I believe, are several. First, the **individualism** in which he was raised, and his **limited family loyalties and life purpose**. Second, the significant people in his life **modeled middle-class caution**, predominant at the time in the treacherous political environment, in order to protect their families. Their **moral agency was limited to personal choices and tempered with self-interest**. So is Eliot's. Third, the climate he grew in was one of distrust

beyond one's family and friends. Neither the hostile social system, **nor** the cautious family environment modeled **empathy beyond immediate others**. Hence, others are seen not as part of a larger humanity but as potential enemies.

I believe that some of Eliot's limitations are culturally symptomatic, as shown above, while others are developmental, to the degree that the two can be separated. It seems interesting to explore the parallels between Eliot and William, because they share the similar developmental and cultural limitations. Developmentally, both exhibit whole-hearted commitments, limited to an interpersonal range, and are somewhat suspicious of others that are different. They also share fairly conservative cultural allegiances, traditional loyalties, and impermeability to other ways, which tend to limit rather than facilitate developmental vision. Both cases suggest the **importance of the balance between moral loyalties and permeability in Conventional CC** in order for it to be able to grow in the direction of a fully developed Postconventional CC.

Eliot shows the characteristic for Conventional thinkers tendency to be dualistic, easily disillusioned with people, and self-protective. Like William, he also reveals some stereotypically male conventional limitations: seeing himself in the role of the bread-earner, he is too busy working to have time to be in touch with his feelings. He is not very communicative and open, does not tend to share

himself, does not recognize interconnectedness, and is boundary-and-goal-oriented.

In spite of his guardedness, Eliot has been very politically active since the fall of the communist regime. He had the **courage** to participate in the first demonstrations, which the still powerful communist network video-filmed in order to track down participants. He offered his organizational competence in the first democratic elections and took on responsible tasks. He contributed financially to the election campaign, something very unusual in Bulgaria, given the limited means of most people, Eliot included. He devoted time and enthusiasm, and was disillusioned when re-communization began. Now, he has found new ways to continue his involvement, bringing political and organizational vision to the task of building new democratic structures.

Eliot relies on the **personal respect he commands in his town** to encourage people to vote for democracy. However, when offered to run for mayor, and become the enlightened leader that he has the potential to be, he declined. He felt his dental practice was more important to him than a political career. Devoting his life to service was not really an option for him. He has maintained a **steady commitment** to supporting the democratic process, as well as substantial financial contributions. Overall, his public work reveals an on-going **struggle between courage,**

commitment, and competence on the one hand, and **skepticism and a sense of being overwhelmed** with the multiplicity of the social situation, on the other. He **grapples with this tension** between self-protectiveness and true commitments, professionalism and service, in a way I consider characteristic of Conventional CC.

Eliot **takes perspective on the country's political and cultural heritage and national character** in important ways, and shows substantial **critical discernment** in the tasks he takes on. For example, he tries to educate people that communism as a political system is outdated. He tries to help others see their own learned helplessness as a result of their political experience, and break the inertia in thinking. He interprets media information to others in intelligent, independent-minded ways. Through his own professional example, he tries to model the feasibility of the democratic way. In spite of his skepticism, he is a **leader**, **generally positive** and **operating on faith**.

Eliot talks about international issues with a mix of understanding, and stereotypes and contradictions similar to William's. Discussing the war in Bosnia, he shows an ability to see through the international power-and-interest dynamics involved. Yet, he tends to interpret the war as "a Moslem vs. Christian issue", and practical concerns about the potential ambitions of Moslems in Bulgaria seem to dominate over his humanitarian concerns. He searches for solutions

within the international status quo, sharing stereotypical popular beliefs in a World Conspiracy of Masons and Jews, and expecting solutions from the Western big powers. However, as soon as I engaged him in sharing his more personal experience with the Bulgarian Moslems as a medical practitioner, he showed empathy, fair-mindedness, and respect for their humanity and positive qualities.

Eliot's moral motivation shows well-developed dimensions 1 and 2, moral identity, and moral responsibility and agency. His motivational limitations, I believe, have to do with his limited empathy and permeability (dimension 3), discussed above, as well as with his frames of reference (dimension 4). He believes in a higher power of goodness and justice, and in that sense clearly operates from a moral frame of reference larger than the self. He says that in his daily life he is guided by a value system which corresponds to the Ten Commandments. He does his best to align himself with these principles, and he believes that if all people were to do the same, there would be peace on earth. However, he seemed fairly satisfied within his individualistic personal philosophy.

In spite of these limitations, Eliot reveals a consistent generativity unlike Ada's. The contrast between the two of them helps understand how CC is differently expressed in different contexts. In a totalitarian context, the ability to resist and consistently question, without

allowing self-interest to obscure one's sight, becomes particularly central to CC. While both Ada and Eliot are intelligent, moral, and independent-minded people, the **difference between them is mostly in the consistency with which they resist the tide**. This consistency, I believe, is **related to their motivation**. Eliot's primarily moral motivation, strengthened by his family tradition, underlies his **principled resistance**. Ada's mix of self-interest and moral motivation accounts for her **reactive resistance** to only some social aspects as a way of gaining identity.

In contrast, in the more democratic and multifaceted US context, life offers an infinite variety of possible pathways, some of which can be very protected. Unless a person belongs to an oppressed group, as is the case with Jim, choices are not so clear-cut black and white, and consistency and resistance acquire different dimensions. Although resistance to the mainstream cultural tide is still crucial, as William's case shows, it is primarily the inclination to seek broader meaning than pragmatic self-interest which becomes distinctive.

In the strength of Eliot's moral resistance to the tide from the vantage point of a continuous elaboration of right/wrong, good/bad, true/false distinctions, I see Eliot as the Bulgarian counterpart of William. As pointed earlier, the comparison between the two of them reveals an important characteristic of Conventional consciousness, including its

CC version: its inclination toward strong and rigid identification, and its difficulty with permeability. In the case of Conventional CC, this strong identification is moral, and accounts for these people's upright moral character, normative concerns, habitual morality, and moral imperative, all of which make it easier for them to resist than to explore the value of different, alternative ways. Since permeability comes fully with the movement toward postconventional consciousness, **Conventional CC always seems to raise the question of whether the individual exhibits enough of a balance between moral identification and permeability, to be developmentally alive** rather than too set in his/her ways.

In exploring this particular limitation of Conventional CC, it helps to remember Suzie Valadez, who is also a conventional thinker. What makes her permeable enough, and tips the balance in the direction of life-long growth, is her activated spiritual potential, which requires compassion, humility, tempering one's tendency to judge, forgiveness and acceptance of others and of differences. It may be that to the degree that a Conventional CC person has that activated spirituality, it counterbalances strong moral identification, and allows for growth and expansion beyond limited loyalties and prejudices. For example, while Eliot was raised in an atheistic culture, in which religion was seen as nothing but "the opium for the masses", William

related a life-long negotiation of the depth dimension of experience. Eliot appears more locked in his individualism than William, who seems more engaged in a wholesome re-examination of his relationship with the world.

Both William and Eliot suffer from the same male conventional limitations, and leave a lot to be desired in terms of relationships and permeability. However, William appears more permeable than Eliot, which, I believe, is related to his cultural advantage in the democratic US environment. The contrast between them also reveals some of the advantages and disadvantages of the Bulgarian context.

Eliot's **sense of identity, rooted in a rich and solid cultural and family tradition**, is his greatest advantage over William's more precarious rootedness. Another advantage that Eliot has is the **populatedness of his immediate world with significant figures of authentic authority**. In comparison, William has to draw on public figures, because his family does not offer much. Also, **the sense of history seems a lot more present** in Eliot's life, which may account for his **world view being more open to the wider world** than William's, as well as for his **more sophisticated social understanding**. I believe that Eliot's **sense of history is the main source of his sense of agency**. On the other hand, William exhibits less skepticism and more willingness to take leadership roles, because of the less complex and more

democratic and straight-forward environment in which he operates.

Table 8.2 below presents a snapshot of Eliot's motivational characteristics. Figure 8.2 on page 497 shows where I see Eliot on the diagram of the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 8.2

Snapshot of Eliot's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values*, solid*, mediated socialization * b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns* d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultural stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility*** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority* c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed* e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency*

Continued next page

Table 8.2 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stifles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited* empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being*, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community h. cognitive & affective provincialism*; limited membership in immediate interest groups*; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. limited communication & sharing* j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships* k. compartmentalization & prejudice* l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy*, relatedness,* permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy c. rootedness in relatedness* d. engaged in relationships on every level* e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others* &larger world g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community* h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others* j. permeability to meaningful social relationships k. lack of compartmentalization* & prejudice* l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society*

Continued next page

Table 8.2 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection***
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning*	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life*; search for it & on-going questions
	b. no larger purpose than individual self	b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood*
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point*
	d. negative criticism	d. critical discernment*
	e. reliance on habit & ritual	e. self-reflection*
	f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions	f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions*
	g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments	g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework*
	h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context	h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context*
	i. surface functioning*	i. depth dimension of existence activated
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



A = MORAL INTEREST B = MORAL AUTHORITY C = PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D = EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E = SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F = PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G = HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 8.2 Eliot's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Complexities On the Preconventional Level

The Case of Ivan

Ivan is in some ways a unique East European phenomenon of the last 50 years - the product of communist ideology, and a representative example of the better version of communist chiefs, not the thoroughly corrupt ones, but those who, at least in their own minds, sincerely adopted the communist idea. Yet, as I examined his case more closely, I began to realize that his type of consciousness has a much wider occurrence. **He illustrates how ideological consciousness, as the complete opposite extreme of CC, strikes root in a person with somewhat arrested development and moral motivational deprivation.** He is a less extreme case than a religious fanatic or a fascist in that he has not lost his compassion and humanity, but he **illustrates** what I believe to be **the same process of the formation of the antithesis of CC.**

Ivan seems to illustrate what Wade (1996) describes as Egocentric arrests in adulthood as a result of a generally tough, misanthropic, and autocratic social and home environment. Throughout the interview, he did not exhibit more than Concrete Operational thought (Commons & Rodriguez, 1990), with the most generalized, global understanding of others, as well as of social roles. He appeared dualistic and intolerant of ambiguity (Perry, 1968), and he seemed thrilled with the discovery of even the simplest

linear causal connections, which may account for his fascination with criminology. He also had difficulty describing any complete social patterns, but seemed to drift back every time to concrete situations, i.e. a Situational thinker (Weinstein & Alschuler, 1985). Finally, he did not seem to have any developed sense of self, but exhibited an alternating Imperial/Interpersonal self/other differentiation (Kegan, 1982), with a tendency to make others captive of his own goals and point of view, and perceive them through a rudimentary, Alien Other abstraction (Wade, 1996). His optimal functioning seemed to be at the early Conformist stage (Wade, 1996).

Although at first sight he seems to share nothing in common with his US counterparts (Sim, Agnes), a careful look reveals significant parallels in the formation of the main components and dimensions of their consciousness. I will explore the parallels in the course of the vignette.

Ivan is a corporal in the criminal police at the Bulgarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and has held this job for over 20 years. A handsome, well-built man in his fifties, he looks at me with eyes somewhat blurred by drinking, and an overall secretive, distrustful, evasive manner. In spite of that, he is friendly and unassuming, and tries to make me feel comfortable by offering me a drink "just to relax". Surprised that I do not drink, he pours himself some Vodka, lights a cigarette and, after much

hesitation and quite a few questions about what I might want to know, prepares to sign the consent form, which is obviously very disconcerting for him.

He immediately struck me as a **good-hearted**, **honest**, **simple-minded**, and **sturdy** peasant, **humble**, **rigid**, and **hard-working**. With the first few words, I noticed how **impersonal** and **cliched** his **language** was, to the point where I felt **a disturbing absence of a mind** across from me. It was as though words were being spoken but there were **no real thoughts** behind them, just a clever computing machine continuously unraveling the sought hidden agenda behind my every word. Almost every time I asked a "why" question, his answer **disowned responsibility for any particular opinion**, and conveyed a general message of "I don't know; they said it was supposed to be that way". Whenever he expressed a feeling, it was apologetically understated, almost as though he did not believe he was supposed to have feelings or be too personal.

Ivan's life story begins rather bleakly: he was born "in a dark cellar", while his parents were fleeing from the bombings during the Second World War. His parents were simple, honest peasants, each from a large family, and with little education, who tried to find a life away from their village and in the big city. As he says,

> they didn't have much to give me or much to teach me, because they had fallen behind on life themselves. But they always told me: "Don't take what belongs to another, be clean and tidy, study

hard, be honest". That was the best they could give me.

These basic values of honesty and hard work constitute the most positive rootedness that Ivan has. In a more traditional pre-communist world of the type that Eliot's family remembers, Ivan would have probably found a way to build a simple life around them in dignity. But class injustice, and the resulting social mobility and political upheaval, tossed him in a direction where other values and priorities became much stronger. Class identity and class struggle were emphasized by the ideology of the day, while the depth dimension of human existence was not drawn upon to sustain people and balance out and humanize the angry social transformation happening.

Ivan's parents became poor blue-collar workers in the city, and the family of four lived in a poor urban neighborhood, huddled together in one room, and sharing kitchen and bathroom with another family, not an uncommon arrangement at the time. In this marginalized existence, it seems that Ivan did not identify with them or with any other particular figure or place in his childhood. He seems to have grown up with **nothing in which to root his sense of identity**, with **almost no sense of identity other than the low self-esteem of belonging to the lower classes**. Like Agnes, he shows a **cold estrangement from himself**, and **predominance of self-image and appearances concerns**.

As it turns out, his grandfather had actually been a well-off land-and-cattle owner in the village, and a solid, respectable man. However, Ivan did not dare openly identify with him, because every time he went to visit his grandparents during school vacation, the village kids would tease him that he was the grandson of the land-owner, which, in those early years after the communist revolution, was considered an offense, a crime. So, although he loves and remembers his grandfather, he barely mentions in the interview that, in fact, he loved village life and field labor and greatly enjoyed it, and those moments were among the few grounding experiences in his early childhood.

Altogether, I was left with the impression that Ivan had little to hold him while growing up, although his parents were caring, hard-working and dedicated to doing the best they could for their children. His mother worked shifts in factories all her life, and Ivan felt for her hard-working difficult life. So every time it was his family's turn to clean the shared spaces and the front and back yard, he would make sure he did it on her behalf before she came home from work. He was obviously a **compassionate, empathic** child, but his stark environment did not support that. His mother never praised him; in his words, she was rather cold, which he believes was "a good preparation for life".

Ivan parallels Sim's from the US sample in his stark childhood and the resulting generally arrested developmental

profile. They also share some similarities along their motivational dimensions. Both underwent **direct, unmediated socialization** into the available mass culture as a result of the lack of any opportunity to root their identity into something more lasting. Both have a **precarious self-image and sense of identity**, and are **self-absorbed and instrumentally-oriented**. However, there are some important distinctions in the direct socialization of each.

Sim was socialized into a gangster Imperial (Kegan, 1983) sub-culture of an Instrumental purpose and exchange orientation (Kohlberg, 1985), which was somewhat held in check by social laws, requiring more developmentally advanced functioning, i.e. Social Law and Order orientation (Kohlberg, 1985). Although Sim lost himself more than once, there was also the sobering influence of friends and family which introduced **an alternative conversation** into his life.

Ivan's story is different. He was directly socialized into a dominant Imperial communist ideology, which operated on the basis of fear, punishment for disobedience and reward for obedience. The initially idealistic socialist ideas from the turn of the century, which focused on social equality and justice, free education and medical service for all, social unity and integration, had been progressively distorted at the hands of angry and oppressed people, who saw in them an opportunity for revenge and access to power. The communist ideology that developed was oriented toward

transfer of power from the hands of the upper classes to the hands of the lower classes, and control of the former upper classes. With such compartmentalized justifications of new forms of oppression, and thorough severing from all the positive aspects of past traditions, that ideology became increasingly corrupt and indiscriminate in its ways. Hence, the whole fabric of social life was based on Heteronomous morality and orientation (Kohlberg, 1985). The predominant social values were completely arbitrary, rewarding habitual lying and lack of shame and remorse, plotting, paranoid pervasive unwarranted suspiciousness, self-centered power struggles for interpersonal advantage and control, etc.; i.e. all the characteristics of Egocentric consciousness (Wade, 1996).

This social system filtered directly into Ivan's life through his father, reinforcing the early **adolescent** boy's level of consciousness and **instrumental** developmental **motivation**, establishing it as a **norm**. It not only did not introduce, but did **not** allow an **alternative conversation**. As we saw, Ivan had no developed dimensions of moral motivation to counterpoise to that overwhelming influence. Hence, he appears to have become confirmed in his Self-Protective and Opportunistic (Cook-Greuter, 1990) ego development; and the optimal morality he developed was a punishment-reward and good boy/good girl orientation (Kohlberg, 1985). The whole interview with him was a continuous elaboration and sad

illustration of the above. Here are the concrete circumstances through which the above process unfolded.

In his childhood, his father made the somewhat abrupt but typical for the times transition from a shop assistant to work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At that time, it was the party policy to summon half-literate workers into government loyalty, teach them the dominant communist ideology, give them positions of power, and thus create a new, manageable ruling class of loyal puppets. Ivan's father became specialized in criminology, and worked for the government for 30 years. The stories he told his family of the struggle of the good policemen against the bad criminals became a powerful influence on the impressionable mind of the young boy. Ivan developed **an adolescent ideal**, which is more than Sim ever had. His **good boy/good girl ideal** incorporated the best he had seen in his grandfather, a strong, sturdy Bulgarian, who cracked walnuts between his teeth, loved and understood his farm animals, had a grounded, earthly philosophy of life, and a basic integrity about him.

The concept of a steady effort to do good, which will be rewarded, got filtered through the current, simplistic, and socially dominant understanding of doing good which his father represented, i.e. fight the bad guys who disturb social order. So Ivan developed a dream, to become a hero in the fight against bad in society. This was the closest he

ever came to a moral ideal. In some ways, his concrete operational boyish fascination with cops is reminiscent of Tom's, but it took him in a direction much different than Tom's. While this ideal allowed Tom to work for social order and justice in his local limited ways, the same ideal led Ivan to protect a social order which was unjust and oppressive.

After he graduated from high school and did his two-year mandatory army service, his ambition to become somebody and do good to others translated into a decision to pursue a career in law. **No**thing in his environment provided him with a **higher standard or frame of reference**, which would invite a careful, critical, and self-reflective examination of his real capacities, as well as the moral and educational requirements of such a career. The standards in the family were primitive, and the social system modeled quick opportunities to rise in status through an **amoral, expedient combination of ambition and acquiescence**. His father was an example of how one could make a career without much education. So although an average student, Ivan applied to university to study law, explained his failure at the exams with circumstances, worked in a factory for a couple of months, and eventually used his father's connections to get a job at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As he says,

> I felt that was my place, my hobby...no, not that, what's the word, my calling...Whether it's genetic, or the fact that my father worked there.

I was struck by the extent of **ignorance and mindless confusion which accompanied his search for competence and identity**, and by how readily the available political ideology filled that vacuum. At 22, Ivan became a cop, a government agent and a member of the communist party, with the fancy title "criminal expert". For the rest of his life, that **position in the hierarchy, which combined ideological and government loyalty, became his identity**. He was sent to specialize in Moscow, and began "to grow as a policeman". As he says with great pride, in his 2 years in Moscow, he read more books (in criminology and law) than he had ever read in his whole life - a disturbing reflection on the erudition required to be a government agent. He became a loyal government servant, to the point where on the way back from the Soviet Union in 1968, he intercepted the Bulgarian army reserves heading in trains to invade Czechoslovakia, and he never asked a single question. Asked how this event impacted him, he says:

> To tell you the truth, it was not spoken about nor written about in the press. Or if there were any discussions, they were in the vein of "it had to be done; if it had to be done, then it had to be done". I simply could not discuss it, nor did I think about it too much. I cannot remember discussing it with colleagues, pondering over it. I don't know how it was. But nothing stands out in my mind, nothing I remember. It was common knowledge that Czechoslovakia had to be saved from capitalism, that socialism was in danger. And so if we have socialism, we have to save the Czech brother. If that was the judgement of those in authority, that's how it had to be. I remember no comments about it, no thoughts, no interpretations. That was the system. We were not

> supposed to interpret, plus we were government servants...

The only personally important thing Ivan remembers, associated with the Czech events, was the fact that a neighbor, who was younger, had been recruited to go to Czechoslovakia, and was rewarded on returning with free admission to the university, with no entry exams. He studied law, and thus got an advantage over Ivan. Eventually, Ivan got a chance to pursue a degree in law part-time, through a special quota from his job, and he takes pride in having stuck it through "out of stubbornness". Ivan does not report any reasons to want to apply a degree in law in his work, but, as he says, knowing he did that improved his self-esteem. His greatest happiness and pride is that he climbed through every step in the hierarchical ladder: getting that job, asserting himself, growing in the hierarchy, completing his education, although a little late...becoming a father...gaining self-confidence from being the head of the family, holding a job, and earning a degree at the same time, and the status and recognition that came with it all.

The one significant figure in his life Ivan can think of was his first boss in the police,

> a man with a big heart, very grounded...who treated me with love...as his own son...showed me some tricks in criminology, advised me about many things, and I like listening and taking advice...

That summarizes the extent of what he took responsibility for in his own life, according to his own

account - giving advice to younger colleagues, teaching them criminology, moralizing. The other model in his life is an uncle who had only seventh-grade education but was smart and self-reliant in life, and able to make a good life for himself and his family "both before, and now, under democracy". In Ivan's value system, self-reliance, and clever and stubborn resilience are central. As he says, "the struggle with life has to be waged like a man, all the way". His **individualistic, instrumental values** are, in fact, very reminiscent of the ones characteristic of US culture. The difference is that because of his geographic location, he put them to service not to materialistic success in a market economy, but to materialistic success within a destructive socio-political ideology. He showed **no more and no less critical discernment or concern with larger issues than many of the people I interviewed in the US sample**. His interpersonal morality is equally limited to his family, friends, and familiar others.

Ivan loves people and likes helping. Many people come to him for help because of his high position, and he relates various human stories with **compassion**. He uses his high position and connections to help practically anybody who turns to him, whether to procure them a job within the system, or to help somebody get out of trouble with the police, or to respond to an emergency. He considers it basic humanity to respond to people's needs, including material

assistance. Helping seems to be both **empathy**-driven, and an **opportunity to feel in authority**. He likes to feel appreciated in return and tends to be **self-righteous and judgmental** when his specific expectations from others are not met.

Overall, I was left with the impression that he was still negotiating issues of authority, moral and other, because they had not been negotiated earlier in his life. Whereas in most of the Conventional adults I studied, at some point authority issues translate into issues of responsibility and agency, Ivan showed **no trace of agency**, **limited, mostly interpersonal responsibility**, and **a strong concern with authority**.

For example, asked what kind of causes he contributes to, he relates two occasions on which he gave money. One was for an idea which he likes but did not believe could become a reality, and did not care to follow up on, or even discuss with me. The other time was on seeing a Red Cross box in some public place. He did not know what cause it was for, nor asked. His thinking was: "If it's for the Red Cross, it will be for good". In both cases, since he did not feel directly in authority, he took no responsibility to follow up or even understand the issue involved.

It is important to understand that Ivan is not a man without **social consciousness**. He resents the careerism he sees in his younger colleagues at the Ministry, their

selfishness and lack of work ethic. He holds **doing one's duty and being honest** on the job as very important. He takes pride in **never having taken advantage of his position to abuse his power or gain extra benefits**. He feels gratified that his own daughter chooses not to use her father's connections but to confront life's challenges with her own abilities, and to serve others rather than seek an easy job. He **cares** enough **about his job** that if he came into a lot of money, he would like to invest most of it into restructuring the criminal agency he works for in order to make it more efficient, and leave some improvement behind after his long career there. He feels responsible to help train and teach younger colleagues, and not just be their superior but find the best way with them. Within his Conformist law and order orientation, he feels **responsible to follow guidelines, and socially established ways**. For example, he will join in the cleaning of the neighborhood, a common practice and somewhat of a requirement under communism, without being asked, because "I can't sit at home when people are working outside".

Altogether, his uneven developmental profile covers the range from an Egocentric raw self-interest, love of status, and a tendency to make others captive of his own goals, to sturdy, basic honesty, work ethic, and sense of interpersonal responsibility. Through all of it runs a **mindless social adaptability**, and **no trace of self-**

reflection or internal moral conversation. Asked if he has ever done anything that he regrets from a moral point of view, he interprets the question in terms of whether or not he feels good about all the practical decisions he has made in his life (choice of car, apartment, etc.). His **thinking is full of stereotypes, platitudes, borrowed opinions, and unexamined contradictions**, whether he talks about the war in Bosnia and the danger of Islamic fundamentalism, internal or external national security, privatization, etc.

Explaining why he stays away from politics, Ivan rationalizes his personal strategy of **withdrawal and compartmentalized, self-interest-oriented concerns** in the following way: "You either have to be very honest and then you will not succeed, or you have to be able to maneuver". In the next sentence, he declares that when he watches on TV the kind of people that run for presidents, he sometimes thinks he could run for president too. That struck me as the most sincere acknowledgement of an **absolute lack of self-reflection or any larger frames of reference as vantage points for critical discernment**. Asked how he forms his political opinions, he quickly adds that the media information is the same for everybody, unless you happen to know the person or overhear the impressions of someone who has met him/her, which might give you extra insights. As if to complete his contradictory statements, he adds that he likes reading the official communist newspaper which he has

always read, and in the next breath criticizes others, who read the newspaper issued by the democratic party for being afraid to read anything that might question their beliefs.

When I tried to probe deeper into Ivan's beliefs and system of meaning, he let me know that he is an atheist, because he doesn't believe in God, which was the official party line, and a Christian, because he was baptized, and baptized his daughter. However, lately, he has been reading popular publications about "fortune-tellers, extrasensors, etc.", and "is willing to consider that there might be something in it". The one firm thing in his **meaning-making system** seems to be the tendency to **divide the world into "us" and "them"** in a way consistent with the Alien Other social perspective-taking (Wade, 1996) of communist ideology. "Us" are the fellow party members and government servants; "them" are all the unknown Alien Others, be it people of different professional or other interests, class belonging, or, even worse, Westerners. In other words, **Egocentric communist ideology** seemed to be his **ultimate frame of reference** through which he makes meaning of his choices in the world. Compartmentalized from that, is his Interpersonal humanity with immediate others. The conflict between the two did not seem to bother him.

When I challenged him on how he made sense of the corruption and abuse of power amongst party officials, currently discussed in the media, he explained that there

was nothing wrong with the communist system, but it was just individuals who did not live up to its principles. He explained that the communist manifesto, by which every communist has to swear, contains the same principles as the Bible, and people have failed to live up to them just as Christians have.

Overall, Ivan is a dramatic example of how vulnerable marginalized people from deprived environments are to all kinds of ideologies. He illustrates what Freire (1973) calls "naive transitive consciousness", characterized by perceptions barely permeable to other than biological challenges, difficult discernment, magical explanations with a static, limited understanding of causality, over-simplification of problems, gregariousness, fragile arguments, polemics, and nostalgia for the past. I believe that this kind of consciousness is an outcome of amoral and expediency oriented Egocentric motivation untempered by an alternative conversation with sources of moral motivation.

A close examination of Ivan's motivation reveals some important contextual elaborations along dimensions 2 (authority, responsibility, agency) and 3 (relationships). Dimension 2 shows that when we talk about the importance of figures of authentic moral authority in a young person's life, it is mostly immediate family and friends that make the difference. Beyond that, every culture offers some ideals or ideologies which can fill the gap left by the lack

of immediate authentic authority figures, but there are risks involved in that kind of direct socialization, as Ivan's case shows. Also it is important to make the distinction between figures of authority and figures of authentic moral authority. Ivan had a figure of authority in the face of his father, but he was not truly a figure of authentic moral authority, and did not serve as a buffer between the young boy's innate moral sense and the social influences.

Hence, in an ideological society, the lack of immediate authentic authority figures may well be the difference between developing one's innate moral sense and building some resistance to indoctrination, and becoming its mindless victim. In a consumer society like the US, that might be the difference between a massified consumer consciousness and CC. However, since a consumer society is less visibly threatening to individual development, the likelihood is that it will generate less resistance. My Bulgarian sample shows a greater split than the US sample between those who resisted and those who were not equipped to, and a higher occurrence of conscious **resistance**. In contrast, very few of the people I talked to in the US sample felt there was anything in society to really resist, and those who did, had prominent authentic moral authority figures in their lives, and were CC people.

Dimension 3 shows that Ivan in fact had a sense of common purpose with others within the same ideology and personal commitment to the government, and did not exhibit a split between his private and public life. To the degree that he understood public life, he had the two integrated. So **the sense of community by itself is obviously not a defining characteristic of CC**; one has to ask **what kind of community, ideological, interest group, or human community**, is there a distinction between "us" and "them", and what is it. It is also important to note that Ivan had concerns with justice and not hurting others; he had social consciousness and an enduring commitment beyond the self, and believed he was working for the betterment of society. However, he showed no **capacity to be in an independent critical dialogue with his world from the point of view of universal moral values**; he revealed no **independent and interdependent investigation of truth**.

Ivan's direct socialization, sense of class identity, and struggle with low self-esteem and self-image (dimension 1), make him the Bulgarian counterpart of Agnes and Sim. His case, just like theirs, shows the importance of giving a human being the opportunity early on to ground his/her sense of identity in lasting, universal moral values and an activated depth dimension of existence, and derive strength and inner sense of nobility from them, as Suzie Valadez illustrates. While Suzie is internally free in spite of her

extremely limiting material circumstances, Ivan, Agnes, and Sim are in different ways victims of their social world.

Ivan has an advantage over Sim, because he had at least some strong values to see guide him: traditional Conformist (Wade, 1996) values of honesty and hard work, which he shares with Agnes. His values go further than hers: his simple value system required self-sacrifice and respected the idea of service to society. Hence, Ivan's moral motivation exceeds that of both Sim and Agnes. In the strength and limitations of his values, he is similar to Ada, and like her, is full of contradictions. On the one hand, he has devoted his life to the struggle with crime, and has helped many people in the process. On the other hand, he has compartmentalized away all inconvenient questions.

Ivan also shares another theme in common with Sim, Agnes, and Tom, the intellectual, as well as spiritual deprivation of the culture of poverty. His mind was not trained or drawn upon in any significant way, and he developed no larger frames of reference which could serve as a vantage point for critical discernment.

Overall, Ivan's case is an illustration of the importance of and interaction between all four motivational dimensions in the formation of social consciousness. Table 8.3 below offers a snapshot of Ivan's motivational

characteristics. Figure 8.3 on page 522 shows Ivan's place n the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 8.3

Snapshot of Ivan's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity***	**moral identity**
	a. rooted in social conventions, unmediated by values, precarious*	a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization
	b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues*	b. strong character grounded in virtues(*)
	c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns*	c. peripheral self-image concerns
	d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns*	d. normative ends
	e. absence of habitual morality*	e. habitual morality(*)
	f. no moral imperative*	f. moral imperative
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility***	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility**
	a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models*	a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized
	b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it*	b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority
	c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness*	c. moral self-attribution & sense of internal moral authority
	d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultural stereotypes*	d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed
	e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility*	e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility
	f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority*	f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency

Continued next page

Table 8.3 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting***	**empathy, relatedness*, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting**
	a. hostile environment stifles empathy & relatedness*	a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness
	b. lack of/limited empathy*	b. levels of empathy
	c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others*	c. rootedness in relatedness
	d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments	d. engaged in relationships on every level*
	e. centrality of receiving	e. centrality of giving*
	f. inner place not inclusive of others*	f. inner place inclusive of others & larger world
	g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community	g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community*
	h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity*	h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity
	i. limited communication & sharing*	i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others
	j. impermeability to meaningful social relationships*	j. permeability to meaningful social relationships
	k. compartmentalization & prejudice*	k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice
	l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life	l. integration of private & public life*
	m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting	m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting*
	n.no social consciousness	n. social consciousness*
	o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	o. enduring commitments beyond self* & work for the betterment of society*

Continued next page

Table 8.3 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals***	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection**
	a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning* b. no larger purpose than individual self*	a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood
	c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest* d. negative criticism* e. reliance on habit & ritual* f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions* g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments* h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context* i. surface functioning*	c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point d. critical discernment e. self-reflection f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. depth dimension of existence activated
	j. disengaged & alienated from one's world*	j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relationships w/ reality



Figure 8.3 Ivan's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Variations in Personal Integration with Postconventional CC

The Case of Emily

The case of Emily reflects the transition to the intellectual, moral, and spiritual integration of Authentic CC, although with moral motivation exhibiting a prominent self-interest component. Emily maintains a critical moral dialogue with her socio-cultural environment, continuously redefines her relationship with it in congruence with her understanding, and seeks an alternative vision of how things should be on grounds of explicit concerns with justice and equity. However, because of her prominent self-interest, her moral agency is much more limited than Jim's.

Emily is an unemployed single mother of three children, a 13-year old girl, an 11-year old retarded girl, and a baby. She lives on social security in a social environment in which being a single mother automatically makes a woman an outcast; in which the social network is very inadequate, hostile and prejudiced, and retarded children are considered a source of shame and usually left behind after birth. With her choices, Emily has challenged practically every social norm, and has brought on herself a double stigma. Yet she carries herself with equanimity and quiet dignity, and does not see herself as a victim of society. She left me with the impression of a happy, fulfilled person on a path of life-long growth and expansion, and at one with the world.

Emily's life continues the theme of the effect of a culture of poverty on an individual. In a way, she shares some of the experiences of Sim, Tom, Agnes, Ivan, growing up literally on the fringes of society, and struggling with the ensuing self-image issues. Her parents' home was on the outskirts of Sofia, small and very poor, although arranged with taste by her mother, according to Emily. Her parents were somewhat of an outcast couple themselves, because they were too poor, and did not fit any particular class in terms of education and occupation (her mother had only elementary education, her father was an artist and a hunter). Emily was ashamed of inviting friends to her home, and did not overcome that until 18. Her life is the story of a beautiful and intelligent woman, who took many years and many blunders to negotiate her self-image.

However, there is a substantive difference between her and Sim, Tom, Agnes, and Ivan. Like Jim, she grew up with an activated depth dimension of experience, and like him, although coming from a poor and ostracized social class, she lived a with a sense of inner dignity and pride. The contrast between Emily and Jim on the one hand, and Sim, Tom, Agnes, Ivan on the other, illustrates that it is **not so much material poverty, as the frequently accompanying spiritual poverty of an early environment which actually thwarts** a young person's development.

Emily's environment was materially poor, and spiritually alive; she describes it as "awesome". Her mother was a "naturally intelligent, warm-hearted woman with a sense of humor", and her father was artistic, intellectually searching, morally driven, and "solid". Her mother's "highly developed **sense of beauty and harmony**" dominated the home. Her father's **courage**, and **love and understanding of nature** gave her a rich outdoor experience of the world. It was not only his outdoor adventures that **expanded her horizons**; he was also **an idealist on an independent search for meaning**. In her words, he read things that were not widely known at the time, Hegel, Foerbach, "Anti-During", and even read science fiction to his young daughters at bedtime, when people in Bulgaria had not even heard about it yet.

Perhaps because of his intellectual devotion to the communist idea, and his critical approach to its early realization in the 1950s, her father was expelled from the communist party for independent thinking and lack of submission to the party rules. However, he continued to teach his daughters his beliefs, not giving signs of heart-brokenness because of his marginalization. Emily seems to have internalized a lot of his **spirited resilience** and **detachment from social power hierarchies**.

Overall, even in her early life, the **theme of being different, outside the norm**, dominates, just like in Bembow's (1994) activists. She also relates **intense moral**

self-reflection around identity issues, and a continuous **search for meaning** and **redefining of belonging**. For example, she relates an incident in kindergarten, when a boy who liked her was given the task to supervise whether the other children washed their hands well, and observed the required discipline, or not. When the time for him to report came, she knew he was going to point her out as the best child, and she also knew she did not deserve that because she sprinkled water on the other children and broke the discipline rules in front of him. She was selected, and got a reward, a little bag of sea shells, which she put into her locker. During afternoon nap, she snuck up to her locker to check on her bag of sea shells, and found it missing. She remembers that as her first encounter with two things, theft, and the realization, that fully grew on her much later, that "undeserved things do not happen". I was struck by her **strong inner moral sense** at an early age, which reminded me of Gandhi and the other exemplars, and which later grew into **intense self-reflection and search for meaning**.

Emily lived in a **contemplative**, magical world of her own, and describes beautifully the **synchretic oneness with the world** that her Naive consciousness (Wade, 1996) at the time allowed her to feel. Her experience illustrates the point made in chapter 5 about the potential of Naive

consciousness for positive development if its spiritual potential is adequately fostered.

> There are things that I have just always known. I don't know how, but I just knew. And I had a calmness inside. I also knew that other people did not know those things. I saw the world full of magic, magic which is not beyond people's reach. And I felt very surprised that people did not seem to understand that.

Unlike Gandhi or Jim, Emily's innate moral sense and spiritual potential was not consistently fostered by regular spiritual practices and moral induction in her family. Rather, it grew on the fertile ground of authentic models like her parents. She seems to have imbued those models into her own strong moral character. The formation of her sense of identity seems to exhibit more of a **struggle between preoccupations with self-image and class-related low self-esteem, and a moral sense of inner dignity**.

Emily remembers that she was always hungry for attention, which was part of her struggle with self-image, and demanded it through artistic self-expression, and rebellious leadership. As a child, she set out to prove that girls are no worse than boys, played soccer which was very unusual for the time, made swords and pistols from sticks, and commanded the respect of the boys in the neighborhood. Her **strong character** reminds of Virginia Durr's childhood (Colby & Damon, 1992). She was an **excellent student**, **ambitious and independent-minded**. She had the **courage** and the **strong sense of justice** to confront teachers with what

she believed was wrong, running personal risks, and was still everybody's favorite.

In pre-adolescence, she was increasingly attracted to the kids who fell outside the norm, and, on retrospect, considers that period the beginning of her **personal philosophy of understanding, accepting, and learning to value people's differences**. Like Gandhi, Emily shows **a life-long elaboration of some moral principles central to her way of being**. In her case, it is the belief that differences have to be respected as part of the richness of life, because they actually represent alternative pathways, and thus offer a better understanding of the human potential. Her whole life seems **populated with significant people and relationships**, and each elaborates further the theme of **learning to accept and understand people's differences, and growing in the process**. In describing these significant people, who, just like in Jim's life, include teachers and friends, as well as family, she shows an appreciation for nobility in others, good taste, and meaningful engagement with life, i.e. a **high personal standard and discrimination**.

Around 13, she became progressively disillusioned with the social system, and broke away from the role of the favored student, becoming **a social rebel** instead. She became aware of the "falseness of social norms and feigned ideals", and of the existence of social classes in the supposedly classless communist society. This was her first experience

of what Bembow (1994) calls "catching culture in a lie", and it spurred Emily's struggle to transcend class distinctions in her own friendships. Another significant development of that period is the **intellectual quest that her alert searching mind set out on**, from Nietsche's concept of the superman, to films, and all-night conversations with others young people "exploring new worlds of meaning". For the next 10 years, individualistic rebellion, social life, and self-image became central, leaving academic achievement and college admittance by the wayside. When she was eventually admitted to study for school teacher certification, she quit halfway through because she realized the rigidity of the educational system within which she would have to teach, and reacted by giving up the whole enterprise.

From that point on, Emily's life struck me as **a series of tests**, as she herself sees it, and also much like Jim's; she came out of each one **strengthened** and with **a deepened understanding of life**. Her ability to view life's challenges as spiritual tests reflects two important qualities: **a remarkable permeability and openness**, and **an activated depth dimension of experience**. I am inclined to believe that **these two qualities are**, in fact, **related**, as they appear in a similar configuration in Jim, and in the moral exemplars.

Emily gave birth to a retarded child with a distorted spine. The doctors prepared her that the child would die. She refused to think that way, **putting all her faith with**

God instead. When it became clear that the child would live, pressure was put on her to leave it behind, but her **sense of personal responsibility**, **respect for life**, and **habitual morality** were stronger. Here is what she says:

> I knew very well that the child had chances. I had also seen enough in the homes for abandoned children that I wasn't going to leave my daughter there. Whatever chance she had, I would use it...Nevermind the doctors' expert opinion. I have intuition. I never even thought twice whether to leave her or take her...Everything significant in my life has come through her...The way I though at the time, nobody can know the real potential of a child when they are born. Everybody has their life path. I could not leave her behind. She was born to me, and it was my job to see her through.

Emily refuses to even use such strong words as **personal moral responsibility**. She is quick to add that if somebody else, faced with the same dilemma, decided to leave their child behind, she would be the last to judge that act as immoral. She believes that nobody is in a position to understand another person's life journey, and the best she can do is to offer whatever she can to make things better. Again, we hear the same theme of **respect for life and its mystery in each person's path**, a richer and more complex developmental elaboration of the same theme that we saw in William.

> If I had the opportunity and the means, I would take all these abandoned children from the homes, and create a wonderful environment for them to help them develop...I can undo somebody else's decision to leave their child behind, if I think I can do more. But I have no right to judge.

Another typical Postconventional CC theme, which recurs in Jim, and later in Danton, is that of Emily's **personal growth shared with others**. She learned to see her retarded daughter not as sick but simply as different, and learned to help her develop. She shows a remarkable capacity to take her daughter's perspective, and work with it as normal, with wisdom and common sense, without falling victim to the doctors' scary conclusions. Emily thinks that her retarded daughter's great needs provided a wonderful opportunity for her other daughter to learn to manage her own egoism, help her sister, and accept differences in people, rather than learn to see herself as a deprived victim. Emily shows both **compassionate understanding** of her own children, without extremes of guilt or indulgence, and a **deeply spiritual personal philosophy**, in which learning to give to others with an open loving heart, regardless of differences, and without self-pity, is the highest value. At first, as a mother, she used to feel bad about not being able to provide nice material things for her children, but she considers it one of her lessons to become detached from those ambitions and help her daughters understand that one cannot have all one wants.

Emily's intellectual quest for meaning and a better understanding of life sets her apart from Jim, and makes her markedly more philosophical and self-aware. She develops the theme of shared growth into a **profound spiritual**

understanding of interconnectedness and energy systems, when she talks about how every child's unwanted reaction is only a reflection of what the parent(s) still need to work out in themselves.

> If I lose control over myself sometimes, or feel irritable, perhaps not right away, but 10 minutes later one of my daughters starts talking to me with irritation or aggressiveness, without even a visible reason. I know where it comes from, it comes from me. So I try to calm down, and then they calm down...The egoism of every child is only a reflection of the egoism of the mother. They observe and learn from the mother. At least until adolescence, they are one single energy system.

The whole conversation with Emily was suffused with **intense introspection** as she makes sense of what she sees as her spiritual tests. She shows an **intelligent, thoughtful engagement with every aspect of her reality**. Even when she relates her marriage to, and divorce from, a physically and emotionally abusive alcoholic, she contemplates in retrospect her own part in that, and her responsibility in helping healing happen. At the same time, she remains **fair** and **clear-minded**, and refuses to be manipulated. As a divorced woman and single working mother in a science lab, she relates experiences of institutionalized sexism, social injustice and sexist discrimination. She **stood her ground** and finally lost her job. Then began the humiliation of trying to receive social security, and she confronted extreme social discrimination against single mothers and even more so against retarded children. Emily weathered all

that, and fought her battles with remarkable **common sense and equanimity**.

In the meantime, Emily's living conditions in her father's house faced her with a different kind of challenge. Her mother had died, and her father, who had undergone an overall degradation in his later years, in Emily's words, brought in his girlfriend with two daughters and even a grand-daughter, to co-exist in a tight space with his daughter's family. It was a severe humbling experience which Emily relates:

> I had nothing in common with those people, in terms of inner life, way of thinking or way of living. I learned to accept other people and to live with them in good will, without irritation, without extremes...for the common good.

Amidst this challenge, Emily offered to take care of an old single aunt who had undergone an operation and had nobody to care for her. Since the house was so full, she took her into her own bedroom for a couple of years, until she died. She says the decision was easy to make; what was hard was learning to live with the old woman, who was a difficult, opinionated, controlling character. Emily describes the **caring straightforwardness and firmness**, with which she managed the old woman's egoism and rigidity of character. In the same spirit of **empathy, compassion, understanding, personal responsibility and habitual morality**, Emily took care of her aged grandmother, and her first husband's grandmother, and relates these things as

"little things, not worth mentioning". She takes no credit, and does not like to talk in terms of sacrifices. Unlike Jim or any of the other people I interviewed, she does not see herself as a helper, but seems to operate with a level of unity of self and morality comparable to that of the exemplars.

> I don't think a person has to make sacrifices for anybody else, in the sense that, if you are not doing something out of an inner conviction, there's no point in doing it. You have to do it with conviction, not as a sacrifice. When I do things, it's because I believe it's important to do them.

Emily sees all the relationships in her life as "quality relationships", as she calls them; and understands and experiences them as opportunities to learn and grow. She shows **permeability to meaningful relationships**, and seems to be on a **life-long journey of self-discovery and expansion**. She reads a lot, **moves with ease and critical discernment in the world of ideas**, and shows no compartmentalization between ideal and real, between intellect and spirit. The teachings of Christ, the Christian Master Beinsa Douno, and Carlos Castaneda are part of the way she lives, with **faith, positivity, strength, and serenity**, much like Colby & Damon's (1992) exemplars.

> You asked me how I managed with practically no means and no job. Well, this is how. I have searched all my life to gain a better understanding of myself and the things that happen to me. Now I know that this is not the only world, that there are many worlds and many lives; and everything that happens is what we need in order to gain understanding...So now I can take things

> which would crush me otherwise...I have learned about mental health -if we can see things positively, and discover the learning potential in every situation, we are OK. When a person is angry or in crisis, s/he cannot understand what's happening to them. They can only sink, although that's not bad either. Through it, one can come closer to oneself, find one's own inner support down there, at the very bottom, and rebound...

Emily' greatest **commitment** other than to her daughters, seems to be to remain true to herself and **reconstruct every ready idea** out there, much like Gandhi did. She takes that tendency to a somewhat individualistic extreme, discussed earlier in this chapter as the Western heritage. She is not completely free of ego distortions, and in that sense is not a fully established Authentic consciousness (Wade, 1996). Asked why she chooses not to marry the father of her baby, with whom she has what she sees as real **intimacy of understanding and thinking**, she rejects the institution of marriage as something "closed, which does not fulfill its function", and for which, therefore, she has no use. As I probed deeper, I encountered her fear of committing and getting hurt again, and her self-protective desire to remain independent, all of it **rationalized** with the above philosophy.

Emily is by far not a fully integrated human being. Side by side with her spiritual understanding, I could also feel her **grappling with bitterness**, and frequent **irony** of both herself and men. Like Jim, who had to negotiate racism in is life, she had a life-long struggle with sexism in a

patriarchal society, and went through many painful stages of growth, including alcoholism and helplessness. She challenged and confronted men, and took the anger and revenge that came back at her. As she emancipated herself first from men, then from institutionalized sexist morality, and finally from her own sense of inferiority, she began to understand that if she can fully accept herself, men will learn to accept and respect her too. Gradually, she found out, that confrontation is unnecessary; that the real battle is within. As she told her story, her graceful, thoughtful presence alternated with proud bitterness and irony. I felt awe and respect for her inner battle, as I listened to her:

> We should not confront people. We either accept a person or we don't. If we can fully accept ourselves, why wouldn't we be able to accept others? In the sense that they exist. A man may not become intimate with you, your lover or husband, but the very fact that he exists means his existence is necessary...My conflict with men was that I refused to act as they expected me to. I sought that conflict because I wanted to prove that women are equally worthy in their way of being as men...I was a fighter, and men do not like to be fought...I thought I could accomplish something by fighting outside circumstances. The real fight is within.

Emily is a **moral agent** and a **courageous helper** in complex and non-standard ways. First of all, she takes responsibility to clear up the negative energy within herself. Then she helps others, with **no self-righteousness** or personal expectations attached; and afterwards, she forgets what others would call help.

To every person I have ever hurt, I have tried to make up in some way. Even if just to apologize within myself. For example, the drastic way I separated from my husband, with two little children on my hands, left him with a deep sense of guilt which he had to heal for a long time...Later, I realized that there were other things I could have done if I had been calmer and stronger. I could have worked on myself, and in this way he would have changed too. I judged him very severely. In our much later contacts, I found a rare moment when we were able to talk without bitterness, and apologized to him...

When others turn to me in need, I do what I believe is right. I don't know if I want to call that help. It's more of a mutual thing, they learn from me and I learn from them. These relationships are gifts...I share what I know about waters and feeding and mental health...I try to help others not feel like victims of their lives...But I cannot talk about volunteering help, because I cannot remember. For me, **to do something good, and then to remember it and talk about it, is already about something else**; it's about your ego, not about others. I simply **engage with the other person's world**, and it is something beautiful and enriching for both of us.

The way Emily turned around the question about volunteering work, was the point, at which she most completely departed from all the Conventional thinkers I described so far. She also made me aware of the cultural limitations of the interview questions, which attend to a pragmatic, materialistic cultural tradition, within which volunteering is a separate compartment to be probed into in a person's life. Emily lives her life with **no compartmentalization of private and public**. Jim was the only person who came remotely close to her way of thinking. With her extended family, who still consider her a hopeless rebel, as well as with friends, and with every person who

crosses her path, she practices **unconditional love and acceptance**, **honesty**, and **personal transformation**. She sees herself as an **agent of positive social change** through her **personal example of courage, tolerance and understanding** in an intolerant and fear-driven world.

> The measure of the development of a country, or a civilization, is precisely its social sphere, i.e. how it relates to different individuals. People like my daughter, and other invalids, or people who are different...I participate in this process of educating and civilizing through my neighborhood, the attitude of my neighbors to me and my daughter. I do not fit into their concepts; I am different. Yet, they do not act differently; those who communicate with me, do it genuinely; the others, who don't, are also genuine. Nobody is aggressive to me, and that's in itself progress, especially in a neighborhood like this, where people are not very sophisticated. I believe that my behavior, my approach and way of thinking is reflected in others; everybody can feel when a person is calm and has accepted herself. I am open, and they are open, and approach me with a small comment, conversation, advice, or just to enjoy the baby, and exchange a few kind words.

Emily transcends fears of destitution and anxiety over material things, in a social environment driven my misery, materialism, and fear.

> In my opinion, a person has to be truly mature spiritually to be ready for money, to use it wisely, and not become its servant and forget that one's real task is work on oneself. Few people have remained unscathed from having money...I have no fear of destitution. I believe that if I act according to my best understanding, it will somehow reflect in the material world. Logical, isn't it?

Emily has difficulty committing, whether to a job or to a socio-political cause. She defines herself as a **free**

spirit, who "cannot be made to fit into the boundaries of one family, one country, one planet". She does not consider herself politically engaged at this particular point in time. She was engaged when the communist regime first fell, because she saw an opportunity for people to release the accumulated tension of 50 years, and open up to change. But soon she saw things begin to repeat themselves, and realized that real change requires an internal transformation, for which there is not yet a readiness. So she chooses to view things more philosophically, in drastic contrast to the general context of politicizing and extreme polarization. Nevertheless, her **socio-political thinking is engaged and responsible**, showing **complex social perspective-taking**:

> In order to judge a particular political line or group, I have to understand and feel the thinking of the whole nation. The current state of things is the outcome the whole complex of people, with all its groups. Nothing happens accidentally. What we have is what we need at the moment. That's how it is with everything in life. It's another question how I see the future, a future without fear. Fear is at the core of all human misery. In order **to do away with fear, we have to all understand who we are, where we are going, what life is about, and that life does not end here**. Then we will have global change. **Global change will mean that things are done without self-interest**, that international help is given for the right reasons and in the right way...Every nation has its values, and the help given has to respect those values.

Emily's **global vision** shows a **unification of political, historical, and spiritual understanding**. She believes the purpose of both individual and collective life is transformation and progressive unification with the source

of life. She does not consider that a religious idea, but a **basic spiritual commitment to life**. She differentiates between a religious commitment to serving an institution or leader, and a spiritual commitment to live with personal responsibility and integrity. She is acutely **aware of the interrelatedness of all spheres of human activity**, emotional, social, material, spiritual, universal, as well as of the limitations of our current paradigms of thought. She **lives with awe of the beauty, strength, and harmony she sees reflected in the universe**, and with a strong sense of **spiritual responsibility**. She believes the sense of well-being comes out of acting out of her real values, a theme recurring in Bembow's (1994) interviews with activists.

Emily **stretches her critical discernment** to understand everything that happens in the world; but at the same time she knows, that what she cannot understand, a mass war or annihilation, still has its reasons to exist, and she has to continue trying to understand. **Morality**, in her definition, is the **sense of beauty and harmony with oneself and the universe**, a reverberation of the eternal theme of moral discourse of the unity of Truth, Beauty, Goodness (Sorokin, in Maslow, 1959).

Emily exhibits a consistently moral motivational profile with one visible limitation: she remains somewhat self-referential and individualistic, and finds it hard to define a common purpose with others, and commit herself to a

collective cause. Nevertheless, her choices illustrate that there are many different ways to be a moral agent in one's world. In terms of the overall complexity of her development, she surpasses significantly any of the other cases discussed so far. However, she does not represent a more compelling case of CC than Jim, because of her relatively lower moral motivation.

As a result of the particular interplay of spiritual and intellectual development in her life, Emily is able to identify with the whole human race, embrace the human condition, and be discerning in the sense of clear-sighted, not condemning, characteristics which Wade (1996) describes as specific to Authentic consciousness. She is a general systems thinker with a critical moral understanding of historical contexts, and radical innovator, although she does not yet exhibit broad social concerns with justice. She has true empathy, genuine tolerance, and habitual insightful introspection. She blends the love-and-power solutions of Affiliative and Achievement consciousness (Wade, 1996) into a synergy of fulfilling her own personal mission, even if it is not quite understood, and supporting the personal growth of others. She is increasingly integrating the body and mind/soul dichotomy, and progressively operates out of an emerging holonomic understanding, which includes paradoxes, and stands in dialogue with history.

Emily does not yet reveal a fully integrated sense of self and morality, nor the accompanying principled commitment to justice, human dignity, freedom, equality, the value of life for all in the face of a relativistic universe. She is still somewhat tentative in terms of how she relates to her society and culture, but she stands in responsible relationships with her world.

Table 8.4 below offers a snapshot of her moral motivational dimensions. Figure 8.4 on page 546 shows where I see Emily in terms of the full human range of CC and non-CC.

Table 8.4

Snapshot of Emily's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization* b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns* d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility, mostly derived from social & cultural stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility*** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority* c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed* e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency*

Continued next page

Table 8.4 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stifles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others*; no sense of community* h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relation-ships k. compartmentalization & prejudice l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society*	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness* d. engaged in relationships on every level* e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others &larger world* g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others* j. permeability to meaningful social relationships* k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice* l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self* & work for the betterment of society

Continued next page

Table 8.4 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference & limited goals** a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning b. no larger purpose than individual self c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest d. negative criticism e. reliance on habit & ritual f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. surface functioning j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection*** a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions* b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood* c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point* d. critical discernment* e. self-reflection* f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions* g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework* h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context* i. depth dimension of existence activated* j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



Figure 8.4 Emily's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

The Case of Danton

I see Danton as a characteristic example of Systemic CC in its fully developed form, with some intimation of a possible movement toward Authentic consciousness. He offers less evidence of Authentic consciousness than Emily does, but in some ways is more socially active, and may be what people most readily imagine as CC. He has a more consistent systemic understanding than Jim exhibits, and exhibits even some metasystemic thinking (see Commons & Rodriguez, 1990). In some ways, he appears to be a postconventional feminist elaboration of Eliot's way of being. Danton's case, in contrast with Emily's, Jim's, and Eliot's, offers a better understanding of the many different ways to be a CC individual.

Danton is an average height, out-of-shape, slow and somewhat dishevelled-looking man in his forties, with intelligent and alert eyes and a sensuous smile coming out of a flax face. He is regarded as an outstanding psychotherapist within the Bulgarian context where the profession is relatively new; he is widely read and uses three foreign languages. As he sits across from me in his bare office with two armchairs, a small table and a bed, and many books around, he impresses me as a typical East European intellectual, narcissistic, reflective and introverted. Yet, he turns out to be both that and its

opposite, a deeply empathic and permeable man; an existential humanist.

Danton's **way of being** is **rooted in extended family, place, and ethnic identity**, and all of these are **sources of moral authority**. His story begins with the memory of the extended family and clan, and a big house in which they all lived or gathered until one of his grandfathers and great uncles with their families left for Israel. All these people took great pride in having lived in Sofia (the capital) for generations, ever since the 15th century. They remember how the city grew and developed; and they share a **sense of permanence, loyalty and pride**. They are Jews, and it seems **fundamental to their sense of identity to be observing of the laws, respectful, loyal, and reliable contributing citizens**, so that, in their own thinking as Danton reveals it, they can earn the right to live in a particular country, and be accepted. So it was very **important to be well-educated, well-mannered, honest, and to excel** both in the professions and in the arts.

Just like in Eliot's case, this **solid patriarchal culture and tradition**, with its **interconnectedness and strong moral values** seems to provide the very backbone of Danton's way of being. It is also the source of many **contradictions** and not immediately obvious forms of **prejudice**, which may well be a compensatory mechanism for the insecurity felt around their Jewish identity. For

example, there is a certain distrust for the newcomers into the city, especially for the influx of people from the countryside during the years of communism. There is also a **clear class identification**, which contrasts with what we saw to be Emily's approach from the previous vignette.

Altogether, I was struck by the fact that Danton seemed to fit more into the patriarchal Bulgarian society while growing up, surrounded by a male culture, and equipped with some convenient prejudices. He **did not have to be an ultimate rebel and pathbreaker**, like either Emily or Jim, because he was not on the fringes of society. He could afford **a more gradual redefining of his culture and context**, which is what his life story reveals. This may account for the nature of his CC, which appears to be a **more intellectual phenomenon, without the deep spiritual integration** that both Jim and Emily exhibit, and with a **clearer tension between self and morality**.

Danton remembers growing up in an old Sofia apartment building, where all the families belonged to the same social class, and knew each other, and the children played together under the protective supervision of the parents in that micro-community. It was a secure and happy childhood, with **many relationships** with both peers and adults, all colored by issues of **loyalty and moral authority**.

His grandfather on his father's side was a prominent lawyer and representative of the Jewish community. He was a

member of Parliament before the communist revolution, and a social democrat. Danton makes a special point of the fact that his grandfather was not a member of the Grand National Assembly convened after the communist revolution, which sentenced most of the members of the anti-communist opposition to either death or labor camps. Later, Danton's father took his father's social democratic ideals further, and became a convinced communist idealist. So the extended family was with one foot inside, and one foot outside the social system, never truly persecuted or ostracized, although there must have been some anti-Semitic tension which would account for many of his clan moving to Israel.

The extended family gathered regularly around the grandfather in his house, and political discussions were common. Danton grew up with the **larger world included in his inner space** and a strong awareness of how world events reverberate in ordinary people's lives. That, in combination with his **sense of history and heritage**, seems to have a lot to do with his **openness to the world** and **moral agency**.

Moral induction family practices seem to have emphasized early on a **strong sense of moral responsibility** to the family and the larger community to do one's best. **Values discourse** appears to have been an on-going organizer of experience. Among those values, **high standards of accomplishment, knowledge and learning** were central. In this context, Danton took his education very seriously, and

remembers the family trauma around the fact that his brother did not speak until his fifth year. The family was terrified "that they might have created a retarded child", which eventually turned out not to be the case. However, the contrast with Emily's meaning-making around that issue is significant in terms of the kind of moral values that are central in each case. In her case, it is respect for and acceptance of differences; in his case, it is high standard and excellence. Each extreme seems to have its strengths and limitations.

Danton's story reveals a typical male socialization within a patriarchal society. The boys' **earnest friendships** are strongly encouraged, as is their competition to excel within acceptable limits; they play chess and **develop their minds**, and acquaint themselves with philosophy and the social sciences. They resist organized communist school life, read and write poetry, listen to serious music, and gather to discuss social issues. Danton built a **moral identity around earnest intellectual resistance** to the prevailing political system, and his community of friends gave him a sense of balance between individual accomplishment and **commonality of purpose shared by a community of thinkers**. Again, it seems important to note that **this kind of moral earnestness**, which Danton shares with William and Eliot, seems to come with men from a relatively protected social niche. In contrast, people like

Jim and Emily, who were complete outsiders, had to develop a more feminist approach to morality.

Danton's first encounter with social distinctions not just on the basis of ideas but in terms of real-life circumstances, came about during mandatory army service, when he was discriminated against as a member of the intelligentsia from Sofia. Later, during the six-day war in Israel in 1967, he says he painfully realized that he was a Jew, and could not embrace the official party line against Israel. In both cases, the realization that he did not quite fit in, was accompanied by **fear and anxiety**, an important theme throughout his life, and one that sets him apart from Jim and Emily, who never had such hopes in the first place, and never knew the fear of losing them.

This tendency of Danton to sit on the fence and wait out circumstances reflects on the character of his particular moral agency, which shows a **tension between self-interest and morality**, reminiscent of Eliot's. The parallels may be associated with the contradictions of the male patriarchal culture they both belong to.

Danton went through his medical school university years with academic success, belonged to a circle of friends who listened to The Beatles and sang about freedom, and felt intensely emotionally involved in the events of the Czech Spring in 1968. When the democracy movement was crushed, he withdrew into his studies and married life, and later, into

his professional specialization. With the same **inner passivity and caution**, he picked psychiatry because he had some connections there, and later got his first job with the help of his father's connections. For the next 10 years, he tried to adjust and adapt to the socio-political requirements, wrote what he considers useless pseudo-scientific articles, and feigned scientific activity, taking up even a doctoral dissertation on a required topic in which he had no interest. In retrospect, he evaluates this as a wasted period of his life, but **takes little responsibility** for it, rationalizing it as his efforts to survive. While negotiating his, at the time, Institutional (Kegan, 1982) loyalties to the system, Danton even became a member of the Communist Party, under pressure from his superiors. That cost him the loss of some friendships, and a **life-long struggle with his own conscience**.

Danton's movement toward Postconventional CC seems to have occurred through his encounter with psychotherapy in the face of a prominent Western specialist who visited Bulgaria. Here is how Danton speaks of the turning point in his life:

> I was thoroughly shaken by his approach to freedom, to the profession, to people. I lived through a shock...I saw my future in that psychotherapy and realized that I **had to** specialize in it and **develop myself**. The first thing that struck me is the accent that psychotherapy puts on **human freedom**, on the need for a person to be free, to fight for his/her freedom...I was interested in existential literature; those were current issues at the time:

> freedom, Solzhenitsin...And I probably went for it because I saw some personal issues that I would have to resolve. I **saw the meaning of my life in working with people in real ways, as well as working with myself**. I detested what was being done in the psychiatric clinic, where the system was impenetrable - the clinic is responsible for the person, there is no personal responsibility, and there is nothing you can do but despair.

For the next 10 years he specialized in psychotherapy, "went through some severe catharses, despaired, decided to quit many times, and kept going back" to that man's clinic for more training. That was a time of **intense personal growth and self discovery**, in his own words. Since then, his work as a psychotherapist has become his **calling** and his **greatest commitment**, and, therefore, central to Danton's CC way of being. He sees it as an opportunity "to **enter into a dialogue" with the worlds** of his patients, and **build relationships**; a constant challenge "to **seek meaning**", and change himself, in order to understand others better.

Danton is **permeable** and **values "partnering**, the dance of **interaction**". He is a **moral agent** through the work he does with people, frequently charging nominal fees for those who he knows cannot afford to pay, or even giving free services, if necessary. He understands that, in the current socio-historic context of the country, and perhaps even the world, the **positive growth** and **personal responsibility** orientation of the psychotherapeutic paradigm is ahead of its time.

> The times are not the best suited for psychotherapy. People are not interested in

> rethinking their behavior. They just do things to meet their basic needs, to exist...Now people are after quick fixes, and psychotherapy takes time. It is hard to redefine things in such a context.

In **reflecting on his own challenges**, Danton shows **the same**, not a lesser, **degree of critical discernment**.

> My training is far from perfect...And sometimes I have a hard time being spontaneous and relaxed...I am a little vain; I want to be liked. I am ambitious; I have a hard time with criticism... I would like to be more efficient; to understand more, not to investigate, but to understand people and myself more.

Danton is **honest and open** about the **ongoing struggle with himself**. Although his moral motivation clearly predominates, this **tension between self-interest, humanism and moral imperative** is negotiated differently in the different domains of his life. He seems a lot more engaged in his work than in his family life and parenting. He is somewhat aloof from his two sons, leaving the main responsibility for their raising to his wife and his parents, who help her - a traditional division of roles. He explains this with his wife's "more intelligent approach to practical issue", which suits him well, in his own words. In his parenting, what he remembers most are the challenges, not so much any rewards. He remembers times in his life when he was so consumed with himself that he hardly noticed his children; in retrospect, he feels "a little guilty".

The same tension is also captured in what he sees as the most influential people in his life. Amongst them, his mother and his wife are seen as sobering models of how to be

practical, grounded, and even skeptical at times. They are in contrast with people, like his father and his teachers, who taught him ideas. He also admires Jewish existentialist and proponent of civil opposition Martin Wuder, who remained in the Jewish community in Germany until the last possible moment during the rise of Nazism, and who, later on, in Israel, resisted the predominant chauvinism. What Danton finds most valuable in him is that "he always sought the dialogue between people, and as early as 1948, started probing public opinion for the creation of a new culture, political and overall...". Danton makes a point of not liking the figure of Christ, because he does "not like suffering", and is "connected with life in more grounded ways".

Altogether, I was left with the impression that Danton's **moral agency,** the source of which is his **humanism**, is somewhat **weakened by his existential skepticism**. On the one hand, his humanism is the source of his **respect for people and life**, and his **orientation toward an ongoing dialogue with history and the world**. On the other hand, the secular existential part of it leaves him somewhat disoriented, trying to define intellectually the potential for harmony in the world, and falling a little short every time when he attempts to conceptualize something beyond the moment of open interaction. His personal philosophy remains

trapped in **individualism**, and he **finds it hard to talk about universal moral values**, remaining ambivalent and vague.

Danton's **secular existential humanism** is, in a paradoxical way, **both his special strength and his greatest limitation**. There is a particularly interesting aspect of it, which seems to have stamped his unique form of moral agency. Here is how he speaks about it:

> I like losing causes. I find them more appealing. Perhaps, I do not see myself as somebody who is likely to succeed. But I also like myself that way. I think that losing gives me more than winning. It gives me a perspective on things, some wisdom. I see the bigger picture in life...Progress happens gradually, and things develop, but good never wins. It's a paradox, but in the battle between good and evil, evil always wins. And yet things change...So the point in human experience is experiencing it - even pain, war, everything. It all increases our sensitivity and understanding.

As we see, Danton shares Emily's philosophy of learning to accept life as it comes, but, unlike Emily, and the moral exemplars, he cannot quite define the theme of self-transcendence. Hence, he does not have the same source of faith, positivity, and endurance. In spite of that, much like Paul (Bembow, 1994), he describes a notably courageous dance with history. Danton's complex distinction between individual battles between "good and evil", and historical progress seems to be the key to the understanding of **his specific form of moral agency**. He sees himself as losing the battles but contributing to the historical process.

For example, while still working at the psychiatric clinic for alcoholics, for years he organized group therapy for alcoholics with the help of a couple of colleagues. Since there was no appreciation within the medical establishment of such services, he did it in his free time, for free, in the course of 9 years. The particular groups he organized always fell eventually apart, but out of his years of efforts, the first Alcoholics Anonymous eventually developed. He gained nothing materially, yet he says that the work with alcoholism has given him as much as he has given to it. This is an excellent example of his **professional and social vision**.

Another example of his agency is his participation in the "City of Truth", a massive act of civil opposition organized in Sofia after the fall of the communist regime in November 1989, and during the preparation for the country's first free elections in 50 years. During those months the former communists campaigned on people's fears about the initial confusion around the transition to democracy. In response, the democratic opposition created this commune in the center of the city, right in front of the Communist Party House, which functioned as a mini-city camp within the city, and governed itself democratically. The City of Truth lasted for over 3 months; the people who committed to it lived and slept there, and collectively built democratic micro-institutions, while the rest of the city supported

them by bringing food. Here is how Danton describes his participation, meaning-making, and **political vision** around that heroic historic act:

> I participated in the City of Truth because I understood it as civic service. I went and offered my counseling services for dealing with crisis situations of which there were all kinds. A couple of us therapists stayed there and offered therapy to individuals in crisis. It lasted throughout the summer. We were among the last to leave. **I believe this was an attempt to create a truly civic, self-regulating society** in Bulgaria. People went there, put up their tents, and took on different functions and responsibilities. They elected a mayor, a city counsel; there was a church, etc. **It was an excellent example of the path that our society needs to take.**

In each case, we see Danton as a **creative innovator**, working **in teams** with others, caring and practicing **active love and service** with **dedication**. In reflecting on all these forms of engagement, Danton explains them with his inner inclination to nurture, to support. He even sees something "pastor-like" in himself, but is quick to question it critically, and wonders whether his **desire to do good and serve** may not have some egocentric motives. This is yet another illustration of his **honesty and personal integrity**.

Danton seems to **approach every issue on a systemic level**, an example of which is whether or not he will give to beggars on the street. The same is true about his political involvement. Ever since his youthful years, he has actively resisted totalitarianism. He wrote articles, gave talks, and his **main theme**, in his own words, was **resistance to violence**, whether expressed as totalitarianism or

aggression. A **contextual thinker**, over the years he tried to work with "the isomorphic models with which people's minds operate in this particular context, the collective symbols". He examines how his own behavior and choice in the sixties, as well as those of his friends, parallel psychologically the behaviors and choices of young people in the nineties.

While exercising complex contextual systemic understanding of human experience, he does not lose touch with the immediacy of life. He describes his inspirational experiences with simple people of all walks of life throughout the country during the first democratic elections, when he volunteered to talk phone calls from various parts of the country to receive the final counts. His **awe at** those **people's genuine engagement and sincerity of motive** reminded me of William's awe when he comes in contact with the grandeur of nature in a sunset. In his best moments, and around certain issues that truly draw him out, Danton shows the same **wholesome immediate relationship with reality** which Freire considered the mark of a CC person.

Danton's **cognitive and emotional decentering, and sense of belonging to a larger humanity** comes though in the way he talks about the war in Bosnia, with both lucid systemic understanding and **passionate moral imperative**.

> For me Bosnia represents a moral dilemma, a missed opportunity since 1991. Three different ethnic communities used to live there in balance and even harmony. I think that the conflict was artificially ignited and escalated. Everyone could have done something at the beginning. Everyone

means us (Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria), the West; but no one moved a finger. The Persian Gulf and Kuwait were more important at the time. And Serbia is a fascist state, right next to Bulgaria. That is very scary, more so than anything else. But we seem to be blind. And the nonsense that is being said about neutrality and what not...Such a violation - they burned a whole city, Zheppa, in the heart of Europe! And what's happening? Everybody is buying time, looking around, listening, talking about some hypothetical things...And in the meantime, these are the countries in which there is a chance to develop the future socio-political structure of Europe. Because these are Moslems, but they are Serbs. Saraevo is the only city in the world which saved its Jews during the Second World War. Moslems, Serbs, they all came together and saved the Jews. The only other places in Europe where something like that happened are Denmark and Bulgaria. But as a city, Saraevo is the only one. So that's a wonderful example of tolerance...and what happened? How do things like that happen? It's clear that there is a dirty political game underneath. And Clinton is too soft. Violation and aggression have to be stopped with determination; then it is time for contracts. And what upsets me most is the horrible silence in Bulgaria. No real information, complete disinformation. Intelligentsia, intellectuals, all big words, and in fact they do not even comment on the Serbian actions - and that's a totalitarian fascist state!...In the meantime, some Westerners come and start asking questions as though they are looking to us for information. And they are responsible to know. Some Western psychiatrist stands in front of an audience here and asks: How did it come to that? It is his responsibility to inform himself.

It is helpful to note here the contrast between Danton's understanding of the war in Bosnia, and the conventional compartmentalized concerns of Eliot around the same issue. In fact, Danton says that he has been contemplating the idea of getting together a team of colleagues to get to the refugee camps in Bosnia, and start crisis intervention counseling. This is a wonderful example

of Danton's **high standard of personal moral responsibility**, as well as **political and humanistic vision**. The **world is actively included in the inner private place from which he negotiates his choices**. He says that neither his grandfather nor his father were zionists, because they did not believe that the future belongs to countries, and people should live where they live. We see here glimpses of his **emerging global vision**.

At the end of the interview, Danton confessed that the interview had actually been a wonderful opportunity to reflect on his life and path. He **takes deep responsibility for understanding his own meaning-making**, which is **the closest he gets to an activated depth dimension of existence**.

Danton's variation of Postconventional CC, in comparison with Emily's and Jim's, illustrates the fact that CC is not the direct outcome of either structural development or moral motivation, but rather a synergistic product of the interaction between the two. As discussed throughout the vignette, his particular configuration of CC shows a more sophisticated intellectual development and a less activated depth dimension. His spiritual understanding is somewhat hesitant and ambivalent, developed enough to make him very permeable, but not developed enough to give him the courage and fortitude that his best intentions

require. He is clearly a moral agent for positive social change, but not a particularly empowered one.

Table 8.5 shows Danton's motivational characteristics. Figure 8.5 on page 567 shows his position on the diagram of the CC/non-CC continuum.

Table 8.5

Snapshot of Danton's Motivation

Dimension	Expediency Motivation	Moral Motivation
1. Identity	**social identity** a. rooted in social conventions*, unmediated by values, precarious b. lack of moral character grounded in virtues c. centrality of self-image & appearance concerns d.self-absorbed*, instrumental consumer concerns e. absence of habitual morality f. no moral imperative	**moral identity*** a. rooted in universal moral values, solid, mediated socialization * b. strong character grounded in virtues* c. peripheral self-image concerns* d. normative ends* e. habitual morality* f. moral imperative*
2. Agency & Responsibility	**lack of agency & limited responsibility** a. absence (or scarcity) of figures of authentic moral authority; no models b. lack of opportunities to compare & discern authentic authority; lack of respect for it c. either no moral self-attribution and sense of personal moral authority or its opposite: self-righteousness d. limited sense of moral responsibility*, mostly derived from social & cultural stereotypes e. no internal conversation around issues of moral authority & responsibility* f. no examples of true agency translate into skepticism, helplessness, fear in the face of external authority	**moral agency & expanding moral responsibility*** a. figures of authentic moral authority; models internalized* b. intuitive moral sense develops into critical discernment of & respect for authentic authority* c. moral self-attribu-tion & sense of internal moral authority* d. expanding personal moral responsibility continuously reconstructed* e. centrality of internal conversation around moral authority & responsibility* f. examples of moral agency translate into personal moral agency*

Continued next page

Table 8.5 continued

3. Relationships	**lack of empathy, alienation, impermeability, no concerns w/ justice & not hurting** a. hostile environment stifles empathy & relatedness b. lack of/limited empathy c. isolated,individualistic way of being*, in competition w/ others d. lack of/mostly casual relationships; just contacts; deficiency of attachments e. centrality of receiving f. inner place not inclusive of others g. no common purpose w/ others; no sense of community h. cognitive & affective provincialism; limited membership in immediate interest groups; no sense of belonging to a larger humanity i. limited communication & sharing j. impermeability to meaningful social relation-ships k. compartmentalization & prejudice l. split b/n public & private life & alienation from public life m.no concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting n.no social consciousness o. no basis for enduring commitments beyond self, or work for the betterment of society	**empathy, relatedness, permeability, concerns w/ justice & not hurting*** a. benevolent, empathic environment fosters empathy & relatedness* b. levels of empathy* c. rootedness in relatedness* d. engaged in relationships on every level* e. centrality of giving* f. inner place inclusive of others & larger world* g. fulfillment derived from common purpose w/ others & sense of community* h. cognitive & affective decentering; sense of belonging to a larger humanity* i. value placed on open communication & permeability to others* j. permeability to meaningful social relationships* k. lack of compartmentalization & prejudice* l. integration of private & public life* m. concerns w/ justice & equity & not hurting* n. social consciousness* o. enduring commitments beyond self & work for the betterment of society*

Continued next page

Table 8.5 continued

4. Meaning of life	**self-referential frames of reference* & limited goals** a. sense of meaninglessness of life; no search or questions about meaning b. no larger purpose than individual self c. peripheral concerns w/ right/wrong, good/bad, true/false; no vantage point outside self-interest d. negative criticism e. reliance on habit & ritual f. no interest in establishing consistency in one's understanding of life; no grappling w/ contradictions g. embeddedness in socio-cultural reality; status quo taken for absolute; tendency to be satisfied w/ opinions, stereotypes, polemics & fragile arguments h. impermeability to suggestions & questions arising from context i. surface functioning j. disengaged & alienated from one's world	**larger frames of reference and life purpose as vantage point for critical discernment & self-reflection*** a. faith in meaning & wisdom of life; search for it & on-going questions* b. life purpose seen in aligning oneself w/ life's meaning as best understood* c. continuous elabora-tion of connections b/n right & wrong, good & bad, true & false as vantage point* d. critical discernment* e. self-reflection* f. efforts to integrate understanding of reality & grappling w/ contradictions* g. problematizing of socio-cultural reality from point of view of larger moral framework* h. permeability to suggestions & questions arising from context* i. depth dimension of existence activated* j. engaged in wholesome & immediate relation-ships w/ reality*



A= MORAL INTEREST B= MORAL AUTHORITY C= PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D= EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E= SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F= PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G= HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 8.5 Danton's Position on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

General Findings From the Bulgarian Sample

The Bulgarian sample of 8 cannot be claimed to be representative or even comparable to the US sample because of the higher average level of education of the Bulgarian participants. I found 2 cases of **CONVENTIONAL CC** and 3 cases of **POSTCONVENTIONAL CC**. Figure 8.6 below includes the 8 Bulgarian participants on the CC/non-CC continuum, along with all the other cases discussed in this study.



A = MORAL INTEREST B = MORAL AUTHORITY C = PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D = EXPANDED MORAL & SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY E = SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS & POLITICAL ACTION
F = PHILOSOPHICAL EXPANSION G = HISTORICAL & GLOBAL VISION

Figure 8.6 Position of All Bulgarian Cases on the CC/Non-CC Continuum

Although unrepresentative, the Bulgarian sample appears to reveal some important insights into the contextual and generic features of CC in contrast with the US sample. Perhaps the most important finding of this cross-cultural comparison is the fact that it is confirmation of the generic understanding of CC as the synergistic outcome of the interaction between moral motivation and structural development. The CC/non-CC continuum seemed to account adequately for the Bulgarian cases. Moreover, there seemed to be parallels between the Bulgarian and the US cases, which I have explored in this chapter. Sometimes, those parallels seemed so clear, that it was actually possible to see a particular Bulgarian case as the counterpart of a particular US case. Such cross-cultural pairs, like for example Finnigan and Ada, Ann and Eliot, Jim and Emily, provided important insights. These pairs offered rich illustration of the cross-cultural, and other contextual variations in **PRE-CC**, **CONVENTIONAL CC**, and **POSTCONVENTIONAL CC**.

Below is a summary of the specific characteristics of the Bulgarian context which seem to foster or hinder moral motivation and structural development. The attempt to examine the two separately is in itself an abstraction, only for the purpose of clarity. It is important to start by saying that, just like the US context, the Bulgarian context seemed to foster certain aspects of CC and hinder others.

Those aspects differ in the two cultures, but neither one seems more conducive to the development of CC than the other. Rather, the value of the cross-cultural comparison is, I believe, in its potential to show the strengths of each culture, which can be drawn on, and to hypothesize the optimal middle ground where new solutions can be sought.

In order to be consistent with the examination of the contextual factors in the US sample, I begin with the contextual characteristics which seem to support or challenge the development of the dimensions of moral motivation.

Moral Motivational Dimensions

In summary, the current Bulgarian context seems to be more favorable to the development of moral identity (dimension 1), moral authority and responsibility, but not agency (dimension 2), and the meaning of life (dimension 4). It appears very unfavorable to the development of empathic and permeable relationships beyond immediate family and friends, and to the formation of social consciousness (dimension 3).

Moral Identity

The main cultural advantage seems to be that of solid rootedness in family, place, class, profession, and a prominent moral values dimension in all these forms of identity. Traditional patriarchal values emphasize honesty,

trustworthiness, high personal standard of education, work accomplishment, and work ethic, courtesy, generosity, forbearance, respect, hospitality, righteousness, sacrifice. Child-rearing practices employ a lot of moral induction and moral discourse as an organizer of daily experience. They build character, and stimulate the development of habitual morality and moral imperative. The overall contextual configuration seems to foster morally mediated socialization.

However, there is also a flip side to these traditional ways. They reveal an abundance of gender and racial stereotypes and forms of oppression, which account for the many contradictions and inconsistencies in the ways values are applied and virtues are practiced. I observed a certain compartmentalization of moral values and virtues, which tended to make moral identity less consistent.

External Moral Authority, Personal Moral Responsibility, and Agency

The Bulgarian culture of permanence and hierarchical patriarchal relationships abounds in figures of moral authority in the immediate and extended family. The emphasis on education also introduces a host of other models of authentic moral authority into a child's life. The overall populatedness with models of varying degrees of moral authority gives young people a diverse exposure to examples that they internalize, and the opportunity to compare, and develop critical discernment. Also, the on-going negotiation

of these contrasts appears to make prominent internal conversations about issues of moral authority and responsibility. Hence, this traditional patriarchal culture seems to foster normative concerns and a pervasive sense of moral responsibility.

However, the agency modeled by most of these figures of moral authority seems limited to interpersonal moral responsibility in an immediate circle, and to gender and social roles. The patriarchal tendency toward authoritarian methods also limits somewhat the agency of people, especially women and people of other races. Conversations about larger civic responsibility abound, and the greater world seems consistently present in the understanding of family affairs, but the totalitarian regime limits substantially the opportunities to convert these conversations into reality.

Meaningful Relationships, Concerns with Justice and Not Hurting, and Social Consciousness

This appeared to be the weakest dimension of the Bulgarian sample, and not for lack of patriarchal interconnectedness. In fact, the Bulgarian circle of close family and friends exhibits a lot less alienation and more relatedness than I observed in the US sample. I saw an abundance of meaningful, wholesome relationships, in comparison with which the US sample in general appeared almost dysfunctional in its disconnectedness. The inner place from which choices and moral decisions are made seemed

to include others and the greater world much more so than in the American sample.

However, the main limitation of patriarchal traditions is their impermeability to different ways and different cultures. They appear very territorial and self-protective, full of prejudices and stereotypes, and distrustful of differences. Patriarchal culture is strongly Conformist (Wade, 1996), and its concerns with justice and not hurting are compartmentalized, so that they rarely extend beyond interpersonal relationships and group membership. Hence, social consciousness is limited to a strong sense of civic responsibility, and does not show a tendency to expand. 50 years of a totalitarian regime did not contribute to this cultural characteristic, but, in fact, deepened the protectiveness and distrust for larger and different social groups, and for collective social life.

Meaning of Life

Ontological questions appeared as prominent in people's lives as instrumental questions. Answers appeared to be sought in varying degrees in different places, with an overall tension between cultural traditions as sources of meaning, and individualistic, self-referential frameworks, the outcome of a general disillusionment with both religion and ideology. Critical discernment appeared frequently based on reactive self-definitions in opposition. The strong sense of history and a common past seems to provide a larger

holding context and meaning for people; there seems to be no sense of future, other than the individual choice of profession as calling.

Overall, the Bulgarian sample showed a comparable tendency to compartmentalize public and private selves and allegiances, and difficulty with critical self-reflection, permeability and empathy beyond familiar others as their American counterparts. Although living in a more communal and interconnected culture, the Bulgarians I interviewed were also struggling with individualism and difficulty building allegiances. Most of them were trying to negotiate the legacy of disillusionment with a debunk ideology, and its destructive impact on the fabric of social life. That left them rejecting any collective frames of reference, developing a strong educational Achievement orientation, relying heavily on their intelligence and critical discernment to the point of chronic skepticism and negativity. Hence, morally aware individuals expressed a sense of isolation, alienation, and lack of agency, which made their commitments beyond the self equally difficult.

Structural Development

In terms of the impact of the specific cultural context on the structural developmental component, the Bulgarian collective norm seems to call for a mix of third and fourth order of consciousness (Kegan, 1994), depending primarily on

gender roles. In that sense, it fosters self-differentiation less than the US context, and, depending on gender and social role, may even discourage it. As we saw in the cases of the two Bulgarian women, Ada and Emily, each had to grow and negotiate a place for herself in an environment dominated by men, and each struggled bitterly to emancipate herself.

The cross-cultural study of CC yielded some interesting insight about the nature of the historical time we live in. In the stories of my Bulgarian interviewees, I heard the account of a world in transition. A character-building past of rich and contradictory history had given most of them a sense of rootedness and personal moral authority, and some of them critical discernment. Yet, few seemed to be equipped with the permeability and larger frames of reference needed to meet an indefinite future. I encountered a general apprehensiveness and sense of helplessness. CC is more of a goal than a reality.

In the stories of my US interviewees, I heard the same account of a world in transition, only differently expressed. By the very nature of US society, established fairly recently and out of a concoction of cultural traditions, it seems to require a different type of coping strategies from the individual. Because of the lack of rootedness in history and past, people seem forced to rely more on their individual courage and ability to be self-

sufficient. CC seems to be as much a goal rather than a reality in the US, as it is in Bulgaria.

The lack of agency and the sense of helplessness in the face of an indefinite future, seem to bring about similar reactions in both samples, which appear more polarized in my US interviewees. On the one end seem to be people who close down into utmost alienation and compartmentalization; on the other, people who plunge into reckless activity and activism; the middle ground is held by existential resistance.

Hence, these two cultural contexts offered a glimpse of slightly different coping strategies in the face of a general lack of CC in a world of global transition. The Bulgarians tended to hold on to the strengths of their rich patriarchal tradition. The Americans sought solutions in the extremes of political conservatism or liberalism. Not many people seemed to know how to negotiate a balanced, permeable approach to the future, guided by moral agency.

In conclusion, the cross-cultural sample offered important insights into the specific strengths and limitations of each cultural context, and the potential power of combining those different cultural characteristics. The two cultural contexts manifested in different variations the same difficulty with frames of moral and spiritual meaning larger than the self. This appeared to be the

fundamental challenge to most of the intelligent and caring people in both parts of the world that I interviewed.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This dissertation project undertook to define an integrative psychological construct, that of critical consciousness, from the point of view of an interdisciplinary noetic approach. It linked philosophical insights about human consciousness with current psychological understanding of the dimensions of consciousness and its noetic development, as they all relate to what has been tentatively established as the CC developmental pathway.

The study subjected the broad phenomenon of CC to a rigorous empirical and developmental exegesis through descriptive accounts of the levels of its evolution in the life-span of interview subjects and secondary life histories from different cultural and historic contexts. The central research question concerned the nature of adult social consciousness which occurs on the boundary of public and private, and is characterized by engagement in a liberating, meaningful dialogue with the present and future of one's world, and resistance to the forces of collusion with an unjust status quo. This study has provided some important, though tentative, insights into the sources of the CC pathway, which will be discussed below.

The construct of CC focuses on both the formation of adult social consciousness under the shaping influence of

various socio-historical forces, and the way this consciousness operates in the social world. The construct describes both the **ontogenesis of self as a socio-historical construction** and the **active operation of self on social reality**. This study approached these two aspects of CC in a somewhat different fashion. On the one hand, the study employs a deductive approach in order to establish theoretical convergence concerning the first aspect, i.e. the formation of adult social consciousness and its main dimensions. On the other hand, it was designed to offer empirical descriptions of the second aspect, i.e. of the way this social consciousness operates on social reality at different levels in its evolution. In addition, the study offeres non-definitive empirical observations on possible connections between ways of operating and circumstances of the formation of social consciousness.

The more specific research questions asked were:

1. What are the main components of CC and what are the criteria for the emergence of CC? Along what dimensions does it evolve, and what is the course of its evolution through the life-span?
2. What are the characteristics of the qualitative transformations in consciousness which allow individuals to experience and conceptualize progressively more adequately the need for social change? What are the particular concerns specific to each qualitative transformation? How does the

individual negotiate his/her social environment differently at each level of transformation? What forms do social responsibility and moral commitment take at each level? What are the characteristics of the language used to describe them? What are the achievements and limitations of each transformation?

3. What might be the important contextual conditions for the formation of CC? What is the role of family environment and socio-historical context in the emergence and progressive elaboration of CC? Are there multiple developmental pathways?

4. How does CC differ from other forms of consciousness; is it a different phenomenon or is it on the same continuum of noetic development?

Summary of the General Findings

The CC/Non-CC Continuum

Perhaps the most important outcome of this work is the integrated understanding of CC as **a moral way of being**, a **life-long pathway**, the **synergistic outcome of the on-going interplay between moral motivation and the structural development of consciousness**. Such a definition of CC, as a primarily moral, rather than intellectual phenomenon, is consistent with Freire's (1973) understanding of CC as a way of being which establishes relationships with the world impregnated with consequence. It has been supported by

interview cases of fairly intellectually sophisticated individuals who do not exhibit CC, as well as of less sophisticated people who exhibit CC.

The study suggests that **the CC pathway is qualitatively different from the non-CC pathway, because of the presence of the independent component of moral motivation**. Compelling converging theoretical and empirical evidence supports the empirical claim that the centrality of authentic moral concerns in the formation of consciousness is independent of the level of operant structural development, although the moral motivational dimensions are continuously elaborated throughout development. Hence, I claim that moral motivation should not be confused with the on-going developmental elaboration of reasoning around self-interest and related right/wrong issues. This work continues Colby and Damon's (1992) approach to morality as something more than the outcome of social-cognitive development and moral reasoning.

The centrality of moral motivation in the formation of consciousness appears to account for the qualitatively different nature of the CC pathway in two ways. First, moral motivation seems to be the source of a distinctive energy that spurs development. Without its dominant presence, life-long structural development depends for its motivational source on the evolving negotiation of immediate self-interest, and appears to be more vulnerable to social circumstances and more uneven. Second, moral motivation is

developmentally elaborated into an unusually expansive range of moral and social concerns and engagements, which result in moral agency and responsible citizenship as the content expressions of CC. I did not observe a comparably committed citizenship among the non-CC interviewees. In view of the above two findings, I suggest that **the non-CC pathway is a suboptimal pathway of social development**. In contrast with it, the CC pathway brings about a greater developmental integration of the whole person, and a resulting expansion in moral and social agency.

This research project has further elaborated the centrality of moral motivation in the formation of CC in two important ways. First, both the moral exemplars from the literature and the CC individuals whom I interviewed, report the presence of an undifferentiated moral inclination in childhood. I call it **intuitive moral sense**, or the better impulses of the heart. The accounts of CC individuals describe early environments which consistently redefined self-interest in moral terms. These accounts suggest that the children began to define themselves increasingly by their moral inclinations, and developed a closer link between the separate conceptual systems of self and morality (Damon, 1988). This seems to have facilitated what Colby and Damon (1992) describe with regards to exemplary individuals as the progressive formation of a sense of self around a moral center, the remarkable bringing together of moral and

personal goals, the gradual expansion in the range of concerns and extensiveness of engagements. My observations from the 28 interviews seemed to confirm Damon's (1988) point that for most adults, the two conceptual systems of self and morality become linked only up to a point, with the relationship varying from relative separation to relative integration, and true uniting of the two remaining a rare event. Hence, I believe that **the intuitive, undifferentiated moral sense requires education, grounded in universal moral values, in order to develop into moral motivation.**

Second, this study identified **four dimensions of the formation of a predominantly moral motivation.** The analysis of the case histories of my 28 interviewees from diverse cultural backgrounds revealed a different configuration of the four motivational dimensions in each person. Generally, the potential for moral motivation seems counterpoised in varying degrees with immediate self-interest. The overall balance in adulthood seems to have a lot to do with a web of interrelated influences related to personal history and cultural context.

Where moral motivation, i.e. the desire to do what is understood to be good and right, and the tendency to conceive of self-interest in moral terms, dominates over narrowly conceived self-interest, it becomes a powerful factor for growth and development. With growth, i.e. with the progressive interaction between moral motivation and

structural development along the CC pathway, there seems to be less and less of a distinction between moral motivation and self-interest, and a greater unity of self and morality (Colby & Damon, 1992).

The people who exhibited CC gave evidence of some configuration of intellectual, moral, and spiritual education, which interacted developmentally with their intuitive moral sense along the four motivational dimensions, and resulted in a potentially liberating, CC way of being. In contrast, the individuals who did not exhibit CC, related circumstances of intellectual, moral, or spiritual deprivation, and spent their lives developing compensatory mechanisms to combat an inner sense of general disempowerment. However, even those individuals reported an intuitive moral sense, or what I called the better impulses of the heart. Their stories relate a variety of hostile, unempathic, or predominantly amoral, expediency oriented environments, which seem to have discouraged these better impulses. Instead of the intuitive moral sense being fostered into fully formed moral motivation, over time, it became poised in opposition to the growing sense of immediate self-interest.

These albeit undefinitive insights are in keeping with Vygotskian developmental theory. Hence, I believe that the distinction between people on a CC and on a non-CC pathway, i.e between **people in whom self-transcending moral**

motivation is defining, and **people in whom expediency and narrowly conceived self-interest are defining**, may not be inherent to those individuals. Rather, it may reflect our still confused and fragmented priorities at the present evolutionary state of human civilization.

The tentative understanding of the formation of moral motivation in the interaction with the person's environment along the four motivational dimensions suggests that there may be some continuity between the moral agency of exemplary individuals in service to humanity, and the CC and non-CC ways of being of ordinary people. On the basis of this assumption, **the full range of human social consciousness has been conceptualized as a continuum between the CC and the non-CC pathway** along the two main dimensions of consciousness, structural development and motivation.

The two pathways share the same levels of composite structural development, while the motivational axis is bisected by two different kinds of motivation, predominantly moral and predominantly expediency oriented. This CC/non-CC continuum seems to account for every case I encountered in my representative US sample, and in my smaller, non-representative Bulgarian sample, as well as for all the exemplary cases, and my broader observations. Although the two pathways seem to differ substantially in terms of the general content expression of consciousness, the hypothetical conceptualization of a CC/non-CC continuum

opens the door for further investigation of the life-long possibilities for developing predominantly moral motivation.

Moral Motivational Dimensions

There are many different ways to understand the independent moral component which this study establishes as central to the optimal development of consciousness along a CC pathway. Generic analysis of a broad range of empirical material showed four recurring motivational dimensions in the formation of personhood, which may or may not be colored by primarily moral concerns: (1) identity; (2) authority, responsibility, agency; (3) relationships; (4) meaning of life.

The separation of these motivational dimensions is an abstraction since they form and operate in constant interaction. The overall motivational configuration is the synergistic outcome of this interaction, and is unique for every individual. How these dimensions develop and interact seems to be influenced by the immediate family, and later on by the larger socio-cultural environment. Below, I summarize briefly the tentative insights gained from the empirical data about each motivational dimension.

Identity

Moral or expediency oriented thinking and doing seems to be the outcome of who one thinks one is, i.e. one's sense of identity. The formation of a sense of identity appears to

be a process of developing rootedness in certain concepts and realities. The kind of rootedness that develops seems related to what realities early family environment models, and what concepts it explicitly teaches. It is also influenced later by what the larger social environment models and teaches.

In examining the influence of early family contexts on the formation of a sense of identity, it is important to differentiate between the realities that are implicitly modeled, and gradually internalized as character, and the concepts that are explicitly taught, and develop into a source of conscious identification. Modeling and teaching, character and identity formation, are in constant interplay. Ideally, the two would be in harmony, but every person's history reveals a different configuration of the two.

Concepts are the early organizers of experience central to the explicit discourse in the immediate family and, later, in the larger social environment. These concepts can be predominantly universal moral and/or spiritual values, which mediate and color the way social experience is understood, as is the case with William, Eliot, Ann, Jim, Emily, Danton, as well the moral exemplars. Conversely, these concepts can be predominantly oriented toward current social conventions, such as class, race, national of other group interests, social or gender roles, etc.

In Ada's and Finnigan's cases, there was a mix of moral and class concepts taught. Tom and Ivan were taught a limited number of moral concepts, in Tom's case - caring for others, in Ivan's case - hard work and basic honesty. Agnes and Sim were taught no concepts by their immediate family environments, and were deprived of much guidance of any kind. All four interviewees revealed direct socialization into the prevalent social concepts and configurations which appeared most relevant to each of them. In Agnes's and Sim's cases, it was class. In Tom's case, it was the town community and its particular needs and interests. In Ivan's case, it was the political ideology of the ruling communist party.

Where there is explicit moral and/or spiritual discourse as an early organizer of experience, the kind of social identity that develops reveals more solid groundedness and endurance, and seems less vulnerable to changes in social circumstances. Moral induction fosters moral self-attribution, and builds character. It seems to contribute to a more secure sense of self, and to make the individual less prone to overwhelming self-image concerns. It also fosters the development of empathic feelings, habitual morality, and moral imperative. The preoccupation with normative rather than instrumental concerns, which develops with a predominantly moral/spiritual identity, in

time begins to operate as a vantage point for critical discernment.

However, explicit moral and/or spiritual values discourse can translate into self-righteousness and hypocrisy if it is not supported by implicit modeling of the striving after moral and/or spiritual virtues. The formation of moral identity involves the on-going negotiation of the tension between values embraced and virtues practiced. The cross-cultural sample yielded some interesting insights into how different cultural contexts play into the negotiation of this tension.

The patriarchal family background, which characterized the lives of most of my Bulgarian interviewees, exhibited many inconsistencies between the values upheld and the virtues practiced, as we saw in the case of Ada. The contradiction between the honesty and integrity her father taught her, and the compartmentalized and inconsistent way in which he applied them in his own life, seems related to her remaining caught in an on-going struggle between morality and self-interest, tending toward self-righteousness and selective self-interest. In Eliot's case, in spite of the somewhat narrow emphasis on immediate family loyalties, and a certain clan exclusiveness, there appears to have been enough consistency between moral values and virtues to facilitate the formation of moral character and identity. In general, patriarchal moral values exhibit a

notable potential to build strength and solidity of character when the stereotypes they perpetrate are counterbalanced by sufficient honesty, empathy and permeability. Danton is a good illustration of that.

In the US sample, I saw the opposite tendency: a movement away from explicit moral discourse as an organizer of early experience, a tendency to see it as obsolete, and relegate it to hypocritical pseudo-religious practices. William remembers it as part of his schooling experience, but considers it a thing of the past. Finnigan's mother modeled authentic moral and spiritual virtues for him, but shied away from explicit moral discourse. In Finnigan's understanding, that was part of her democratic, tolerant, unintrusive approach. However, such an understanding of democratic, as equivalent to casual and laissez-faire, seemed to result in a general disorientedness. Agnes, and most of my other US interviewees had mostly accidental models to rely on, and in most cases they did not model any consistent set of virtues. Overall, the US sample showed a greater tendency toward direct socialization, unmediated by explicit moral discourse, and mostly influenced by mass social concepts.

Jim and Emily reveal what I consider the potential meeting ground between strong traditional values which build character and identity, and a democratic tolerance and openness to the examination and re-definition of those

values, which guarantees freedom from prejudice and stereotypes. In both of them, as well as in Gandhi, Paul, Suzie Valadez, and Mother Waddles, that meeting ground was spirituality, **an activated depth dimension of experience**. These people's self-identifications exhibit a quiet and enduring sense of inherent nobility, and a principled and heart-felt respect for the nobility of other human beings regardless of social distinctions. To the degree that they exhibit a primarily spiritual identity, more so with Jim and less so with Emily, they appear stronger, less conflicted, and more enduring and positive than the rest of the people I spoke to, as well as more developmentally alive.

Authority, Responsibility, Agency

This motivational dimension reflects the tendency for authentic external moral authority in a child's life to be internalized, and gradually reconstructed as personal moral authority, responsibility and agency. This dimension is directly related to the dimension of identity, and its separation is simply an operational abstraction. To the degree that there is explicit moral teaching and implicit modeling in a young person's family environment, there are also figures of authentic moral authority. The populatedness of a child's life with such figures appears to be a significant motivational factor. In fact, it seems that the degree and nature of agency of Finnigan, Ada, Ann, Eliot, Jim, Danton, and Emily reflects the agency modeled by the

significant sources of authentic moral authority in their childhood.

In Finnigan's case, it was primarily the limited but genuine interpersonal agency of his mother, who was a source of moral support and understanding for women around her. Finnigan became that for the young people he taught at afterschool for 20 years. There were no other significant authority figures in his life, and he did not develop a particular permeability to authentic moral authority. In Ada's case again it was a limited source of moral authority: personal and professional integrity from her father, and self-sacrificing love and parenting from her mother. Ada repeated those models in her own life, and, just like Finnigan, did not develop much beyond them.

In contrast, the lives of Ann, Eliot, Jim, Danton, Emily were populated with significant adult figures of authentic moral authority, and these people developed a range of personal authority and responsibility that reflected the range to which they had been exposed. Ann had been exposed to adults with a serious but somewhat detached and intellectual attitude to world events; she herself is very serious about civic responsibility but only gets engages to a point, and is not really permeable. Eliot's significant adults also modeled serious and somewhat limited and traditional forms of civic responsibility, with a measure of self-protectiveness. His life story reflects that

constant tension of trying to strike a balance between his strong and expanding sense of civic responsibility, and his self-protectiveness. In Jim's, Danton's, and Emily's cases, in which the range of authentic external authority in early life appears to have been the broadest, and the most open to and engaged with the world, it translated into their own ever-expanding agency.

Hence, where there are figures of authentic moral authority in a person's life, several things seem to happen. First, they provide **examples of moral agency**. Second, a childhood world populated by figures of authentic moral authority, rather than limited to one or two, provides **exposure to different facets of authentic moral authority**, and a less rigid and limited understanding of it in adulthood. It is, perhaps, worth remembering here the African saying that it takes a whole village to raise a child.

Third, these diverse models inevitably come into contrast with other authority figures, so that the young person has the **opportunity to develop** his/her intuitive moral sense into **critical discernment of and respect for authentic moral authority**. In contrast, the lack of such figures in Agnes' life seems related to her inability to explain what she values in the occasional figures she has some admiration for; i.e. her lack of critical discernment, and overall sense of helplessness, fear and skepticism.

Fourth, the on-going negotiation of such contrasts seems to generate **an internal conversation around issues of moral authority and responsibility**, which becomes central to the person, and strengthens his/her preoccupation with normative concerns and moral imperative.

All of the above translate into a sense of personal moral authority, degrees of empowerment, moral responsibility and agency, continuously reconstructed. Such a perspective raises a lot of questions with regard to the contemporary shrinking of adult authority in a child's world to the immediate family, or even its lack, characteristic of Western culture. This question will be taken up again in the conclusions section of this chapter.

Relationships

This motivational dimension reflects **the importance of experiencing oneself in relationships** in the overall formation of moral motivation. The nature of the relationships one learns to establish with one's environment appears to be a powerful motivating factor in terms of one's ability later to become a caring, engaged moral agent for positive social change. People, who learn to be in compartmentalized, self-interest-oriented, or casual relationships, with limited or no empathy, seem to become estranged from themselves first, and, as a natural outcome, lose the ability to engage fully with their world either. Agnes, Sim, Ivan, Finnigan, and Ada are all examples of the

above, each struggling with their own limitations which reflect the limitations of their specific early relationships.

In the case of Agnes, a hostile, unempathic family environment seems a primary influence in her becoming cold and self-protective, judgmental and unempathic in her own life. She operates with a host of stereotypes and prejudices, and does not seem in the least concerned that they may actually hurt other people. Sim also experienced the world as a hostile, estranged place, although less so than Agnes, possibly because he had some kind of implicit, rudimentary caring relationship with his father. He also had his mother's caring, though expressed in alienated, strictly physical providing without much emotional closeness. Combined with the better impulses of his own heart, this experience with relationships translated into his own physical caring for both his family and his retarded sister. Beyond that, he remains impermeable to other than biological and immediate needs, in much the way Freire describes semi-intransitive consciousness, i.e. characterized by "a near disengagement between men and their existence" and "difficult discernment".

It is enlightening to note the contrast between Agnes's and Sim's development, on the one hand, and Tom's development, on the other hand. Tom also reported a basic, unsophisticated relationship with his parents, mostly

oriented toward physical needs. However, there seem to have been much more empathy and connectedness operating, and, as an adult, Tom engaged in a caring, giving way with every human being that crossed his path. His unsophisticated intellectual development did not allow him to transcend his racial stereotypes on a conceptual level, but on a personal one-on-one level he extends himself to people of different racial and religious backgrounds with empathy, compassion, and habitual morality. He is fully engaged with the needs of his town, within his limited understanding, and is a significant and respected positive influence.

Ivan's case represents, in my understanding, a middle ground between Agnes's and Sim's impermeability, and Tom's permeability to claims on his empathic feelings. On the one hand, he responds to people's needs when they present themselves in front of him; on the other hand, he compartmentalizes hurtful social practices as "necessary", and manages to dissociate his empathic feelings from those instances. Ivan's early relationships reveal the same inconsistent, limited caring coupled with impermeability.

Finnigan's early relationships were empathic, laid-back, somewhat casual or at least not earnest, and oriented toward practical help more than anything else. That is what he considers most important in the relationships he himself engages in. Intimacy and earnest engagement with people and ideas are not his characteristic. In contrast, Ada's early

relationships were earnest and engaged, but oriented toward hierarchical authority and competence issues, and not particularly permeable. In her adult life, she became an earnest and committed moral presence in her realm of personal competence - her profession - with hierarchical relationships holding a definite appeal for her; she does not exhibit much permeability to issues beyond that.

Conversely, the lives of Jim, Danton, and Emily are so rich in empathic and meaningful relationships, continuously reconstructed, that an active and wholesome engagement with their world appears to be a natural thing for them. They exhibit the active receptiveness Colby & Damon (1992) identified as characteristic of their exemplars. Ann, Eliot, and William represent in-between cases of engagement with their world, reflecting the more limited nature of their own relatedness.

Altogether, the ability and inclination to engage in meaningful, wholesome relationships with one's environment, and be moved by expanding levels of empathy, permeability, and concerns with justice and equity, appears to reflect the degree to which environments foster empathy, relatedness, and a common purpose with others. It is also important who and what the person's circle of relatedness includes; whether it includes a sense of belonging to a larger humanity and an awareness of one's connectedness with nature, or it is provincial and includes only limited

interest groups. A limited sense of belonging generates either no concept of social justice or a dangerously limited one. Conversely, expanding empathy, relatedness and permeability translate into inclusive concerns with justice and equity, and develop into CC.

Meaning of Life

Whether a person asks and values questions regarding the meaning of life, i.e. whether ontological, rather than instrumental, concerns are central to his/her experience of life, is another significant motivational dimension. The search for authentic meaning in life through continuous elaboration of the connections between right and wrong, good and bad, true and false, provides a larger frame of reference, which serves as a vantage point from which to reflect on self and experience. Engaging in a genuine dialogue with reality draws on the mind, expands its capacities, and eventually develops into principled, philosophical, historical and global vision.

This search for meaning larger than the self seems to be fostered by a moral and/or spiritual environment which operates with faith in the meaning and wisdom of life, and recognizes one's responsibility to align oneself with it. This faith in a greater meaning seems to be internalized in early childhood, as we saw in the cases of Gandhi, Paul, Emily, Danton and Jim, before it can even be conceptualized in adolescence or adulthood. It develops into an earnest

engagement with reality, into a habit of being aware, asking questions, making meaning. With the advent of adolescence, that becomes an idealistic quest for principles one can identify with, and it spurs intense self-reflection and critical examination of reality. This frame of mind snowballs into a life-long independent and interdependent investigation of truth and meaning, and quest after justice, which becomes central to the individual. At the heart of this dialogical relationship with life is the belief in its meaningfulness, and the urge to find, construct, and be in harmony with that meaning.

The search for meaning is a powerful integrating factor in personality development. As Colby and Damon (1992) show, "a true integration of reflection and action rests on a unifying belief that must be represented in all the cognitive and behavior systems that direct a person's life choices" (p. 310). Hence, **a critically conscious moral agency requires both a unifying belief system, and its on-going critical reconstruction**. In Colby & Damon's exemplars, and Bembow's (1994) activists, this unifying belief system was characterized by a **faith in a meaning greater than the self**, "an intimation of transcendence" (Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 311). The same has proven to be true in the cases of CC individuals I encountered.

Moreover, I have found that the sense of transcendence appears related to the sense of agency of the individual. As

discussed earlier in this chapter, moral motivation is essentially self-transcending. However, the element of self-transcendence may be implicit in the ethic of orienting one's life toward right and wrong, and a consideration of others, or it may be an explicit component of one's moral thinking. To the degree that a person's belief system is strictly ethical, with no explicit intimation of transcendence, there seems to be a less complete unity between self and morality. Moral agency is carefully and cautiously defined so that it does not overwhelm the individual's ability to maintain a balance in his/her life.

Eliot and Ann are good examples. William and Danton show some intimation of transcendence, which is tentative and somewhat ambivalent, in the process of evolving. Their agency is less cautious than that of Eliot and Ann, but still reveals the tension of a constant balancing act. In contrast, Jim and Emily do not seem to struggle with balance. Everything they do is part of the way they believe and the way they are; they exhibit a greater unity of self and morality, and seem to live with flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993).

Overall, the above cases illustrate that the more strictly ethical the beliefs, the more protectively they are held. The more they gain an intimation of transcendence, the more open to re-examination they seem to become. Ann and Eliot appear a lot more rigid and self-righteous than

William, who is also a conventional thinker with a tendency to be self-protective of his Institutional balance (Kegan, 1983). Although all three of them share some difficulties with reconstructing, William's sense of awe with life keeps him open and humble. His permeability is less limited to an intellectual channel of exchange with the world, the way Ann's and Eliot's is; it is more grounded in a holistic experience of the multi-faceted complexity of life even when he cannot quite comprehend it.

Danton represents a fascinating transitional case in that respect. Much like Eliot, he started with strictly ethical beliefs, a strong sense of history and heritage, and a moral identity built around earnest intellectual resistance. Two things drew him further. One was his identity as an intellectual, which involved an intense search for, and dialogue with ideas. The other was his professional exposure to the human struggle for meaning as a psychologist, and later a psychotherapist. The struggle to reconcile ideas with the breath and depth of human experience, appears to have activated in some degree the depth dimension of his existence, and made him permeable to life's paradoxes. His solution is to develop an existential philosophy, which relies mostly on conceptualization, but contains an albeit tentative yet notable spiritual dimension of reconciliation with what cannot be explained.

Unlike Danton, Jim and Emily did not have to struggle intellectually to define an intimation of transcendence. It was an integrative part of their early lives; in Jim's case, through the deep spirituality and expansive inner strength of his mother and grandmother; in Emily's case, through her own intuition. Amongst all of my interviewees, Emily exhibits the most activated depth dimension of existence and understanding. Her critical moral agency embraces the human condition with discernment and clear-sightedness, and is expressed in a radically innovative approach to life in her own social mileau.

Overall, the empirical data has shown a range of variations in how central questions of meaning are framed and approached, with personal agency and integration increasing with the progression from strictly ethical, to broader secular humanistic concerns, to an active spiritual approach to life.

The above detailed examination of the tentative findings along the four motivational dimensions reveals my consistent interest with educational questions about the nature of early environments which may be instrumental in fostering positive growth and CC. That is not to suggest that when those environments are not in place, CC has no chance of developing later in life. As has been pointed out several times throughout this study, the depth dimension of human experience integrates all the above moral motivational

dimensions. There is no reason to believe that it cannot be activated at any point in life, bringing about the moral elaboration of the above dimensions in adulthood.

In fact, one case in my US sample, which has not been discussed in detail, the case of Cathy, seems to represent an example of a person caught in the midst of a transition from primarily self-protective and self-interest oriented motivation to increasingly moral and spiritual redefinitions. It remains to be studied to what degree and under what circumstances such personal transformation may lead to a shift from a non-CC to a CC pathway.

Interplay of Moral Motivation and Structural Development in the Formation of Levels of CC

One of the important outcomes of this study is the understanding of CC not just as a particular way of being, but as a life-long pathway. When we think of CC, it seems easiest to imagine it in its advanced, fully developed form, as combining enlightened critical discernment, insightful introspection, and creative moral agency. The goal of this study has been to describe its contextual evolution along its main components, bringing together Neo-Piagetian and Vygotskian understanding into an integrated model.

This research project has hypothesized and illustrated the lifespan interaction between the moral motivational component and the composite structural developmental component, in producing what has been tentatively suggested

as a CC pathway of development. As we saw in the rich empirical data, CC does not come in one form, and is not limited to particular expressions. It is a multifaceted way of being with a unique configuration in every person who exhibits it. The differentiation type analysis (Soltis, 1978) showed that CC evolves along three levels: **PRE-CC, CONVENTIONAL CC, POSTCONVENTIONAL CC**, described through individual cases in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Each level is the synergistic outcome of the interaction between the forming and growing moral motivation, and composite structural development. Hence, each level negotiates a substantially different range of tasks, concerns, and limitations.

The level of **PRE-CC** is the time when the intuitive moral sense and developmental potential interact with family contexts and education in a way that leads to the **development of a moral motivation**, which dominates the forming sense of self and self-interest. The centrality of moral interest seems to provide a challenge to the developing social-cognitive capacities of the young person, and fosters critical discernment, which, in turn motivates further moral dialogue with one's world around questions of moral authority and responsibility. When the qualitative moral developmental transformations reach the point of a formal operational understanding of causality and social patterns, and a differentiated sense of self, the ground is laid for the emergence of **CC**.

The level of **Conventional CC** continues to negotiate the earlier themes of moral interest, authority, and responsibility, in the context of **growing critical discernment**, **moral introspection**, and **moral agency**. The establishment of meaningful and wholesome relationships within an ever-expanding social radius becomes central, and develops in the direction of the formation of a social consciousness concerned with social justice and equity. The main achievement of this level is the birth of **problematizing** and dialogical relationships with social reality.

Conventional CC grapples with many contradictions, stereotypes, and prejudices, as well as limited permeability. Their successful progressive shedding depends on the strength of moral motivation, and on the degree to which the spiritual potential to integrate self and morality has been activated. This period reveals glimpses of the prefiguration of principled moral, social, and philosophical vision.

The level of **POSTCONVENTIONAL CC** represents the **formation of CC proper**, i.e. **a social consciousness disembedded from, and able to deconstruct, its immediate social mileau, engaged in a progressively expanding critical moral dialogue with its socio-historical world**. There is a progressive expansive reconstruction of the meaning and

purpose of life, and principled philosophical, historical, and global vision evolves.

This is a period of gradual integration of moral motivational dimensions and emerging paradigmatic understanding into an activated depth dimension of existence. With it, we see the advent of **integrated and interconnected personhood**, which shows **no compartmentalization of public and private concerns**, and a **consistent moral agency across domains**. The CC pathway culminates in what Freire (1973) describes as emancipated subjects, rather than objects, of history, able to "perceive epochal themes", and "act upon the reality within which these themes are generated" (p. 5).

Conclusions from the Current Study

In terms of the specific research questions, with which this study began, I conclude as follows:

1. The main components of CC are moral motivation and composite structural development. The criteria for the emergence of CC are:

(a) The formation of the four dimensions of moral motivation: (1) moral sense of identity; (2) sense of personal moral authority, responsibility, and agency; (3) empathic concerns with relationships, with justice and not hurting, and permeability to meaningful social

relationships; (4) search for truth and meaning in life, and related self-reflection and critical discernment.

(b) The formation of formal operational understanding of causality and social patterns, and a differentiated sense of self.

CC evolves throughout the lifespan along the above 4 moral motivational dimensions and 3 structural developmental dimensions.

2. There are three levels of qualitative transformations in consciousness which allow individuals to experience and conceptualize progressively more adequately the need for social change. They are Pre-CC, Conventional CC, and Postconventional CC, and they have been described in detail in the previous section. Briefly:

People exhibiting **Pre-CC** negotiate concerns with authentic external moral authority, personal moral authority and responsibility, and emerging sense of agency. These concerns are negotiated mostly in the person's immediate interpersonal environment, and in concrete situations. Social responsibility and moral commitment are expressed mainly around concrete issues in one's daily life. The language used to describe them is global and undifferentiated, frequently naive, and sincere. The achievement of this level is in the ability to impact others as a model of moral agency in concrete situations. The

limitation is that the person has difficulty understanding social patterns and has to rely on stereotypes and conformist ways, which often contradict his/her morally motivated and emotionally decentered person-to-person ways of being. These contradictions will eventually foster cognitive decentering, but in the meantime are experienced as overwhelming and confusing in terms of concrete choices.

People exhibiting **Conventional CC** negotiate concerns with expanding moral and social responsibility, the implications of growing social consciousness, and possibly political action. These concerns are negotiated within a growing radius of meaningful social relationships, and with a growing sense of agency. Social responsibility and moral commitment take the form of positive social work within the exiting system, as well as social activism, which seeks legal ways to address specific forms of social injustice. The language people use to talk about their commitments is earnest, perhaps idealistic, revealing a sense of awe, rather than casual and cliched. The achievement of this level is the liberating understanding of social patterns, and the resulting ability to problematize, begin to shed stereotypes, and make informed personal choices. An accompanying achievement is the birth of true self-reflection, which allows one to monitor more consistently the integrity of one's choices. The limitation is that the person is still embedded in his/her social-cultural reality,

and not fully empowered. S/he still has to struggle with the interpersonal pressure of ideologies, as well as with contradictory pulls.

People exhibiting **Postconventional CC** negotiate concerns with principled social and political vision, and possibly philosophical and global expansion. Social, moral, and spiritual commitments become increasingly integrated. The achievement of this level is the ability to deconstruct social reality, disembed from one's social milieu, and engage in a progressively expanding critical moral dialogue with one's socio-historic world.

The limitations of this study have not allowed a more detailed and rigorous exploration of the specific transformations within each level of CC. This remains the task of future research.

3. This project has been able to identify tentatively some important contextual conditions for the formation of CC, which have been reviewed above. The study was not designed to answer this question definitively but to generate insights and potentially testable hypothesis. One important finding that can lead to new hypotheses deals with the centrality of moral discourse and modeling as early organizers of experience. Its potential to foster the development of the intuitive moral sense into moral motivation, as well as to stimulate cognitive decentering

and critical discernment, may need to be investigated further in longitudinal studies. Related to this finding is the hypothesized importance of the presence of figures of authentic moral authority in a person's life. Last but not least, this study seems to suggest the importance of activating the depth spiritual dimension of experience as a way of tapping a distinctive source of energy which can liberate and transform a person into a moral agent.

The cross-cultural sample illustrated the strengths and limitations of two different cultural and socio-historical environments in fostering CC, reviewed in detail at the end of chapter 8. The secondary data on Gandhi's life explored a third cultural and socio-historical context with regard to its impact on the formation of CC. In addition, each vignette explored the possible impact of a different micro-culture within the cultural-historical contexts of the US and Bulgaria on the evolution of CC. In this way, the study has illustrated multiple pathways in the ontogeny of CC related to different personal, social, cultural, and historical contexts.

The conclusion from the cross-cultural study is that neither one of the contemporary US and Bulgarian contexts is more conducive to the development of CC. In all the life stories, I heard accounts of slightly different coping strategies in the face of a general lack of CC in a world of global transition. The Bulgarian interviewees related a

character-building past of rich and contradictory history, which has given most of them a sense of rootedness and personal moral authority, and some of them critical discernment. Yet, few seemed equipped with the permeability and larger frames of reference needed to meet an indefinite and swiftly changing future. I encountered a general apprehensiveness and sense of helplessness, a tendency to hold on to traditional thinking and the patriarchal past, and in more educated people, a middle ground expressed in existential resistance.

The US interviewees related the same conflict between past, present, and future, expressed in more polarized reactions of either utmost social alienation and compartmentalization, or reckless activity and activism. The nature of US society, established fairly recently and out of a concoction of cultural traditions, seems to account for the lack of rootedness in history and past, and people's extreme reliance on individual courage and self-sufficiency. The clash of individual interests in this very individualistic culture seems to lead to seeking solutions in the extremes of political conservatism or liberalism. CC seems to be as much a goal rather than a reality in the US, as it is in Bulgaria.

The overall conclusion with regard to contextual conditions for the formation of CC is that not many people seem to learn from their contexts how to negotiate a

balanced, permeable approach to the future, guided by moral agency. The two cultural contexts manifest different variations of the same difficulty with frames of moral and spiritual meaning larger than the self. This appears to be the fundamental challenge for most of the intelligent and caring people I interviewed. By highlighting the strengths of each culture, which can be drawn on, the cross-cultural comparison can lead to possible future hypotheses about the optimal cross-cultural middle ground where new solutions can be sought.

4. I believe this study has illustrated the fact that CC is indeed an alternative kind of consciousness, while on the same continuum with familiar noetic development. However, this project was not designed to investigate in detail the interrelations between familiar noetic development and the CC pathway, but rather to offer exploratory insights.

Implications for Future Research

Since this study has formulated a new psychological construct, it opens the door for a broad range of new research questions. Some of them pertain specifically to the need for further exegesis of the construct of CC; others concern broader ramifications.

Specific Further Research Questions

The descriptive, exploratory nature of this research, and the wealth of insights it has generated, will require further hypothesis-testing studies. The specific questions for future research grow out of the research questions which guided the present study. In review:

1. This study identified areas of developmental growth, namely social-cognitive and ego development, which bear on CC. However, there is no single model that speaks to the developmental component of CC. I have found pertinent the models of Weinstein & Alschuler (1985), Kegan (1982), Commons (1990), Cook-Greuter's (1990) revision of Loevinger, and Wade's (1996) integrated account of noetic development. There is a need to explore the fit between these and other existing developmental models and the phenomenon of CC, elaborate further the composite developmental component, and establish a formalized way to assess it.
2. There is also a need to develop a way to evaluate moral motivation along the dimensions and criteria established in this study. An important research question is how we can assess the predominance of moral over expediency concerns in a person's overall motivation. Another related research question would be how to assess the degree to which moral concerns are central in each of the four motivational dimensions, identity, responsibility and agency, relationships, and the meaning of life.

3. A separate research question involves the need for more stringent research on the interplay between moral motivation and structural development, which produces levels, and possibly stages of CC. Since CC is not reducible to moral motivation, but is a synergistic product of the interplay of moral motivation and structures of thought, there is a need to develop a rating protocol which can formalize the testing of levels and stages of CC.

4. There is also a need to design longitudinal studies, as distinct from the kind of snapshots to which I was limited in the present study, in order to focus specifically on the necessary and sufficient contextual conditions for the development of CC. Further research needs to pursue the exploratory insights gained through this study.

5. Research is needed to explore further the nature and early onset of the intuitive moral sense.

6. There is a need to study the interaction between the intuitive moral sense, and values discourse and modeling as early organizers of experience.

7. Research needs to bring better understanding of the distinct energy which moral motivation seems to release into development of consciousness.

8. Further research is also needed to test the generalizability and universality of the construct of CC across different cultural contexts.

9. This study has tentatively suggested that the CC pathway may represent not just an alternative but a more optimal pathway for the development of adult social consciousness. Specifically designed research is required to study further this hypothesis.

10. A related research question concerns the possibility for people to shift from a non-CC to a CC pathway at any point in life. Under what circumstances and as a result of what kinds of personal transformation that might be possible is yet another exciting future research question.

Broader Research Questions

Morality

The current study suggests the need to study morality as something more than the outcome of social-cognitive development and the accompanying evolution of moral reasoning. The central empirical claim of this research concerns the relative independence from structural development of the centrality, as opposed to the peripheralness or absence, of moral concerns in a person's life. The study found a centrality of essentially self-transcending universal moral values in the lives of CC individuals, and a moral motivation which appears to grow out of an intuitive moral sense, present in every person's life, when it is continuously redefined in terms of universal moral values.

This moral motivation has been found to range from strictly ethical to spiritual concerns. In the case of predominantly ethical concerns, the self-transcending element is implicit in the orientation toward the common good, whereas in the case of spiritual concerns, the self-transcending aspect is explicitly held as a value. In either case, the self-transcending nature of moral motivation, grounded in universal human values, raises the question about the need to re-integrate the discourse on universal moral and spiritual values into the study of life-span development.

The study seems to suggest that the ego-transcending nature of moral motivation brings to structural development a distinctive energy, which foreshadows the complete evolving of ego-transcending motivation with Authentic consciousness (Wade, 1996), and in this way serves to spur structural development in that direction. That may account for my observation that each stage of CC appears to operate with the optimal capacities of the developmental range of that stage, and in that sense foreshadows the next structural developmental stage. Such an understanding also accounts for the particular agency and resilience, faith and fortitude of CC individuals. Clearly, this is a significant theoretical question which will require extensive research.

Conventional developmental theories converge in describing the evolving of ego-transcending motivation with

Authentic consciousness as the peak of human development (Wade, 1996). Recently, some developmental theorists have begun to explore self-transcendence, as the culmination of mature adult development, in terms of the insights it may be able to offer into "a more comprehensive, integrative perspective at both the individual and collective levels" (Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1994, p. xvi). Transcendence is understood as "the conscious apperception of an underlying unity of life" (p. xvii).

Overall, the human capacity for self-transcendence has so far been studied theoretically mostly as a higher order developmental ability (Miller & Cook-Greuter, 1993). However, the secondary and some of the primary empirical cases reported by this study suggest that we may be underestimating the human potential for self-transcendence early in life, and its capacity to interact with structural development. There seems to be no reason why the study of transcendence should be relegated to the far reaches of adult development. Although the full developmental capability for it does not evolve before postconventional thought, we seem to have ample evidence of both the possibility for, and the power of transcendent frames of reference earlier in life.

This study pulled together compelling converging theoretical and empirical evidence of the power of self-transcending universal moral values to foster the intuitive

moral sense early in life. Research needs to explore further the phenomenon of the activation of the depth dimension of human experience (Marcuse, 1989), and the distinctive energy it seems to release into the life-span, as reported by some of the cases in this study and other research. There is also a need to study the ways in which this capacity may interact with family, educational and other environments to produce moral motivation.

Related to this is the need to study further the nature of the intuitive moral sense and the degree to which it might represent the potential human capacity for self-transcendence, expressed albeit incompletely, early in life. It is the tentative understanding of the current study that this intuitive moral sense may well be the human spiritual potential awaiting to be developed.

These questions pose a significant challenge to the general discomfort of rigorous academic research with issues of spirituality. They highlight the need for interdisciplinary integration in beginning to connect the rigorous exegesis of the CC pathway with a second order of questions, which arise in the course of the above examination.

The Need for an Interdisciplinary Noetic Approach to the Study of Consciousness

The findings of this study highlight the need to place the understanding of optimal adult social and personal development in an interdisciplinary noetic context. The

study of how people's thinking about the social world undergoes progressive reorganization with the evolving knowledge of social configurations and patterns, and the evolving understanding of one's relatedness to them, needs to be carried out with a recognition of the relation of the discourse on CC to current historical macro-discourses in other noetic fields such as religion, philosophy, etc. As chapter 1 points out, the construct of CC has macro-developmental significance as the evolutionary antidote of the myopic adaptation of the human species. The capacity for CC liberates the individual from the narrowly adaptive lock of the present, and allows him/her to live with one foot in the future, actively transforming that present into a better future. In this sense, CC is an important aspect of social intelligence which cannot be adequately understood from the point of view of a single branch of social science.

As pointed out in chapter 3, this work joins a diverse body of research in recognizing that questions about optimal human development can no longer be answered, or even constructively explored without an epistemological shift past scientific compartmentalization and myths of "objectivity" (Aull, 1988). Perhaps it is time for psychology to explore further the possibility and power of a noetic approach which unites the discoveries of science with the insights of religion in understanding the nature and essential characteristics of human consciousness.

> The long-standing conflict between science and religion arises from the disagreements of corrupt religion and arrogant science. Science is the system of knowledge that allows humanity to understand material existence, and religion the system of knowledge that assists it to understand its own spiritual nature. That there is any inherent disagreement between the two is a claim for which there is no real basis. Moral behavior is an expression of man's spiritual nature in the realm of material existence; therefore, moral education calls for collaboration between religion and science (Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992, p. ii).

I consider such questions of interdisciplinary integration particularly important, because I share the view of Adorno (1967), Jacoby (1975), Vygotsky (Wertsch, 1985), and many other social thinkers in the past century, that psychological study cannot truly contribute to social and human transformation unless it explores the relationship between psychological phenomena and the society, culture and history of which they are a part. It is important to note that such noetic integration has already begun (Abdullah, 1995; Wade, 1996).

Potential Implications for Educational Research and Practice

In view of everything said so far, further educational research will need to consider current efforts to develop an integrated moral curriculum, based on the ideal of oneness, and relying on the universal teachings of all the world's religions and the writings of great thinkers in the East and West (Taafaki, 1986; Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992; Bushrui, 1996).

The main question which, I believe, comes out of this study, is: What does education for critical consciousness involve? What kind of transformation in family education, schooling, and the nature of social institutions would foster the formation of strong and tolerant moral identity and character, and promote moral agency and CC in this age of global transition?

In order to highlight possibilities for future educational research, it seems pertinent to review briefly the research questions which arise from the current understanding this study offers of the dimensions of moral motivation, and their centrality in the ontogeny of CC.

Identity

An important research question is whether **helping every person develop rootedness in a sense of his/her inherent nobility as a spiritual being** may overcome the counter-tendency to build one's sense of identity around transient and questionable social configurations.

As the empirical data, in convergence with other literatures, suggested, rootedness primarily in class, race, gender, national or other group belonging builds a sense of identity in the context of fear, anxiety, and social competition. In contrast, as we saw in the cases of Gandhi, Paul, Emily, and Jim, a person's socialization can be mediated by a recognition of his/her own spiritual nature, its potential for love, mercy, kindness, service,

generosity, and justice, and the power of moral behavior to express that spiritual nature (Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992). Spiritual self-understanding seems to lead naturally to a striving to develop spiritual qualities (virtues) of character, and in this way seems to release the human potential.

Exposure to explicit moral discourse and consistent moral induction around values such as trustworthiness, purity, kindness, courtesy, respect, which constitute the universal spiritual thread that runs through all the world religions (Taafaki, 1986), may be important contextual factors. Clearly, such possibilities deserve serious further investigation.

Authority, Responsibility, Agency

The development of discernment of and respect for authentic moral authority in others, and the gradual evolving of personal moral authority and responsibility, is, as we saw, dependent upon the presence of figures of authentic moral authority in one's life. The empirical data shows that most people have few such figures, if any, in their lives. How can this current reality be changed given the contemporary fabric of social life, the general shrinking, and even disintegration, of core family units, and the pervasive debunking of authorities of the past?

There is a general outcry amongst both young people and adults for authentic moral authority, different from

hypocritical, self-righteous, and moralistic pseudo-religious authorities, and from equally hypocritical, alienated, and ideological secular intellectual authorities. The literature which explores this crying need is abundant (Abdullah, 1995; Bellah et al, 1985; Rutstein, 1994; Wilshire, 1990).

The overall problem seems best summarized in Coles' (1995) account of his encounter with an earnest and disillusioned Harvard student, quitting her college education, and "fancy, phony Cambridge", because she found no answer there to her burning question: "What's the point of *knowing* good, if you don't keep trying to *become* a good person?" Her heartbreaking account of the experience of "the disparity between intellect and character" in academia (Coles, 1995), parallels on a personal level what has been extensively explored as The moral collapse of the university: professionalism, purity, and alienation (Wilshire, 1990).

As the cross-cultural sample in this study showed, authentic moral authority is the meeting ground of the best of traditional character-building values, with the best democratic ideas of the progressive movement, without the stereotypes of the first, and the disorientedness of the second. It is not a battle ground between liberals and conservatives, or between religious and secular approaches

to contemporary social reconstruction. Its spiritual essence unites these opposites and integrates dualistic polarities.

As Sorokin (Maslow, 1959) points out, the most influential people in human history have been spiritual teachers, who have formulated eternal moral principles, and become models of "sublime, unselfish love" (p. 10). **No human being**, regardless of economic or family background, **need be deprived from an education which develops intimate understanding of** the teachings of these, and other female and male **models of transcendence** throughout human civilization. The paths of all the CC individuals, examined in this study, show that being exposed to, and engaged in dialogue with, the authentic authority of world spiritual teachings is a powerful way to help a person recognize and develop his/her own moral authority, responsibility, and eventually agency. It may be a significant contribution to educational practice to explore further such possibilities.

Relationships

One of the fundamental challenges in this dimension of moral motivation seems to be the experience and recognition of interrelatedness. As we saw in the cases of Jim, Emily, Suzie Valadez, Mother Waddles, Gandhi, **relatedness can and needs to be taught**, and may be best learned in an authentic spiritual environment which practices it on every level. It appears logical that the fostering of a spiritual sense of

identity would facilitate the recognition of and respect for one's oneness with the rest of humanity.

> The development of the moral structures of a new age implies a profound change in the conception of essential relationships: between man and nature, among individuals and groups, within the family, and between the individual and social institutions (Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992, p. 8).

At the dawn of our transition to a global civilization, the overcoming of racial, class, gender, and other stereotypes is the ultimate test of true relatedness. It may be most effectively taught through the principle of the oneness of humanity (Rutstein, 1993). Such an approach

> enables each individual to feel as one part in an organic whole and to realize that injury to any part results in injury to all, that one's accomplishments are built on the sacrifices and achievements of others, and that one's own fulfillment lies in the welfare and happiness of one's fellow human beings. Awareness of these truths helps delineate the beginning of a path that will lead humanity out of the conflicts that have characterized relations between individuals and groups in every society throughout the world... Moral action is infused with the feelings of love, harmony and kindness that can only be engendered by an unshakable belief in the unity of humankind (Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992, p. 7).

Ways to **develop an understanding of what it means to be in a relationship with the world** need to become the focal point of future educational research.

Meaning of Life

The empirical data revealed the limiting, undermining impact of self-referential frames of reference and limited personal goals in the lives of most interviewees. Hence the importance of **teaching a greater, self-transcending purpose**

in life, which helps the growth, transformation, and well-being of the individual and society (Noguchi, Hanson, Lample, 1992). The question for further research, then, is what kind of education **fosters the independent and interdependent investigation of truth and reality**, and the establishing of larger, self-transcending frames of reference.

A hypothetical conclusion from the current study is that moral and spiritual education may be the way to open and activate "the depth dimension of human existence" (Marcuse, 1989b, p. 281), by teaching self-transcending moral motivation long before the structural capacity for complete transcendence has fully evolved. This may be an approach to education for CC. Further research from the point of view of an integrated noetic paradigm is needed to shed more light on these possibilities.

In conclusion, the CC developmental pathway leads toward a historically and globally responsible citizenship, the understanding of which has become particularly important at the present juncture in history, when our global interconnectedness and interdependence are becoming increasingly evident, and their recognition is our only way of solving the global problems which confront us. As the First International Dialogue on the Transition to a Global Society, held at the Landegg Academy in Switzerland in 1990 under the auspices of UNESCO, acknowledged, in our social

evolution we are heading toward a planetary civilization. It will be characterized by the emergence of a world community, the consciousness of world citizenship, and the founding of a world civilization and culture (Bushrui, Ayman, & Laszlo, 1993). The *emergence of a global human consciousness* able to confront the challenges of our times requires "the integration of our public and private institutions - and, in fact, *the integration of our public and private selves*" (Bushrui, Ayman & Laszlo, 1993, p. 3). I believe that means that such a process requires education for critical consciousness.

APPENDIX A

CONSENT FORM

US Social Responsibility Study (Colby & Damon) Version

The nature and purpose of this research have been satisfactorily explained to me, and I agree to participate in the study. I understand that I am free to discontinue participation at any time if I choose to do so, and that the investigator will gladly answer any questions that arise during the course of the research. I also understand that any information on me will be identified by a subject number rather than my name, and the list of names and numbers will be kept in a separate file so that my participation will be anonymous. In agreeing to participate in this interview, I am also granting permission to Dr. Anne Colby and her research team to use the data I provided in the telephone interview and follow-up surveys conducted by the Harvard Medical School. I understand that if I am interested in receiving a report about the research, the investigators will be happy to share their findings with me at the end of the study. The interview is expected to take about three hours, and I will receive a check from Harvard University for the agreed-upon payment.

I have read the above statement and agree to participate in the study.

_____

Signature Date

_____ _____

Name (print) Social security number

_____

Home address

_____

I give my permission for Dr. Colby to allow selected other researchers to use the interviews and other data from this study (without names attached) for further research after the initial analyses are complete.

___ yes ___ no

Bulgarian Critical Consciousness and Social Responsibility Study (Elena Mustakova-Possardt) Version

I volunteer to participate in this qualitative study and understand the nature and purpose of this research. I understand that:

1. I will be interviewed by Elena Mustakova-Possardt.

2. The interview will take up about three hours.

3. I will be paid $40 for participating.

4. The questions will address various areas of my life, such as work, family, political convictions, etc, since the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the main concerns and priorities at midlife.

5. The interview will be tape recorded to facilitate analysis of the data.

6. I am free to participate or not without prejudice, as well as to discontinue participation at any time if I choose to do so.

7. My name will not be used, nor will I be identified personally in any way or at any time. Any information on me will be identified by a subject number, and the list of names and numbers will be kept in a confidential file by Elena Mustakova-Possardt. I will, therefore, not be exposed to any risks as a result of participating in this study.

8. I give permission to Elena Mustakova-Possardt and other researchers to use the interview data from this study (without names attached) for further research after the initial analysis is complete.

9. A copy of the proposal for the study will be available to me upon request, and the final results will be part of Elena Mustakova-Possardt's dissertation, which will be available for public use.

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Researcher's Signature	Participant's Signature
Date	Date

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW FORMAT

Interview Questions for Colby & Damon's (1994) Social Responsibility Study

I. Begin with McAdams life story interview.

1. Life chapters. Divide your life into its major chapters and briefly describe each chapter.

2. Critical events. Describe one peak experience and one nadir experience.

3. Significant people. Describe two of the most important people in your life story.

Were they people that you felt you learned from in important ways? If so, what did you learn from them?

What person or people you have known or just known about do you admire the most? For each, why do you especially admire that person?

(Optional probe - Do you see yourself as similar to that person?)

II. Major domains of social responsibility.

1. Work for pay

Do you work at a job, for pay? What do you do? How long have you been doing that? What did you do before?

Is the work you do important to you personally? Why?

What do you get out of working? (What kinds of rewards do you get from your work?)

What has been important to you about your work; what have you liked; what has been hard about it?

What are your goals in relation to your work?

Do you feel that other people you work with share the same goals?

What kinds of things make it difficult for you to reach your goals?

How does your work relate to your sense of who you are as a person?

What kinds of sacrifices does your work require you to make?

How do you keep going on your work in the face of difficulties?

If you won the lottery or something like that and didn't need to work for financial reasons, would you keep working at the same or a similar job? If not, what would you do?

2. Family responsibilities

Have you had responsibilities for raising children?

What have been the biggest challenges and rewards in raising your children?

What have you done in raising them that you have felt especially god about, not so good about?

(If children are grown:) Are you at the present time still involved in doing things for your children? Please describe.

Have you taken responsibility for anyone else's children over any extended period of time. Please describe.

Have you had major responsibility to care for an ill or aging parent or other relative? Describe. (Ask even if the parent/relative is deceased.)

Do you have plans regarding elderly parents (or in-laws)? What would you do if your parent(s) (or spouse's parents) could not take care of themselves? What about siblings?

What, if anything, are you called upon to do for your relatives, like brothers or sisters, nieces, nephews, in-laws, or others in your extended family? (For example, direct care, shopping, visiting, living with you, lending/giving money, providing financial support on regular basis, etc.)

How would your relatives describe the way you are (the role you tend to play) in relation to the family? What would they approve? What would they be critical of? What do you feel proud of? What do you feel badly about?

Do you have friends or neighbors that you do things for? (help with their kids, help with errands and chores, lend things they need, lend money, listen and provide emotional support, take food, etc., when they are sick or someone in

their family dies, etc.) Would you like to do less or more of this kind of thing? Do you feel that you ought to be doing more in this area?

How do the things you do for your immediate family, other relatives, and friends or neighbors relate to your sense of who you are as a person?

What kinds of rewards are there in doing this activity?

What kinds of sacrifices do you have to make? What kinds of things make it difficult for you to reach your goals in these areas? What problems do you experience in this?

How do you keep going on in this in the face of difficulties?

(If they bring up specific sacrifices) Do your spouse, children, or friends support your involvement in these activities?

3. Volunteering and donations

Have you ever done any volunteer work, working for a group or organization, etc. without being paid?

What kind and amount of volunteer work are you doing now?

What is the history of your involvement with volunteer work? What got you into it? Over time, did you get more or less involved? What led you to become more or less involved?

How do these activities relate to your sense of who you are as a person?

What kinds of rewards are there in doing this kind of unpaid work?

What kinds of sacrifices do you have to make? What kinds of things make it difficult for you to reach your goals in these areas? What problems do you experience in this?

How do you keep going in the face of difficulties?

To what extent have you worked with other people on these things? (other individuals, groups, organizations)

Do your spouse, children, or friends support your involvement in these activities?

Do you ever contribute money to charities, church, organizations like the PTA (Parent Teacher Association),

public radio, your college or university, etc? Which ones? How much? Why those? Are there others you would especially like to support if you had more money to give?

Did your parents contribute money, do volunteer work, get involved in political activities, etc?

4. Political involvement

Do you think of yourself as a politically involved person? If not, why not? Has the idea ever appealed to you? If the idea does appeal to you, what has kept you from acting on it?

To what extent do you study/come to understand the issues on the local, state, and national levels? How do you do that? Give examples.

Do you vote in local, state, national elections? How regularly?

Are you involved in other political groups, organizations or activities, for example having to do with local issues like the schools, the environment, and so on?

Have you ever worked in a campaign, for a candidate or an issue? Have you given money to a political candidate or campaign?

When and how did you become involved in this activity? Describe history of involvement.

How do these activities relate to your sense of who you are as a person?

What kinds of rewards are there in doing this kind of activity?

What kinds of sacrifices do you have to make? What kinds of things make it difficult for you to reach your goals in these areas? What problems do you experience in this?

How do you keep going in the face of difficulties?

To what extent have you worked with other people on these things? (other individuals, groups, organizations)

Do your spouse, children, or friends support your involvement in these activities?

Can you think of a political issue that has come up in the past year that you really care about (either local,

national, or international)? What is it? What are your beliefs about it?

III. Moral judgments and dilemmas

I want to ask you a few questions about how you think about morality and moral dilemmas you may have experienced. People mean different things when they use the words moral and morality. When you use the word morality, what do you mean by that? What comes to mind as most important?

Can you tell me about an incident in your life where you weren't sure about the ethically or morally right course of action? How did it become clear to you what to do?

Do you ever feel a conflict between what you want to do and what you feel would be morally right to do? How often? What usually happens in this kind of conflict? Do you wind up doing what you want to do or what you think is morally right?

What does the phrase moral courage mean to you? Would you say that when you faced the difficulties you described you demonstrated moral courage? Were there times when you think you were a coward?

From the moral point of view, what are the things you have done that you feel best about?

Again, from the moral point of view, what are the things you have done or failed to do that you feel worst about?

IV. Community

Are there some groups or communities to which you feel connected, people you spend time with, they do things for you and vice versa?

Could you describe what they are like, what kinds of things you do with the other members of the community, what, if anything, you tend to do for each other?

Give history of involvement in most important communities, and current meaning and activities.

(If they don't mention church or other religious group or things that they become involved with through their children, or work-related communities, neighborhood-related activities, ask about these.)

(For the most important community the person describes, or two or more communities that are very salient in this person's life:)
What kind of thing is required of you to be a good, responsible member of that group? To what extent do you feel you are a good, responsible member of that group?

Are there ways in which you haven't been as responsible a member of that community as you might have been? (What have you failed to do as a responsible member of that community? Is there anything that you would like to do differently?)

What things do you like about the community? What things don't you like?

What leads a person to be especially respected within that community?

Can you describe a particular incident when you feel you didn't come through, you failed to live up to what was expected of you as a member of the group or failed to live up to what you expected of yourself?

V. Religion or personal ideology

Please describe in a nutshell your religious beliefs.

How do your religious beliefs relate to your sense of yourself as a person?

Please describe how your religious beliefs have changed over time. Have you ever experienced a period of rapid change in your religious beliefs?

Do you belong to a church, synagogue, or other religious community? In what ways do you participate in the activities of the church, etc?

VI. Postlude

Why did you agree to take part in this interview? Are you glad that you did? Why or why not?

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